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THE GRAVEST 366 DAYS



DAY BY DAY

WITH

THE EDITORS OF

THE EVENING MAIL

The Gift of Friends

19

17



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THE GRAVEST 366 DAYS

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MARCH 15, 1917

"We will never bring disgrace to this our city by any act of dishonesty or cowardice, nor ever desert our suffering comrades in the ranks. We will fight for the ideals and sacred things of the city, both alone and with many; we will revere and obey the city's laws and do our best to inculcate a like respect and reverence in those above us who are prone to annul or set them at naught; we will strive unceasingly to quicken the public's sense of civic duty. Thus in all these ways we will transmit this city not only not less but greater, better and more beautiful than it was transmitted to us."

—Oath of the Young Men of Athens

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**Editorials in this book
that express the viewpoint
of Mr. S. S. McClure bear
his signature.**

PREFACE

The year since September, 1915, has been the most momentous in our history since the Civil War. All in all, it is probably the most vital year in the history of this world in which we live.

In the year since September, 1915, great changes have occurred in our national life. Great problems have pressed, and still press, for solution. We have with us Mexico, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, to say nothing of the vast duty of preparing and nationalizing America. Peace is coming. We must cast the weight of America, for America, into that great equilibrium that will be called peace terms. And after peace, what?

No administration, Republican or Democratic, can solve these problems alone. In a democracy the determination of the nation's destiny may seem to be in the hands of its government. In reality, if the people be awake, that government's action can be nothing but an echo of the people's will, which we call public opinion. But there can be no clear voice of public opinion, the composite of our individual wills, unless we clarify our own opinions on these great matters. Out of muddy, careless thinking by the citizen will come muddy, careless policies by the nation.

America today needs preparedness, above all the preparedness of intelligence. No citizen dares shirk the duty of honest thinking.

The editorials, here reprinted without alteration, represent the stand which the *Evening Mail* took upon the great issues of the present and the future—our stand as taken on the days when those issues arose.

Only the question of international policies which were acute in the year September, 1915, to September, 1916, are treated. Hence the omission of the vital problem of Belgium.

September 24, 1916.

Causes of the War

WHOSE IS THE GUILT FOR THE EUROPEAN WAR?

BY S. S. McCLURE

The Danger Spot in Europe; Data on the Mobilization of Russia

On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey put his finger on the danger spot in his dispatch to the English embassy in Berlin:

"I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it. The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia."

Sir Edward Grey also wired to Sir F. Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, July 24, 1914:

"Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation."

In fact, when the history of this war is written by a dispassionate historian, it will be seen that Sir Edward Grey saw more clearly than any other statesman the inevitabilities of Austria's note to Serbia.

The Czar to the Kaiser:

"Evidence about the commencement of partial mobilization in Russia is still further confirmed by the

telegrams of the Czar to the Kaiser on July 30, when the former replied to the latter's request to demobilize his forces by saying that the 'military measures now coming into operation were decided upon five days ago.' This would mean that they began on the 25th, and so confirms the previous evidence."

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914:

"The sudden, brusque and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other."

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, July 25, 1914:

"Apparently we shall now soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this should happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia (should be Italy) and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them."

The British ambassador at St. Petersburg as early as July 25 warned the minister of foreign affairs that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time

to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once.—*British White Paper*, July 25.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris, July 29, 1914:

"As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable."

On July 29 the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Temps* telegraphed that "mobilization is proceeding in Kieff, Odessa, Vilna, Warsaw and St. Petersburg." The last three military areas are in the region of the German frontier.

Telegram from the Kaiser to King George, July 31, from the "Nord - Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20:

"Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals agree with my ideas and with the information which I have received to-night from Vienna and which I send on to London. I have just learned through the imperial chancellor that he has received the information that the Czar this evening ordered the mobilization of all his army and navy. He has not even waited for the result of the intervention on which I have been engaged and has left me entirely without information. I am going to Berlin to take measures for the safeguarding of my eastern frontiers, where numerous Russian troops have already assembled."

Von Bethmann-Hollweg in Reichstag, July 31:

"The Russian government destroyed through its mobilization,

menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets, just as it was on the point of succeeding."

The St. Petersburg newspapers for August 1 published the following official statement, which definitely announced the time and place of assembly for the reservists, in the following words:

"His majesty the emperor decrees herewith that the army and navy shall be brought to a full war footing. First day of mobilization, July 31, 1914."

Summarizing these dispatches, it may be said that the decision of Russia to mobilize partially was taken on the 24th, directly after presentation of the Austrian note to Serbia. This was confirmed on the 25th, and during the week-end all military preparations except the calling up of reservists were made, and partial mobilization orders were signed but not issued.

British White Paper, July 31:

"Von Bethmann-Hollweg told Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador to Germany, that he could not leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and that if military measures were being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quietly. The chancellor added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request."

Speech of the Imperial Chancellor before the German Reichstag on August 4, 1914:

"Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France—a war that has been forced upon us. * * * From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict we declared that this question must be limited to Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end in view. All governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in the settlement of this matter.

"Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war all over important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.

"Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization."

DIPLOMACY MOTHER OF WARS

A glance at the workings of European diplomacy in a single phase of the present great struggle discloses the part which the errors of diplomatists have played in the series of events that have culminated in this super-war.

At the congress of Berlin, in

1878, Great Britain, with the backing of Bismarck and of Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, imposed a veto upon the task which had been accomplished on the battlefield by Russia. This task was the creation of an independent Bulgaria, to include Macedonia and the province known as Eastern Roumelia. Britain opposed the carrying out of the treaty of San Stefano, which gave sanction to the creation of a strong state, uniting the entire Bulgarian race, on the ground that a great Bulgaria would operate, in effect, as an advance post for the Russian march to Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

The new Bulgaria was dismembered at its birth. A small tributary principality, under the suzerainty of Turkey, was created along the southern bank of the Danube. Eastern Roumelia was constituted an autonomous province under a Turkish governor. A feat of diplomacy was undone in 1885 by the people of Eastern Roumelia, who erased the frontier which chancellors had drawn, and joined their blood-brothers of the Bulgarian principality. Macedonia was thrust back under the full power of Turkey, under paper guarantees of reforms which never were put into effect.

The first Balkan war constituted an attempt by Bulgaria, in alliance with its neighbors, to accomplish the task of driving out the Turk which had been achieved by Russia and nullified by the congress of Berlin. If there had been no treaty of Berlin, there would have been no first Balkan war. If there had been no first Balkan war, there would have been no second Balkan war for the division of the territory which

had been assigned to Bulgaria under the treaty of San Stefano.

One of the immediate results of the second Balkan war was the rise of Serbian nationalism, stimulated by the Serbian successes in that conflict and reinforced by Russian activities at Belgrade. Out of that nationalism rose, as history now has duly recorded, the spark that set the world on fire.

When some understanding and dispassionate mind of the future shall have summed up in their true relation the events that brought on the monstrous period through which the world is passing, the terrible balance of criminality will be found to lie, not in the passions of peoples, but in the blunders of diplomats—blunders that have deluged Europe with the blood of its strongest, its noblest, its best.—*Nov. 18, 1915.*

A VOICE FROM RUSSIA

"If Prussian militarism is destroyed, if that evil thing which has darkened all our lives is destroyed, as I most firmly believe it will be destroyed, I think some measure of disarmament may be possible. It should be quite possible for, with England and Russia friends, the rest of the world is safe."—Sergius Sazonoff, Russian minister of foreign affairs, in an interview with a correspondent of the *London Chronicle*.

A remarkable statement by a remarkable statesman. Once more the world is asked to believe that it was Russia's abhorrence of militarism that caused her to draw the holy sword—the sword upon which is inscribed the motto "S' nami Bog," "God is with us." Once more the

world is asked to believe this oft-reiterated fiction in spite of the fact that at the outbreak of the war Russia had an army of 1,384,000 under the colors, and Germany only 870,000; in spite of the fact that in the past generation Russia has waged two great wars of her own provocation, one with Turkey and one with Japan, and had sought the third until she found it; in spite of the fact that the entire Russian administration, from top to bottom, is and always has been a military administration, with a truly military disregard for individual rights, and with Cossack whips as implements of government.

And now, with the hated Prussian militarism as the object of Russia's righteous wrath, M. Sazonoff points piously to the time when the world will be "safe." It will be "safe" when Russian militarism, the greatest militarism the world ever saw, and British navalism, the greatest navalism that the world ever dreamed of, stand side by side as the protectors of "the rest of the world."

Truly, unfathomable is the hardness of Sergius Sazonoff and measureless his contempt for the intelligence of the "rest of the world"!—*Feb. 24, 1916.*

FRONTIERS

Much of the loyalties, the loves, the hopes, the hatreds and the aspirations of the world have been concentrated since history began along imaginary lines drawn on the map. Nations have shed rivers of blood to shift a frontier or to prevent its obliteration. The fate of empires has been staked upon the

effort to extend a frontier; vast dominions have fallen asunder like a child's house built of blocks, because of the failure to prevent the violation of a frontier.

Now a frontier is a purely imaginary line. The soil on either side of this line is apt to be the same. In many instances the population is approximately the same. And yet to the traveler who knows history the crossing of a frontier is an act which appeals to the imagination. It is an act which evokes a vivid realization of a difference of ideals, of a diversity of aims, of a conflict of interests.

Wherein lies the magic meaning of this imaginary line? Why do men die in hosts in an endeavor to preserve it? Why are the annals of the human race largely a record of the shifting of frontiers?

A man's identity is his most precious possession. An attempt to suppress that identity is an attempt to obliterate the personality which that identity represents. In defense of that identity a man will sacrifice life itself. The identity, the continuity of a nation is as enduring an instinct as the identity of an individual. The nation, like the individual, will offer the ultimate sacrifice on the altar of that identity.

The problem of frontiers is complicated by geographic, commercial, racial and military considerations. The original frontiers were those of race. It was natural that there should be a limitation of intercourse between peoples of differing speech; hence the line of contact between them also became a line of division. Then, in the course of time and the migration of peoples, a confusion of this simple and automatic demarcation arose. A con-

flict developed between racial, geographic and strategic divisions. Because of this confusion Europe has weltered through centuries of international anarchy.

England has thrown her commercial and political frontiers far beyond her racial boundaries. Russia, by a series of absorptions, has flung her line across Europe and Asia to the Pacific. France, in the course of the past century, has shifted her boundaries southward across the Mediterranean into the heart of Africa.

Russia and France, like England, have spread out territorially far beyond the extent of their respective races. Russia, politically and commercially, has become largely an Asiatic power. France has become to a great extent an African power.

Of all the great powers of Europe, the political frontiers of Germany alone coincide to a marked degree with her racial boundaries. With a population of more than 65,000,000 and a growing birthrate, to Germany alone of all the great European states has been denied an adequate expansion overseas except in the least desirable part of Africa.

There is an inequity which history has bequeathed to Europe, and the struggle of to-day is the inexorable struggle for readjustment. Should Europe at the end of this war still deny to Germany a more approximately fair relation between her racial frontiers and her commercial and political boundaries, the signature of the treaty of peace will be only the portent of a still greater war to come. The history of Europe will continue to be the annals of a chronic conflict over imaginary lines.—*May 12, 1916.*

THE ANGLO-GERMAN TREATY OF 1914

By S. S. McCLURE

On adjoining columns of this page I publish the terms of a treaty which, if consummated, would have removed the hostility between England and Germany. The other data and documents I publish are to be found in any well constructed history of the diplomacy of 1914.

I came across this treaty by chance. One of my fellow passengers on my journey to Constantinople was Dr. Jaekch, an expert on European Turkey and Asia Minor, and he knew of this treaty because he had helped prepare it.

During my stay in Constantinople I spent one evening with the German ambassador, Count von Metternich, who had been the German ambassador in London for many years and had worked in hearty collaboration with Sir Edward Grey to remove the causes of friction between England and Germany. He confirmed the accuracy of the data I had secured from Dr. Jaekch and expressed a very high opinion of Sir Edward Grey and his work to establish friendly relations between Germany and England.

On my return to Berlin, I at once took the document containing the terms of the treaty to the Foreign Office. I was anxious, first of all, to have it absolutely confirmed by the highest authority, and, secondly, to get permission to bring the material with me to America. I was successful in both respects.

I then showed the document to the American ambassador, Mr. Gerard, who deemed it of sufficient importance to have a copy made and sent to the State department at

Washington. This was particularly reassuring to me, as it might not be possible for me to get any papers past the British blockade.

So far as the authenticity of this document is concerned, I have the very highest German governmental authority. On the English side I quote from "The Diplomatic History of the War," by M. P. Price, of Trinity College, Cambridge, published in the autumn of 1914 (Charles Scribner's Sons).

The assassination of the crown prince of Austria-Hungary, the immovable and implacable stand of Austria-Hungary against Serbia, as expressed in the note to Serbia, the ensuing negotiations combined with mutual dread and distrust, resulting in war, prevented the signing of this treaty.

It is a fair deduction from the nature of the treaty, and from the success of the previous similar British treaties with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, that had no such serious event as the assassination of the crown prince occurred during 1914 there would be an entente among the nations now at war that would have rendered war unlikely for many generations.

The important thing is that early in 1914 there were no irreconcilable differences between England and Germany. The pacific tendencies of both governments are obvious. Von Bethmann-Hollweg is regarded in Germany as above all a pacifist.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg's strong desire for the maintenance of the peace is indicated by his notable speech in the Reichstag last Monday. The speech is thus referred to in a dispatch by the Associated Press:

Berlin, June 5, 1916.—One of the most stirring passages from the speech came when the chancellor replied to a pamphleteer's charge that in the opening days of the war he had believed England would have remained Germany's friend, or at least neutral, and that he had wasted three days parleying with England, three days which meant an enormous prolongation of the war because the first blow was not struck promptly enough.

"I know that my attempts at an understanding with England," said the chancellor, "are my capital offense, but what was Germany's position prior to the war? France and Russia were united in an indissoluble alliance. There was a strong anti-German party in Russia and an influential and growing section in France which was urging revenge and war. Russia could only be held in check if the hope of English aid was successfully taken from them. They would then have never ventured on war. If I wished to work against war I had to attempt to enter into relationship with England.

"I made this statement in the face of the development of an English policy which was hostile to Germany and of which I was entirely cognizant. I am not ashamed of my conduct, even though it proved abortive. He who on that account charges me with being the cause of the world catastrophe, with its hecatombs of human sacrifices, may make his accusation before God. I shall await God's judgment calmly."

This passage caused a tremendous sensation in the house and it was repeatedly interrupted by loud cheering.

All Germany regards Von Bethmann-Hollweg as a pacifist, and it is universally believed by his supporters and by his opponents in Germany that he postponed the declaration of war for two or three days, hoping with England's co-operation to prevent war.

In my interview with the chancellor he told of the overwhelming mass of evidence, official and private, in regard to the Russian armies that compelled him, in self-defense, to declare war.

Germany may have misinterpreted the acts of Russia. The government of Germany did not feel justified in taking the risk of a Russian offensive. I believe that in those hurried days the implacability of Austria-Hungary caused mutual fear in Europe and that this mutual fear or dread caused the war.

I publish above his defense before his opponents in the Reichstag, for endeavoring to preserve peace in July, 1914. He has been charged as in part responsible for the Russian invasion of East Prussia.—*June 8, 1916.*

THE IMPENDING ENTENTE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND GERMANY, JUNE, 1914

By S. S. McCURE.

Terms of the Treaty

There were many indications of a growing friendliness and mutual confidence between England and Germany and Germany and France for a year or two prior to July, 1914.

In April, 1913, Von Bethmann-Hollweg declared in the Reichstag:

"With England we are on the best footing, we have gone hand in hand

with her in the present crisis, and in spite of Great Britain's membership of the triple entente, it is very advisable to aim at a peaceful agreement with the British empire in the future. The language of the British statesmen is altogether conciliatory and peaceable."

Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch on July 30, 1914, to Sir E. Goschen, British ambassador at Berlin:

"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved."

Finally in his statement to the Reichstag, August 3, 1914, just the day before England declared war, Von Bethmann-Hollweg said:

"Shoulder to shoulder with England, we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even, as late as the 30th of July, forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Serbia, i. e., after her march into Serbia."

It will be remembered that the last interview between the British ambassador at Berlin and the imperial chancellor refers also to the improved conditions between England

and Germany. Sir E. Goschen, British ambassador in Berlin, writes to Sir Edward Grey on August 5, 1914:

"I found the chancellor very agitated. He said: 'All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards.'"

"As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy that saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years."

A more definite statement as to the basis of good feeling between England and Germany is to be found on pages 44 and 45 of "The Diplomatic History of the War," by M. P. Price, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, published, 1914, by Charles Scribner's Sons:

"But in spite of the failure of the political and naval negotiations, in spite of the Morocco crisis and the ever increasing pressure of armaments, Anglo-German relations sensibly improved after the Balkan crisis of 1912, when the two countries co-operated for the settlement of the Albanian question. It appeared, in fact, about this time that a change in Anglo-German relations was about to take place on account of mutual interests in the near East. Indeed, an Anglo-German agree-

ment over spheres of influence in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was being prepared and was to have been signed in the autumn of 1914. Such an agreement would have settled all outstanding questions between the two countries in the East, it would have given Germany her place in the sun, and might have laid the seed of an understanding in Europe which would have included Germany in a European concert and put an end to the system of power-balances."

On March 2, 1916, during my journey to Constantinople, I learned the terms of the treaty referred to by M. P. Price. I submitted the data I had secured to the Foreign office in Berlin on my return to Germany early in April, and I print herewith the provisions of this treaty as finally given to me by the Foreign office in Berlin and which Price states was to have been signed in the Autumn of 1914.

The Anglo-German Agreement of 1914

Anglo-German agreement, June, 1914, which was drafted and already initialed by the members of the conference. It would have satisfied Germany for decades without endangering the British empire:

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is definitely left to German capital in co-operation with Turkey. In the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working will not be hindered by England.

2. Basra becomes sea harbor in the building of which German capital is concerned with 60 per cent. and English capital with 40 per cent. For the navigation from Basra

to the Persian gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to.

3. Buweit is excluded from the agreement between Germany and England.

4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is interested with 50 per cent., German capital with 25 per cent. and Turkish with 25 per cent.

5. The oil wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be developed by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at 50 per cent. by England, at 25 per cent. by the German Bank, at 25 per cent. by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irrigation works there had been intended a similar understanding. The rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, the English government is concerned, remained unaffected. This society exercises south of Basra, on the Schat-el-Arabia, as well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the production and transport of oil.

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand to French capital for the construction of railways in southern Syria and Palestine

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with the following repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozambique.

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which established the political predominance of France in Morocco, but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" as to the trade of all nations.

England's Similar Treaties with France and Russia

1. England and France.

After several years of acute hostility between England and France a treaty was concluded April 8, 1904, by which the conflicting claims of England and France in Egypt and Morocco were satisfied, and all causes of European conflict removed later by the Algeiras conference and other negotiations. Later the interests of Germany were recognized and the Anglo-French agreement became part of the law of Europe.

2. England and Russia.

The hostility between England and Russia was acute and of long duration.

A convention signed August 31, 1907, settled the differences of the two nations on the continent of Asia. By this convention their respective interests in Persia were definitely settled. Agreements were also made as to Afghanistan and Thibet.

The result of the agreements with France and with Russia was to remove long-existing and dangerous conditions that might easily have caused war.

There was no motive for war in 1914 on the part of either Germany or England. That England worked ably and whole-heartedly to preserve the peace of Europe is obvious to the most casual student of contemporary historical documents and data. It is claimed by some writers that Germany conspired with Austria to bring about this war, that Germany was behind Austria in sending the extremely provocative note to Serbia and that Germany did not exercise a restraining influence over Austria. There is nothing in the printed dip-

lomatic documents to bear out this idea, and if we take the beliefs of contemporary observers we must come to the opposite idea and conclude that Germany no more than England wanted war. Let us consider:

Did Germany Know the Nature of the Austrian Note to Serbia?

I give herewith what the Berlin correspondents of English newspaper and other newspapers said at the time and statements from governments.

London Times:

Berlin, July 24.—“The severity of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia has caused surprise here. I understand that the German government was not aware of the details or of the tone of the note, although it had received confidential information as to its ‘scope.’ The extent of the demands to be made to Serbia was, however, left entirely to the discretion of Vienna, and advice was neither asked for nor offered officially. Far less has Germany encouraged Austria-Hungary to go to extreme lengths. The note has therefore caused surprise, and the Chauvinists, of all people, are indignant that Berlin was not asked for advice and was not given full details of the Austrian demands.”

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office,
July 25, 1914.

The German ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign office saying that his government had not known beforehand,

and had had no more than other powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back.

Die Post (Berlin):

Berlin, July 25.—“Every sentence is a blow of the fist in the face of the Servian government. We fully understand and appreciate the deep indignation and the incurable pain which dictated these sentences. But we must still ask ourselves once more: On what does the Austro-Hungarian government really base these serious accusations?”

Daily Telegraph:

Berlin, Sunday Night, July 26.—“It has been suggested that Germany is in part responsible for the contents and tone of the Austrian note. She has even been accused of occasioning or at least inspiring that document. This imputation she absolutely repudiates.”

Manchester Guardian:

Berlin, Monday, July 27.—“Clearly, Germany was unaware of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented. I am assured on reliable authority that the government disapproves the excessive sharpness of the tone employed.”

Westminster Gazette:

Berlin, July 29.—The belief expressed in some English newspapers that Germany and Austria planned the crisis with Serbia in order to bring on a “preventive war” with the dual alliance is ridiculed. The crisis is directly traced to the Sarajevo assassinations, without which Austria would probably have nursed her other grievances with Serbia for years.

The “*Berliner Tageblatt*” statement that “*Wilhelmstrasse*” saw the ultimatum only “at the last minute” is taken as correct.

Did Germany Try to Restrain Austria?

All the diplomatic dispatches indicate that Germany endeavored to moderate Austria's position. In my interview with Count Apponyi he said:

“So far from pushing Austria-Hungary to war, Germany put every pressure on her in order to avoid it. But for Emperor William's strong, at a given moment, almost comminatory advice, Austria-Hungary would have insisted on the principle that no power, least of all Russia, had any right to step in between her and a neighbor who constantly intrigued against her tranquility and safety. These are well known facts, established by unimpeachable documentary evidence.”

From the Rheinische-Westphalische Zeitung, July 26.—

“It is really ridiculous for the people of Vienna and Budapest to imagine that Europe and our whole planet have given them the sacred mandate to avenge the dead archduke.

“Unluckily, it would be the German army that would be charged with this task. It is scandalous that our government should not have demanded to be minutely informed of the details of the Austrian demarche before it was made.

“We ought to declare to-day that we are not obliged to aid Austria in its policy of conquests. We have nothing to gain in a war against Russia.”

Berlin Correspondence Daily Chronicle:

Berlin, Monday, July 27.—“There is no doubt that the German government ardently wishes that the conflict may be localized.

“Germany undoubtedly wants peace, but her view of the situation is that Austria cannot now withdraw a step before she has obtained full satisfaction from Serbia. Any attempts toward securing peace that leave this point out of the question will be cordially supported by the German empire.”

Cologne Gazette:

Tuesday, July 28.—“The desire of the western powers to avoid through timely action the extension of the Austrian quarrel with Serbia will not only be gladly entertained, but the Berlin cabinet is ready in more than one capital to work through mediation for the maintenance of European peace. One may congratulate oneself that through the initiative of Sir Edward Grey the idea of mediation has been taken up officially and is being only discussed.”

Daily News:

St. Petersburg, Monday, July 27.—“The breathing space secured by the friends of peace, headed by England and Germany, has perceptibly relieved the situation.”

Bethmann-Hollweg to German Ambassador in Vienna:

Berlin, July 30, 1914.—“We are indeed ready to fulfill our duty. As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness.”

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.—“German ambassador informs me that German government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance farther while powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.”

Reuter's Agency:

Thursday, July 30.—“Reuter's Agency in London circulated on July 30 the following from a well-informed source:

“Despite any idea to the contrary, Germany is doing her best to prevent a European outbreak. Her position must, however, be taken into account. She cannot, as is supposed in some quarters, bring pressure to bear upon her ally to stop all action, but she has been giving, and continues to give, good advice to Vienna.

“It would be useless to disguise the fact that the partial mobilization of Russia has made the situation as regards Germany, and particularly Austria, more difficult.”—
June 8, 1916.

Russia's Mobilization as Recorded by Correspondents

From the St. Petersburg Correspondent of the London "Post."

“As a matter of fact, Russia took steps for mobilization the moment

the Council of Ministers decided last Friday (July 24) that the sovereign status of Serbia must be protected at all costs."

The St. Petersburg correspondent of the London "Times" regarding a conference held the evening of July 25:

"At the close of the meeting the Czar, speaking of the Austrian note to Serbia, is said to have exclaimed, 'We have stood this sort of thing for seven and a half years. This is enough!' Thereupon his majesty authorized the issue of orders for a partial mobilization confined to the fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. At the same time an intimation was given to Germany that orders for the mobilization of the remainder of the Russian army would follow immediately upon mobilization in Germany."

Here are the developments in Russia July 24 and 25:

From "Le Temps," Paris.

"After the meeting of the Council of Ministers it was decided that mobilization orders should be issued immediately for the army corps at Odessa and Kieff. The energetic intervention of the war minister, Gen. Sukhomlinoff, created a great impression."

St. Petersburg Correspondent London "Daily News," July 26.

"The crisis will become acute later in the week, when the mobilization of the Kieff, Warsaw and Vilna military contingents will be in full swing—which lie directly on the German frontier."

The clearest forecast was made by the Paris correspondent of the London "Telegraph" on July 28, as follows:

"The one certain thing is that if Austria goes beyond a certain point in her attack upon Serbia, Russia must and will intervene. That means an invasion of Galicia by Russia, with Roumania almost probably attacking next door. That means Germany compelled, not only by treaty but in self-defense, to take up arms for Austria. The first stroke in the defense of Austria by Germany must, of course, be an attack upon France. The German plan is a violent and sudden attack upon France, after which, it being assumed that the attack is overwhelmingly successful, Germany will just be in time to turn round upon Russia, always slow in her mobilization.

"Finally, all this means the British fleet making a swift dash to annihilate the German. In short, the conflagration once lit, no one knows where it will stop."

The "Daily Chronicle" correspondent at St. Petersburg July 28 said:

"Already a rapid mobilization is proceeding in the west and south-west, virtually from the German frontier to the Black Sea."—*June 9, 1916.*

HOW WAS WAR POSSIBLE IF ENGLAND AND GERMANY WERE AGAINST WAR?

By S. S. McCLURE

My interviews with Count Tisza, Count Apponyi and Baron Burian and other Austrian and Hungarian statesmen first made me realize that this was really an Austro-Hungarian-Russian war, when I visited Budapest and Vienna.

I was often told that Count Tisza was the real author of the note to Serbia which caused the war. Some

would say, "Yes, we caused the war and we are proud of it." Others would say "That note to Serbia was meant to make war. Serbia had to be punished."

In my interview with Count Tisza and his associates I went right to the heart of the question:

"Why did Austria-Hungary send such a peremptory note to Serbia with a forty-eight-hour limit?"

"Because," they said, "the intrigues and aims of Serbia threatened the existence of the empire."

"But why the forty-eight-hour limit?"

"Because we knew Serbia, knew that nothing but such a demand would bring a reply. Without such a time limit no satisfaction could be secured. Twice before we had to mobilize our armies at an expense of \$80,000,000 to \$100,000,000 each time, putting a heavy burden on our national budget. The situation had become intolerable and dangerous, and finally Serbia had plotted to murder our crown prince."

"But did you not know," I asked, "that Russia would certainly intervene?"

"It was none of Russia's business. It was a private matter between Serbia and us. What would America think if Japan intervened in your Mexican trouble?"

"Yes," I said, "let us admit that it was none of Russia's business. Still, did you not *know* that Russia would make it her business?"

They replied: "We thought the chances of Russia's interfering were about fifty-fifty, but that whatever the consequences we must remove the Serbian menace"

I asked if they did not realize that if Russia came in all Europe would be involved. The reply was:

"It was none of Europe's business. Europe must interfere at her own risk. Our situation was dangerous and intolerable. Because Serbia was a small state we had been very patient, but when our crown prince was assassinated we felt we must put an end to the whole Serbian danger."

The manner of the Hungarians that I saw was even more convincing than their words. Some of the officials gave the impression of men under an obsession. To them the Serbian trouble of two years ago was the most terrible thing in the world. Just as the Irish question seemed the most difficult problem in the world to English statesmen, so to Austro-Hungarian statesmen the center of the world was the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the safety of the empire the most important thing in the world.

(I have been in many countries. I know of no nation whose views about itself differ much from this.)

Count Tisza is one of the most powerful and forceful statesmen in Europe. He is a great sportsman, noted tennis player. He has fought thirty duels, one when he was premier of Hungary. When I was told by well-informed people in Budapest and Vienna that he was the real author or at least the inspiration of the note to Serbia it seemed probable that he was.

Count Apponyi is one of the most noted men of Hungary. I was received by him in his library. On the wall was a portrait of Roosevelt.

"You see," he said, "in spite of Mr. Roosevelt's being against us, I still keep his portrait."

Afterward Count Apponyi visited me at the hotel. The important part of my interview with him was

revised by Count Apponyi himself, and it was as follows:

"The work of this permanent conspiracy against our territorial integrity and safety was darkened by a series of attempts (four in number within a few years) against the lives of valuable Austrian and Hungarian government agents, the crowning deed of which has been the assassination of Archduke Francis, heir presumptive to the Austrian and Hungarian throne, and of his wife at Serajevo.

"While negotiations were still pending the order of general mobilization was issued at St. Petersburg, though Germany had warned Russia that such an order would amount to a declaration of war, since no power could risk the chance of a conflict with Russia except by forestalling the actual mobilization of her enormous masses."

Baron Burian, the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, said to me:

"Russia was using Serbia as a torpedo to wreck the Austro-Hungarian empire."

A distinguished diplomat explained the situation to me as follows:

"Austria has many Irelands or Mexicos on her borders. The very existence of the empire was threatened by Serbia, backed as she was by Russia. We had reached the utmost limit of safety."

After spending nearly two weeks in Austria-Hungary I understood how utterly implacable and unrestrainable the government of the dual monarchy was in its attitude toward Serbia.

The point now to consider is well

stated by the Italian historian Ferrero:

"Why was it that on July 29, all of a sudden, less than twenty-four hours after the chancellor had made his excellent peaceable proposals to the English ambassador, the imperial government requests Russia to stop mobilizing against Austria, when Austria did not yet feel herself threatened by these Russian preparations and did not complain of them?"

The answer is to be found in the newspaper correspondence and diplomatic documents in the adjoining columns.

On July 24 Sir Edward Grey said:

"Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action. * * * Once the Austrians had attacked Serbia it would be too late for any mediation."

Sir Edward Grey was right and the story as told in the accompanying documents shows how fatefully and inevitably the war came just as he so frequently pointed out in his wise and splendid efforts to preserve peace.—*June 9, 1916.*

FIGHTING FOR STEEL MARKETS

In the London *Outlook* of July 8 is an illuminating article on "Lorraine and German Metallurgy." It is a call to England to see that France gets back Lorraine because this would destroy the German steel industry and leave Great Britain a free hand in the export field. It is shown that Germany before 1871, when Lorraine was acquired, was rich in coal but poor in iron ore.

Take away her iron ore, and her iron industry is gone.

Figures are cited to show what England has lost and what she must regain.

In 1860 the world consumed only 7,000,000 tons of cast iron, and England supplied half of it. France only produced 1,000,000 tons, the United States 800,000 and Germany 700,000.

In 1913 the various countries producing pig iron ranked as follows: United States, 31,000,000 tons; Germany, 19,300,000; Great Britain, 10,500,000; France, 5,300,000. England, beaten in her production of pig iron, was to suffer a graver defeat still in her steel.

In 1913 England exported 3,000,000 tons of steel products, Germany 4,500,000; but in 1900 that same Germany had only exported 1,600,000, and as far back as 1890 only 86,000 tons.

One by one England's metallur-

gical positions were wrested from her by the Germans.

The Outlook calls upon Great Britain to remove the Germans from Lorraine and regain the steel trade of Europe.

It is a striking illustration of the solid basis of fact that must be behind Great Britain's championing the cause of smaller nations. The history of Ireland, the Boer republic, Egypt and Persia must make it clear that small nations per se are not indiscriminately championed. The designs upon German metallurgy are a specific instance of that principle which the London *Times* of March 8, 1915, proclaimed in such classic form:

In this war England is fighting for exactly the same kind of reasons for which she fought Philip II., Louis XIV. and Napoleon. She is not fighting for Belgium or for Servia, for France or for Russia. They fill a great place in her mind and her heart, but they come second. The first place belongs, and rightly belongs, to herself.

—August 7, 1916.

Issues of International Law

FOREIGN SUPPLIES OF ARMS

Much stress is being laid upon the necessity of preserving for our nation the possibility of getting arms from oversea in war. It is declared that for us to cease our exports of arms to belligerents now would be to create a precedent which would be turned against us when, in our time of need, we call on foreign countries to send us the implements of war.

The danger is that this talk will delude people into thinking that they can depend on the oversea world to help when war bursts upon us. Nothing is farther from the truth.

When war comes, if we command the seas, no enemy can land on our shores, and we shall need to have no arms or ammunition sent us. If our fleet does not command the seas, the enemy will command them and confiscate any arms sent to us, no matter how much money we have to pay for them, and no matter what precedents we keep alive in this war.

Our safety is not in keeping alive this or that precedent. Our safety is a navy able to keep at arm's length any sea power in the world.—*Feb. 10, 1916.*

TO ELIHU ROOT

By JOHN W. BURGESS

Mr. Elihu Root is reported to have said in his address to the state con-

vention of his party in Carnegie Hall, February 15, that at the time of the entrance of the German forces into Belgium all the parties to the war were parties to the fifth Hague convention of 1907. Mr. Root ought to know about that, since he was secretary of state of the United States—that is, the chief diplomatic officer of the government—at the time. Nevertheless, as an old student of international law and the history of diplomacy, older even than he, and interested scientifically in getting at the exact truth in this matter and every other matter of history, I am compelled to call his statement most respectfully in question.

According to Mr. James Brown Scott's work on "The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907," published in the summer of 1915, two of the parties to the present war have never ratified this convention, viz., Great Britain and Serbia. Mr. James Brown Scott was the secretary of our delegation at The Hague convention of 1907 and is an accurate scholar, having scientific interest in the truthfulness of his statements.

Now, the German troops entered Belgium on August 4, 1914. Serbia was a party to the war on and after July 28 preceding. Great Britain declared war formally against Germany on August 4, a few hours after the entrance of the German troops into Belgium, *but she*

had two days before this, according to the statement of Sir Edward Grey in No. 148 of the so-called "British White Paper," assured France that she would enter the war as France's ally in case of war between France and Germany, and France was a party to the war before the German forces entered Belgium.

Thus two of the parties to the war, Serbia and Great Britain, the one both formally and actually, the other practically, if not formally, were *not* parties to the fifth Hague convention of 1907 at the moment when the German forces entered Belgium. This fact abrogates this fifth Hague convention altogether during this war, because the 20th article of the convention declares:

The provisions of the present convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention.

Moreover, it must be remembered that in ratifying this convention the government of the United States laid down the express condition that nothing contained in the convention should be construed as requiring the United States to interfere or entangle itself in or with the political questions of foreign states or to relinquish its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.

So far as I can comprehend the issues and events, the claim of Mr. Root that this country was obligated to interfere in the conflict between Germany and Belgium, and his criticism of the administration for not having done so, have no foundation of any kind, least of all any legal foundation.

I am a Republican of the first generation, an older Republican than

Mr. Root himself. My Republicanism began on the battlefields of the civil war. My first vote was cast for Gen. Grant for President and I have never in my life voted for a Democrat for anything. I have also thought that it might have been the better policy for this country to have recognized Huerta as president of Mexico, and I have felt sure that if the administration had forced Great Britain, from the start, to respect our rights of trade with neutrals and in non-contraband with Germany and Austria-Hungary, there would have been no submarine warfare on merchant vessels.

Nevertheless, I was not prepared for such a reckless, unfounded assault upon the policy of the administration from so responsible a source. As a Republican it has grieved me most deeply, and as a loyal American I cannot view this effort to influence the country to abandon its peace and neutrality and plunge itself into the cost, sufferings and horrors of war under such pretexts as anything short of an indifference to the interests of our own country which is positively appalling.

If the Republican leaders have no better principles than this platform of folly, hate and destruction to offer to the Republican voters, then I for one am done with the Republican party and shall exert every grain of influence I possess to prevent its re-advent to power.—*Feb. 26, 1916.*

KEEPING THE FAITH

America has been ambitious to be the champion of the rights of neutrals in this terrible world catastrophe. It has been our opportu-

nity, and our duty, to keep alive these precedents which are called international law. Of the few nations apart from the conflict, we alone had the power to see to it that, in striving to injure each other, the belligerents did not strike at the lives and property of neutrals, who had no part in making this war and who should not be made its victims.

The belligerents have been fighting in two theatres—on land in their own countries, and on the seas. What happened on land was not of great concern to the neutrals; they had no business getting into the firing zone of the combatants. On the sea it was a different matter. The seas are the joint possession of all nations. Peaceful commerce has a prior right to the use of the seas. This right is modified, and not eliminated, by a state of war between two nations. The progress of international law has been a record of the restrictions of the right of those who choose to go to war to interfere with the trade and travel of those who choose to remain at peace.

This broadening basis for the security of neutral rights was built upon precedents; mainly upon cases where during war time powerful neutrals had prevented combatants from interfering with noncombatant lives and property on the high seas. To Great Britain, as a powerful neutral, the world has been particularly indebted for the maintenance and extension of the rights of the peaceful trading nations. The seas came to be regarded as the highways of commerce, in which combatants came as interlopers.

The old piratical practices of a warring sea power were limited to

definite rights of interference as fixed in the law of blockade, and, when no blockade existed, by the law of contraband. Whoever interfered with a British shipment on the high seas, except as justified by the law of blockade or contraband, was brought to terms and to apology by England exactly as if the wrong had been committed on British soil. Indeed, it had been committed on British territory, for the seas are the joint territory of all nations.

When this war broke out Great Britain was a combatant, and the duty of guarding the freedom of neutral trade and travel—the upholding of international law—fell to the United States. The small neutral countries of Europe, with frenzied belligerents on all sides of them, dared not speak. They looked to us.

We held both England and Germany in the hollow of our hand. England, by her vast purchases of supplies in America, has pawned with us her future. Germany has been convinced that this was a financial war, to be won or lost through financial exhaustion. Nothing has been more apparent than Germany's willingness to go to any length of concession to prevent our boundless financial resources from being allied to the allies. Never did a neutral have so great power, so easy of exercise.

Now at this crisis in our international relations it is worth while to take stock of our achievement. How have we guarded the heritage of international law which the course of events placed in our keeping? At the end of the war will neutral nations feel more secure because of our upholding of their rights, or will they feel that we have

allowed the destruction of all the defenses which had been built for them?

Our professions have been fully on a par with our opportunities. On October 22, 1914, when our first note was sent to England, we said:

This government will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law.

On October 21, 1915, when our last note to England was sent, we said that we unhesitatingly accepted the championing of the rights of neutral nations.

The clearest of all expressions of our intent is in a part of our July 21 note to Germany regarding the *Lusitania*:

The government of the United States and the imperial German government are contending for the same great object, have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, *from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost.*

Those were very brave words of profession. What of our performance? Apart from all passion, prejudice and hearsay, what are the facts of the case as set forth in the record for all to read?

At the opening of the war we asked all the belligerents to adopt the declaration of London as their code of naval warfare. The declaration of London resulted from a convention called at the behest of England, and is a clear codification of the immunities of neutral commerce in war time, compiled by an

international conference in the dispassionate days of peace. The declaration states in its preamble that "the signatory powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law." Germany and her allies accepted the declaration. England and her allies refused; or worse, "accepted" it "with modifications" which made it a mockery.

The British order in council of August 20, 1914, put the severest breach of the war into the defenses of neutral rights. Great Britain in that order practically destroyed the distinction between conditional contraband and absolute contraband. Both these classes were forbidden to move to Germany, and both placed under suspicion if moving to a neutral country adjacent to Germany. The contraband lists were then expanded so as to contain every article of import into Germany except cotton. The right of blockade was exercised without assuming any of its obligations.

Under the operation of this illegal order and its substitute of October 29, nothing but cotton was allowed to enter Germany, and half our shipments to neutrals—among other things, \$15,000,000 of meat products—were haled into the British prize court and subjected to loss and delay upon mere suspicion. We sent no protest against this violation of law—and of the very precedents Britain had established—until December 26, 1914. That protest was an academic one. In her answer to it, dated January 7 and February 10, 1915, Great Britain did not in the slightest degree meet our demands.

The purpose of the British measures was to starve Germany. The Germans in January, 1914, adopted measures for the conservation of grain and flour in the empire, in order to make supplies last until the next harvest. On February 18 the submarine warfare was instituted as a reprisal against Great Britain's starvation measures.

Great Britain then proposed a "blockade" as a retaliation against the submarine warfare. The blockade, so called, was to prevent Germany from exporting anything and from receiving cotton—all other imports into Germany had long since been stopped by the August and October orders in council and the swollen British contraband lists.

Our government saw that these reprisals might be endless. So, for a second time, we invited the combatants back into the limits of law. We suggested that Germany give up her submarine warfare and that England allow food for noncombatant population to proceed to Germany. Again, Germany accepted our offer; again, Great Britain rejected it.

Which of the belligerents is manifestly determined to continue violation of neutral rights in the pursuit of its own ends?

In March, 1915, the blockade was declared, in the face of our protests. We protested again. On March 30, we pointed out that Britain was not in the Baltic and so did not hinder Swedish exports to German Baltic ports like Stettin. Therefore she had no right to interfere with our exports to Stettin. No iota of concession has ever been made to our representations of the illegality of the blockade. No note to England

ever showed that we meant business.

With Germany it was quite different. Our first occasion to speak to her was after the February submarine order. We told her that we should hold the German government to strict accountability for injury done to American vessels or citizens. When the *Lusitania* was torpedoed in early May we told Germany she should not expect us

to omit any word or act necessary to the performance of our sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

Yet we never made any serious move to perform the sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens when England infringed upon them. Our March 30 protest against the blockade was answered evasively by England in July. Not until October 21 did we renew our protest to England, and it was again a literary affair. There was no suggestion of threat in it.

In the meantime the *Lusitania* matter was vigorously pursued. Time after time we were on the verge of a diplomatic break with Germany. We forced from her concession after concession, until at last, in February, 1916, she offered to apologize for sinking the *Lusitania*, to pay an indemnity, to sink no more unarmed liners without warning.

To make sure that German submarines would have no excuse for sinking merchantmen without warning, we have attempted to have England agree not to arm her merchant ships. We contended that any armament is superior to a submarine on

the surface, and the submarine cannot be expected to rise, visit and search unless trading vessels cease arming against the submarine. Mr. Lansing notified the entente powers:

I should add that my government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of the under-seas craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly.

Well, that seemed clear. Berlin, basing on these words of ours, issued a warning that after March 1 she would torpedo all armed liners. If they were really auxiliary cruisers, as we contended, they deserved no warning.

England objects to our procedure and threatens to withdraw her merchant marine from our service if we rule that armed liners are auxiliary cruisers. Suddenly Mr. Lansing reverses himself. He says that he cannot stand by his ruling without the consent of all belligerents: i. e., England. He and the President tell the German ambassador that to kill an American on an armed British liner will mean severance of diplomatic relations between this country and Germany. Congress becomes alarmed at the prospect of a war with Germany because of a German order which we apparently authorized her to make. So Congress threatens the President that it will pass a resolution warning Americans off armed ships.

So the matter stands to-day.

The question of whether merchant vessels have a right to arm for any purpose is a much mooted proposition in international law. Prior to

the declaration of this war it has been a rule with France, Germany and Spain that the arming of their merchantment in times of war made them auxiliary cruisers and vessels of their national navies. Consequently this is not a change of front by Germany. It is uncontradicted that the national laws of the belligerents are not in accord on this subject.

The argument of our government that international law cannot be changed during the progress of a war is of no force, in view of the previous attitude of this government in reference to the blockade. In our note of March 30, 1915, to Great Britain, it is stated:

The government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the old form of "blockade," with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines and aircraft.

In our note of March 5, 1915, to the British government, it is stated:

This government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods of modern naval warfare, particularly in the use of the submarines for both defensive and offensive operations, may make the means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility.

The attitude of our government thus seems to be that we can admit to Great Britain and France that the advent of submarines may cause a change in a fundamental proposition of international law, without asking Germany for its consent to this change, even though such happens to injure the cause of Germany.

On the other hand, in a case where we are "particularly impressed" with the justice of the German position in reference to the advent of submarines, we will not consent to the clearing of a doubtful proposition of international law without the consent of England, if the change would happen to bear heavily upon the allies.

Not only have we refused to take any firm stand against England, but we have refused to aid any one else in so doing. When in November, 1914, Great Britain mined the open North sea, the Scandinavian countries asked us to join them in a protest against this lawless act. We declined. We now decline to join Sweden in a protest against Britain's interference with international mails on the high seas.

We insist on the very letter of the law when it is a question of our right to ship ammunition to the allies. But we insist on neither the letter nor the spirit of the law when it is a question of shipping food to the peaceful inhabitants of Germany. We protest that the "blockade" is unlawful, but we do nothing, and promise to do nothing about it. Thomas Jefferson tells us that there is no difference between our restraining shipments of food to Britain's enemy, and allowing Britain to restrain them unlawfully. Both alike are unneutral acts.

Is all this fair? Is it American? Is it the performance of that even-handed justice which befits a neutral?

Above all, have we kept the faith and fulfilled our trust, to hand down to posterity the full body of international law which civilization has intrusted to us?—*February 29, 1916.*

DUTY OF CONGRESS TO DECLARE REAL NEUTRALITY OF AMERICA

By JOHN W. BURGESS

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*:

Sir—Replying to many questions concerning the submarine controversy between the governments of this country and Germany, I beg to say that, in my humble judgment, the administration has woven around itself such a web of fallacies in regard to the international duties of neutral governments toward belligerents that it has become practically helpless, and that Congress must take the matter in hand, extricate the administration from its self-imposed bonds and set it upon the right track again.

The administration made its first fatal mistake when it declared to the people of this country and to the world that this government could not, in the course of a war, prohibit the manufacture and export of arms and munitions of war without committing a breach of neutrality and thus giving the belligerent which considered itself put in disadvantage thereby a just cause of war upon us.

There is no such principle of international law as this and there are plenty of precedents against this groundless claim. To hold that this government is unable lawfully to prohibit at any time the exportation of anything it chooses from its ports is to deny the sovereignty and independence of the nation which has vested it with the power to regulate commerce without placing any such limitation on the power.

By all the principles and practices of public law this is purely a domes-

tic question. The British government itself, through the mouth of Mr. Gladstone, expressly declared it to be such in the year 1870. We put it on or take it off, said he, in accordance with the interests of our own people. I am unable to understand, and have never been able to understand, how the government of the United States could make such a declaration. Even were it true, it would be the height of imprudence and indiscretion to make it. It certainly has proved itself to be such. It has apparently taken the only peaceable weapon out of our hands, with which we could have forced Great Britain to observe our rights of trade with other neutral countries and with her enemies in non-contraband articles, and has bound us hand and foot to the policy—the war policy—of Great Britain.

Happily, however, our constitution vests in Congress, not the President, the regulation of commerce.

It is Congress, and Congress alone, which can prohibit the exportation of munitions or anything else. It is Congress, therefore, which has the ultimate determination of the question whether the laying on of any such prohibition would be unneutral, and Congress, fortunately for us, has not yet committed itself to any such view as that announced by the administration.

Again, the administration has proclaimed that no nation can change a rule of international law during the course of a war. It might have said that no one nation can change a rule of international law at any time, although Great Britain has been announcing to the world almost every month during

the course of this war some change which she has claimed to make in the rules of international law obtaining at the beginning of the war, and this government has acquiesced in them, either tacitly or under protests so mild as to be ineffective in all really important matters. It is, however, a principle laid down in all text books of international law that a sovereign nation may withdraw itself justly and rightfully from the observance of any so-called rule of international law or even from the express obligations of a treaty when it regards them as threatening to its own life and vital interests.

But this high sounding declaration of the administration about the inviolability of the rules of international law during the course of a war has no application at all to the matter which the administration is endeavoring to make it cover, viz., a warning by this government to its citizens not to travel on the armed merchantment of the belligerents. Pressed to its utmost limits, such warning is only an announcement to our citizens that the government will not be responsible for their safety on such ships, that it will not plunge this country into the hates and horrors of war in order to attempt to avenge the accidents to a handful of inconsiderate, reckless and unpatriotic men, who obstinately insist upon traveling on such ships.

Can any man with one grain of common sense left in his cranium call that the changing by this government of a rule of international law? Where is the rule of international law which requires any government to be responsible anywhere or at any time for the safety of its citizens? There is none and never

has been. That is a question again of a purely domestic nature.

You may call it, if you will, the refusal of the government to attempt to enforce the enjoyment of a customary privilege. But that is just what neutral governments are always doing in times of war. What is the recognition by neutral governments of the right of visitation and search of neutral vessels by belligerents on the high sea, or of the right of belligerents to blockade enemy's ports against neutral commerce, except a refusal on the part of the neutral government to attempt to enforce the enjoyment of the customary privileges, or rights, if you prefer, of its citizens in reference to the freedom of the high sea or of entering the ports of a friendly nation?

The manifest anxiety of the administration to work this domestic power of the government of every sovereign nation over its relations to its own citizens around into some sort of a duty to the belligerents under the behests of international law is the thing of sinister import which no patriotic American citizen dare allow to escape his eye. Stripped of all the sophistries of rhetoric and presented in the full nakedness of its iniquity, it simply means that this government and nation shall acknowledge an obligation to Great Britain, Russia and France to deliver safely in their ports the arms and munitions of war sold to them in this country under the cover of the imperiled persons of American citizens.

This pseudo obligation is termed the right of American citizens, and the maintenance of it is called a question of national honor! Was there ever such folly manifested be-

fore in responsible places? To me such a course of argumentation is making straight for national dishonor. It is making straight also, for national catastrophe. No government dare bruise the intelligence, conscience and the sense of justice, fairness and truth of its citizens by any such legal fallacies. That conscience and that sense of truth will, sooner or later, revolt against such bonds and rend them asunder.

"You cannot fool all the people all the time."

These are the reasons of my conviction that Congress should now take the submarine warfare controversy into its own hands for solution and should at once set aside this fictitious international law which the administration has invented, to the serious impairment of our national sovereignty over our own domestic questions.

Congress, and not the administration, is, under our constitution, the determiner of international law and international obligation for our citizens. The administration, by its erroneous interpretations of both international and constitutional law, has bound itself hand and foot to the policy of Great Britain. It has rendered itself impotent to act freely. Congress, however, is as yet uncommitted, and should, therefore, exercise its full power and authority to save the country from foreign war, which, once entered on, will not in my opinion, cease without a thoroughgoing internal economic revolution, as likely to be destructive as constructive.

Newport, Feb. 28.

JOHN W. BURGESS.

—March 1, 1916.

PEACE OR WAR

Again the issue of the submarine is before the country for decision. In the last analysis, it is the issue of peace or war. There is no evading the gravity of the situation. Certain interests in the United States are urging us towards a "diplomatic break" with Germany. The ultimate outcome of a diplomatic break, with the resulting inflamed feelings here and in the central empires, is war.

America will not evade this war if it is a just one, necessary to protect the vital rights of our citizens and sustain the national honor. No sense of unpreparedness will hold us back; to defend America we can and will make the sacrifices to prepare, even during war. We are not afraid to fight. To-day we face the issue, count and weigh the facts and decide where our honor and our interest takes us.

The State Department gives us the facts upon which to make our decision. The essential facts are contained in the diplomatic correspondence of the first nine months of the war. In those nine months the entire present situation developed. This diplomatic correspondence was published by the State Department in a "White Paper," May 27, 1915. Any American who decides for war without considering the facts which the government thus lays before him forfeits his right to citizenship in a democracy, for a democracy's existence is built on the exercised intelligence of its citizens.

All through these papers the fact stares us in the face that German and British lawlessness cannot be considered separately. Our first

move was to attempt to restrain both the belligerents within the limits of law. On August 6 (page 5 of the "White Paper") we sent a joint telegram to all belligerents asking them to accept the Declaration of London as their code of naval warfare. This declaration was a clear statement of neutral rights of trade and travel. The central empires accepted our proposal (page 5); the allies rejected it (pages 6 and 7). That is, the allies "accepted" the declaration "with modifications." The modifications destroyed the declaration as a document protecting the rights of neutrals. So on October 24 (page 8) we wrote England and withdrew our suggestion that the belligerents operate under the provisions of the declaration, on the ground that, as modified by England's acceptance, it was no longer any protection for us.

Great Britain, however, continued to wage war under the Declaration of London as modified to suit herself. She prevented us from shipping all foodstuffs to Germany, though Britain was maintaining no blockade, and, without a blockade, such stoppage of our foodstuffs exports was contrary to all law and to British precedents themselves. We set all this forth in our first protest to England of December 25, 1914 (page 40). Great Britain, in her answers of January 7 and February 10, 1915, declared her intention of continuing to proceed in the very course we had declared as lawless (pages 41 and 45).

In the meantime Germany, which had learned to become dependent upon America for many foodstuffs and especially fodder—such as cottonseed meal—saw the approach of famine. On January 28 she com-

mandeered flour and grain in the empire for governmental distribution, and issued bread cards to limit consumption. As a retaliation against the British starvation policy Germany announced on February 4, effective on February 18, a submarine campaign which would sink British vessels whenever and wherever found. Neutrals were warned to keep off such ships. Neutral vessels were advised to keep out of the war zone, because the British policy of flying neutral flags put them in peril. All this was communicated to us in the German memorandum dated February 4, 1915 (page 53).

The whole situation looked very grave to us. A German policy had been announced which, added to the British, promised to abolish all neutral rights at sea. On February 10 we wrote to England (page 55) and asked them to stop using the American flag, thus removing any German excuse for torpedoing an American vessel. On February 19 (page 59) Great Britain refused to give up the use of our flag to shield her vessels from submarines.

Dispatches from London indicated that England was going to stop all traffic to or from Germany, as a reprisal against the submarine warfare. So on February 20 we tried for the second time to make both England and Germany return to the limits of law. Both were justifying their lawlessness as an act of retaliation against the other. We proposed to remove the ground for any retaliation. We asked England to let us send food to the civilian population of Germany, and in return we asked Germany to give up her submarine warfare. This was our note of February 20 (page 59). Germany accepted our proposal on

March 1 (page 60); England refused it on March 15 (page 64).

Instead of giving up her lawlessness, England multiplied it. On March 1 (page 61) she declared she would seize all goods moving to or from Germany. It is not pretended that any blockade is maintained; its rights are assumed, but its obligations are evaded. There is no lawful blockade, because all nations are not kept out of Germany; Sweden and Norway trade unhindered with German Baltic ports, for Britain does not hold the Baltic. Therefore it is unlawful to stop our ships moving to Baltic ports. Moreover, our government contends that for us to accede to this illegal British obliteration of our rights is equivalent to a refusal to trade with Germany, and is so a violation of that neutrality which we choose to observe. This is the argument of our note to England of March 30 (page 69).

In the meantime Germany was putting the submarine policy into effect and on May 7 sank the *Lusitania*, an act that shocked our whole people. On May 13 (page 75) we told Berlin in no uncertain terms that we should hold Germany strictly accountable for American lives lost through submarine activities.

This May 13 note is the last in the "White Paper," but the succeeding events are fresh in the minds of all. The State Department ceased to regard German and British lawlessness as joint offenses, tied together by an avowed reprisal policy. Washington ceased to hold to account the prime originator of offenses against us and the one who has twice openly refused to return to law. All our pressure has been exercised against Germany, whose offending began seven months after

England's and who has twice accepted our just request for a joint return to the limits of law. All our notes to England since March 30, 1915, have been argumentative and rather protests against interference with our shipments to neutrals than against interference with our shipments to Germany.

On the other hand, the sternest threats were used toward Germany until in December she let us write a *Lusitania* note that suited us with regard to apology and reparation for the disaster, and guarantees for the future.

While this note was in Berlin being signed, we sent a note to the entente powers asking them to disarm their merchant vessels in order to make possible that visit and search which we had forced upon German submarines as a substitute for indiscriminate destruction. We said in our note that we were inclining to the argument that armed merchant vessels were auxiliary cruisers and so suitable for destruction without warning.

Basing on this note of ours, Germany issued her warning that after March 1 she would sink all armed British merchant vessels. After our note to the entente we cannot logically go to war to avenge American lives lost on what we call auxiliary cruisers.

We already have an answer from the entente. They refuse to disarm liners. In the last two weeks has come a new memorandum from Germany, again offering to return to law if England will, and submitting to us proof of offensive actions by "defensively armed" merchantmen, as the British call them. In the last few days various British ships have been sunk carrying passengers,

among them the *Sussex*, a trans-Channel liner.

Proof is not in yet whether the *Sussex* was sunk by a submarine and whether she was unarmed, unresisting and did not attempt to escape. If all these conditions are true we may, if we choose, go to war over the matter. Germany will probably say that there are bound to be occasional mistakes in sinking "unarmed" British ships so long as Britain refuses America's demand to disarm them all. For a submarine to rise and approach an "unarmed" ship that turns out to be armed is to court destruction.

We can go to war, but there is another way out. It is to recognize the essentially joint character of the British and German issues. It is to compel their joint return to law, which every consideration of even-handed justice dictates and which our own diplomacy has twice suggested. International law is codified in the Declaration of London, which protects us against both illegal blockades and submarines. By a threat of breaking commercial intercourse, followed—if necessary—by war, we can force each belligerent to abide by that declaration.

What do we really want? Does America prefer to go to war to enforce our sense of justice upon one combatant while leaving the other free to violate our rights as it chooses? Or does America choose to recover from both belligerents for ourselves, the peaceful world and the future, the neutral rights of trade and travel which international law has handed down to us?

Which course do honor, justice and interest dictate?—*March 31, 1916.*

THINKING AMERICA

Come now, let us reason together.

To-day America stands face to face with participation in a great war, whose end none can see, whose sacrifices in blood and treasure awe the intellect. A democracy, if it is to exist, is a nation of thinking citizens. Every American is false to his duty who to-day shuns the mental effort of shutting his ears and mind to clamor and prejudice and of thinking straight on these great issues. A chain is as strong as its weakest link. A nation's thought is only as clear and straight as that of the mass of citizens who compose it. Whoever shirks his individual duty of thinking does not thereby fail to contribute to the action of the nation. But he contributes to it the impetus that comes from willful ignorance.

No American chooses to be in this unthinking class. No American need be. The facts in this pending war are all known. The issues lie on the table for all who will view them. The President has told Germany that she must give up her starvation campaign against England, that she must forego wholly the use of submarines against British freight vessels. For to tell Germany that her submarines must emerge, visit and search freighters which Britain refuses to disarm—this is to say that these frail craft must commit suicide. In effect we demand that submarines shall not be used against the carriers of British food supply, and that Germany must give up her attempt to starve England.

But when we turn to the diplomatic papers published by our State department, we find that England began a starvation campaign against

Germany by an order in council of August 20, 1914, two weeks after the war began. We find that England's method of conducting the campaign, barring food shipments to Germany on the sea, was in violation of the very precedents of international law which England had established. We find that our government said this to England in sharp terms on December 26, 1914, and March 30, 1915.

We find when we look for the facts that Germany started her starvation campaign against England by means of a submarine warfare on February 18, 1915, six months after England had offended, and that this submarine campaign, endangering the lives of Americans on British vessels, was fully as great a violation of international law as England's.

Then the thinking citizen turns the pages of the government White Paper and finds that on February 20, 1915, we asked both belligerents to come back to law. England was to give up her interference with our foodstuffs moving to Germany, Germany was to call off her submarines. And, to his amazement, the citizen finds that Germany agreed, England refused. As a joint agreement could not be secured, both continued their evil ways.

The citizen, continuing, discovers that since then all our pressure has been applied to Germany. The so-called British "blockade" (England has never dared to call it a blockade) has tightened. The President now proposes to break diplomatic relations and have war with Germany because she will not give up the use of her submarines.

These, then, are the facts of the case. What is America's duty in the premises? There are three things

which we can do. Two of them mean peace. One of them—so far as human foresight can judge—means war.

First—We can bring both belligerents back to the limits of international law. We can threaten to break off present commercial relations with either belligerent which does not give up his starvation campaign, whose conduct abolishes the established rights of neutrals to trade and travel on the high seas of the world. We can threaten not only present severance of commercial relations with the offender, but we can also levy a penalty tariff against his goods, to apply for a long time ahead. The economic losses, present and future, which would confront either belligerent opposing our demand are such as to insure compliance.

This course would mean peace, and the full restitution of the rights of neutrals on the part of all who violate them.

Second—We can ignore the breaches of international law on the part of both offenders and declare that we are indifferent to what either of them does. We can remove all occasion of conflict with either belligerent, by forbidding our citizens to try to export to Germany, and by warning our citizens to stay off British merchant vessels. Then no matter how many of these ships are sunk by Germany, it could not cause friction with us.

This course would mean peace and the abandonment of neutral rights on the high seas of the world, at least during the period of this war.

Third—We can disregard England's violation of international law, and devote ourselves exclusively to

removing the German offenses. In the unlikely event of diplomatic success in this undertaking we shall have peace and gain the restitution of a part of neutral rights, from one offender, Germany. In the likely event that Germany will not consent to return to the legal limits alone, we shall have a diplomatic break, war, and shall lose all opportunity to act as the defender of neutral rights. We shall render ourselves unfit to act as mediator between the combatants in any way, or to shorten the conflict.

Each sovereign citizen of this democracy decides these issues on these facts. The sum of these reasoned decisions is the final word of the nation.

America should not abandon its rôle as defender of the rights of neutral nations. Never in history has such a call come to a nation as that which this war has brought to us. Let us rise to it and with equal vigor insist that the law of nations shall be respected by both belligerents.

Our President was right when he defined his position as that of "spokesman of humanity." Let him indicate that he intends to enforce international law, no matter from what quarter violated, and the obstacles that now seem so formidable will melt away. Sensible men in both belligerent countries, the conscience and public opinion of the world will support him.—*April 22, 1916.*

"COME NOW, LET US REASON TOGETHER"

The President has America solid behind him when he insists that belligerents observe international

law and the dictates of humanity. That means, in simple English: Germany and England, in their rage to destroy each other, shall not practice indiscriminate highway robbery and murder on the seas. It means that the peaceful nations shall retain their prior right to the highways of the world, and that international bandits shall not lay embargoes upon neutral trade and travel which are not specifically sanctioned by international law. Our demand that the belligerents shall follow the dictates of humanity means that they shall not so use their naval forces as to threaten or take innocent human lives which have no part in the making or prosecution of the war.

These are the principles upon which we stand. Their application to the situation in hand is clear. Both belligerents are transgressing against the commandments of international law and humanity. By our own confession of faith we are pledged to reassert law and compel observance of the rules of civilized warfare.

The German violations of law and humanity are grosser and more palpable; the British, however, may fairly claim that they were first in the field and gave the Germans an excuse for their acts. Two weeks after the war began Great Britain passed an order in council which forbade us to ship food to Germany. No blockade of Germany was maintained, and for England to interfere with food shipments to the German civilian population was against the first principles of international law.

It was also against the dictates of humanity. It was a measure which, if effective at all, would carry famine to the non-combatants of Germany,

for every one knows that the army is supplied first. Indeed, British statesmen confidently expected a civilian famine. On November 9, 1914, Churchill said:

The economic pressure brought about by the navy will spell the doom of Germany as certainly as winter strikes the leaves from the trees.

If this is not inhumane, nothing is. We became involved in the process when our food ships going to Germany, like the *Wilhelmina*, were held up. To some in America the British seizure of the *Wilhelmina* was a mere matter of property, not to be compared with German submarine destruction of life. But the British seizure of the *Wilhelmina* and her food cargo was an attempt on the lives of a thousand German civilians whom that cargo would feed. Nationally, from the American viewpoint, the seizure was perhaps only a violation of a property right. But internationally the seizure was an attempt on life itself. And we, who sit in judgment on the nations and apply international law, must think internationally.

When the Germans, six months after the war began, started their starvation campaign, they prosecuted it in the only way open to them, by using submarines to torpedo merchant vessels without warning. International law requires that a warship—a submarine—shall not harm a merchant carrier until it has visited and searched her. Then, if the merchant ship is found to have a cargo more than half contraband, she may be sunk, but not until passengers, crew and ship's papers are saved. Germany's present procedure breaks this law. The sinking of crews and passengers on unarmed British merchant vessels, unwarned

and helpless, is a crass violation of the first principles of humanity.

No word we have said to the Germans is untrue. We have exercised all patience with them. They must return to the civilized rules of warfare. Their attempt to defeat England must proceed along lawful and humane lines.

No more can we permit England to prosecute her starvation campaign along equally unlawful and inhumane lines. Both these belligerents must wash their hands and clean up their records.

The President of the United States has at different times framed a platform upon which he can stand and rally every true American to his side. Only July 21, 1915, he wrote to Germany, speaking of the freedom of the seas—the right of neutrals to use them freely for trade and travel in war time:

The United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost.

On February 3, 1916, he said at St. Louis that the United States aspired to have the world say:

That it was we who kept the quiet flame of international principle burning on its altar while the winds of passion were sweeping away every altar in the world.

On that day he further said:

I want the record of the conduct of this administration to be a record of genuine neutrality and not of pretended neutrality.

To-day the judge of international law is the President of the United States. The jury is Congress and the people of this country. Our economic and military power stands ready to punish as we condemn. The trial of the two offenders has

been completed. Both are guilty in the eyes of the law and of common humanity. Shall we give them both the choice of immediate reform or punishment? Shall we let them both go free? Shall we punish one and release the other?

If the judge will charge the jury with the facts and with the stirring statement of the principles of law and neutrality in his July and February utterances, there will be a unanimous and just verdict.—*April 24, 1916.*

OUR PROBLEMS

If ever an administration was beset with difficulties, it is the present administration at Washington. The President and his cabinet deserve the loyal support and honest aid of every American in solving the pregnant problems that confront America. Every nation is taking advantage of our crisis with Germany to press its demands upon us.

Carranza orders us out of Mexico. We entered Mexico to catch and punish a bandit who murdered our citizens in cold blood. It was "Villa alive or dead." We are still in Mexico. Villa is still alive in some mountain fastness, planning to relaunch his wrecked bark upon the tide of a national Mexican resistance to the Gringos. We went to Vera Cruz to get the flag saluted. We came away without the salute. We went over the border for Villa alive or dead. Are we to come away with him alive and with American dead on the trails over which we vainly pursued him? With American prestige—the Mexicans and world may say "American honor"—thus lowered, what will be the future safety

of American property and lives on our side of the border? If we withdraw, what will be the impression the world will get of our military efficiency and the strength of our national purposes? The administration is weighing the loss with the gain if we are now to quit Mexico at the demand of a Mexican school-master.

Great Britain chose the days of the approaching German crisis to send us her notes refusing our demand that she cease confiscating our mails on the high seas, and refusing our demand that she give up the passengers captured from the American steamer *China* off Shanghai. On Thursday, April 20, 1916, the very day after the President delivered his address to Congress with its ultimatum to Germany, London cabled that the long-delayed reply to our note of October 21, 1915, requiring the withdrawal of the British "blockade," is on its way. Britain has already let it be known that her reply was to be a refusal. In this crucial hour, when she believes our hands are tied, when she believes we are in no mood and no position to defend ourselves against wrongs from the enemy of Germany—in this hour England sends us her denial. The London dispatch of April 20 significantly adds:

Since its arrival in Washington certain cable changes have been made in the original note.

But Washington knows when governments are trying to take advantage of us, and Britain may yet find that in her ingenuity she has overreached herself.

Japan is taking this time to press its objection to our sharp form of Asiatic exclusion. The national immigration laws, and especially the

California land laws forbidding the Japanese to own property, are a thorn in Japanese pride. These are the days which Ambassador Chinda thinks suitable to reopen the case at Washington. Back of it all, eventually, is what?

Shadow by shadow, stripped for fight
The lean black cruisers search the sea.

Washington knows the million veterans of the Russo-Japanese war. The citizen may see an impressive section of them being reviewed by the Emperor Yoshihito on the pictorial pages of last Sunday's *New York Times*.

But Washington is not ignorant that this is the way in international affairs. Every nation is looking for its own advantage and chooses the most favorable time to press its claims; that is, the time when its adversary will feel least able to refuse them. Washington will recall the premature recognition of the Confederacy by Britain and France. It will recall that Napoleon III. took advantage of our preoccupation during the civil war to violate the Monroe doctrine and send Maximilian's expedition to Mexico.

Washington does not forget that we also have taken occasion to press our will on embarrassed friends. When Great Britain was harassed by the Boer war we put upon her the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which gave us the power to build the Panama canal alone, to own and operate it as we choose, and to fortify it. We had none of these rights under the Webster-Ashburton treaty, which the Hay-Pauncefote superseded. The earlier treaty provided that England was to be our partner in the enterprise. When Colombia was in the throes of a revolution we

recognized and supported the revolutionaries and bought from them the Panama canal zone. And now—

Even-handed justice
Commends the ingredients of the
poisoned chalice
Even to our own lips.

It has always been so. International relations are no love feast. They are a game where the choicest minds of nations, backed by their united physical force, play for the world's prizes of possession, trade, power, dominion. At the gentlest, the play is with sharpened wits, with far-sighted seizure of opportunity, with calculating use of an adversary's—or a friend's—extremity. At the worst, the mask and costume of diplomacy are thrown aside and the armed warrior stands revealed, as we see him to-day in the earthquakes of artillery operations at Verdun, the desperate infantry charges on the Tigris, the roving aeroplanes over Bulgarian headquarters at Doiran, the silent stroke of the submarine in the North Sea.

These are the issues, the eventualities, which President Wilson and those around him face. Every one looks out for himself, and he looks out for America. *Sauve qui peut*. It is no time for a divided America. We seem to be facing merely the question of neutral rights in this war—the right to travel and trade on the high seas. Beyond this thin veil of the high seas problem is the great, burning, inescapable issue of America's security, her respect, her place, her influence, perhaps her existence, among the nations of the world.

To meet these issues we must supply the President with the power to uphold America. That power will consist partly of material things; an

adequate army, an adequate navy, a nation industrially prepared to defend itself. But he also deserves the spiritual power that comes from a nation united behind him.

Stand by the President!—April 25, 1916.

FACING THE FACTS

At last we are beginning to hear plain speaking. The last issue of the *New Republic* points out to its readers what it considers the essential unneutrality of the course which this government has taken during the present war. The *New Republic* cannot be accused of being pro-German. It is frankly pro-ally, and when it refers to a German naval officer, speaks of him as "a frightened or drunken submarine commander." The *New Republic* does not love the Germans. It only wants us to recognize that our government proves by its acts that it does not love them and is determined to avoid any protection of our rights which could be of aid to the Germans in winning the war. The *New Republic* says that the American people would not stand for any policy of true neutrality. Nor would the *New Republic* itself.

It then states that true neutrality would have required us, in February, 1915, to force a joint return to international law, instead of merely suggesting it and tacitly accepting Britain's refusal. The *New Republic* says that as neutrals we should have threatened England with an arms embargo in order to compel her to join Germany in accepting the Declaration of London. But, the *New Republic* says, the people would not have sanctioned

such a course, which might have made for a German victory.

These are serious charges. The *New Republic* by implication charges the American people with having abandoned the American policy of keeping out of Europe's quarrels, and with having determined to distort our neutrality for the purpose of aiding the success of the allies. More than that, the *New Republic* by implication accuses Mr. Lansing and Mr. Wilson of unneutrality.

Unneutrality means gradually attaching to ourselves the character of a belligerent, and entering the war. The *New Republic* admits that we are logically bound to break the British blockade now that we have eliminated the submarine warfare. But, it says, our people would not support any attack on British interference with our trade rights. If we fail to take action against the British as we have against German lawlessness, the *New Republic* is not ignorant that this means a course of events which in all likelihood will portend war to us. All that is clear as day in the last German note.

Where does the *New Republic* get this information as to American public opinion being so unanimously and belligerently on the side of the allies? No census of sentiments has been taken. Congress is supposed to have its ear fairly close to the ground. Whoever reads the debates in Congress sees a fixed determination of the majority there to keep us out of this European struggle, and a firm resolution to bring both belligerents to a full recognition of American rights. Congress does not see how we can tie the hands of one party and leave the hands of the other party free. One way to put it is to say that Congress is looking

for votes. Another way is to say that Congress is afraid not to represent the views of a majority of its constituents. Well, then, the majority of these constituents seem to be against this very policy that the *New Republic* advocates.

More serious is the implication of weakness on the part of the administration. On October 21, 1915, Mr. Lansing characterized the British blockade as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible" and indicated his intention to abolish it in the words:

This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights which have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations.

On February 3d the President spoke at St. Louis. He said:

I want the record of the conduct of this administration to be a record of genuine neutrality, and not of pretended neutrality.

We prefer to think that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing were using those words to express, not to conceal, their thoughts. We believe that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing expressed the sentiments of three-fourths of their countrymen. We believe that there is a standpoint that regards the welfare of America alone.—June 5, 1916.

ARE THERE ANY NEUTRALS?

This war has affected the deepest feelings of nations and of individuals as no other war ever has affected them in history. Nations have

proclaimed their "neutrality" with all the solemnity of official phraseology. These proclamations are not worth the paper on which they have been written. This unprecedented clash of world forces and world interests has affected, in a direct and intimate way, every nation and every individual in Christendom. There is probably not an individual who has not made up his or her mind as to who will win, or who ought to win in the best interests of civilization and humanity.

In commenting upon this universal cleavage of sympathies, the *New Republic* has this to say:

It is interesting that the American communication to Great Britain and France on the stoppage of mails rouses no emotion and evokes no satirical reference to "notes." There is no outcry that this wordy correspondence is beneath the dignity of a great nation. There is practically no sentiment in favor of any effort to back these words of ours with deeds. Why is this? Primarily because we are suffering inconvenience and commercial loss which can be repaired, whereas in the German controversy people were being killed and could not be restored to life. But that is not the only reason for our tame protests. America is predominantly sympathetic to France and England, and legal "rights" seem less important than the greater issues at stake. Behind this sympathy lie many other things—all that is symbolized by Belgium, all that is bound up in the Anglo-French loan and our commercial connection with the allies, and deeper still a half-conscious sense that the American future in the world is interwoven with that of the liberal powers of western Europe. That is why, though we talk grandiloquently of upholding our "rights" at any cost wherever attacked, we do not intend to do anything of the kind. We are not supporting "law." We are acting on policy.

The realization of the force and the depth of sentiment that underlies the attitude of nations will serve to convey a hint of the tremen-

dous difficulties that beset the paths of neutral statesmen, not only in America, but in Europe. Behind the official acts of diplomats and chancellors is a vast pressure of public opinion which threatens the painfully constructed dams that hold back the flood.—*June 7, 1916.*

THE COLLAPSE OF SEA LAW AND THE END OF THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

A new British Order in Council has been issued, dated July 8, 1916. An Order in Council is a legislative act on the part of the King's Council in England, abolishing that international law which protected the property of neutrals on the seas and substituting British law therefor. Acting under this new substitute for international law British cruisers then proceed to seize American ships and American goods, and British prize courts proceed to condemn them.

This July 8, 1916, Order in Council officially buries the Declaration of London, an attempt to form a code of international law, made at the London conference, which was called by the British government in 1901. The Declaration of London has been dead since the first British Order in Council of August 20, 1914. It is appropriate that the burial should now take place. It is not the interment that we would prevent. But in our hearts we know that we never lifted a finger to save the victim and that most of our ills in this war can be traced to our indifference to his slaughter.

The Declaration of London was signed by the representatives of all leading nations of the world.

In the preamble of the Declaration of London its character is clearly set forth:

The signatory powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.

The Declaration of London was not ratified by any of the governments after the British House of Lords refused to join the House of Commons in ratifying it. The Lords blocked it because it forbade the British navy to do the very lawless things which it has done in this war. To be sure, the Declaration of London did not make new international law. It merely took the leading principles of that law, as embodied in practice in past wars, in treaties, in the Hague conventions. Most of the immunities which the declaration conferred on neutral commerce in war time were merely chosen precedents; cases in which England as a powerful neutral forced belligerents to keep their hands off neutral commerce. For example, England had repeatedly forbidden a belligerent, unless maintaining an effective blockade, to stop British foodstuffs (conditional contraband) when sailing into the belligerent's enemy, unless it could be proven that the foodstuffs were consigned to the enemy's military forces. Otherwise the foodstuffs were exempt from seizure.

This immunity of conditional contraband unless it had a military, not a civilian destination, was embodied as a principle in the Declaration of London. The document also provided fixed contraband lists. Most of the raw stuffs of the world's trade were put upon the free list. Such were cotton, wool, rubber, flax. A belligerent could not touch them

on the high seas. Other goods were designated conditional contraband, like food and clothing. These could be stopped only if demonstrably in transit to a belligerent's armed forces. Other goods like arms and ammunition were called absolute contraband, subject to confiscation by a belligerent who found them moving to his enemy's country at all, either directly or via the territory of an adjacent neutral. Ships sailing to a neutral country—as from New York to Holland—could lawfully be searched only for contraband goods demonstrably in transit to Germany. This was the limit of interference which could, according to the Declaration of London, be lawfully laid upon the commerce of the United States with continental Europe, unless England were to maintain a blockade: a cordon of ships interposed between Germany and all other nations. In such a case all commerce to and from Germany could be stopped.

When the war broke out our government asked the belligerents to adopt the Declaration of London as their code of naval warfare. The central powers adopted it. Great Britain and her allies adopted it "with modifications" in the British Order in Council of August 20, 1914. One of the "modifications" of this order was a new contraband list. Successive British contraband lists were issued (September 21, 1914; October 21, 1914; December 23, 1914) and soon every leading article of our trade, except cotton, was on the British absolute or conditional contraband list. So the protection of the fixed contraband lists of the Declaration of London were removed.

The next "modification" abolished

the ancient immunity of conditional contraband. Its movement to Germany was prohibited if consigned

to or for an agent of the enemy state or to or for a merchant or other person under control of the authorities of the enemy state.

Of course no conditional contraband exported from America could be consigned to any one except to "an agent of the enemy state or a merchant or other person in control of the authorities of the enemy state." Any consignee in Germany would come under one of these heads. Since all goods were soon on the British absolute or conditional contraband lists, and neither absolute nor conditional contraband could move, the "modified" Declaration of London, instead of being a protection to the right of neutrals to trade with a belligerent (Germany), became a thing which removed the last vestige of that right to trade.

On October 29, 1914, a new Order in Council introduced new "modifications" in the Declaration of London. New barriers were raised against the movement of goods to Germany via neutral European countries. The October order read:

III. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of said declaration, conditional contraband shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port if the goods are consigned "to order," or if the ship's papers do not show who is the consignee of the goods, or if they show a consignee of the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy.

IV. In cases covered by the preceding paragraph, it shall lie upon the owners of the goods to prove that their destination was innocent.

It was obviously impossible for a Swede or a Dutchman who was handling our trade with Germany to

prove that its destination was innocent, when by British "law" every one in Germany has been made a tainted consignee. The search for German-bound goods in the ships trading from here to neutral European countries has been the cause of the detentions, confiscations and losses to which we have been subjected. Through ship detentions in British harbors Scandinavian and Dutch ship owners have been terrified into refusing to accept any American exports to their own countries except when certified by the British consul at New York. Our government has refused to join the Scandinavian monarchies in a joint protest against this British action. American producers like Standard Oil, the copper interests, the meat packers, have been forced by England to agree to ship nothing to Germany during the war. They are forced to agree not to trade with a nation with whom we are at peace, though the State Department has told England that interference with that trade is unlawful and that for us to submit to it would be to violate our neutrality.

On March 30, 1915, we made this clear to the British government:

It is confidently assumed that His Majesty's government will not deny that it is a rule sanctioned by general practice that even though a blockade should exist and the doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory be rigidly enforced, innocent (non-contraband) shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States to neutral countries to belligerent territory without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition or confiscation.

And no claim on the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with these clear rights of the United States and its citizens as neutrals could

be admitted. To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain, which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this government in the present circumstances.

Just what do our words mean? Surely not what they say.

By the Orders in Council of August 20 and October 29, 1914, all our trade with Germany was killed, with the exception of cotton moving to Germany, and goods moving from Germany to us. Goods from Germany to us, like dyes, can lawfully be touched only if a blockade of Germany is maintained. On March 11, 1915, another Order in Council was issued by the British government, stopping our exports of cotton and all our imports from Germany. It declared that Great Britain would seize all goods en route to or from Germany. That is, it assumed the rights of blockade without assuming its obligations. Britain does not blockade Germany; it has no warships in the Baltic, and Sweden trades unhindered with German Baltic ports. Why cannot we? Merely because we do not insist on the right to do so.

In our note of March 30, 1915, we defined the illegality of the British blockade in the clearest terms:

The Scandinavian and Danish ports, for example, * * * are free, so far as the actual enforcement of the Order in Council is concerned, to carry on trade with German Baltic ports, although it is an essential element of blockade that it bear with equal severity upon all neutrals.

Then on October 21, 1915, we defined this same "blockade" as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible."

It is more than a question of our material losses or our self-asserted

unneutrality in this war. The precedent is being established that the dominant sea power in every future war can by an Order in Council destroy our trade with its enemy. The Order in Council has been substituted for the blockade in international law.

To be sure, we protest. On March 30, 1915, we protested. Great Britain answered us in July, 1915. On October 21, 1915, we protested again. Great Britain answered on April 26, 1916, in a note of 13,000 words, meeting no one of our demands. But there have been various indirect reactions to our expressed displeasure. England now destroys most of our mail to and from Germany, and opens and abstracts our business letters to European neutral countries, all in violation of a Hague convention. The latest answer is the new Order in Council of July 8, 1916. After formally stating that Britain will no longer observe the Declaration of London, the order sets forth the conditions under which absolute or conditional contraband goods will be stopped, if moving to Germany direct or via adjacent neutrals. It must be borne in mind that all our exports, including even cotton, are now on the British absolute and conditional contraband lists.

First. The hostile destination required for the condemnation of contraband articles shall be presumed to exist until the contrary is shown, if the goods are consigned to or for an enemy authority or agent of an enemy state, or to or for a person in the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to or for a person who during the present hostilities has forwarded contraband goods to an enemy authority or agent of an enemy state, or to or for a person in the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or if the goods are consigned

"to order," or if the ship's papers do not show who is the real consignee of the goods.

It may not be clear why Great Britain, after banning all trade to and from Germany in its order of March 11, 1915, should take the trouble to specify treatment of contraband goods. If all goods going to or from Germany are contraband, why single any of them out for special mention? The reason becomes clear after a little reflection. Suppose we force England to rescind the Order in Council of March 11, 1915? We should still find this Order of July 8, 1916, banning all our exports. The diplomatic procedure would then be to treat regarding the terms of the July 8th order, and regarding the propriety of including in the contraband lists each of the hundreds of articles carried there. The July 8 Order in Council provides a second, third and fiftieth line of trenches to be taken after we have stormed the order of March 11, 1915.

It is not quite a hopeless situation. It could have been—and could now be—handled with firmness and success. International law emerges from each war as strong as the strongest neutral in the war has *been able and willing* to preserve it. We can still save the law of the sea. We can, if we choose, demand that all belligerents in this war observe the Declaration of London as a code of naval warfare. No belligerent has the force to resist such a demand from us. The Declaration of London would prevent any resumption of German submarine warfare, for it specifies visit and search as the only lawful method for a warship to proceed against a merchant carrier. The declaration would

settle the grave issues, and remove the graver dangers for the future which threaten us from the Orders in Council.

If we had at the outset forced, instead of merely recommended, the Declaration of London, our controversies with Germany and England would never have arisen. By its adoption these controversies can be settled now. In the Senate are two bills, one of Senator Walsh, empowering the President to declare an embargo on our exports to any belligerent unlawfully interfering with our trade; and one of Senator Gore, empowering the President to embargo ammunition exports or financial aid from us to a belligerent interfering with our trade contrary to the provisions of the Declaration of London. The levying of an embargo is not a hostile act; indeed, to-day England embargoes many exports to us and refuses to accept many of our goods. We shall have no satisfaction from England without the threat of an embargo, just as we had none from Germany without the threat of severing diplomatic relations and war.

The Declaration of London is, as it has been through the war, the key to the situation. It is the measure of our duty as guardians of neutral rights on the sea, and is the means by which that duty can be performed.

We have told both Germany and England that we proposed to force them to return to the limits of law. On July 21, 1915, we wrote Germany:

The government of the United States and the imperial German government are contending for the same great object, have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the United

States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost.

On October 21, 1915, we wrote England the same message:

The task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world, against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising from the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States now unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, *exercising always that impartiality which since the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations.*

On February 3, 1915, the President expressed at St. Louis the American people's longing for neutrality and their intention to preserve it. He said that he aspired to have the world say:

That it was we who kept the quiet flame of international principle burning on its altars while the winds of passion were sweeping away every altar in the world.

I want the record of the conduct of this administration to be a record of genuine neutrality, and not of pretended neutrality.

What do our words, what do the words of our President mean? Is neutrality a half-way thing? Is international law like other law, before whose eyes all offenders are equal?—July 12, 1916.

The Submarine Issue

ONE VICTORY SCORED—NOW FOR ANOTHER!

President Wilson has triumphed. Humanity owes him a debt of gratitude deeper and greater because the victory he has won for it has come by the pen, not by the sword. For all time his example of patient but firm insistence upon the sacredness of life will endure in history as one of the brilliant triumphs of diplomacy—possibly in its final significance the most far-reaching ever scored by any American statesman. Not alone in his own country, but throughout the world, it will be realized that he has established a policy of humanity in sea warfare that will stand unchallenged for all time.

Germany, fighting to the last with characteristic determination to break down a barrier deliberately erected to starve her people at home and paralyze her industries, has yielded to her own better impulses and recognized the force and justice of President Wilson's appeal in behalf of civilization. Weak nations, like weak individuals, seldom have the courage to chance their course when they are shown to be in the wrong. Only the strong do that.

It must be conceded, therefore, that Germany has risen nobly to the high moral plane on which the American contention was based, and, with true sacrificial spirit, has joined in making a precedent which

no sea power will ever attempt to ignore. The extent to which the German government has gone in what might be termed a surrender of her interests can hardly be appreciated. It is not without possibly serious consequences to herself that Germany has put good will above material interests, and imperiled the fate of her own people for the good of humanity. It must not be forgotten that stealth is the essence of submarine warfare. The submarine is not a battleship. It cannot defend itself from attack. Its safety is under the surface of the waters, and its sole usefulness lies in surprising enemy ships. Germany's acquiescence in the "visit and search" contention, therefore, places her whole submarine campaign on a less effective basis. To that extent, it is a distinct gain to her enemy, England. Every English ship captain will sail the seas with far less concern hereafter, and seek outlets for England's trade with the certain knowledge that the powers at Washington and Berlin have robbed his voyage of its greatest terror. It is not the purpose of war to do that, yet that is precisely what German acquiescence does for Germany's enemies.

On the other hand, the English embargo to which the German submarine campaign was a response stands unchanged by any protest which this government has made to London.

Despite our attitude, England

still insists on a limitless expansion of her list of contraband. She adheres rigidly to a policy that not only seriously affects our interests, but is in direct contravention to her own traditional attitude. There is nothing in international law to justify a sweeping assertion that everything on the seas is contraband, even though its destination is indisputably not military.

President Wilson has used no uncertain language in his remonstrance to the English government and in demanding a revision of its orders in council. He stands on the broad ground outlined above. There is not an inch of it that can be justly disputed; nor can the principle be bartered away through an offer by England to buy the cotton we would be shipping to Germany were the seas as free to neutrals as they should be. The validity of international law is at stake in the recognition by England of President Wilson's contention. Bribery—for that is what England's cotton purchase plan amounts to—cannot be permitted by this government to gloss over a violation of principle.

No section of the country would resent acquiescence in such a bartering away of principle as would the South. It realizes that its whole future is involved in the recognition of its right to ship its cotton to every port in the world and under all conditions. It is not seeking a temporary adjustment, but the establishment of a permanent policy—or, rather, the recognition now by England of a code of law heretofore insisted upon by her, and universally recognized.

The vital and permanent interest that we as a nation have and the South as an integral part of our na-

tion has, is shown by the fact that 65 per cent. of the world's cotton is grown here. It goes to Russia, England, Germany, Japan, as the chief centers of consumption. If it is not to have the fate of last year's crop, it must move freely over the seas at all times. Any sea law that challenges its right to do so instantly becomes a menace to the South's greatest interest, and remains so until this government insists upon a reversal.

That is the task President Wilson now faces.—*Sept. 2, 1915.*

THE SUBMARINE ISSUE

The President has been singularly consistent in his policy in regard to submarine warfare. He stands firmly on his basic proposition that the lives of noncombatant American citizens must be safeguarded by the exercise of "visit and search." No submarine must attack an unresisting passenger ship without giving passengers and crew an opportunity to save their lives.

This stand is based upon the highest conception of international law, and upon the instinct of humanity. His policy is supported by the moral sense of the American people, and in maintaining a code of law at sea he has the absolute confidence of the American people.—*Sept. 11, 1915.*

THE PRESIDENT'S VICTORY

In the name of his government, Count von Bernstorff has given assurance to the United States that "The orders issued by his majesty the emperor to the commanders of German submarines have been made so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the *Arabic case*

is considered out of the question."

Therein lies the crux of the great victory which President Wilson has won by his diplomacy, a victory of which the American people may justly be proud, and for which the whole world owes a debt of gratitude to the man who achieved it, for it redounds to the benefit of the noncombatants of all nations.

What President Wilson has won is the recognition of a great humanitarian principle in the midst of the most sanguinary war that has stained the pages of modern history. Patiently but with unalterable persistence he has pressed for this point through a long series of diplomatic interchanges, covering a period of nearly five months since the world was startled by the awful tragedy of the *Lusitania*.

Harassed at home by an impatient people who sought to incite him to acts of indiscretion which would have plunged this nation into the frightful maelstrom of the European conflict, and heckled by many whose sympathies with the Teutons blinded their eyes to the outrage which had been committed upon helpless women and children, the President has closed his ears to the public clamor and has marched straight along the path which he felt sure would enable him to peacefully gain the end he had in view—namely, safety for all persons who travel upon the sea upon peaceful errands.

The *Evening Mail* gratefully accords to President Wilson the fullest measure of praise for the triumph of his diplomacy, and believes that the American people, irrespective of partisanship or their sympathies toward either belligerent, will do the same.—Oct. 6, 1915.

THE ANCONA AFFAIR

To-day's dispatches make it clear that there will be no international complications arising out of the *Ancona* affair. The people of the United States will breathe a sigh of relief over this latest news. If there is one thing this country distinctly does not want, it is trouble of any kind with any of the belligerent powers of Europe.

For the present, at least, our differences with Germany have been adjusted; our grievances against England have been formulated and presented, and we may assume that these, too, are in a fair way to settlement. To have had a new cause of trouble arising between America and Austria would not only have had the effect of greatly increasing the nervous tension under which the American people have labored ever since the *Lusitania* affair, but would have appreciably dragged us one step nearer to actual embroilment in what is now almost a worldwide war.

It is impossible to imagine anything more pitiful and heartrending than the sinking of a shipload of women and children. But according to the very plain and complete statements which came over the cable to-day, the responsibility for this tragedy rests with the unfortunate captain of the ship, who recklessly attempted to run away after he had been signaled by a warship to stop. Under all the rules of war, recognized in this country as well as in Europe, the commander of the submarine was acting entirely within his rights in firing upon a vessel which refused to stop when called upon to do so.

The heavy load of responsibility

that rests upon the captain of a merchant ship, and the horribleness of war, even when its accepted rules are lived up to, are the lessons of the *Ancona* tragedy. All good Americans should be thankful that nothing more is involved.—*Nov. 11, 1915.*

THE NEW SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

The new submarine warfare which Germany began under new conditions on March 1 constitutes the final phase of the struggle to break Britain's control of the seas.

Britain's dominion over the oceans is based upon the battleship. With the battleship she has made her insular position impregnable. With the battleship, supplementing the seizures of strategic positions on the earth's surface through centuries of time, she has made herself impregnable. With the battleship she has made herself mistress of the seaways of the world, from Gibraltar through the Suez canal, or around the cape to the Falkland Islands, the Bahamas and Bermuda. The destruction of the preponderance of the battleship as the great maritime fighting unit would involve tremendous change of Britain's status among the nations.

Germany has selected and elaborated the submarine as the one weapon capable of destroying this preponderance. On the day on which an effective submarine blockade is established, Britain's mastery will go. Sea power will become the equal possession of all nations, for even the smallest nation will not be too poor to secure a sufficient equipment of under-sea boats. The discovery of gunpowder destroyed

the power of the armored man on horseback, because it enabled the unarmored man on foot to meet his opponent on terms approaching equality. The submarine will work the same equalization between the power of enormous resources, with a long building programme, and the nation of comparatively small means and without naval traditions.

It is the conviction of Germany—based upon her experience—that the submarine has been developed to a much higher point of effectiveness in the past two years than in the preceding decade. The minds that are directing German naval policy have reached the conclusion that the under-sea boat, as perfected by the achievements of German genius, is now capable of disputing, with fair promise of success, the British dictum: "Britannia Rules the Wave."

The issue as affecting the world is: Will the submarine furnish a new basis of sea power? The answer to that question involves the very existence of Germany, and Germany's success would not invade the right of any other nation to its share of that sea power. The victory of the submarine would not mean the concentration of might on the oceans in the hands of one nation. It would mean its distribution among all the maritime nations.—*March 3, 1916.*

NO WAR OVER ARMED LINERS

In Washington on Friday the Senators were called upon to decide whether they were prepared to go to the length of war to defend the "rights" of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent liners. By a vote of 68 to 14 the Senators

informed the world that they were not prepared to go to war for this cause.

It was Senator Gore who, by a skilled parliamentary move, unparalleled in the history of Congress, put before the upper house the decision that would eventually have to come before them if we should maintain our present attitude toward the attack of German submarines upon armed British liners. Senator Gore obtained a final answer.

For weeks the Gore resolution has been pending, a resolution warning Americans from traveling on armed belligerent merchant ships. The administration wanted this resolution defeated; that is, it wanted the Senate to assert the right of Americans to travel on these vessels. But upon this issue there was much Senate opinion that differed from that of the administration. For example, Senator Stone, chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, was in favor of keeping our citizens off armed ships and would have had to vote for the Gore measure if it had come up directly.

Therefore, the best which the Democratic leaders in the Senate could promise to the administration was to table the Gore resolution; that is, leave the issue still open, to be decided when an American should be killed on an armed British ship. Then Congress would have to determine how far such an American had been within his rights and whether we would go to war to avenge him.

Such was the situation when the Senate convened on Friday. The Senate committee on foreign relations reported the Gore resolution and recommended that it be tabled.

All debate was shut off and a vote called for. However, Senator Gore could not be refused his request to "perfect" his resolution. He did this by striking out all but the purely formal preamble and making the thing a resolution stating that the killing by a submarine of an American on an armed belligerent ship would be a cause for war between the United States and the German empire. Then Gore voted to table his own resolution.

Before the resolution was voted on, other Senators tried to speak on it. But the very gag rule which the Democratic leaders were enforcing prevented them from discussing the perfected resolution. They had to vote on tabling it and they tabled it, 68 to 14.

If the Senate had tabled the original Gore resolution, the administration might feel that it indirectly had sanctioned the present stand toward Germany, in that the Senators refused to warn Americans from armed liners. As it is, by a vote of 68 to 11 the Senate declared that it would not sanction war as a means of enforcing the policy to which our present diplomacy is committing us.

The President may feel that the Senate and the people are solid behind him in the policy of keeping us out of this war on any such issue as Americans risking their lives on British merchant ships, armed and instructed to sink submarines.—
March 6, 1916.

"ARMED FOR DEFENSE"

At this crisis it is worth while to present to ourselves the issue as to armed merchant vessels and submarines. Many attempts have been

made to becloud the issue, which is in itself a clear and simple one.

One warship, of course, can be sunk by another without warning; for example, a British cruiser by a German submarine. Armed merchantmen have been considered to be in the warship class, and so susceptible of being sunk without warning, unless the armament was obviously of defensive character. In this latter case the hostile warship could exercise against the merchant vessel only the right of visit and search, with whatever further powers the results of the search might authorize.

What was defensive armament? It was armament not defensive against a hostile warship, but against pirates who a hundred years ago infested certain seas. This rule meant: A British sailing vessel, returning from the Far East, could not be sent to the bottom without warning by a hostile French frigate on the ground of being a war vessel because it carried guns.

The condition of immunity for the merchant craft was that its guns should be too small to be able to cope with the warship, which instead of sinking it held it up and searched it. The merchant ship's guns could not be of sufficient size so that, if the warship came up near, the merchantman would be able to fire into the warship and sink it. Such power in the merchant ship's armament sufficed to make it a warship. No one would dare to approach and search it if so armed. So merchant craft, in order to retain their innocent character and be immune from being sunk at sight, could not carry guns large enough to seriously injure a warship if it came alongside. The merchant ship

was allowed to carry small guns because even if she tried to act treacherously with them when the warship came up, the latter would be merely stung, not mortally wounded, and would at once sink the traitor.

That is, merchant vessels could be armed only defensively with small guns to keep off pirates. This is the full meaning of defensive armament. Mere possession of the power to injure an approaching war vessel—the possession of this power put the merchantman into the warship class and rendered it liable to being sunk without warning.

Now appears a new warship, the submarine. Any armament can sink it. The presence of a three-inch gun on a merchant vessel makes it impossible for a submarine to emerge and come alongside for search. A three-inch gun could pierce the frail shell of the submarine or could shoot its periscopes away and then, when it submerged to escape total destruction, it would be blind.

In order to be incapable of mortally wounding a submarine, a merchant ship must carry no armament at all. The excuse of carrying armament to resist pirates no longer exists; there are no pirates now. Arms on merchant vessels can only be for the purpose of destroying submarines. According to the established rules of international law, this sort of armament takes the merchant vessel out of the merchant class and makes it a warship. Warships may be sunk by submarines without warning.

How the British merchant ship's guns are to be used against a submarine is clearly set forth in the instructions to these craft issued by

the admiralty, recently cabled to this country by the British government. The merchant vessel is to open fire on any submarine approaching or pursuing it, both of which actions are necessary for boarding and searching. That is, British merchant vessels are instructed to sink any submarine that emerges and approaches.

All these changed conditions of naval warfare were in Mr. Lansing's mind when he wrote the entente powers:

My government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of underseas craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government.

For an American to take a trip on a British armed liner, which our government has designated as an auxiliary cruiser, is to expose himself to the destruction which, Mr. Lansing intimates, the vessel deserves.—*Mar. 7, 1916.*

BEFORE THE BAR OF NEUTRAL PUBLIC OPINION

The facts in the controversy regarding submarines and armed liners are now all before the public. Washington at last has published the appendices to the German memorandum of a week ago, giving facsimiles of the captured instructions to masters of British merchant vessels, instructions regarding the procedure against approaching submarines. London has had a chance to comment upon these appendices. The briefs and arguments are in. The case is up for judgment by America.

On August 4, 1914, the British chargé at Washington wrote to our State department and warned us to guard German merchant vessels from escaping from our ports to the high seas, there to be converted and armed to attack British commerce:

His majesty's government will hold the United States responsible for any damage to British trade or shipping, or injury to British interests generally, which may be caused by such vessels being equipped at or departing from United States ports.

While Germany was to be bound, Britain was to be free. On August 9 a further British communication was handed to us, stating that we had no right to interfere with coming and going of British merchantmen, armed "solely for the purpose of defense."

On August 19 and 20 we sent answers to the British notes. We denied the international validity of Britain's claim that German ships could not lawfully be converted into cruisers on the high seas. We disclaimed any responsibility as to the effect on British interests, if this conversion should occur. We acknowledged, without comment, receipt of the British viewpoint regarding the harmless nature of armed British merchant ships. It was obvious that we were not convinced.

Therefore, on August 25, Spring-Rice handed us a note dictated by Sir Edward Grey:

I have at the same time been instructed by his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs to give the United States government the fullest assurance that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes of attack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for defense that they will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they never will under any circumstances attack any vessel.

Upon this definite promise we agreed to allow defensively armed British liners to enter our ports. The Germans had in the meantime been urging us not to do this. In a note to Bernstorff of September 19 we informed him of our decision. We clearly stated that:

The presence of armament and ammunition on board a merchant vessel creates a presumption that the armament is for offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries armament solely for defense.

In various ways the presumption of the offensive nature of any armament at all might be removed. The most important evidence was the above declaration of Spring-Rice. Other evidences of innocent purpose were that the guns were small, few and not mounted forward, and That the vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers are the same as those on board before war was declared.

The grounds on which we were to judge the innocence of armed vessels were thus determined in the first two months of the war. In the light of events since then, what judgment must we pass upon the guiltless status of these vessels?

Our whole submarine controversy with Germany has been designed to force the submarines to cease sinking unarmed, unresisting merchant vessels without warning. We insisted that the submarines should visit and search merchantment and, if they sank them, only to do so after safeguarding crews and passengers. The implication in all our correspondence is that submarines are warships with a lawful right of visit and search, and that resistance to the exercise of this right deprives merchantment of immunity.

Our German correspondence dragged on. Finally Germany let us write, for her to sign, a *Lusitania* note that would be satisfactory to us, and Bernstorff dispatched this note to Berlin, which in due time approved it.

In the meantime our State department had become convinced that the very power of merchant ships to attack the frail submarine rendered it impossible for the latter to perform that visit and search which, we insisted, should be substituted for the fundamental right of the submarine, as a warship, to destroy.

So Lansing wrote the entente powers advising them to take arms off merchant vessels:

My government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of the undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government.

Basing on this note of ours, Germany issued her sea order declaring that after March 1 her submarines would torpedo on sight all armed British merchant vessels. We have sent no official answer to this German order, though Congress made it clear that we shall not go to war to avenge an American sunk on what the Secretary of State calls a British "auxiliary cruiser." The entente powers have not yet answered our suggestion that they disarm their merchant vessels; their officials intimate that they will refuse.

To-day the question raised by the new published instructions to masters of British merchantmen regarding "defensive" use of armament is

whether Great Britain has not committed a serious breach of her plighted word to us in August, 1914.

These instructions were captured by a German submarine from a British steamer in the western Mediterranean. When the news first became public of these British admiralty orders that "defensively" armed merchant vessels should attack approaching submarines, the admiralty said that the captured instructions were antiquated, and had been replaced by those of October 20, 1915. But the October 20 order, as cabled to us by the admiralty, was in no import respect different from the earlier order, submitted by the Germans. The admiralty's preferred version is:

It is important, therefore, that craft of this description (hostile submarines) should be allowed to approach to short range, at which a torpedo or bomb launched without notice would almost certainly be effective. Consequently it may be presumed that any submarine or aircraft which deliberately approaches or pursues a merchant vessel does so with hostile intentions. In such cases fire may be opened in self defense in order to prevent the hostile craft from closing to a range at which resistance to a sudden attack with bomb or torpedo would not be possible.

How does this accord with the definite promise to us of August 25, 1914?

British merchant vessels will never fire unless first fired upon, and they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel.

Are these the "unarmed, unresisting" merchantmen which we require the submarine, after emerging, to approach, visit and search?

The other documents in the German "find" are not denied by London. One is the following:

Ratings embarked as gun's crew will sign the ship's articles at the rate of pay communicated.

Uniform is not to be worn in neutral ports.

That is, a naval gun crew is shipped on the peaceful trader. But they are not to appear as such in neutral ports. Evidently the British admiralty desires to prevent us from knowing that they have obliterated one of Lansing's marks of defensive armament:

That the vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers are the same as those on Board before war was declared.

Finally, the British consciousness of guilt is clearly shown in the following highly confidential communication to the ship's master:

In no circumstances is this paper to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy.

This paper is for the master's personal information. It is not to be copied, and when not actually in use is to be kept in safety in a place where it can be destroyed at a moment's notice.

The paper referred to is the paper of instructions regarding the treatment of approaching submarines, from which extracts have here been given.

In the light of these facts, the British government will soon know what official Washington thinks of the defensive armament of peaceful British traders. It will learn how far we think we can base our policy in this momentous matter solely on the word of Sir Edward Grey. His majesty's government can already figure out for itself our attitude when we receive its expected refusal to disarm these innocent halcyons of the sea.—*Mar.* 23, 1916.

UNDERSEA FREIGHT CARRIERS

Many a dream of yesterday is a tangible fact of to-day. Many a flight of scientific speculation has found expression in an effective structure of steel and steam and electricity. Daedalus and his wings of wax, which melted in the sun, was only the precursor of Langley and the Curtiss brothers and Wright and Pegoud, with their wonderful flying machines, constructed on the principle which failed the classic flyer when the test came. When Jules Verne wrote his famous novel, "Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea," the world called him a dreamer. And yet to-day the realization of his dream is one of the main issues in a great international complication.

The submarine has proved a formidable weapon in warfare. It is now proposed to make it a carrier of trade. There is no inherent reason to doubt the practicability of a project now discussed in Berlin, for the construction of great commerce-carrying submarines, each with a freight capacity of 2,000 tons, to ply between Hamburg and New York. A fleet of a hundred such boats, it is estimated by a Berlin dreamer who may turn out to be a prophet, could carry annually 150,000 tons of imports and a similar quantity of exports between Germany and America. Of the international results of such a departure in the carrying equipment of Germany, the ingenious Berliner writes

The submarine freighter also would quite demonstrate the folly of England's claimed rule of the seas. The freedom of the seas would become a reality. Our shipbuilders, engineers and constructors

should now take the floor and say whether or not the submarine freighter is an achievable possibility of the near future.

All of which sounds somewhat fanciful to-day; but achievements which appeared far more difficult of accomplishment a generation ago are now among the familiar things of our civilization.—*Mar. 24, 1916.*

ADDED DIFFICULTIES IN THE SUBMARINE CONTRO- VERSY

With England in its present state of mind the settlement of the submarine controversy is still far away. The reason is that this controversy cannot be settled apart from the British blockade of Germany, against which the submarine warfare is a retaliation. Great Britain now officially announces that she will not return to the limits of law along with Germany. The announcement is made in London by Lord Cecil, British war trade minister. The news is not without interest, and discouragement, for America.

We cannot make one combatant to abide by the rules of the game and allow the other to make his own rules. England's attitude has blocked our progress toward asserting humanity and law.

The dispatch from London is correctly headlined in New York: "Britain spurns peace terms; Cecil speaks for England; rejects with contempt the peace suggestions of Bethmann-Hollweg." To those who have read the Wednesday speech of the German chancellor it may seem wonderful that any human being could see in it peace suggestions.

But Lord Cecil does, and spurns them thus:

Conversing with American correspondents on behalf of the Foreign office, Lord Robert said that the suggestion that Germany might abandon her submarine warfare, if Great Britain relaxed her food blockade, was hardly likely to be entertained by Great Britain, which had no faith that any promise made by Germany regarding submarine warfare would be kept.

It is recalled that our quarrel with England is older than our quarrel with Germany. The illegal British "blockade" of Germany was begun by the British Order in Council of August 20, 1914, and perfected by the British Order in Council of March 11, 1915. The German submarine campaign, in retaliation for this attempted starvation of German civilian population, was not initiated until February 18, 1915.

In two strong notes to Britain, dated December 26, 1914, and March 30, 1915, we set forth our intention to bring her back to the limits of international law. On March 30 we said that acquiescence in the British form of blockade would forfeit both our rights and our neutrality, which required us to trade with both belligerents when no lawful blockade exists. We explained the illegality of the blockade to be the fact that it was not effective and did not exclude all neutrals from trading with Germany. The essence of a blockade is that it must bear equally on all neutrals. So long as England's warships are afraid to enter the Baltic and so unable to bar Swedish and Norwegian ships from German Baltic ports like Stettin, Britain has no right to stop our ships destined to the same ports.

There has never been any question that the American government has considered the British starvation and the German submarine policy as joint and connected offenses against us. In the second half of February, 1915, England was claiming that her coming March 30 Order in Council, completing the blockade, was a retaliation against the submarine warfare, while Germany was claiming that the submarine warfare was a retaliation against a starvation policy that began on August 20, 1914. We accepted the statements of both and cut the Gordian knot by asking them to forego their acts of retaliation and remove the causes of retaliation. We asked Germany to give up her submarine warfare. We asked England to let food go to Germany for the civilian population, to be distributed by American consular officials. Germany agreed, England refused.

The subsequent course of events is fresh in all American minds. On May 7 the *Lusitania* was sunk without warning, and our government then turned to the task of curbing the more sensational violations of our rights, namely, those perpetrated by Germany. By the end of 1915 we had modified the original German submarine policy—a policy of summarily sinking all British ships in and out of England—to the extent of exacting a promise that no passenger liner, unarmed and unresisting, would be sunk without warning.

There is only one reason why we did not succeed in winning for all British merchant vessels, both passenger and freight steamers, a German promise of visit and search instead of summary destruction. The

reason is that Britain refused to accept our suggestion that she disarm her merchant vessels and so make it safe and possible for a submarine to rise, visit and search. Secretary Lansing has said that armed vessels are "auxiliary cruisers" and so suitable for unwarned destruction. Hence this country cannot well make any move to protect them.

Germany has never said that she would visit and search British freight boats other than passenger steamers, *so long as Britain refuses to disarm these freight boats*. Nor can we enforce such a policy. For a submarine to emerge and approach a freighter that may carry a concealed six-inch gun is to commit suicide.

Nothing is clearer and simpler than that we have come to the end of the concessions that we can extort from Germany unless we at the same time force a return to law on the part of England, equally an offender. So long as we fail to thwart the illegal British attempt to starve Germany, we cannot wholly remove the retaliation against that starvation policy.

Whether the attempt at starvation is gradually proving successful; whether by self-denial the Germans are effectively meeting the situation, or whether the attempt is being partly successful and German babies are dying of a milk famine because there is no cattle fodder—all this is immaterial. An attempt was made to starve the civilian population of Germany. English statesmen in the first year of the war openly boasted of its success. It is hypocrisy to say that the starvation was directed against the military. Every one knows that the military is fed first and famine falls upon the

non-combatants. If we do not bring England away from this starvation plan we cannot entirely thwart Germany's reply, an attempt to starve the civilian population of England with the only means at her hand, namely, the use of submarines to sink the carriers of England's food supply.

We have the power to force both belligerents jointly to forego their illegal acts: Germany to renounce her submarines as a weapon against merchant steamers, England to renounce her starvation plan. The time has come to force these offenders to abide by the law; the time for merely suggesting it is past. It is this which Lord Cecil fears. It is this joint return to law against which he protests. England wants us to apply to the very letter the law against Germany, but England is to be free from abiding even by its spirit.

This cannot be also Washington's viewpoint. Is it for Lord Cecil to tell us that we cannot force Germany wholly to forego the use of submarines if we once get her to promise to do so? Lord Cecil knows, as every one else does, that we have not been able to get any broad, definite and binding promise from Germany because of our failure to take action against the British starvation policy with which the German abuse of submarines is inseparably connected. And now Lord Cecil confirms the impression that has been fastening itself in American minds, that this British concession—the *sine qua non* of further advance—is not to be had for the asking, but must be compelled by the exercise of pressure the means for which a protecting fate has put into our hands.—April 11, 1916.

A CHANCE FOR DIPLOMACY.

By EDWIN J. CLAPP.

(Author of "Economic Aspects of the War.")

The *Evening World* of yesterday suggested a way out of the deadlock that now confronts Germany and America. It is worth the thoughtful consideration of people in Berlin. The *Evening World* proposes that Germany suspend her illegal and murderous submarine warfare against British merchantmen and trust to the fairness of the American government and the American people to see to it that England also is brought back to the limits of law.

Suppose to-morrow the papers were to contain the following note from Germany in answer to ours of last Wednesday:

The imperial German government is constrained to recognize the justice of the demands of the American government that Germany return to the limits of law as universally accepted before the outbreak of the war. Until further notice, therefore, the imperial German government will not use its submarines against any merchant vessel except to exercise the traditional right of visit and search, together with any rights that may grow out of the results of that search.

The imperial German government, however, does this with the firmest confidence that the same pressure applied to it will now be applied to the British government to force that government to renounce a starvation campaign against Germany through a blockade which the American government in its note of March 30, 1915, described as illegal and indefensible, and a measure in which America

could not acquiesce without forfeiting its rights and violating its neutrality. It is against this starvation campaign, as all the world knows, that the German submarine policy is a reprisal.

The imperial German government recalls to the attention of the American government the American policy as announced in the note to Germany dated July 21, 1915:

The government of the United States and the imperial German government are contending for the same object, have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost.

The imperial German Government, hereby removing what America has designated as a violation of the freedom of the seas from one quarter, now confidently expects America to cause the removal of what it has designated as a violation of this same principle from another quarter. If it should prove impracticable for the American government to bring the British government back to the limits of law, the German submarine reprisals against this illegal blockade will be resumed. It would be obviously unfair and unjust—and contrary to the spirit of fair play of the American people and the American government—if neutral America were to insist that one belligerent should abide by the very letter of the law, while another were left free to violate both its letter and its spirit.

Does any human being imagine

that America would not fulfil the trust imposed in her by this sort of surrender?

But there is no question that England would yield. We have economic pressure which she cannot resist, and all the world knows it. Such a note from Germany would finally result in a recovery of international law for the neutral world.—*April 22, 1916.*

OUR TWO POSITIONS ON ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS

No one ought to remain unclear as to the nature of the memorandum on armed merchantmen made public by the State department yesterday. It is stated that this memorandum represents the official position of our government in the question of armed freighters and submarines. The memorandum, by granting to freighters the widest possible latitude in using their guns against submarines, practically makes it impossible for the submarines to rise, approach and exercise that process of visit and search which we are trying to force them to substitute for unwarned destruction.

Our quarrel with Germany can be definitely settled only by the abolition of under-water attacks on trading vessels. There are two clear paths that lead to a settlement of this quarrel. If we follow one path, we shall force England to give up her illegal starvation war against Germany. If that occurs, the submarine war on England's food carriers, designed by the Germans as a retaliation, falls of its own weight. The *Evening World* of April 14th suggests a way by which Germany could make it easier for us to bring

about this joint return of both Germany and England to the limits of law. The *Evening World* suggests that Germany suspend the operation of her submarines against British food carriers, relying on the honor and neutrality of America to exercise on England's lawlessness the same pressure exercised on Germany's. If Germany's forthcoming note takes this course, we shall be friends with her again, and she will attain the end sought by her whole submarine war, namely, the abolition of the British "blockade."

However, Mr. Lansing may not take any measures against England at all, and yet insist that Germany cease all unwarned attacks on British freighters, using the submarines only to exercise the right of visit and search, together with any rights that may grow out of the results of that search. The best we can hope is that Germany will accede to these restrictions on condition that we get England to agree to disarm her food-carrying vessels. So long as England refuses to do this—so long as all her freighters, or any of them, carry guns that can pierce the frail hull of an approaching submarine—just so long we cannot tell submarines that they must restrict themselves to visit and search. If we do tell them this, in effect we tell them that they cannot exercise the rights of a warship against a trader without committing suicide. In plain words, they cannot enjoy the rights of warships.

For us to insist that England, as the price of immunity from submarines, shall disarm her freighters, will simply be an application of old principles of international law to the new conditions of naval warfare. Formerly, when all warships

were above the water, a merchant vessel was allowed to carry small guns and yet be classed as a trader, not to be summarily sunk. The small guns were to give the trader protection not against the warship but against Barbary and Chinese pirates. If the merchantman carried guns large enough to injure an approaching warship, the merchantman would not be approached at all, but sunk from a distance, as a naval vessel. The principle was: Immunity for a trader ceased when her armament was such as to endanger an approaching warship.

Apply the principle to the case in hand. The submarine is a warship. Any armament is sufficient to sink her as she comes to the surface and approaches. Therefore, any armament on a trader forfeits the trader's immunity. Barbary and Chinese pirates are no more; any guns are for the purpose of sinking submarines. All this was in the mind of Mr. Lansing when early this year he wrote to the entente powers, asking them to disarm their merchant vessels:

My government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of the undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government.

The offensive nature of the British guns on their traders is proven by documents captured by Germany from the steamer *Woodfield*, submitted to us, and not denied but confirmed by the British admiralty. The guns are served by naval gunners placed aboard the trader, with admiralty orders to fire on an approaching submarine.

Great Britain, answering Mr. Lansing's note, refused to disarm her merchant steamers. We then proceeded to insist that Germany give up her submarine warfare, and we let drop our contention to England that armed traders, being "auxiliary cruisers," were not immune from sudden destruction. Not only does this new memorandum of ours drop our contention, but it turns directly about and says that merchant vessels have a perfect right to arm against submarines and that, in spite of traders carrying armament—which we once said made them "auxiliary cruisers"—the submarines must not touch them without visit and search.

According to the interpretation current in Washington, there are two main points in the State department's memorandum. It says that a submarine must assume that an armed British merchant vessel is armed for defense only, until the guns are actually used against the submarine. It says that the mere presence, on board British traders, of admiralty attack orders, like those found on board the *Woodfield*, is not sufficient to prove that the trader's armament is for offense. The attack orders must carry penalty for the merchant captain whose ship disobeys them, in order to prove the guns to be of offensive nature.

If we thus reverse our previous position and stand on the present memorandum, we deny to the submarine a warship's right of control over merchant vessels. We deny to the submarine the right which the floating war vessels exercise: The right to sink at sight a trader so armed as to endanger the approach of the war vessel. In case Ger-

many does not simply accede to our demands, we hereby make it infinitely more difficult to enforce those demands. She considers that we are insisting on immunity for British food vessels without at the same time requiring that these vessels, to have immunity, shall conform to the ancient principle of reducing their armament below the point of danger for an approaching warship.

Our first position on the question of the relative rights of submarine and armed merchant ships is more logical than our second one, more in accord with the established principles of international law and more likely to avoid a conflict between America and Germany.

Above all else, we cannot afford to deny to the submarine all rights of the older types of warships. The submarine is an American invention. Both for offense and defense against a power which holds the seas, the submarine is an unequalled weapon. And to-day we do not want to throw away any freedom of action for our own submarines in a future war in which we may not hold the seas.

It is fortunate that in this question of the naval rights of submarines we have two positions, and that in case of need we can revert to the logical, the first one.—*April 29, 1916.*

OUR SUBMARINES

The present question as to the proper position for the United States to take upon the matter of armed traders and submarines is complicated by the necessity of considering what is to our own advantage. If we unduly restrict the

power of German submarines now, in the interest of British commerce, we may set precedents which will return to plague us in the future.

Such abstract questions as the relative rights of submarines and food vessels become very concrete when we consider definite cases of war in which the United States may be involved in the future. A war with Japan is by no means impossible. It is also by no means impossible that in such a war Japan will be our superior on the sea. Our only means of attacking her would be by the use of submarines. Her vulnerable spot would be her food supply, for like England she does not feed herself but is dependent upon food from overseas.

Let us assume these very possible conditions and see how our only power to reach Japan would be destroyed by the precedents which some want us to create in the present struggle between England and Germany.

It is the American-Japanese war of 1920. An American submarine sights a Japanese ship with provisions from Germany. Our submarine wants to prevent these provisions from reaching Japan; the submarine has no desire to sink the passengers and crew of the ship. It would like to halt the ship and, before sinking it, take off the crew and passengers, later towing them to safety. But Japan, acting on England's precedents in the war of 1916, has refused to disarm her food carriers. If the American submarine rises to order the Japanese vessel to stop, the latter's concealed gun will sink our frail craft. The German government, acting on a precedent set by the United States in the war of 1916, has warned us that we

cannot sink Japanese carriers of German food until after visit and search, without incurring a diplomatic break, and war with Germany. But the Japanese merchantman's guns will not allow us to visit and search. We dare not risk war with Germany. We dare not sink these Japanese ships which refuse to let us visit and search them. So our submarines are powerless.

That is, if the memorandum issued last Wednesday by the State department becomes the official stand of the administration, the administration will make for us a bed in which we may not want to lie.

The wise thing for this government to do is to abolish the use of sea power to starve a civilian population—unless a lawful and complete blockade is maintained. That is, we should abolish the present illegal starvation campaign of both England and Germany. But if we are going to allow international law to be recast, and if we are going to allow the old-fashioned warships to do as they choose to starve the civilian enemy, then let us create this freedom of action also for the democratic submarine which all nations can use. Let us not create freedom of action solely for the benefit of England, who alone is certain to control the surface of the seas in future wars.

To retain for our submarines in the future the same power that will be exercised by an opponent that will hold the seas against us, it is necessary for us to revert to our earlier stand on the question of submarines and armed traders. In our own future interest, it is necessary to see to it that if British food vessels are to be immune from unwarmed submarine attacks, they must

drop their weapons of resistance to submarine visit and search.

In other words, our own future demands that we recognize the submarine as a warship.—*May 2, 1916.*

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ISLAND EMPIRE

In Washington last week, at a meeting of the American Society of International Law, Capt. W. L. Rodgers, U. S. N., told his hearers that German submarines have succeeded in challenging the supremacy of the British navy.

On the following day Mr. Lansing told the same society that the internal combustion engine, through making possible aircraft and the submarine, had revolutionized warfare. He compared the change to the change wrought by gunpowder. The internal combustion engine, used in aeroplane and submarine,

has made surprise almost impossible on land and has vastly increased the possibility of surprise at sea.

Mr. Lansing could have said more. He could have said that the submarine spells the downfall of the supremacy of the island empires and the rise of the supremacy of continental countries like ours, whose food supply is in itself and need not come from overseas.

Every schoolboy recalls the classic tribute of Shakespeare to the impregnability of England in Richard II.:

This royal throne of kings, this scepter'd
isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war;
This happy breed of men, this little
world,

This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands—
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm,
this England.

But to-day the sea no longer serves England as a wall, or as a moat defensive to a house. Through the industrialization of England, it has become a workshop for the world, where nearly 50,000,000 people are engaged in manufacturing goods to be exported in return for raw materials and food to feed the home population. The seas must be kept open; that is, free passage must be secured for food vessels, else the nation starves. But free and unhindered passage for food vessels is no longer secured by control of the surface of the water. Out of its depths comes a stern and unrelenting "Halt!" The other island empire, Japan, is in a similar position. Like England, Japan is dependable on food from overseas.

The submarine is a wonderful defensive weapon for continental countries, and is for them an irresistible weapon of offense against all island powers built upon open sea routes. The short-sighted course of England in this war is forcing the starvation campaign upon the world as a recognized method of civilized warfare. At the very outbreak of the war England, by banning foodstuffs for Germany, established the principle that sea power may be used to starve an entire nation, in spite of the fact that that sea power does not assume the obligation of maintaining a lawful blockade. We have acquiesced in this principle at least tacitly, by not forbidding it. We cannot for long hold back German submarines from carrying to England

the same starvation which England designed against the German civilian population. British diplomacy has made a thorny bed for British citizens to lie in.

By forcing England and Germany both to renounce their starvation campaign, we can, to be sure, save England in this war. But in all future wars a power dependent on overseas food supply can never again be the autocrat of the world. The reason is that such a power is indefensibly vulnerable to any country that can support a hundred submarines. Submarines are not costly; they are a democratic instrument. Any smaller nation with a self-sufficient food supply or with land connections to neutral sources of food supply can answer the threat of the sea power of England or Japan with a threat ten times more terrible.

Gunpowder meant the democratizing of land warfare; the feudal knight could not resist the serf who held a gun. Submarines mean the democratizing of sea power. Invented in America and perfected in Germany, the submarine has broken the wall, filled up the defensive moat of the island empire. It has wrenched the trident from the ancient lords of the sea.—*May 3, 1916.*

A PRESIDENTIAL VICTORY

The President has won a great victory. Britain, at the outbreak of the war, set out to starve Germany by stopping all food going to Germany. It was a crass violation of international law. Germany retaliated by an attempt to starve England by torpedoing freight car-

riers in and out of England. To be sure, England's violation of international law came first, and the inhumanity of the attempt to starve a nation is perhaps equal to the inhumanity of sinking passengers and crews of British vessels without warning. But more neutral lives were lost through Germany's action, and the President, spokesman for humanity, insisted on settling the German issue first. He has resisted all pressure from all sources to make England and Germany jointly return to the limits of law. Germany must return first.

In to-day's note Germany does return. Without reserve she gives up the practice of torpedoing without warning British vessels, armed or unarmed, passenger or freight carriers. Every ship that sails the seas is now as safe as if the submarine had never been invented. Germany lays down the submarine arm by whose use she challenged British naval supremacy. The President has won a glorious victory.

He has created for himself the path to an imperishable fame. He may be known as the arbiter of nations, the savior of international law and international morality. He may force a complete return to law at sea, a return which will obviate the present necessity that nations, in self-defense, arm to the teeth.

The German suggestion that the President might be now expected to remove England's violations of law is a piece of gratuitous advice that no one asked for. No one so well as the President knows the opportunities that confront him to-day. In his note to Germany regarding the *Lusitania* in July, 1915, he said that America would defend the principle of the freedom of the seas

—the right of neutrals to trade and travel freely in wartime—against all who violate it, without compromise and at any cost.

One of our offenders having thus recanted, we need not be told of our own intention to bring the other one promptly to book.

The President's one-track mind has been freed of the German traffic congestion. Signals now read "clear" for the waiting train of the British issue. It will travel the same unerring road which the German issue has already passed over.

—May 5, 1916.

ARMED LINER ISSUE DEAD

Hesitancy to accept the German note as a full concession to our demands is accounted for largely by the misinterpretation, on the part of some members of the press, of one phrase of the note. The phrase is contained in the new instructions to submarine commanders:

In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels *recognized by international law*, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance.

The phrase "recognized by international law" refers to the "general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels." It does not refer to "merchant vessels" alone. That is, unwarmed sinking is to cease for all merchant vessels, armed or unarmed. The submarine will, in the manner allowed by international law, stop, visit and search merchant

vessels. If they prove to be lawful prizes the submarine will then, in accordance with international law, proceed to destroy them after saving lives on board. A captor may destroy his prize if he finds it inconvenient to take the prize into port.

A proper understanding of the German concessions removes any fear that Germany has allowed the controversy over "armed liners" to prevent a full understanding with us.—*May 10, 1916.*

GERMANY MAKING GOOD

On July 5 an editorial in the *Chicago Herald* ran as follows:

Germany has made good on her latest submarine promises.

There has been no more *Lusitanias*, no more *Sussexes*, no more ruthless sinking of vessels carrying American citizens. The promises given to President Wilson have been kept to the letter. American lives have been spared, American property has been untouched, and Washington has not been compelled to resort to extreme measures.

For the good faith which it has exhibited in this matter, for abiding strictly by the terms of its pledges, Germany is due recognition. To that extent the peace of the world has been advanced and the cause of international right set forward. The matter is one for common congratulation.

The solid settlement of the German issue is a cause for satisfaction to the administration at Washington. The *Chicago Herald* editorial also will serve to remind us that we have performed half the work which destiny entrusted to us as the greatest neutral nation in this world war. We have corralled and tamed one of the offenders against the codes of international law and humanity.

The other is still at large. Great Britain still pursues a policy of attempting to starve 50,000,000 civilian men and women in Germany. The attempt is being pursued by means of a blockade which a year ago we designated as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible." We have pointed out a glaring example of the ineffectiveness of the blockade in that Sweden trades unhindered with German Baltic ports. Then why may not we? The first essential of a blockade is that it shall bear equally on all neutrals; that it shall shut all neutrals out of Germany or none, except ships carrying contraband of war.

Thomas Jefferson tells us that for us to accede to such an illegal blockade is to become a party to its lawless attempt on the lives of women and children. In March, 1915, we told Great Britain that we could not accede to this blockade without violating the neutrality which we chose to observe.

What of this British issue? What of our protests against the opening on the high seas of our mails to neutral countries? The "inviolability" of the mails has become a myth. These are matters which involve more than our rights, our material interests, our neutrality. On our preservation of international law depends the confidence with which the world that intends to be peaceful will face the future. By our action or inaction we decide whether or not the seas, the currents of international commerce, belong to those who work and trade or to those who choose to fight and slay.

Half our work is done. We shall leave a sorry record if we do not complete the other half.—*July 10, 1916.*

WALL STREET AND THE U-BOAT

Why should the financial district have a chill and the prices of American securities be depressed in the stock market because the undersea liner *Deutschland* arrived at Baltimore? The giant submarine brought wealth to the United States—a wealth of dyes sorely needed in a thousand lines of American industry—and will take back to Germany products of America.

If Wall Street's vision was not narrow it would see in the *Deutschland's* coming a thing of cheer and not of chill. It would see other *Deutschlands* carrying from our ports the yields of our farms, our factories and our mills. It would see more profit, more prosperity for our farmers, our manufacturers, our railroads, every one. It would see more trade by land and by sea, regardless of blockades, legal or illegal, so long as the war lasts. It would see in the *Deutschland* one of the real bull features of to-day.—*July 11, 1916.*

SUBMARINES AND BLOCKADES

An interesting question is the effect which commercial submarines will have upon the legality of the British blockade of German North Sea ports, like Hamburg and Bremen. Our State department has characterized the British blockade as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible," because it did not include German Baltic ports. With these ports Sweden and the other Scandinavian

countries trade undisturbed. Therefore, it is, we claim, unlawful for England to stop our exports to the German Baltic, for such stoppage—with Swedish exports permitted—is a violation of a prime element of true blockade; namely, impartiality.

Now the commercial submarine comes out of Bremen, a North Sea port. Sister ships are building to ply regularly between Bremen and our North Atlantic ports. They will regularly pass in and out of Bremen with practical certainty of not being captured. That being the case, the question asks itself: What of the effectiveness of the British blockade of Bremen?

What is an effective blockade? In the past it has meant the continuous presence, off the blockaded port, of enough warships to make it manifestly dangerous for merchant vessels to get in or out past the blockaders. The British blockaders are not off Bremen. They are north of Scotland and in the English Channel, intercepting ships that attempt to get past the British Isles, north or south of them. There are occasional British cruisers in the North Sea, perhaps enough of them to make it manifestly dangerous for Scandinavia to try to trade with Bremen. Let us assume that, up till now, Bremen has been blockaded.

Obviously a blockading cordon under modern conditions of submarine warfare, must be far out from the blockaded port. The cordon cannot be expected to intercept every vessel that tries to go in or out. But the cordon must be so effective that the chances are that a vessel will be caught if it tries to run through. If vessels can march

calmly past the blockading cordon with the practical certainty of not being caught, is the blockade still effective?

The commercial submarines will thus march past the blockading squadron, with the certainty of not being caught. Can the blockading squadron then lawfully stop other vessels that desire to proceed through the blockade, steamers and sailers? If a new development of the technique of merchant vessels enables a class of them to prove the blockade ineffective, must not the blockaders so develop the technique of their operations as to be able to catch the blockade breaker and reassert the effectiveness of the blockade? Until that reassertion occurs, must not the blockader admit the ineffectiveness of the blockade and desist from pretending to maintain it?

For the United States in the present case, the question of whether or not Bremen is blockaded is perhaps an academic one. We know and have stated that the German Baltic ports are not lawfully blockaded and we shall assert our right to ship to them.

However, the question as to the effect of commercial submarines on the effectiveness of the blockade of Bremen has a deep bearing on the whole future course of maritime warfare and maritime law. If the coming line of commercial submarines is to render the British blockade of Bremen ineffective, then the blockade is a thing of the past. This is a question which in the immediate future will force itself upon the attention of the diplomats and the international lawyers of the world.—*July 12, 1916.*

ENGLAND AND THE SUBMARINE FREIGHTER

The arrival of the submersible freighter *Deutschland* grows in importance the more its possibilities are examined. We do not have to do with a single ship, but with the first ship of a new steamship line, steamers so built that they are immune from the blockade of a power that holds the seas. We may now hope that the obstructive attitude of Great Britain towards the development of maritime law in war time will be reversed. We may even hope that the way has been paved for introducing the principle of the immunity of private property at sea in war time. This is a principle for which the United States has always contended, from the Treaty of Paris in 1856 to the second Hague Conference in 1907.

England is the manufacturing, trading and financial center of the world. She paid a price for turning herself into an international workshop; she became dependent upon other countries for oversea supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. To guard this vital oversea line of communications, to prevent the starvation of 45,000,000 people in the British Isles, the British navy was there. This was the defensive aspect of British sea power.

That sea power had also an offensive aspect. It could strike as well as guard. British warships could cut the oversea line of communications of any other country that had developed its foreign trade. For Britain had the strongest navy in the world. This possibility has hung over Germany like a sword of Damocles the last thirty-five years

while her foreign trade has been growing.

The logical development of our repeated proposals of the immunity of private property at sea in war time would have been the abolition of blockades and contraband. No nation would have had to maintain a navy to guard its oversea lines of communication. The routes of trade would have been free from the depredations of war. This might seem precisely what England, with her vulnerable oversea trade, would want. The establishment of the free seas would have freed England from the fear of being struck. But it would also have deprived her of her most terrible power to strike. With the most powerful navy in the world England was the sure gainer by the old order of things. She could not really be struck and no other power could escape her striking.

That was in the days when warships and freighters were all on the surface. Now we have undersea warships. They seriously imperil the British line of communications; the navy that holds the seas is no defense against the submarine. We have curbed the German submarines in this war, at least temporarily. But there is every prospect that their development in numbers, radius of action and armament will be such that in future wars commerce carriers will be at their mercy.

Nor can the navy that holds the seas strike a deadly blow at other trading nations in the future, as the submersible freighter develops. Unless the principle of the free seas is proclaimed, nations after this war will go to any extreme to produce within their borders all the necessities of national existence. Imports,

for which no home substitute can be found, will be imported in submersible freighters in war time.

With her vulnerability as to her own commerce greatly increased and her striking power as to the commerce of others greatly reduced by the development of the submarine, Great Britain may now be willing to join the other nations of the world in agreeing to exempt the commerce of those who choose to trade from destruction by those who choose to devastate and slay.
—July 13, 1916.

THE PRESS AND THE DEUTSCHLAND

It is instructive to read the editorials of eastern papers regarding the advent of the submersible freighter *Deutschland*, her status under international law and her effect thereon. The comments range from lavish praise to rebuke, and back again to the patronizing remark of the *New York Times* that:

At best the achievement of this bold craft will serve only to stir the wonder and promote the gayety of nations.

It is as if the *Times* had seen the *Deutschland* at the Hippodrome.

Similar is the judgment of the *Hartford Courant* as to the significance of the event. The *Courant*, apparently after reflection, decides to give the *Deutschland* mention in its editorial column, which is headed by this thrilling bit of international news:

The *Torrington Register* of Saturday and the *Norwich Record* of Saturday came along yesterday with the *Greenwich Graphic* of Friday. Welcome, of course, but a trifle late.

The New York *Journal of Commerce* is thrown into real distress at the thought of the international complications which the Deutschland may cause us if we allow her to take on a cargo here. The purpose of the boat is to escape the lawful British blockade and, the *Journal of Commerce* feels we may lose our status as neutrals if we allow her to use our ports and carry our goods.

Its (the *Deutschland's*) very purpose is one of evasion if not of direct violation of what is called law between nations in time of war. . . . How about the obligations of neutrals in regard to the use of their ports for this kind of trade, which is deliberately planned and directed for the defeat of the blockade at the other end of the line. . . . Has a neutral country the right to permit its ports to be used in that way by one belligerent power against another?

We have been rude enough to that blockade already. Our secretary of state has called it "ineffective, illegal and indefensible." If we now stand by and watch German submersible freighters make a perfect farce of what is not a blockade in any case—why, no one will longer have any respect for it at all.

The Washington *Herald* sees in the arrival of the Deutschland a demonstration of Germany's power—and probably her intention—to invade us. The trip

gives us notice that it is or soon will be within the power of the Germans to put submarines equipped with guns or torpedoes into any or all of our ports at will.

The New York *Evening Telegram* has the most humorous reference of all:

By the way, the advent of the *Deutschland* is another Sunday happening of extreme interest the *Evening Telegram* has given to the reading world,

which it otherwise would have had to wait until Monday to learn of.

The U-boat no doubt timed its arrival in recognition of our neutrality.

No doubt. The conspiracy between the Deutschland and the *Evening Telegram* will be proven if the boat has brought over enough German dyes for the paper again to don its all-pink garb.

These airy comments are, to be fair, not typical of the editors of the country, who see the deep and wide significance of the event, laud the heroism of captain and crew and praise this new triumph of German genius. The *Baltimore American* frivolously remarks:

Germany has the laugh on Great Britain for sure.

The Albany *Argus* has an excellent discussion of the status of the vessel under international law. The *Argus* contends that the submersible freighter cannot be sunk without warning or without caring for safety of passengers and crew.

The doctrines to which we have forced Germany to accede may yet be of the utmost value to her. . . .

Doesn't it mean for future wars, even if too late for this one, that effective blockades must be impossible.

The New York *Evening World* hails the submersible freighter as a new sovereign of the seas and says she will revolutionize naval architecture as the Monitor did. The Boston *Post* says:

The feat which has been accomplished is a marvel in its application of an invention of destruction to the uses of trade.

The New York *Globe* of July 11 strikes the deepest note of all. The *Globe* sees Great Britain freed of the constant fear that her oversea lines of communication

might be cut. Because of the submersible freighter, Great Britain, the *Globe* says, will not be as dependant as she has been on the command of the sea to carry on trade with her extended dominions. Nor will Germany need fear starvation in the future. The *Globe* calls its editorial "The Negation of Sea Power." It concludes:

The general interest of the world would be advanced by the negation of sea power. It would lessen British necessity and at the same time provide against the abuse of the power born of such necessity. The nations would tend to become more pacific because able to be sure of their economic safety. May the Germans go as far as they like, therefore, in building larger and larger undersea craft. In this they will be advancing the welfare of mankind.

Finally, we may all indulge to the full our natural sentiments of admiration and satisfaction over the feat of the *Deutschland*. The *New York Times* tells us:

One doesn't have to be a sympathizer with Germany's cause to see in the crossing of the Atlantic by the *Deutschland* an achievement of no small magnitude.

We are relieved. Somehow we worried about the warmth of our feeling for Captain Koenig and his men. We breathe free again, now that that feeling has passed the national board of censorship.—*July 14, 1916.*

DEUTSCHLAND A MERCHANT VESSEL

The State department has made the only possible decision on the status of the subsea liner *Deutschland*. It has ruled that the *Deutschland* is a merchant vessel entitled

to all the privileges that are extended to other merchant vessels in American ports.

The decision rendered in the case of the *Deutschland* will of necessity apply to all vessels of character similar to the *Deutschland*, despite the declaration by acting Secretary of State Polk that each future submarine freighter which enters the territorial waters of the United States will be classified separately and independently. If the *Bremen*, now reported to be on its way to an American port with another German cargo, meets the conditions which have won for the *Deutschland* a rating as a mercantile vessel, the State department will have no choice but to classify the *Bremen* as an unarmed merchantman.

Having established, by its negotiations with Germany, certain definite principles of law necessitated by the development of the submarine as a weapon of offense and defense, the United States by its decision on the *Deutschland* is codifying the rules of nations with regard to the use of a submarine as a freight carrier. Thus to the United States has fallen the task of recognizing and regulating the latest arm of the sea commerce and sea warfare of the world.

The initiative of the United States in the legal and international aspects of the submarine boat seems to be a fitting outcome of the pioneer services of American brains and American enterprise in making the submarine itself a fact.

The State department's decision must furnish interesting reading at London and Paris, where it was expected that legal or diplomatic means would be found to rob the Germans of the fruit of their inge-

nity and enterprise.—*July 17, 1916.*

BRITISH FOOD CARRIERS

The official reports of Lloyd's Register show interesting data regarding the shipbuilding industry in Great Britain. On March 31, 1916, there were under actual construction in British yards 1,423,335 gross tons of shipping. It looks like a large amount.

But what helps Great Britain in her need for more ship room is not the tonnage building but the tonnage launched and completed. In the first three months of this year 80,561 gross tons of shipping were launched. The explanation of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce at Washington is:

The dates of launch and completion in British yards are uncertain so long as the yards are employed fully on naval construction and turning out munitions for the allies.

The total of 80,561 gross tons launched in three months does not replace the normal wastage from wreck, fire or old age; to-day that wastage is greatly increased by the perils of war.

It is a strange and significant coincidence that addition to the British merchant marine in the first three months of 1916, that is, 80,000 tons, is precisely the amount of British shipping that German submarines were destroying every week in this same period.

The facts illustrate the value to Great Britain of our intervention in the submarine warfare on her behalf. The facts indicate how serious a thing it will be for England when the submarine campaign is resumed,

with the increased numbers of underwater craft completed since April. Germany will probably not submit for an indefinite time to the illegal attempt to starve her civilians without returning to her own illegal methods of attempting to starve the civilians of England.—*Aug. 4, 1916.*

THE GORE RESOLUTION AGAIN

Our neighbor, the "Times," never lets a week pass without proclaiming the doom of some one who voted for the Gore resolution. The Progressive Senator Clapp, of Minnesota, was favored with one editorial each fortnight because of his vote on that measure, and when he was defeated at the Republican primaries a short time ago the "Times" saw in his defeat a righteous judgment for his iniquity. Now the "Times" is out in favor of two Socialists in Wisconsin and against two Republicans "who voted for the Gore resolution."

As a matter of simple fact, Senator Clapp was defeated through local political conditions in Minnesota. The two Wisconsin congressmen did not vote for the Gore resolution for it never appeared in the House, being a Senate measure. If they had so voted it would have made no difference. Nobody in the West and few in the East understand what the Gore resolution was, anyway. Among those who have not yet got it straight is the "Times."

When the submarine issue was acute, Senator Gore introduced a resolution warning Americans not to travel on armed belligerent liners. The body of the resolution was pre-

ceded by a very flowery preamble. At the moment that the vote was to be taken and debate was shut off, Senator Gore *amended* his resolution. Apparently seeing that it would not pass, he used it to play a trick on the Senate. He left undisturbed the flowery preamble, but changed the body of the thing into a resolution that the sinking of another armed belligerent liner with an American on board would be a cause for war with Germany!

So Senators Clapp and La Follette, and the other condemned ones who voted for this resolution, voted to support the administration up to the very limit of war. If their vote meant anything, surely the "Times" approves of them.—*Aug. 29, 1916.*

SIX-INCH GUNS NOW

It used to be three-inch guns.

Such was the armament of allied merchantmen when Sercetary Lansing ruled that merchantment could carry guns without forfeiting their immunities as peaceful carriers.

Germany protested against this ruling. She pointed out that even a three-inch gun gave a merchantman the power to destroy a submarine. Mr. Lansing reaffirmed his own interpretation of international law. The armament carried by allied merchantmen was of so small a caliber that it was purely defensive, he explained.

And now it is six-inch guns.

The *Cedric*, of the White Star Line, steamed out of New York harbor yesterday with one of these larger guns mounted at her stern.

Will it be twelve-inch guns next? —*Sept. 15, 1916.*

BOATS THAT DIVE

It thrills the imagination to read of the arrival in Baltimore of the *Deutschland*, the world's first commercial submarine. It is the same thrill which has been running through the world since the air was conquered by the genius of man. As in the air, so under the water, the stern pressure of military necessity has compelled a technical development whose commercial use will eventually transcend its military use. Two new elements have been opened for the trade and travel routes of man.

It is early to speculate upon the effect of the commercial submarine upon the British attempt to starve Germany, and upon the legality of the so-called British blockade. One thing is certain: The *Deutschland* and her sister ships will relieve the acuteness of the dye shortage in this country, and will be able to take back to Germany certain hospital supplies, like rubber gloves, which are sorely needed in German hospitals, and which the American Red Cross has not been able to have passed through British cruisers.

We see another example of the fallacy of that ancient fable that the Germans have no individuality and are helpless as pawns when more than arm's length away from the directing general staff. To Karl Mueller, Weddigen, the captains of the romantic Lloyd commerce raiders now interned at Norfolk, as well as Hans Berg, pilot of the *Appam*, we must add the name of Capt. Koenig, of the *Deutschland*. Universal military service, order and discipline in individual and social life, these are not subversive of

the highest development of individual initiative. They are rather the sure basis on which such individuality can develop.

As for the status of the *Deutschland* under international law, there is not the slightest question. She is a pure merchant carrier which, in addition to other accomplishments,

knows how to dive. A merchant vessel that dives remains a merchant vessel just as a man that dives remains a man. No one would seriously propose refusing to a man that dives—on the ground that he is a fish—the status and protection to which he is entitled by law.—*July 10, 1916.*

The British Blockade

COTTON

Cotton, as king among agricultural crops, received renewed recognition at the convention of the American Bankers' Association which closed at Seattle, Wash., yesterday afternoon. On the motion of the president of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, the following resolution was adopted:

Whereas, The cotton crop of 1914 was marketed at low prices with consequent loss and hardship to the planters of the cotton-growing states and all those connected in any manner with the production and sale of cotton.

Whereas, Following the advice of recognized financial and agricultural authorities, the planters greatly reduced the acreage planted in cotton this year in their endeavors to promote as far as it lay within their power the general welfare.

Whereas, The recent declaration by belligerent powers that cotton is contraband now threatens to seriously affect the marketing of this season's crop and work great hardships.

Whereas, The President of the United States and the Federal Reserve Board have shown commendable zeal and great efficiency in forecasting and warding off similar impending calamities.

Resolved, That this convention commends the President of the United States and the State department for the efforts which have been already made looking to a modification of the said contraband order, and that it is a hope of this convention that these efforts will be continued until the threatened peril to this great industry is averted.

This action by the representatives of the entire banking interest of the United States is exactly in line with the policy in regard to cotton which

The Evening Mail has consistently advocated for several months.

Cotton is necessarily an international crop. Sixty-five per cent. of the world's output is produced in our southern states. The centers of consumption lie in the densely populated industrial districts of the New England states, England, France, Austria and Switzerland. Hence the importance of safe transportation and unimpeded distribution to the markets of the world.

Like the other pending international issues, the modification of the contraband order on cotton has a great significance for the future, as well as for the immediate present. If the contraband order for cotton is recognized now, a menace will hang over the agricultural industry of the South that will bring disorganization and heavy loss whenever a war breaks out.—*Sept. 10, 1915.*

OUR DUTY TO OURSELVES— AND TO OTHERS

President Wilson found a hearty response from the people the other day when he declared that "peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted principles of international law—only upon those things which remind nations of their duties to each other."

Peace can be maintained only upon that basis, and war should not be waged upon any other. Certainly the clearly defined rights of non-belligerent nations should not be

menaced by the necessities or the desires of any nation at war. This government has consistently maintained that policy so strongly urged upon us by all our earlier Presidents. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Adams are all on record unqualifiedly against the national servility that would tolerate interference with the trade of a nation at peace, and in favor of an aggressive assertion of an untrammelled right to have commercial intercourse with every nation not engaged in war.

Ever since England, through its Orders in Council, adopted the policy of putting all cargoes from this country that pass her shores under "suspicion," this country has been waiting for President Wilson to assert the rights of American foreign trade as stoutly as he defended those of American lives at sea. Ship after ship has been taken to English ports, there to remain until a prize court could find time to listen to American appeals for release. Our government has cabled its protests when urged to do so by the owners of the stuffs and the cargoes; and with each new arrest of an American ship, we have been told at Washington that a strong assertion of American rights was about to be made to the English government. Such a letter, it was said a month ago, awaited the return of Secretary of State Lansing from his vacation. We are now assured that it is on its way to England by messenger to be delivered to-day.

No doubt when our protest is made it will be in line with the firm attitude of Mr. Wilson's predecessors in office, and with the extract we have quoted above from his recent address. Unfortunately delay has created the impression that the

vitality has been revised out of the document—that fineness of phrase may unconsciously have taken the place of vigor of expression. It is unfortunate, too, that our delay has permitted England to lay down a new sea law, drafted out of its own necessities, for the smaller nations of the Scandinavian group, when if we have a duty in this war it is to be the earliest among peaceful nations in defining and protecting the rights of all. That is one of the things which, as President Wilson has said, "remind nations of their duties to each other, and, deeper still, of their duties to mankind."

Sweden, Norway and Denmark have been looking to the United States with hope that this great nation will insist upon recognition of the accepted principles of sea law, not only as to her own ocean commerce, but that of smaller nations as well. Weak as they are, comparatively, they have not failed promptly to enter their own vigorous protest.

With the powerful backing of the United States, their cause is greatly strengthened and should be brought to a successful decision. The question is, whether Great Britain intends to take action on the protests of neutrals, including the United States, during the war or put off the issue until after the conflict is over. Sir Edward Grey is quoted in recent cable dispatches to the effect that the controversy that has arisen out of the hold-up of American commerce on the high seas should be referred to The Hague for adjudication, and that in any event such an expedient must be resorted to in preference to an open breach with the United States.

There is a distinct implication in

Sir Edward Grey's attitude that Great Britain has no intention to push the matter to a quick decision. Does that mean that the oppressive interference with legitimate American commerce will continue pending the necessarily deliberate proceedings of the tribunal at The Hague? If such is the meaning of Sir Edward's utterance, then it amounts to a declaration of refusal to meet the grievances of the United States.

In such a contingency President Wilson will face the necessity of taking far more vigorous action than any that has yet been contemplated. —Nov. 1, 1915.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

Italy is shipping fruit and other articles to Germany and getting in return coal from Germany's coal mines. This is by leave of England, for Italy must have fuel or her ships could not sail the seas or her factories continue business. Italy is one of the allies, but Italy is not at war with Germany.

If Italy was unable to get coal, Italy would be in a desperate plight. That being the case the English, to aid their troubled friend, permit the Italians to send goods to Britain's enemy, and get the much needed coal in return.

Why isn't England as generous to us? We have cotton—millions of bales of it—that has declined many dollars per bale in value because we cannot get it to foreign mills whose spindles are idle for want of it. We have wheat—millions upon millions of bushels of it—that has declined more than 20 cents a bushel within a month because we cannot get it to

people in Europe who are hungry for it.

And Germany has potash—tens of thousands of tons of potash—that we need to fertilize our farming acres, that we need to make certain medicines, and in a variety of things.

The cotton man of the South and the wheat grower of the West, the manufacturer, the railroad man, the shipper, the whole country, in fact, would benefit if we could exchange goods with Germany as Italy does "by leave of England."—Nov. 1, 1915.

JUST A BILL OF EXPENSE

The cables reflect the satisfaction of England's press and statesmen with the message from Secretary Lansing. There is just enough jar to the comments to keep them from appearing too unanimous in their attitude of benevolent dissent. They recognized that we have laboriously made up a record on which to base a bill of expense, but not to take serious issue with England's determination to rule the seas according to her needs. She has got to starve Germany, hence she defies American sovereignty on the waters and violates the very code of sea law which we bound Germany to recognize.

It was not only with fine phrase but with real vigor that we brought Germany to recognize that this nation proposed to assert its rights under all conditions both as to life and property at sea; it is not surprising, therefore, that the marked difference between that note and the latest Lansing document should have led England to assume, as she evidently has, that she was really not being brought to book—that the offenses she is committing are regarded by

our government as offenses against our pocketbook more than against our honor. The former can be satisfied through The Hague tribunal or otherwise; the latter requires instant satisfaction or gets none at all. Hence England takes our "protest" none too seriously, and will in her own leisurely way, following our own deliberate course, tell us her side of the story a year or so hence.

That is precisely Mexico's attitude in the matter of American claims for property wantonly destroyed by the rival bandits there. Our protests, such as they are, have been put aside for response when the belligerents feel disposed to give the question some thought. The only difference is that in Mexico the American property confiscated or destroyed has been on land; while England has taken American property on the seas. The protection of our government, however, ran to both, and was presumed by our citizens to cover both. Neither Mexico nor England, however, evidently regards our sovereignty as of much consequence when their necessities, arising out of war, demand the choking off of our sea trade or the looting of American enterprises.

A sharp and uncompromising stand toward Germany aroused that country from apathy to our vital interests and brought us a complete diplomatic victory. The Lansing note to England, however, does not justify a hope of similar results. The suggestion has been made from Washington that the issue could be settled by arbitration, likely to drag out for months and possibly for years after the war. In the meantime our throttled trade dies completely. A cash indemnity for a few particular shiploads of stuff cannot

possibly recompense us for the destruction of a vast trade and a commercial export organization that are the result of years of growth, and which are ours by right.

Even now, if it were possible for us to carry on the commerce that the note so ably demonstrates to be ours by right, whole sections of the country would be in a much better economic condition. Cotton, which is our largest export crop, would be bringing from fifteen cents to twenty cents a pound; lard and pork, instead of selling for less than the cost of production, would bring profitable returns to the farmers of the middle West. Our wheat and cereal crop, with Russia out of the market, should average twenty-five cents a bushel higher. The aggregate values lost to our farmers mount to more than five hundred million dollars. We have secured an open route for the export of a million dollars' worth of munitions a day. The country expects that the export interests of other sections, that are at least as legitimate, will be enforced with equal vigor.—Nov. 10, 1915.

AMERICA'S TRADE RIGHTS

Speaking for the best-informed British public opinion, the *Manchester Guardian* says that the issue raised by Mr. Lansing's note to Great Britain is somewhat clouded. If that issue, continues the *Guardian*, involves an insistence upon our right to trade with Germany, the British answer, regardless of international law, must be a decisive NO. If, on the other hand, the United States merely seeks to carry on an unrestricted trade in non-contr-

band with neutrals, strictly for consumption by neutrals, the question would resolve itself into a minor matter of practice, and doubtless some arrangement could be made.

Such a presentation of the case by a responsible English newspaper discloses the immensity of the divergence between the English conception of the situation, even after the presentation of our note, and the actual interests of American producers and importers. To the average man reading that document the main point of emphasis appears to lie in our demand that we be permitted to carry on trade free from molestation with neutral countries surrounding Germany, in goods actually destined for consumption in those countries. The emphasis is misplaced.

The briefest reflection will show that this point is so simple and self-evident that it should not need to be made. The fact that Great Britain and Germany are at war has no bearing whatever upon our trade with Sweden or Holland. With Germany shut out of the markets of the Scandinavian countries as a seller by the exigencies of war, we are entitled to our share of the enlarged demand in those countries, no matter how much our sales there under the new conditions may exceed our exports to the same territory last year or two years ago. That is a trade opportunity that belongs rightfully to the American business man more than to any other. For England to limit us to the quantities sold last year, while her own commerce is profiting by larger exports to those very nations, constitutes a most unwarranted use of naval power, to which we cannot submit.

Sales for home consumption to Holland, Sweden or Denmark are minor matters compared with the main issue, which urgently needs to be brought out in its full force. Unless an actual and effective blockade of all German ports is established, there is no warrant in international law for shutting off the exportation from Germany of any and all articles that we may need. Our farmers must have potash; our textile industries are hampered by the lack of dyestuffs; other industries of the country require other products of German industry. Our importing houses, engaged in this trade, have built up vast organizations representing years of effort and the expenditure of large capital. This business could be closed down legally by no other means than an effective blockade, and even then the way through Holland would remain open to us of right.

The main questions in the controversy—its heart and its essence from the point of view of legitimate American interests—range as follows:

1. Not whether, but **HOW SOON** are we to be allowed to trade directly with the central empires in non-contraband goods? For fifteen months Britain has held up this trade.

2. Not whether, but **HOW SOON** will the embargo on our trade in non-contraband with the central powers be lifted in cases when such shipments are sent by way of adjoining countries? For fifteen months this interference has been kept up by Britain.

3. Not whether, but **HOW SOON** shall we be permitted to trade with the merchants of neutral countries in goods that they may have pur-

chased from Germany? For fifteen months has Britain withheld that right from us.

These rights are ours, and we are entitled to assert them with vigor. The fact that we are selling much is no justification of any attempt to prevent us from selling more. Exports of farm products, such as cotton, wheat, lard and other foodstuffs, would have brought us at least half a billion dollars more than our existing trade if our rights had not been curtailed by the British blockade policy.

Even if our export trade with neutral countries contiguous to Germany has increased, and the presumption obtains that the goods are re-exported from there by rail or water to the central empires, there is no warrant in international law for interference with this trade, except only so far as absolute contraband is concerned. In such a case, and in such a case only, could the doctrine of continuous voyage be justifiably invoked. Never has international law recognized that principle as applicable to conditional contraband, such as foodstuffs.

Such a construction of the law of nations was definitely established by the United States in the civil war, when a cargo of British army cloth shipped to Matamoras, in Mexico, and seized by the federal authorities, was released by our courts on the plea, advanced by England, that since it was conditional contraband, such a shipment to a neutral country was legal, whatever might be its ultimate destination. It was then asserted by Great Britain, and affirmed by the American courts, that goods constituting conditional contraband might be used by the civil population of a belligerent country.

The doctrine of continuous voyage, it was pleaded by England at that time, applied only to absolute contraband. The same doctrine, in the present instance operating against England, is now emphatically rejected by that country.

Shall our State department acquiesce in this facile reversal of interpretation of international law?—
November 12, 1915.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

In many hundreds of textile mills in America there is an acute shortage of dyestuffs. Before the development of aniline dyes the mills depended in large measure on logwood and vegetable colors for dyes. The logwood process is not so satisfactory or so good in results as the coal tar. With the war came a shutting off of aniline dyes from Germany. America has done its best to develop this industry in the United States, but it takes much time. With all our ingenuity, application and effort, it will be years before we are able to fill our needs in this particular field.

Shut off by England from obtaining dyes from Germany, we were forced to turn to logwood. Jamaica is the chief source of supply. Jamaica is a British possession. Great Britain has a mammoth textile industry in the Lancashire district. The British spinners had limited stocks of aniline dyes, and had to consider supplementing them with logwood, so they turned their attention to Jamaica. The Americans, in the urgency of their need, bid so freely that prices advanced rapidly. This was shocking. Right-

ly and properly, the British dye people complained to the government. The British government acted promptly. It not only put an embargo on shipments of logwood from Jamaica to the United States, but it commandeered shipments about to be made to this country.

Some persons in the United States had the temerity to complain of this and make harsh statements about the British seeking to cripple an American industry in order to aid a British one. There was talk even of acts of reprisal.

Happily, there will be no need for any such action. A Washington dispatch says the State department is advised that the British government will permit Jamaica to ship a certain amount of logwood to the United States.

How unjust it is of our textile people to utter any complaint when Great Britain gives evidence of such graciousness! If our manufacturers show proper respect for British interests, they may get a fair proportion of what the British have of any more material they do not require for themselves. Of course, the British must think of themselves first and safeguard their own requirements.

They permit us to buy logwood. We should be grateful.

Think of what would happen if the British were inclined to be arbitrary! Our mills, which employ nearly 700,000 persons, might be limited to the manufacture of white goods.

We are not so appreciative as we should be to the British for the consideration they show to us.—*Dec.* 30, 1915.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

The American cotton crop of this season is estimated by the government to be 11,161,000 bales, exclusive of linters. From the previous season there was a surplus of about 4,000,000 bales. Thus far this season the exports have been less than 2,500,000 bales, and the American mill takings approximate 3,000,000. That means that, in round figures, there are more than 9,000,000 bales in storehouses, on the farms, at the ports or in transit in this country.

Ordinarily at this time of the year our exports are 5,000,000 bales. Therefore our exports are curtailed one-half. Norway wants cotton; so do Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Holland, Spain and Italy. Of course, Germany would rejoice if it could obtain cotton. The same is true of Austria. The only European countries to which cotton is going in any volume are Great Britain and France.

Great Britain specifies the exact number of bales Norway may have each month. It permits Sweden to take a specified amount each month. It prescribes the quantity Denmark and Holland may import.

Some persons may not appreciate the justice of Britain's rules as to how and where America may sell its cotton.

Cotton is contraband, and as such is subject to seizure if shown to be destined to territory of the enemy. Holland and Denmark border on Germany, and therefore the British say they should not be trusted. Sweden and Norway are across a sea from Germany, and the British believe they should not be trusted with a bale of cotton beyond the

bare requirements of their mills. Therefore all cotton for these countries is held subject to British regulation. It must go to Great Britain first, be counted, certified, and then, if all is well, the shippers are permitted to send it on to its destination.

The law of nations warrants no such action, but where international law operates to the disadvantage of Great Britain it must, of course, be ignored.

Some criticism has been leveled at the British on the score that their war rules in regard to cotton and other commodities have been used not only to keep cotton and other goods out of Germany, but to fatten British trade. They have been accused of trading in cotton with the enemy while they have kept it from neutrals.

The official report of the British Board of Trade would seem to support this contention, for it shows that in September, 1915, Great Britain exported to Turkish territory 1,741,100 yards of cotton goods as against 452,000 in September, 1914. Great Britain explains this by the statement that the goods were sold to sections of the Ottoman kingdom which are only nominally under Turkish rule, such as Bussarah, Koweit, etc.

To the people of the southern states the disposal of the 9,000,000 bales of cotton now in the United States is a serious matter. If they cannot sell them to advantage, they will suffer loss. If much remains unsold, the heavy surplus will depress the value of the next crop. These people must be forgiven if they show irritation over the manner in which they are permitted by the British to do business. "Busi-

ness as Usual" is the slogan throughout England, but for many of the neutral nations of the earth it is "Business as Britain Permits."

Freedom of the seas is a farce when one nation prescribes the rules of commerce for all nations in order to fit her own needs.

To add to the aggravation of the South, the British now prescribe that all British vessels sailing from the United States with cotton must carry one-half cargo of grain. It does not matter if the American charterer has made his engagements for cotton. He may suffer financial loss and have to abrogate contracts, but that does not signify. He must obey, or the British government will not permit the ship to carry the freight.—December 31, 1915.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

No American manufacturer or dealer can sell outside of the United States any article of which rubber forms a part without the permission of the British government.

An American who gets an order from Spain for automobile tires is not permitted to ship direct. He must send the goods to Liverpool or London, where they pass under the scrutiny of British agents, and, if the British are satisfied the person to whom they are consigned is of the right sort, a license is issued for their re-exportation to Spain.

No one in France, Italy, Russia, Switzerland, in Africa or in Asia, may receive a shipment of rubber goods from America without the permission of Great Britain. Any attempt to violate the British order may result in a shutting off of raw rubber supplies to the American manufacturer. Without the raw

rubber which Great Britain controls the American manufacturer would be embarrassed seriously.

The Goodrich, the Goodyear and all other tire manufacturers conform to the British regulation. Such foreign goods as they ship they send to Great Britain. They cannot afford to arouse the wrath of John Bull.

So long as America does as the British direct it may continue to be treated almost as considerately as if it were a British colony.

Rubber is contraband of war. As such it is subject to seizure if shown to be destined to territory of an enemy, but not otherwise.

A New Yorker shipped a quantity of dress shields to a firm in Holland. The shipment was seized by the British. It took three months and a lot of correspondence and protest through our State department to get the shipment released. Then the seizure was explained. Rubber enters into the manufacture of dress shields, and as such the British held them.

Hot water bottles, arctics, nursing nibs, rubber erasers—anything and everything of American make into which a particle of rubber enters and for which a dealer may find a market abroad—must be shipped to the British first and held subject to investigation before a license may be obtained for the delivery of the goods to the consignee.

Aside from munitions for the allies, Great Britain holds America to strict accountability in all matters of exports.—*January 5, 1916.*

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

On her last voyage from New York to Greece, the Greek steamer

Thessaloniki had among other cargo a consignment of leather and tannin, shipped by a Philadelphia concern to S. W. Hoffmann & Co., of Salonica.

The steamship touched at Malta, where a British official inspected and approved the cargo. Then she proceeded and at Salonica the freight for Hoffmann & Co. was discharged. Later the British seized the goods, had them replaced aboard the vessel and taken to Malta, where they remain.

Greece is a neutral country. Salonica is a Grecian port, at present occupied by France and Great Britain. The goods are owned by an American. There is no suggestion that they were intended for war purposes or that they were seized as contraband. The only explanation is that the name of the consignee indicates Teutonic origin or nationality.

S. W. Hoffmann & Co. have been in business in Salonica for more than a quarter of a century. Mr. Hoffmann was born in Austria, but has lived in Greece since boyhood. These facts are brought out in a protest from the United States to the British Foreign office, in which the pertinent question is asked if international law is to be made a mockery and neutral goods in a neutral bottom to a neutral country are subject to seizure because the name of the consignee may suggest the possibility of Germanic sympathy, whether goods to Smith would be passed, but the same goods to Schmidt in any part of the world would be seized.

Upon the answer of Sir Edward Grey to this question we shall learn

how we may conduct business "by leave of England."—*January 15, 1916.*

BRITAIN'S LATEST PHASE OF WAR

The desperate nation, like the desperate man, fights without rules. The cables have prepared us for the declaration by England of an absolute blockade of sea commerce between this country and Holland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden through the North Sea, and with Greece or other neutral nations in the Mediterranean.

England does not scruple to interrupt the sea commerce of neutral countries, even of the big United States, to defy every accepted principle of blockading law and to imperil her relations with nations at peace, in the vain effort to accomplish in that way that which she has failed to accomplish through her armies.

Her purpose is to starve Germany into submission. For the past year she has been striving to do this, but without avail. She now asserts that American foodstuffs are reaching Germany through the ports of neutral countries, and so without rhyme or reason, but by the sheer power of her dominant navy, she proposes to limit rigidly the quantity and kind of foodstuffs which Holland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark may take from us. Those countries can import only such supplies as England regards as necessary for their own consumption. No ship can pass to and from the United States and those countries except by permission of the British navy.

A blockade of the coast of Germany—made effective by English fighting ships bottling up German ports—would be, of course, clearly within the rights of England or any other attacking nation. English ships keep clear of the German coast, however. They will make no effort to blockade it even under the soon-to-be-announced order. Their plan is to close the English Channel to sea commerce, and to stretch a line of British cruisers from the Orkney Islands across the North Sea. Thus the only routes from the Atlantic into the North Sea will be closed to shipping. Neutral Europe as well as fighting Europe will be at the mercy of England's ships and all their sea commerce will be restricted to the bare necessities of each nation.

It is not surprising that the King of Sweden violently protests against this invasion of his country's rights as a neutral; it is not surprising that Holland's voice is raised in angry denunciation. The wonder is that France and Italy could have been won over to such a programme, even as a last desperate resource, for it is a plain defiance of laws that have been the protection of the sea commerce of those two nations in the past, and may be sorely needed by them in the future. The cable reports that France and Italy have given a reluctant and belated acquiescence can be interpreted only as a confession by those nations that they are in desperate straits and that the future must be sacrificed for present needs.

But what of the United States? Our direct interest is not in the feeble and ignored protests of the smaller Scandinavian group, but in the attitude of our own government.

What is that to be? England is about to tell us formally that we cannot ship supplies and foodstuffs to any nation in Europe, at peace or at war, without her consent. Those last three words should be repeated: Without her consent! This prohibition, it must be remembered, applies to American trade with neutral countries.

What such an arbitrary assumption of power means for the time being to every nation involved is too plain to require discussion; what it means for all time, should England persuade us to acquiesce in it, ought not to be lost sight of.

It means that the nation with the biggest navy and the greatest number of naval bases will always control the sea commerce of the world—a mere declaration by such a nation would tie up the shipping of all other nations to any extent it desires, just as England now proposes to do. A merchant marine would mean nothing to this country—even though not at war—if England's present purpose is to be an unchallenged precedent, unless we maintained a larger navy than England's and operated it on the English plan of making new sea law, through might, whenever our necessities demanded that we ignore the old and establish the new.

The precedent that England is determined to make by assuming control of the sea commerce of neutral nations means all this to the United States, for with sea law definitely interpreted in that way this nation cannot assume to be prepared unless she is equal in sea power to that of her mightiest possible enemy. That means not only that we must equal England's ships but stand

on England's precedents, as made from time to time.—*January 19, 1916.*

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

Switzerland is a republic, and the United States is a republic, and both nations are neutral, but no one in the United States can transact any business with any concern in Switzerland except through one establishment, the Societe Economique Surveillance, which is British in everything but name. It does not matter whether the shipment is shoe laces or locomotives, it will be barred from Switzerland unless consigned to the Societe Economique.

No one would be so unjust as to suspect that the British, after the war, may use to their own advantage the trade secrets they now are obtaining. No one, of course, doubts that our consul-general at London, Robert P. Skinner, was dreadfully mistaken in charging that the British, in some instances, are using the blockade as a pretense to shut American goods out of various neutral countries while promoting British trade with the same countries.

We know they wouldn't do any such thing. It is true, of course, that if it were any other people than the British, America might run a chance of having its foreign trade stolen from it, but, to paraphrase Marc Antony—

The British are honorable men,
All honorable men.

Meanwhile we are and should be grateful in the extreme for such business as we are able to do with Switzerland, "by leave of England."

—*Jan. 21, 1916.*

BRITAIN'S PRESENT BLOCKADE HITS AMERICA HARD

By E. J. CLAPP

Professor of Economics, New York University

Great Britain is about to announce a "blockade" of Germany. Most of the country has been under the impression that a blockade has existed for a long time and that England has been exercising every force in her power in order to prevent goods from moving into Germany or out of Germany, either direct or through the adjacent neutral countries on the seaboard, like Holland and Denmark.

Certainly the American cotton planters and exporters, who are forced to hold a million bales of cotton which Germany stands ready to buy at 25c. per pound, are under the impression that cotton cannot be shipped to Germany.

Certainly the American users of dyestuffs have been led to believe that they cannot get German dyes.

Certainly the packers, who normally export to Germany vast quantities of lard, are nearly convinced the German market is closed to them. An incident that helped in this conviction was the British confiscation, without payment, of \$15,000,000 of lard which we sent to Scandinavian countries early in the war—confiscated because there was a suspicion that it might get through to Germany.

All these American business men are right. We have long been prevented from sending our goods to Germany or getting goods from her. The blockade will merely be another name for an interference with our trade long practiced and character-

ized by our government as illegal and indefensible.

This inference began when the war opened.

International law on the sea is designed to protect the rights of neutrals. This law decreed that a dominant sea power—say, England—could stop only certain trade moving from neutrals into the enemy country. The goods that could be stopped were named "contraband" and "conditional contraband."

Contraband goods were those which were obviously for warlike use, such as arms and ammunition. England was allowed to confiscate these goods if moving to German territory.

Conditional contraband were goods that were capable of either warlike or peaceful use, like wheat and lard. They might be used to feed an army or a civilian population. Wheat, lard and other food-stuffs could be captured if Britain found on the ship evidence that they were destined for the armed forces of the enemy. Otherwise such shipments were immune.

Goods not on the absolute contraband list or the conditional contraband list could not lawfully be interfered with under any conditions. Such goods were cotton, rubber, wool.

These provisions of international law were not framed to protect one belligerent, like Germany, from another with dominant sea power, like England. If Germany and England chose to go to war, it was their own affair how much they injured each other. International law aimed to prevent them from injuring every one else.

The law is not interested in a famine in the German textile indus-

tries and the resulting unemployment. It is interested in the right of the American cotton planter to find his accustomed market abroad in Germany. If the farmer is cut off from this market, domestic prices are depressed because this forbidden export quota weighs on the home market. The farmer sees his year's work ruined.

That is why international law forbade Britain to interfere with our exports to Germany of cotton, and of wheat and lard if destined to the civilian population. The law was designed to protect our peaceful trade relations from dislocation through wars which foreign countries might choose to wage with each other.

What was England's first violation of this law?

She added the conditional contraband list to the absolute contraband list, in her orders in council of August 20, 1914. That order declared conditional contraband seizable if going to an agent of the enemy state or to a merchant or other person under control of the authorities of the enemy state. No consignee in Germany could fail to come under one of those categories. That is, wheat, lard, flour and other conditional contraband could not be sent to Germany at all.

That is why our foodstuffs exports to Germany ceased the moment the war began.

The next move by England was to extend her contraband lists far beyond the limits that international law allowed, so that every article that could be of any possible use to Germany was included in the lists.

The illegal element in this action is not the intention to "starve" Germany. It was the destruction of a

large market upon which the principal products of neutrals—now made contraband—were dependent: A large market for Chile's nitrate, for Brazil's rubber, for Argentina's oilseed and for our cotton, foodstuffs, oil, copper, naval stores, agricultural implements and general manufactures.

But Great Britain's lawlessness in the first months of the war did not stop with destroying our trade to Germany, England crippled our trade to all neutrals adjacent to Germany, such as Holland and Denmark.

International law clearly defines the limits of British interference with this trade. England could lawfully stop our exports to Holland only if these exports were contraband goods, demonstrably in transit to the enemy, as proven by evidence found on the ship. Articles on the conditional contraband or free lists, moving from us to European neutrals, were not to be touched.

Here again the purpose of the law was not to allow a country like Germany to provision itself through adjacent neutrals on the seaboard. The purpose of the law was to protect those neutrals from having all their supplies held up by a British prize court while the judge decided whether he thought that the supplies might perhaps be going through to Germany. Therefore Britain was allowed to examine ships from here to the neutrals only long enough to determine whether they carried absolute contraband billed to Germany.

England changed all this. By her order in council of August 20 and October 29, 1914, she assumed the right to stop not only absolute contraband but also conditional contraband if she suspected that it was

destined not to the neutral country but through the neutral country. As nothing of importance—except cotton—was missing from the British contraband lists, this all meant that all neutral commerce was henceforth subject to British suspicion and interference.

Most extraordinary of all, if England had a suspicion, the owner of the foodstuffs exported from here to Holland was compelled to prove that these were not going through to Germany.

By October 29, 1914, this system was in full swing. A complete blockade of our exports to Germany was in force, with the single exception of cotton, which, as we shall see later, was prevented from moving by another method.

By October 29, 1914, the system of interference with our trade to neutrals was inaugurated which has been the subject of our diplomatic protests, and which promises now to unite neutrals in a solid, determined group against international lawlessness.

The pending blockade is merely a new name for what is as old as the war. But the name "blockade" will put the grave issue between Britain and the peaceful world into a form that all can understand. It will be easy to demonstrate that no blockade has been maintained and none can be maintained by the British fleet.

In a succeeding article we shall see why it is that Great Britain can maintain no lawful blockade. We shall see the steps by which the 1914 orders in council, through the force of events, grew into the 1916 blockade.

So far two points have been established:

1. The blockade is nothing new.

It is only a continuation of the lawlessness at sea that began in August, 1914.

2. International law is not intended to protect belligerents but neutrals. No one objects to the British blockade because it is starving Germany. We do not know whether it is or not. We object to it because it is unlawfully destroying or crippling a part of our peaceful commerce.

We say to-day what Thomas Jefferson said of a similar British blockade in 1793, when he wrote to Pinckney, our minister to England:

"Reason and usage have established that when two nations go to war those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures and other ordinary vocations, to carry the produce of their industry for exchange to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual, to go and come freely without injury or molestation."—*Jan. 26, 1916.*

THE REAL MEANING OF BRITISH ORDERS IN COUNCIL

By E. J. CLAPP

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The first article of this series was called "The Beginnings of International Lawlessness." There we saw that the blockade which Great Britain is, according to reports from London, about to declare against our exports, is merely a new name for an interference with our trade which England instituted when the war began.

We have no interest in the efforts of the Germans to evade the pressure of British sea power. Our interest is to see that no dominant sea power shall illegally close our markets.

By October 29, 1914, the date of the second order in council, our exports to the central powers, barring cotton, were embargoed and our exports to neutral Europe were subjected to the discretion of the British navy and the British prize courts. Only cotton was free to move. Yet this freedom was a theoretical one. Up to October 29, 1914, practically no cotton had been shipped from here to Germany and her allies, in spite of the fact that cotton was not on the British absolute or conditional contraband list. It was supposed to be a free article of commerce. But England had spread rumors that cotton was to be tabooed, so ship owners would not carry it nor insurance companies insure it. Thus matters went from August 1st to October 24th. On that date the president of the New York Chamber of Commerce wired Mr. Bryan, asking that Britain be induced formally to declare cotton on the free list, so that exporters would dare to ship it.

At the same time Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, called on the British ambassador at Washington and in effect told him that if the desired declaration were not forthcoming, the southern senators would use their power in Congress. The South then held the whip-hand in the Senate, not yet having split on the ship purchase bill, and the British ambassador yielded. He had Sir Edward Grey send a note to Mr. Lansing, who did Mr. Bryan's letter writing, saying that cotton was not and would not be declared contraband.

Movement of Cotton

Following upon this note, cotton began to move to the central powers. We were soon exporting from 300,000 to 400,000 bales per month, partly direct to the Teutonic powers, but largely through the neutral countries of Europe, for direct shipment to Germany was endangered by the British mining of the North Sea.

So the situation stood at the beginning of 1915. The Germans, partly because their imports of foods from over sea had been cut off, felt the pinch. On February 4 was announced the German submarine "blockade" of the British isles as a measure of retaliation against the British starvation policy.

British lawlessness on the sea came first. By adding the conditional to the absolute contraband list Great Britain had prevented food from getting to Germany at the very outset of the war.

On December 26, 1914, we had protested against this British action. Our note quoted Lord Salisbury's famous declaration that even if food-stuffs were destined for hostile territory they could not lawfully be seized on the sea unless demonstrably moving to the enemy forces. Still less, our note contended, could our exports to neutrals be seized.

Thus the present issue between us and England had been raised when the Germans launched their submarine campaign. Anger at lawlessness coupled with destruction of life was naturally stronger than anger at lawlessness coupled with confiscation of property. We turned from the British controversy until the German was settled. Now we

turn to end the policy of confiscating our property.

On February 4 the German submarine policy was announced. All through the month of February, 1915, there were evidences that Great Britain was going to do something new. In Parliament it was indicated that as a measure of retaliation all shipments to and from Germany would be embargoed.

The United States viewed this prospect with alarm. To be sure, most of our exports to the central powers were already embargoed and our exports to neutrals hampered through misuse of the contraband list. But cotton had been moving freely and the relief to cotton prices had been great. The new British measures promised to shut off cotton exports and so destroy one of the markets for the coming (1915) crop. Moreover, the new measures were to stop all our importations from Germany.

The virtual blockade declared by Great Britain in March, 1915, was largely the result of a violent agitation in England against allowing cotton, an ingredient of smokeless powder, to go forward to Germany. The blockade brought about by the order in council of March 11th stopped our cotton without putting Great Britain in the position of declaring that raw cotton was contraband of war. In 1904 England had prevented Russia from so declaring cotton contraband and stopping it on its way to Japan. As a matter of fact, we shall see later that since early in the war the Germans have used no cotton for powder; they have a substitute.

Moreover, the British figured that a blockade measure, by stopping our imports from Germany, would pre-

vent Germany from establishing credit here with which to pay for imports from us. This also was to be prevented by the new British action.

Our government was doubly concerned in the situation that had arisen by the middle of February, 1915. We were concerned because of the German submarine campaign which, though it had not yet killed American citizens, had every prospect of doing so. We were concerned because of the illegal British embargo on all trade with Germany. Each belligerent was claiming that its action was a retaliation against the lawlessness of the other.

Asked to End Lawlessness

So we did the natural thing. We asked each of them to give up his lawlessness and so remove all excuse for retaliation and further lawlessness on the part of the other. Our State Department asked Germany to give up her torpedoing of merchant vessels, and asked England in return to give up her withholding of food-stuffs from Germany.

Germany accepted our proposal. England refused. If England had joined Germany in accepting our mediation, our suggestion that both return to the limits of law, there would have been no Lusitania and Arabic disasters, and the British blockade would not now be up for settlement.

England's answer was in her order in council of March 11th. This remarkable document was virtually the announcement of a blockade. It said that England would seize all goods going to Germany or coming from Germany, either by direct sailing or through an adjacent neutral country on the seaboard.

Why did not England call this a blockade? The word blockade has never been used in the British communications regarding this action. If England had declared and maintained a blockade of all German ports, shutting out the trade of all nations from those ports, we could not have protested.

But England could not blockade the German Baltic ports and she knew it. She knew that her blockading warships could not live in the Baltic for fear of German submarines, and that therefore traffic from Norway and Sweden could move unhindered in and out of German Baltic ports like Lubeck and Stettin.

A "blockade" that could not prevent Sweden from trading with Stettin but prevented the United States from so doing, would violate the fundamental principle of a blockade; that is, that it must bear equally on all neutrals. Therefore the well understood term "blockade" was not used. The public opinion of the neutral world, outside of Scandinavia, would at once have revolted against an embargo on their exports when no similar embargo was enforced or could be enforced against the exports of Scandinavia.

But "orders in council" are not generally understood. Their last extensive use was during the Napoleonic wars, and nobody remembers back so far. The world has just relearned that these orders are merely a method of substituting English law for international law. We have just got it through our heads that the order in council of March 11, 1915, was simply and solely a document assuming the right of blockade without assuming its responsibilities.

Note of March 30

Our government at once called attention to these facts, in its note to Great Britain dated March 30. In it we asserted, in no uncertain terms, the right to trade with Germany in all but absolute contraband of war. Moreover, we asserted this to be our duty. For the United States to forego this right "would be inconsistent with the solemn obligations of the government, and would be assuming an attitude of unneutrality" toward Germany. Not until July did Britain answer our March 30 note, and defend her March order in council, which had established the virtual blockade. In addition, several memoranda have been handed by the British Foreign office either to our State Department or to the American press. Our government has rejected every British argument and stands firm for the rights of neutrals.

Every British contention can be analyzed into either a plea of necessity, an argument of retaliation or a statement that in the civil war we established the precedent which England is now following, namely, the precedent of forbidding anything to reach the Confederacy by sea, either directly or indirectly. But during the civil war we were maintaining a lawful blockade of our enemy and Great Britain cannot now pretend to be doing that.

In the next article, "The Illegality of the British Blockade and the Necessity for Its Removal," we shall see why it is that our civil war cases have absolutely no application to the present or prospective situation.

But the populace of Great Britain is convinced that the Foreign Office, by its juggling of terms and its or-

ders in council, is hindering the navy in applying some sort of pressure to Germany that is not now being applied. The British common people want a blockade, a name which they can understand. So with the common people in the United States. We also want the British action called a blockade. We want the illegality of this embargo on a large part of our foreign trade made plain.

—*Jan. 27, 1916.*

ILLEGALITY OF BRITAIN'S BLOCKADE

By E. J. CLAPP

Professor of Economics, New York University. Author of "Economic Aspects of the War"

Where is this international law about which we talk so glibly? Is it in a book accepted by all nations, interpreted by an international court and enforced by an international police court?

This question touches the weakness of our whole structure of international law. It is in no book accepted by all nations. In disputed cases it is interpreted by no international court. It has no police power to enforce it. International law is found in the precedents of nations, these precedents appearing in decisions of their prize courts, in their diplomatic settlements in war time, in treaties and conventions signed in time of peace.

But in some cases the precedents of different nations conflict. Therefore, nations with large over-sea trade felt uncertain of their future in war time, uncertain of the precedents under which a dominant sea power might choose to act. The prize courts of the dominant sea power in passing upon its interfer-

ence with trade can, if they go back far enough in the sea power's history, find a precedent for actual piracy. Therefore, there was general desire to codify these precedents into a body of the law understood and accepted by all.

Hence all nations welcomed the invitation of the British government—the present British government was then in power—to attend the London conference in 1909. The outcome of the London conference was the declaration of London, signed by the representatives of all leading powers.

The declaration of London is a compilation of the principles already stated: Fixed contraband, conditional contraband and free lists, immunity of conditional contraband en route to the civil population of a belligerent, immunity of commerce between neutrals unless consisting of contraband in transit for a belligerent. No nation got all it wanted, in the declaration of London, which contained many compromises. But in the main the declaration was a good summary of the freedom which neutral commerce had won for itself in the course of the ages.

Ratification Stopped

To become legally binding the declaration of London had to be ratified by all the home governments. The process of ratification was stopped by the action of England. The House of Commons accepted the declaration. The House of Lords threw it out because of an agitation raised in England against that country binding itself to definite rules limiting the exercise of its sea power in war time.

Thus the declaration of London is not legally binding. But it rep-

resented the only codification of international law ever attempted. Our American government has felt that it, the crystallization of the civilized opinion of the world, was morally binding on belligerents. Therefore, in August, 1914, we suggested to all the combatants they adopt this declaration of London as their code of naval warfare during the war.

Germany and Austria accepted our suggestion, Russia and France waited until England answered, and then joined England in "accepting" the declaration "with modifications."

These "modifications" contained in the British August order in council made a farce of the whole declaration, so far as protecting our commerce was concerned.

First, the "modifications" removed the protection which the fixed contraband list of the declaration promised to neutrals. The British orders in council were accompanied by successive "revised" contraband lists which, as explained, soon included all commerce in their scope.

Second, the "modifications" removed the immemorial immunity of conditional contraband, like food-stuffs, when destined to a civilian population. Conditional contraband moving to any one in Germany was declared seizable.

Third, the British "modifications" removed the historic immunity of trade between neutrals in all but absolute contraband in transit to Germany. All our exports to neutrals, even goods on the old free list, were thrown open to British surveillance and, if the British chose to have suspicion, subject to detention and confiscation unless the American shipper could prove to British satisfaction that the neutral consignee would not resell into Germany.

Britain could lawfully exercise this surveillance only in the case of absolute contraband, and the law was that Britain should bring proof of tainted destination.

No Protection for Neutrals

That is, these British "modifications" removed every vestige of protection which the declaration gave to neutral commerce. For England to call this action an "acceptance" of the declaration of London is a reflection upon the intelligence of the outside world.

But apologists for England say the declaration of London is not binding, because never ratified by the home governments of the representatives who signed it in 1909. Moreover, our State Department, after two months of experience of the burdens of the declaration, as "modified" by England, withdrew our suggestion of August that belligerents should consider the declaration as a code of naval warfare. We said we should in the future stand upon our rights as designed in international law. Therefore, both by the English apologists and by the action of our own State Department, we are referred to international law for our rights. Where are those rights defined?

They are defined in precedents. It is perhaps most instructive to use the precedent which England has created. No other nation, when a neutral, has been so zealous as England in halting belligerents when disposed to use their sea power unlawfully.

First, let us examine a precedent which England has helped to establish with regard to the attempt of a sea power, during war time, arbitrarily to swell its contraband list.

In the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian government attempted to put raw cotton upon the absolute contraband list. On instruction from Lord Lansdowne, the English foreign secretary, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg protested against this procedure. His letter to the Russian minister of foreign affairs resulting in forcing Russia to take cotton from the absolute contraband list, read:

"British India is by far the largest exporter of raw cotton into Japan. The quantity of raw cotton that might be used for explosives would be infinitesimal in comparison with the bulk of the cotton exported from India to Japan for peaceful purposes, and to treat harmless cargoes of this latter description as unconditionally contraband would be to subject a branch of innocent commerce to a most unwarrantable interference."

Opposed by Britain

(Yet in August, 1915, although no change had occurred in the relative uses of cotton for neutral and warlike purposes, England declared our exports of cotton to be absolute contraband of war.)

Second, let us consider a case where Great Britain, as a neutral, successfully defended the immunity of conditional contraband, like food-stuffs, when destined to the civilian population of a belligerent.

In 1885 France was at war with China. China was a heavy importer of rice from British India. France declared rice contraband of war, with the purpose of starving China into submission. The declaration met with immediate, sharp and successful opposition from Great Britain. Lord Granville, British minister of

foreign affairs, wrote the French government that regarding food-stuffs "there must be circumstances relative to any particular cargo, or its destination, to displace the presumption that articles of this kind are intended for the ordinary use of life."

With regard to interference in commerce between two neutral countries, consisting of non-warlike goods, Britain as a neutral has never had occasion to defend herself. No belligerent, even when maintaining a blockade, has ever tried to interfere with neutral commerce, except to stop absolute contraband goods in transit through a neutral to the blockaded country.

Finally, it is worth while noting that a sea power cannot, under any code or precedent of international law, interfere with our imports from Germany, unless a blockade is being maintained.

There is no defense of the British measures, if she is supposed to be treating our trade under the laws of contraband of war.

The only circumstance that would give her these powers on the sea is a condition of blockade. If England is maintaining a blockade of Germany, she has a right to stop everything moving into Germany and out of it. An effective blockade removes all the rights of neutrals.

We shall next examine whether England is maintaining a blockade of Germany or can maintain one.

—Jan. 31, 1916.

CIRCUMSTANCES ALTER CASES

In all of Britain's notes to the United States in justification of

British measures restraining and destroying American trade, the point has been tenaciously held that our increased exports to the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries conclusively showed that America was indirectly exporting to Germany.

These same data, showing the growth of American exports to European neutrals, are being cited by Lord Charles Beresford and other leaders of the Northcliffe camp in British politics, in urging a general blockade against Germany. Sir Edward Grey, however, does not want such a blockade. So he explains that America's larger exports to European neutrals are the result of the fact that those neutrals are cut off from their usual source of supply in Russia. By so doing he directly contradicts his own argument in justification of the original measures in restraint of American trade, and admits that the growth of our exports to neutrals is no evidence that anything that we send abroad is getting through to Germany.

With this admission Sir Edward eliminates about one-half of the material in the British correspondence with America up to date.—*Jan. 31, 1916.*

SEA LAW NEED OF THE FUTURE

BY E. J. CLAPP,

Professor of Economics, New York University; Author of "Economic Aspects of the War."

The theory of the ownership of the seas is clear. They are the property of no one nation, but of all nations. American flour en route from Minneapolis to Germany is on American territory until it lands at

Hamburg, for we own the seas jointly with England, France, Turkey, and every other nation.

Flour for the use of German civilians can no more lawfully be seized on the ocean than it can lawfully be removed from an American freight car at Buffalo by British soldiers who come across the border from Canada. Cotton for Rotterdam or Bremen can no more lawfully be taken off a ship in the English channel than British navy forces can lawfully remove it from a wharf shed in Savannah.

All of this is clear unless a blockade or virtual blockade of Germany exists. But the British say that the equivalent of a blockade does exist, and that our Civil War precedents, which prevented the Confederacy from using round-about means of breaking our blockade, are the very same now being applied to Germany.

What are those Civil War cases?

There are two groups: the Bermuda and Matamoras cases. No one claims that the Matamoras cases supply England with any argument. It is the Bermuda cases which are cited.

While we were blockading Southern ports, England was reaching the Confederacy by shipping supplies to Nassau, Bermuda. At Nassau the supplies were trans-shipped into small vessels, which stood a better chance of slipping through the Federal blockading cordon. Our warships stopped British vessels en route to Nassau and took from them supplies that were of demonstrable Confederate destination: swords, uniforms, etc.

Continuous Trip Theory

The nominally neutral voyage from England to Nassau was con-

sidered part of a continuous trip which the goods were openly making.

There would be a parallel in this war if the German North Sea and Baltic ports were blockaded so that no goods could reach them. Then, if we shipped goods to Sweden, goods of demonstrable German destination, Britain might confiscate them and cite our Bermuda cases.

But England has not blockaded German ports in the Baltic, and cannot do so. Sweden can ship undisturbed to these Baltic ports. And then, is there any reason, founded on justice and law, why we should not ship all but absolute contraband to these same ports through Sweden? Our doctrine of "continuous voyage," designed to prevent a breach of blockade, is nonsense when applied to conditions where there is no blockade.

The British practice is nothing better than an indefinite extension of the law of contraband to all our exports. Practically everything we export is on the British absolute or conditional contraband lists, and goods on either of these lists are seized. Also, all exports from Germany to us are seized; for which there is no precedent in contraband law.

To some this may not seem so serious a matter. Many of us want the allies to win the war, and think that acquiescence in the British sea measures is a small contribution for us to make to their success.

We cannot do it. Our individual sympathies in the conflict cannot blind us to the meaning of the precedents thus established. This is not the last war. If international

law—the immunity of peaceful neutral trade—goes overboard in this war, we shall in vain invoke its protection in the next war.

If Parts Were Reversed

Suppose that the next time England and Germany fight, Germany is the dominant sea power. In twenty years it is not unthinkable. Or, if you prefer, suppose Japan at war with England and supreme on the seas. Our sympathies would hardly be with Japan. Yet, after submitting to England in this war, we could not resist Japan's action in putting on the contraband lists all our exports to England and her colonies and seizing those exports wherever found on the seas. Japan would apportion the quotas that we might export to France so that France could not be able to spare anything for England.

In the meantime Japan might not be able to dominate the English Channel or the North Sea, because of British submarines. Russia or the rest of northern Europe would ship undisturbed their grain, flour and provisions to England, while a panic would reign in our grain, cotton and stock markets. The situation is in no way different practice from the one now being maintained against us.

Our rights in the seas are not words; they are something very real. What our government is fighting for is to prevent any nation that chooses to go to war from appropriating for itself the seas, which are the joint property of us all. We are not willing to issue a blanket charter to any belligerent to stop any of our trade when he sees fit.

That is the great issue with England to-day.

If we are truly neutral—and our President says we are—we have more than the right to trade with Germany in all but absolute contraband of war. We have even the duty to trade with her if we trade with her enemy.

America on Record

In our note of protest to England of March 30, 1915—the protest whose insistence has been so long delayed because of the *Lusitania* issue, which arose a week later—in that note we said that for us to forego our right to trade with Germany “would be inconsistent with the obligations of our government, and would be assuming an attitude of unneutrality” toward Germany.

Nor is this attitude new American doctrine. In 1793 Great Britain, without maintaining a blockade, was unlawfully stopping our exports of foodstuffs to France. Thomas Jefferson, on September 7 of that year, wrote Pinckney, our minister to England, to make the following representations to the British government:

“It is an essential character of neutrality to furnish no aids not stipulated by treaties to one party which we are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we permit goods to be sent to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally bound to permit it to France. To restrain it would be a partiality which might lead to war with France, and between restraining it ourselves and permitting her enemies to restrain it unrightfully, there is no difference.”—*Feb. 1, 1916.*

HOW TO BREAK THE BRITISH BLOCKADE

BY E. J. CLAPP,

Professor of Economics, New York University; Author of “Economic Aspects of the War.”

If the present British blockade—masquerading under the name of orders in council—is illegal and indefensible, a violation of our rights, our interests and our neutrality, what are we going to do about it?

It is not merely a question of getting England to rescind her March, 1915, order in council, which announced that everything going to or from Germany would be seized. The repeal of this order would merely open up imports to us from Germany. It would not aid us in exporting.

The reason is already known. Every important item of our exports is on the British absolute or conditional contraband list, and so forbidden to move to Germany directly or via the European neutrals. After removing the blanket contraband list which is represented by the present blockade measures, we should find an individual blockade weighing upon everything we might attempt to export.

The removal of the blockade would be a minor part of the task for us. That task is to restore the rights of peaceful neutral trade to its status before the war. That restoration must involve:

1. Confining British interference to interference with a list of absolute and conditional contraband in harmony with the definitions of this list in the past.

2. Confining the interference with absolute contraband to stopping it if sailing to enemy territory and stop-

ping it if destined to a neutral port, providing it is demonstrably in transit to the enemy.

3. Conditional contraband to Germany to be immune if going for civilian use.

4. Forbidding all interference with our commerce to neutrals except to search for absolute contraband in transit to the central powers.

To Restrict Contraband

In a simple and fair way we may accomplish this restriction of the contraband list to its historical status. In a simple and fair way we may accomplish the restriction of England to that treatment of absolute and conditional contraband which she as a neutral has imposed upon belligerents. It will never disentangle us if we enter into a diplomatic discussion with Great Britain on the merits of keeping this or that article on one or the other of the contraband list. At the customary speed of diplomatic correspondence, these questions, if settled at all, might be settled at the rate of one a month. Each article of trade would be a separate question, and there are hundreds of articles.

The simple and fair way is to hold England to a code of international law framed by the best brains of all nations, in the calm times of peace. This code is the declaration of London, signed by the representatives of all nations at the London conference, though not ratified by all home governments and so not legally binding. The declaration is morally binding. The belligerents are morally bound to recognize in war a code embodying the best practices of law. It is fair to hold

them to something definite, something internationally fair and clear.

The declaration of London, with its fixed contraband and free list, contains the guarantees of immunity which our trade deserves and which we, in behalf of the neutral world, must assert if force is not to supplant law on the seas, the joint property of us all. Our task is to enforce that observance of the declaration of London which, at the outset of the war, we merely requested.

Can we enforce this? We can, and by the most terrible of all powers, the threat of starvation. Read the dispatches from London and the debates in Parliament and see how well the British statesmen realize that England could not live a month without our food, nor fight much longer than a month without our continuous supplies of ammunition. As a means of pressure, we could declare a general embargo on exports to England until she accepted the declaration of London as her code of naval warfare.

Embargo on Arms

To this measure there is serious objection. A general embargo of exports to England would throw our exchanges into a panic. We can accomplish the results by an arms embargo. Its pressure would be heavy and England would know that the more sweeping measure would always be at our hand. Our business in manufacturing war materials, if seriously threatened, could be at least partly compensated by orders from the United States, now in the process of arming itself.

It would never come to the point of levying these embargoes. If Congress merely authorizes the

President to take such action, Great Britain, which cannot fight without supplies, will accept the same compulsion which she, as a neutral in the past, was wont to exercise upon a belligerent who proceeded unlawfully.

Nor would such action on our part be a breach of our neutrality. A provision of a Hague convention reads:

"The rules impartially adopted by the neutral powers shall not be altered in principle during the course of the war by one of the neutrals, except in the case where experience shows the necessity for such action in order to safeguard the nation's rights."

If we are ever to learn by experience, we have learned that some action is necessary to safeguard our nation's rights.

When we have the facts before us we understand the grave concern today at Washington. We understand why the Democratic Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Senate committee on military affairs, declared in a speech in New York on January 8:

"Now let us bring Great Britain to book, just as we have Germany and Austria. She has destroyed the commerce of the United States, so far as neutral trade is concerned. Having swept our commerce from the seas, Great Britain now proposes to commandeer our vessels between the United States and South America."

Mann's Fear of England

We understand why Mann, the Republican leader of the House of Representatives, tells his colleagues on the floor of Congress:

"I have much more fear in the

end of a war with England than I have of a war with Germany."

Now we understand why Gore, by many called an administration Senator, introduces in the Senate a measure instructing the President to ascertain whether any belligerent, signatory to the declaration of London, is interfering with the neutral commerce of the United States in anything designated as noncontraband in that declaration.

(All belligerents are signatory to the declaration through their representatives at the London conference, but the declaration was not ratified by the home governments. Our neutral trade, under the declaration of London, means also our trade to neutrals in transit to Germany, in all excepting absolute contraband of war.)

When the President so designates an offending belligerent, the Gore measure continues, penal statutes shall automatically come into effect forbidding our citizens to sell or export contraband of war to the offender and forbidding national banks to act as loan agents for it and its allies.

In simple English, this is the very procedure about which we have been talking all along; namely, the assertion—through a partial embargo, if necessary—of the rights of the peaceful world as defined in the declaration of London, mainly British made.—*Feb. 8, 1916.*

THE A, B, C OF BRITAIN'S BLOCKADE OFFENDING

By E. J. CLAPP,
Professor of Economics, New York
University; Author of "Economic
Aspects of the War."

Q. If Great Britain has for months been stopping everything

going into Germany and out of it, what sense is there in the talk that England is perhaps "about to declare" a blockade?

A. There is no sense in such talk. We have suffered all the evil effects of a blockade disguised as a March "order in council."

Q. But the dispatches from London tell us that we can have no objection to a lawful blockade. Isn't the blockade of Germany, like besieging a city, rather stringent but still lawful?

A. Yes, a neutral has no recourse from trade losses through a blockade lawfully maintained.

Q. But isn't the British blockade a lawful one?

A. It is not. England does not blockade the German Baltic ports, nor have any warships in the Baltic.

Q. What practical difference does that make? She has enough ships to effectually stop our trade as it goes past the British Isles?

A. Yes, but if England cannot stop a Swedish cargo of lumber going to Stettin on the German Baltic, she has no right to stop a cargo of lumber from Mobile. A blockade must bear equally on all neutrals.

Q. But why cannot England blockade the German Baltic ports?

A. Because the Kiel Canal enables the Germans to throw their whole fleet into the Baltic and annihilate any force which England could afford to send there.

Q. Why cannot England use submarines to stop the Swedish-German trade?

A. The route from Stettin to Gothenberg is so short and so easily patrolled by destroyers that submarines could not more blockade it

than they could blockade the port of Liverpool.

Rights Defined by Law

Q. If England is not entitled by a lawful blockade to stop all our trade to and from Germany, how much of it is she entitled to stop?

A. Her rights are defined by international law. She is entitled to stop no trade from Germany to us. She is entitled to stop our exports of contraband of war, and our exports of conditional contraband if moving to Germany and demonstrably destined for military forces.

Q. What right has England to interfere with our exports to neutrals?

A. She has only the right to examine these exports to look for evidence of absolute contraband destined for Germany.

Q. What is absolute contraband?

A. Goods of obviously warlike nature, use and destination, like arms and ammunition.

Q. What is conditional contraband?

A. Goods that may be used either by the army or the civilian population, like flour or provisions.

Q. How about goods not on the absolute and conditional contraband lists?

A. These comprise the "free list," and may on no account be interfered with.

Q. What is on this free list?

A. Cotton, wool, iron ore, rubber, oil and most of the staples of the world trade.

Q. How did England come to violate these rights of ours if they are guaranteed by international law?

A. Her first violation was the order in council of August, 1914.

Q. What did England do in that order in council?

A. She proclaimed her intention of seizing not only absolute contraband but also conditional contraband moving to Germany, even if destined for civilian use.

All on Contraband List

Q. I see the maltreatment of conditional contraband, but surely we could still ship the goods on the free list?

A. We could not. They were one by one put upon the contraband lists.

Q. Well, that blocks our exports. But what about our imports from Germany? How did they come to be stopped?

A. By another order in council of March, 1915.

Q. What were the provisions of that order in council?

A. It declared everything moving to Germany or out of it seizable.

Q. But that is making exports from an enemy country contraband, though no blockade is maintained. Is there any precedent for this in law?

A. None whatever.

Q. How did England come to interfere with our exports to European neutrals?

A. Following her August and October orders in council she seized anything she chose of our exports to neutrals, and then put it up to American shippers to prove that these goods could not possibly get through to Germany.

Q. Has anything like this ever been done in the history of the world?

A. Nothing.

Q. Well, do you think that if we break the British blockade of Germany we can stop the present interference with our commerce to

European neutrals like Holland and Sweden?

A. It is the only way to stop that interference.

Q. Why?

A. Because so long as England is allowed to think she can stop everything going to Germany, she will stop everything going to countries adjacent to Germany.

Grey's Admission

Q. But have not British notes to us quoted our own export statistics to show how our shipments to neutrals have increased over those of preceding years?

A. You mean our shipments toward neutrals. Sir Edward Grey has just explained in Parliament that those figures show merely how much trade leaves America for European neutrals, not how much arrives.

Q. Where is this international law you talk of?

A. In various precedents in which the rights of neutral trade were asserted and maintained.

Q. Where are these precedents found?

A. In diplomatic exchanges in war time, treaties of peace, Hague conventions and such sources.

Q. Have neutrals in past wars prevented belligerents from destroying peaceful trade and have they thus created precedents which we may use in this war?

A. Yes. Defining the limits beyond which belligerents might not use their sea power was one of the chief functions of England as a neutral.

Q. But "precedents" like these seem an insecure guarantee for the trade of neutrals in war time.

A. You are quite right. That is

why the London conference was called.

Q. What was the London conference, and what was it called for?

A. The British government called it to codify the conflicting precedents and make a clear law of the sea.

Q. Any results from that conference?

A. Yes, the Declaration of London, an equitable codification of the immunity which neutral trade had won at the hands of belligerents.

Q. Was the Declaration of London ever signed?

A. Yes, signed by the representatives of all governments at the conference, but never ratified by the home governments after England threw it down.

Q. Why did England do that?

A. It passed the Commons, but the Lords threw it down because it put statutory limitations upon England's use of her sea power.

"Continuous Voyage"

Q. But they tell me we cannot protest against England because of our own "continuous voyage" cases in the Civil War, when we were doing just what England is doing now. Do these cases apply?

A. Not in the slightest.

Q. What were these continuous voyage cases, anyway?

A. We captured Confederate goods on a British ship bound for Nassau, where they were destined to be trans-shipped to blockade runners. We captured them for purposing breach of blockade.

Q. Then why cannot England capture cotton shipped to Sweden, destined for trans-shipment to Germany?

A. Because, as I have told you,

there is no blockade of Germany being maintained, and none can be maintained.

Q. Has the Declaration of London fixed contraband lists, and does it provide for letting our trade with neutrals alone?

A. It does.

Q. Then why, at the outbreak of the war, didn't we insist that the belligerents observe the Declaration of London, so that neutrals would know where they stood?

A. In August, 1914, we did ask the belligerents to observe the Declaration of London.

Q. What were the replies?

A. Germany and Austria agreed, England and her allies refused. They "accepted" the Declaration of London, but with "modifications" that removed all the protection which it afforded to neutrals.

Q. Are not we creating a bad precedent by letting England make all our trade contraband in this war?

A. We are.

Mortgaging the Future

Q. Can we in the future assert any rights of trade in war times if we forfeit them now?

A. Not very easily. Besides, there is a principle involved.

Q. What is that?

A. Under the same conditions in 1793, when England and France were at war, Thomas Jefferson said that we violated our neutrality if we continued to trade with England while allowing England unlawfully to restrain our trade with France.

Q. Any other objection to the blockade?

A. Oh, yes; it costs us heavily. British measures forced our cotton producers to accept 6 or 7 cents per

pound in 1914. Cotton is only 12 cents now.

Q. But 12 cents looks like a good price to me.

A. Not for a short crop. Our last crop of this size sold for 14½ cents per pound.

Q. How do you know that Germany would take any cotton if the blockade were removed?

A. She has offered to pay over 25 cents per pound for a single lot of 1,000,000 bales.

Q. But even if the blockade were removed, could we properly ask England to take cotton off her absolute contraband list?

A. We could. She promised us, early in the war, not to make cotton contraband. Moreover, in 1904, she as a neutral forced Russia to take cotton off the contraband list.

Q. Why did Russia put cotton on the contraband list?

A. She did it to prevent British-Indian cotton from moving to Japan.

Q. But is not cotton used in Germany to make smokeless powder, and is not it therefore properly classed as contraband?

A. Since early in the war Germany has used no cotton for this purpose.

Q. How do you know?

A. An American was commissioned to visit powder factories in Germany and reported upon their methods. He reported that they were using wood cellulose instead of cotton.

Q. Where can I find this report?

A. It is printed in the *Congressional Record*.

Government Losing

Q. Our government must be losing something in the form of cus-

toms duties which it normally collects on German imports.

A. Yes, about \$30,000,000 a year in federal revenues is cut off.

Q. Well, is there any way we can force England to accept the Declaration of London and return to the limits of the law?

A. Certainly we could threaten her with starvation, with a general embargo.

Q. Would not that throw our business structure into a panic?

A. Possibly. Therefore, an embargo on one set of indispensable articles like war munitions is preferable.

Q. But do you think England would wait until we actually declared such an embargo?

A. Hardly. She would accept the Declaration of London in time.

Q. But does not international law prevent us from changing our laws of neutrality during a war, and would not such an embargo be an unneutral act?

A. It would normally be an unneutral act and is forbidden except "in the case where experience shows the necessity for such action in order to safeguard a nation's rights."

Q. Has any move been made to bring this sort of pressure to bear upon England?

A. Yes, the measure introduced by Senator Gore.

Q. What does this measure provide?

A. That we forbid our citizens to sell or export contraband, and forbid our national banks to give financial aid to a belligerent who interferes with our neutral trade contrary to the provisions of the Declaration of London.

Q. According to the Declaration of London, may our exports to neutrals, our neutral trade, consist of goods in transit to Germany?

A. Yes, everything, excepting absolute contraband of war on the contraband list of the Declaration of London.—*Feb.* 10, 1916.

NOW, AND THEN

A new chapter, nearly the last, has been written in the story of cotton as contraband.

In the Russo-Japanese war, England, then a neutral, defeated Russia's attempt to put cotton on the list of absolute contraband. Russia was trying to stop the movement of British India cotton into Japan, on the ground that it would there be used in the powder factories. The argument which England used, and enforced, was that the civilian use of cotton so outweighed the warlike use that it could not possibly be classed as contraband of war. Contraband means "of obviously warlike nature, use and destination."

In October, 1914, England promised our solicitous State department:

It (cotton) is, therefore, so far as Great Britain is concerned, in the free list, and will remain there.

In the face of all this, in August, 1915, England declared our cotton to Germany to be absolute contraband of war, because it was an ingredient of explosives. But since early in the war Germany has used no cotton in making explosives. She has a substitute—wood cellulose.

To demonstrate this, an American went to Germany and visited German factories where explosives

are made. His technical examination of the processes in the factories proved that no cotton is used in them. His report has been reprinted in the *Congressional Record*.

Therefore, further restrictions of our lawful exports will not have the slightest effect upon the outcome of the war.

Now the British ambassador at Washington rises to meet the awkward situation. Whatever may be the facts, he says, regarding the military use of cotton by the Germans, it is in any case capable of such use, and hence properly on the absolute contraband list.

The promise to us of October, 1914, is another scrap of paper.

Also, when a belligerent, do not do unto others as you have forced them to do unto you.—*Feb.* 11, 1916.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

Shares of stock and bonds of American railroads and American industrial corporations sold through Amsterdam bankers to American investors and shipped on the Dutch steamships *Noordam* and *Rotterdam* from Holland to New York to be delivered to the purchasers were seized in the mail carried by the vessels and are held by the British government.

The British suspect these shares and bonds were owned by Germans and Austrians and so arrogate to themselves the right to capture and, possibly, confiscate them.

It does not matter that American banks, trust companies, brokers, bond dealers and others bought these securities in the regular course of business through the Stock Ex-

change and are embarrassed by failure to get them. The British hold that the stock or the bond must be shown to have none of the taint of the hated German or it is subject to seizure.

Bills of exchange, too, in payment of many millions of dollars' worth of goods shipped by America to neutral nations of Europe, have been taken from the mails by the British and never heard of again.

There are few banks in New York doing an international business that have not suffered through these acts. They are not the ones most concerned. The losses and the woes of merchants and shippers are many.

The Barbary pirates acted on the theory that they owned the Mediterranean. They held up ships, searched them for plunder and exacted tribute. The British act on the theory that they control all the seas. They search neutral ships, purloin treasure intrusted to the mails, rifle the pockets and the baggage of passengers, and, when they see fit, take prisoners.

We went to war with the Barbary states rather than submit to their criminal code. "Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute," was the rallying cry in those days. Today our bankers and brokers and merchants in the foreign trade are protesting to Washington against this new form of piracy in the British channel. They are led by powerful interests, such as the Guaranty Trust Company, the Equitable Trust Company, etc.

If their protests are unavailing we might as well acknowledge that if we travel, or ship or send communication across the seas, it is "by leave of England."—*Feb. 19, 1916.*

TIBETAN HOSPITALITY

Washington, Feb. 21.—Secretary Lansing to-day asked the London Foreign Office for prompt replies to the American notes protesting against application of the trading with the enemy act against American firms and interests.—*News Dispatch.*

Strange are the ways of the peoples of this earth. We realize how arbitrary are all standards when we find that what is sacred to us is disgusting to other men, and what to them is good manners or good morals is abhorrent to us.

In his "Folkways" Prof. Sumner tells of a traveler in Tibet who reported that his native host "expressed his respect for us and his appreciation of our remarks by rising to his feet and extending his tongue at full length."

The custom is recalled to the mind by the manner in which Great Britain has answered our notes of protest against her violation of every right of neutral commerce and correspondence, and against her proceeding in the face of all precedents which she as a powerful neutral enforced.

Perhaps, like the host, Great Britain thinks that this is the most exquisitely polite way in which to express "her respect for us and her appreciation of our remarks."

Only England does not rise to her feet to do it. She lazily rolls over on one side and gives us the unspeakable courtesy of a Tibetan reply.—*Feb. 22, 1916.*

THE COUNTRY OF WASHINGTON

This morning we have news that casts down every spirit which hoped that America would fulfill her mis-

sion as guardian of neutral rights in this war.

Sweden, after fruitless endeavors to induce us to co-operate with her in upholding these rights, has at last bowed to British terrorism at sea. Sweden has formed a Swedish Food Commission to be under British control. The Swedish-American line will accept no consignment for Sweden unless addressed to this British commission or to the Swedish government. England makes the Swedish government personally responsible that nothing consigned to it will be allowed to move to Germany.

Sweden says we have refused to aid her in the perfectly lawful act of forwarding to the German civil population all but contraband of war. Sweden says that in our note to Britain we insisted on the right to ship such goods to Germany via adjacent neutrals, but we will not aid any adjacent neutral in practicing the rights which we so firmly maintain.

On the contrary, says Sweden, we acquiesce in a system of British surveillance over the imports of Sweden which not only throttles our transit trade to Germany but also half our direct trade to Sweden. Our direct trade to Sweden is at the absolute control of a resident British commission. This commission receives applications from Swedish firms that have always imported from America and decides whether or not their names have a German sound, and hence are susceptible to a German connection.

We cannot lightly brush aside Sweden's accusation. We cannot lightly view the evidence of our acquiescence in British sovereignty on Swedish soil, on the very birthday of

the American who removed the last vestige of British sovereignty from our own soil.—*Feb. 22, 1916.*

A CORRECTION

Sir Edward Grey in Parliament the other day made a speech for which America is profoundly grateful.

The opponents of the present British measures, a blockade of Germany and neutrals alike, which our government characterizes as illegal and indefensible—the opponents were citing our American figures of exports to neutrals as evidence of a trade so large that some of it must be leaking through to Germany.

Sir Edward Grey appeased them:

The figures given for exports deal only with goods which left the United States and give no information regarding their arrival.

Henceforth we shall be thankful to the British foreign secretary if he will omit from his correspondence with us mention of the size of our export to European neutrals as evidence of so vast a prosperity in the United States that British action at sea cannot possibly be interfering with us.—*Feb. 24, 1916.*

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

The London "Economist" in its issue of February 12, 1916, page 256, says:

Germany, it appears, has not severed all communication with us, and her exports to Great Britain last year amounted to £200,827. How many people in England know that we are still importing goods from Germany?

On the same page the "Economist" prints detailed figures from the

Board of Trade showing the value of the imports and exports of all British merchandise for 1915, compared with 1914 and 1913. It laments that the United States and Argentina benefited most by selling stuff to Great Britain despite everything the British did to favor Australia, India, Canada and British dependencies generally.

Unfortunately, the "Economist" is unable or unwilling to inform us as to the character of the goods imported by England from Germany in 1915.

Imports of \$1,000,000 do not amount to much, it is true, but how tremendously such an amount of a sorely needed German product, potash or dye stuff, or both, would be appreciated by us!

The British may get them for their own uses, but we can get them only by leave of England.—*Mar. 3, 1916.*

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

In obedience to an order of the British government the Cunard line will accept no freight from New York until further notice except munitions and grain for the British.

The International Mercantile Marine, presumably in obedience to the same order, has canceled all space engaged by private shippers on the steamships Manhattan, Lancaster and Philadelphia, and announces there will be little public freight taken by the Celtic, Cymric and Adriatic.

To get a pound of freight across the ocean now by a liner is difficult indeed. London decides what is to go and what is to remain.

The heads of two large publishing

houses—McGraw and Scribners—appealed to London a day or two ago to let their magazines go through.

McGraw's appeal was rejected, but the Scribner volumes will go across the sea "by leave of England."—*Mar. 9, 1916.*

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

A case of ladies' silk hosiery shipped by Lord & Taylor on the Swedish steamship Hogland, and consigned to F. W. Hasselblad & Co., of Gothenburg, Sweden, has been seized by the British on suspicion that the goods might be forwarded to the Germans.

Lord & Taylor will protest to the State Department against the seizure, on the ground that ladies' stockings are not contraband.

If the British are at all gallant they will release the goods, forward them to Gothenburg and announce to the ladies of that town that they may wear them and, if they desire show a little of them, "by leave of England."—*March 10, 1916.*

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

An enterprising American newspaper, having obtained from its staff photographers, sent to Europe for the purpose, several thousand feet of moving picture films of scenes and actions in the present war, taken at the front, by permission of the Berlin government from within the German lines, has displayed them extensively throughout the United States. Several weeks ago an order came to that newspaper from a firm in Shanghai, China, for a set of these films to be displayed in that and other Chinese cities. In fulfillment of this order, the films were

shipped via the American Express Company to the firm in Shanghai. It now transpires that upon their arrival there the agent of the express company, whose name betokens Teutonic ancestry, although it is alleged that he is not a citizen of Germany, was not allowed to receive these films for delivery to the customer of the newspaper because the British agents of that port declared that to give him the films would be in violation of the "trading with the enemy law."

The American newspaper and the American Express Company have appealed to the British ambassador in Washington and to the British authorities in London through the proper diplomatic officials for the release of these films without success.

These films, the product of American enterprise, owned by an American newspaper, shipped to China, a neutral country, cannot go to their destination—because the "leave of England" is withheld.—*March 15, 1916.*

THE NEW ORDER IN COUNCIL

A new British Order in Council has been promulgated, further restricting trade between America and the neutral nations of Europe. All trade with Germany is long since dead. Having passively accepted previous British Orders in Council, we may accept this one, but we owe it to ourselves to recognize the orders which we take from his majesty's government.

An order in council is a substitute for international law. England as a belligerent is not satisfied with international law, the body of precedents protecting peaceful trade

which England as a powerful neutral has done the most to create. Therefore, when these precedents embarrass her in war, she passes an order in council to supersede them. This order supplants previous international law as a rule of procedure both for British cruisers capturing neutral vessels and cargoes, and for British prize courts in condemning them.

The British Orders in Council are all under the guise of accepting the law of nations. In early August, 1914, we asked both belligerent groups to adopt the Declaration of London as their code of naval warfare. The Declaration of London was a code of international law framed by the representatives of all nations at a conference in London, called by the British government. It is a fair, clear statement of the rights of those who prefer to remain at peace at the hands of those who choose to go to war.

Germany and Austria adopted the Declaration of London, as we suggested. England "accepted" it "with modifications," the modifications being included in her Order in Council of August 20, 1914. When we came to read that order it reversed all protective features of the declaration, which it nominally adopted. The August Order in Council was superseded by that of October, 1914, still in force. By these orders conditional contraband (foodstuffs) were forbidden to move to Germany, along with absolute contraband (munitions). The distinction between the two classes was abolished. The British then issued successively expanded contraband lists until every important article of our export was banned, except cotton.

On March 11, 1915, a new Order in Council was issued, declaring that all goods to or from Germany would be seized. This killed our cotton exports and annihilated our imports from Germany. This abolition of trade with Germany is still called by the British an Order in Council; they do not dare to call their action a blockade, for they know they maintain none.

Goods are not allowed to move to Germany indirectly via neutral countries like Scandinavia or Holland. The October Order in Council authorized Sid Edward Grey to stop our trade with any neutral that may be forwarding goods into Germany. This forced those countries to issue export embargoes on all goods imported from us. Moreover, steamship lines from New York to European neutrals dare not carry any shipment not certified by the British consul-general here, who thereby becomes censor of all our trade with neutral Europe.

But the British government is not satisfied with their own consul-general's approval of the manifest of a Scandinavian vessel from New York nor his sealing of the ship's hatches, so that nothing can be put on board after she leaves. With export embargoes in force in European neutral countries and with the neutral nature of Scandinavian and Dutch consignees certified by British agents in New York before goods can be taken aboard here—if, in spite of this, our exports are seized by England, it can only be for the purpose of destroying our trade.

Ship after ship, so certified, has been hauled into Kirkwall and sent to British ports for discharge and detention. American owners of

cargoes seized and sold a year ago still await the slightest indication of reparation from the British Prize Court. These cargoes may all meet the fate of the \$15,000,000 of American meat products, consigned to Scandinavian ports, seized by the British in October, 1914, and finally condemned without reparation in September, 1915.

Indeed, this fate is the likely result of the new March 30 Order in Council. Its provisions work backward, and so affect all goods seized before March 30. It says that:

It is therefore ordered that the provisions of the Declaration of London shall not be deemed to limit *or to have limited* in any way the right of his majesty, in accordance with the law of nations, to capture goods upon the ground that they are conditional contraband, nor to affect *or to have affected* the liability of conditional contraband to capture, whether the carriage of the goods to their destination be direct or entail trans-shipment or subsequent transport by land.

It is of course a small thing that the capture of conditional contraband moving to Germany via a neutral cannot be affected "in accordance with the law of nations."

Another clause of the new order tells us:

Enemy destination may be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to a person who, during the present hostilities, has forwarded contraband goods to territories belonging to or occupied by the enemy.

That is, any Scandinavian or Dutch merchant who—even before his own country issued an embargo on the export of contraband goods—forwarded contraband to Germany, is now a forbidden consignee of American goods.

Finally, whatever the British seize and hold, the proof of its innocence

is up to us, not to them. The old rule of law that the captor must prove the guilt of his capture on the high seas is reversed. The new Order in Council tells us:

It shall lie upon the owners of the goods to prove that their destination was innocent.

How long, O Lord, how long!

—April 6, 1916.

BESIEGED

A letter on the *Times* editorial page Sunday is one of the most interesting communications that have been sent to any New York paper in a long time. It is worth reading by all, in that it expresses the fairly frequent view of the hopelessness of protecting ourselves against the whole interference with our trade which both belligerents are now practicing.

There is a good deal of talk about sending milk to Germany for its starving babies. And the criticism, in certain quarters, is that if it were not allowed to go in, it would be the grossest kind of inhumanity. What about a besieged city? When the cry of starvation is sent beyond its limits, what is done? Does the attacking general authorize the sending in of supplies? Certainly not. He thunders out: "If you are starving, then lay down your arms and surrender." This is the accepted mode of warfare the world over.

What is the situation so far as it affects America? It is not for us to excite ourselves whether German or English citizens are starving. We enter the field when the belligerents apply the siege theory to illegal blockades or submarine operations which destroy our lawful commerce. We stand for international law not in order to protect starving belligerents, but neutrals trading with belligerents.

There is one very important reason why this country must insist upon our right to send food to the civilian population of Germany. If we do not enforce our protest against the present British annihilation of our trade with Germany, we shall see ourselves obliged to accede to Germany's annihilation of our trade with England, an annihilation brought about by the use of the submarine. If we succeed in forcing the allies to disarm their merchantment, the submarine will put the passengers and crew into small boats before sinking the vessel. Otherwise not.

Our government has called an armed merchant vessel an "auxiliary cruiser," and so suitable for destruction without warning. Therefore we cannot logically resist a submarine policy of destruction of all British craft in and out of England. So long as England adheres to her present stand, every vessel may be carrying a concealed gun on her stern and offer sudden annihilation in return for that submarine visit and search which we have tried to make a substitute for unwarned sinking.

Suppose the submarine commanders have these new orders. Then—

When the cry of starvation is sent beyond its (England's) limits, what is done? Does the attacking general (the submarine commander) order the sending in of supplies? Certainly not. He thunders out: "If you are starving, then lay down your arms and surrender." This is the accepted mode of warfare the world over.

We venture to predict that this same mode of warfare, then applied by Germany, would not be so acceptable to even the *Times* correspondent. Yet it is the logical outcome of our passive acceptance

of the British annihilation of trade with Germany through a "blockade" which we declare illegal, indefensible, and a measure whose fulfillment causes us to forfeit our rights and violate our neutrality. This was our message to England when we made our first protest against that blockade, on March 30, 1915.

The submarine campaign of destruction outlined would not differ in principle from the British measures which with mild protests we let continue.

There is a way for America honorably and effectively to solve this whole problem. It is to now enforce what we have twice suggested: a joint return by both belligerents to the limits of law. Not only is this a way; it is the only way.

Germany and England are both acting in defiance of the code of international law that existed before the outbreak of the present war. To America, as the chief neutral, has come the duty of impartially maintaining this code against both belligerents. It will be better for us, better for the belligerents themselves in the long run, and better for the whole world if we can carry through this great duty. When our President speaks in the name of impartial justice his words will find sanction with neutrals and with the thinking, fair-minded individuals in the belligerent countries themselves.

—April 7, 1916.

SETTLING WITH US AFTER THE WAR

There are some people living in America who want us to take no steps toward asserting our rights to

trade upon the high seas because such assertion must be against England, and nothing must be done to hinder England in exercising her full sea power in this war, whether or not its exercise is unlawful.

These same people, living in America, want us to take the sharpest of measures toward asserting our rights to travel on the high seas—even on armed ships—because such assertion is against Germany, and nothing must be left undone to hinder Germany from exercising the full force of her new sea power, the submarine.

But these fellow-inhabitants do not state the case in this bald way. They say: The question between us and Germany is one of lives and must be settled now; the question between us and Britain is one of property and can be settled after the war.

They point out to us the brilliant result of the Alabama claims case. During the civil war, British-built Confederate privateers sank a large percentage of our merchant vessels. A further large percentage was sold to British owners. Our oversea merchant marine disappeared from the ocean, and never returned.

During the war the Union was powerless to enforce its protest. But after the war we succeeded in having the matter submitted to a court of arbitration. We won a glorious victory. Britain was forced to pay \$15,000,000 into our federal treasury. Will any one dare to tell us that this was a "fair" price for Britain to pay for the elimination of her rival in the carrying trade? Ask the Kansas farmer now paying 50 cents, instead of 5 cents, per bushel in ocean freight rates—ask

the farmer whether the Alabama claims victory was a glorious one.

All these matters are not issues of to-day and to-morrow. By our actions to-day we are laying the foundations of our future.

When our merchant marine was unlawfully driven from the seas we were rent with civil strife, powerless to help ourselves. When to-day our trade is being driven from the ocean or forced into channels that please England, we need not sit helplessly by. Where is the money to pay us if we stand aside and see neutral and German buyers of our peaceful products forced to seek new sources of supply, or devise substitutes for our cotton, oil, phosphates, typewriters, agricultural machinery? And all in the name of a lawless procedure which even his majesty's government does not dare to call a blockade.

We recall that once Britain went to war with China to force China to continue her importation of opium from India. From its opium export tax the Indian government was drawing most of its revenues. It is not seditious and un-American to ask to have applied to England the same severe pressure now being applied to Germany, in order to force the continuation of our exports of cotton, lumber and foodstuffs to all civilian populations of Europe.

After all, the rights of a free citizen and a free nation are more than the physical right to continue to draw breath. There is included the man's and the nation's right to pursue their lawful vocations and earn their livelihood. When Venice gave to Antonio half of the wealth of Shylock, and confiscated the

other half for the State, the unhappy Jew said:

Nay, take my life and all; pardon not that:
You take my house when you do take the prop
That doth sustain my house; you take my life
When you do take the means whereby I live.

That is the view Washington also. Our government will stand on Thomas Jefferson's declaration of the independence of neutral nations:

When two nations go to war, those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures and other ordinary vocations, to carry the produce of their industry for exchange to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual, to go and come freely without injury or molestation.

There is not one serious offender against our vital rights and interests. There are two. We insist on the right to come and go freely, and we also insist on the rest of the Jeffersonian declaration.—April 8, 1916.

THOMAS JEFFERSON'S BIRTHDAY

To-day is the birthday of Thomas Jefferson, the founder and the patron saint of the reigning Democratic party. In a hundred cities of the United States citizens will gather and celebrate the character and achievements of a great American. Of all things Thomas Jefferson did, none is more worthy of our memory and thoughtful consideration than his vigorous, manly American foreign policy. It was a policy which gave this little country a

place and a name of honor among nations.

As secretary of state under Washington, as Adams's vice-president, as twice President of the United States, and as model and prompter for his follower, Madison, Thomas Jefferson dominated the foreign policy of the United States from the formation of the government to the close of the war of 1812. When that war was over United States citizens, our flag and our ships were respected in all lands and on all seas of the world.

Jefferson was an American in the truest sense; he defended American rights against all who violated them. The same task confronts America to-day. During Jefferson's period England and France were almost continually at war. England and Germany are at war to-day. In Jefferson's time both belligerents used every means in their power to draw America into the conflict on their respective sides. It is not different to-day. When they could not bring us into the war, they set about to destroy our commerce in the hope of crippling each other. So in the war of 1914-16. Jefferson, with all the power at his command, fought, and fought successfully, this attempt at the unlimited assertion of belligerents to close the seas to the peaceful nations of the world.

The impartiality with which Jefferson proceeded against wrongdoers was instanced in 1793. In the year E. C. Genet, an agent of the French government, was in this country trying to interest our citizens in the cause of France. His violation of our hospitality went to the extent of commissioning privateers and attempting to raise mili-

tary forces in this country. In June, 1793, Jefferson wrote him sharply:

It is the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by others within its limits, and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring powers.

Genet continued his activities and his recall was demanded and obtained.

In the same year, 1793, England—then, as now, without maintaining a legal blockade—undertook to capture all food products bound for France. The instructions of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, our minister to Great Britain, are illuminating to-day. Asserting that "no nation can agree, at the mere will or interest of another, to have its peaceable industry suspended and its citizens reduced to idleness and want," Jefferson continued:

Were we to withhold from France supplies of provisions, we should in like manner be bound to withhold them from her enemies also, and thus shut to ourselves all the ports of Europe where corn is in demand, or make ourselves parties in the war. This is a dilemma which Great Britain has no right to force upon us, and for which no pretext can be found in any part of our conduct. She may, indeed, feel the desire of starving an enemy nation, but she can have no right of doing it at our loss nor of making us the instrument of it.

At the end of Washington's administration in 1797 Jefferson became Adam's vice-president. The demands of the French directorate, to the effect that we should strain our neutrality in favor of France, became so outlandish that we declared war on France in 1798. After a few sea fights had been fought, Napoleon came to power and withdrew the French demands.

But the great struggle forced upon Jefferson was one with England. The struggle was one to prevent Great Britain from confiscating our ships and cargoes, taking passengers off our ships, impressing American seamen into the British navy. Prof. Johnston describes the fight that Jefferson carried on in words that must have a haunting ring to Democratic ears at Washington to-day.

All the difficulties which followed may be summed up in a few words: the British government was then the representative of the ancient system of restriction of commerce, and had a powerful navy to enforce its ideas; the American government was endeavoring to force into international recognition the present system of neutral rights and unrestricted commerce, but its suspicious democracy refused to give it a navy sufficient to command respect. The American government apparently expected to gain its object without the exhibition of anything but moral force.

Yet with the insufficient means at their command Jefferson and his followers carried their contest to a successful conclusion. In 1807, as a retaliation against illegal blockades of American commerce on the part of France and England, an embargo on all trade with both of them was declared. France gave in, but non-intercourse with England was continued until the friction between the two countries broke into open war in 1812.

In the war of 1812 our little navy made itself respected. To be sure, in the peace of 1814 no mention was made of non-interference with American commerce, of the impressment of American seamen or the other evils against which Jefferson contended. But England understood, and the world understood, that the day for exercising sover-

eignty over American rights was past. It remained for the war of 1914, just a century later, to revive this ancient abolition of our sovereign right to use the free seas.

Jefferson had weak weapons in his hands. To-day the administration at Washington heads the most powerful, the most feared, nation in the world. To-day we can have what we ask for. To-day we have secured from one offender, Germany, all the concessions we can fairly ask without securing some measure of return to law on the part of Great Britain, against whose illegal blockade the submarine campaign is admittedly a retaliation.

We have no malice for England and none for Germany. We are to-day divinely commissioned to uphold the law of nations against all who break it. Is England to follow Germany in a return to this law, or is England to be allowed to fulfill the harsh definition which Jefferson gave of her in a letter to Baron de Stael Holstein on May 24, 1813:

England is in principle the enemy of all maritime nations. The object of England is the permanent dominion of the ocean and the monopoly of the trade of the world.

—April 13, 1916.

THE PACKERS' AND THE COUNTRY'S SHAME

From London come glowing reports of the heartfelt satisfaction of the representatives of American packers before the British prize court. British cables report these men as enthusiastic about the money settlement they have finally received from England in part recompense for confiscated meat exports to

European neutral countries. But the packers in this country, who have American wires to use for communication, express no such joy over the outcome. And when we come to analyze the situation, we find that England would not pay for the unlawfully seized cargoes until the packers agreed not to try to trade with Germany during the rest of the war. The "settlement" was in consideration of a renouncement of the right of America to use the high seas of the world.

The packers' trouble began early in the war. In October and early November five ships of an American steamship company set sail for Scandinavia, consigned "to order." This was the recognized method of exporting and financing our exports of meat products; no objection had ever been raised against it. The ships had all sailed before people in America knew of the provisions of the British October 29 order in council, which, among its many other offenses against law, declared that our "to order" shipments to European neutrals were tainted with suspicion of German destination. Upon this ground our ships, with \$15,000,000 of meat products aboard, were seized and thrown into the British prize court.

These ships and their cargoes, detained in November, 1914, could not get a hearing before the British prize court before April 13, 1915. In the meantime the British had made various unacceptable proposals to settle the cases out of court, offering the packers part payment for the value of their cargoes. The packers naturally demanded full payment.

The cases came before the British court on April 13, but were again

postponed until June 7, then until July 16. There was every prospect that England was going to condemn the cargoes without payment; that is, confiscate them. The ground was to be the British order in council of October 29, which was in conflict with international law. Therefore, on July 15, one day before the court met, our government sent a "caveat" note to England, intended for the information of the prize court. We informed England that we would recognize no action of its prize courts acting under British municipal enactments (orders in council) and not under the recognized principles of international law.

England then proceeded to show just how much she respected our protest and how much she feared our threat not to recognize the action of her prize court. That prize court in September condemned without compensation the \$15,000,000 meat exports and condemned them under the very British "municipal enactments" against which we had issued warnings.

With the aid of the State Department the Americans then set about to get some compensation from the British government for the cargoes thus illegally condemned.

The packers, selling agents of the products of American farmers, were obliged to accept such settlement out of court as England would give. England agreed to pay for the cargoes if the packers would agree, during the course of the war, not to try to sell to Germany or her allies. The packers accepted and signed such an agreement.

They had fought such terms offered them before, not because they

had been engaged in shipping to Germany, but because our government has taken the firmest stand against the illegality and indefensibility of British stoppage of any of our exports to Germany except contraband of war. Food is not contraband of war. The government is under a moral obligation to its citizens to abolish this illegal blockade. The packers wanted to have their hands free, when the promised abolition came, to resume trade with their German customers.

Perhaps, too, they realized that for the meat packers of the United States to sign with the British government an agreement not to supply our accustomed German market would be a clear combination in restraint of trade; and the Department of Justice has not been too lenient with the packers.

Perhaps also they felt the essential unneutrality which would be the lot of this country if those who control one of its industries refused to trade with one belligerent, with whom we were at peace, and continued to deal with another. Perhaps some lawyer had recalled to the packers a famous American dictum of Thomas Jefferson, the patron saint of the Democratic party. In 1793 England, without maintaining a legal blockade—and it is maintaining none now—tried to stop all our exports of grain to France, with which it was at war. Jefferson, then secretary of state, wrote:

Were we to withhold from France supplies of provisions we should in like manner be bound to withhold them from her enemies also.

It is not different to-day. The eternal laws of justice and right do not change.—*April 18, 1916.*

SENATOR STONE

Senator Stone, of Missouri, is chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, and knows more about the true nature of our foreign complications than any other man at Washington, apart from the President and the secretary of State themselves. Therefore when Senator Stone speaks, the nation listens. On April 13, Jefferson's birthday, he spoke in the Senate a word that we needed to hear. He reminded the country that the most essential thing is to have a large navy, and that an adequate army is, though of large importance, secondary, from the viewpoint of immediate necessity.

All may not agree with Senator Stone in seeing England, with her navy, rather than Germany, with her army, our more likely foe. We need not prepare, and we do not prepare, against any specific foe. But no matter who comes against us, we are impregnable if we maintain a navy that can hold the seas. The best land defense against Germany, England or Japan is a navy so strong that none of them can put an army ashore.

All this is implied by Senator Stone:

The people of the United States are less concerned about the military programme of European nations than about their naval programmes. We are separated by thousands of miles by sea from Europe, and there are other considerations that minimize the possibility of danger to us from that source. But the seas that wash the shores of Europe also wash the shores of the United States. A European power sufficiently strong to be supreme on the seas is of greater possible danger to our welfare, whether in times of war or peace, than any mere military power, however formidable, thousands of miles away.

While I look upon the military supremacy of any European power with the greatest aversion, we of America would have no particular reason to dread it; but a supreme dominance of the seas by a single power comes immediately home to us.

We need an army too, and an army means, logically, compulsory service for all men. Above all else we need this military training to set the nation up, physically and morally, and to enthuse the country with the highest of national purposes—namely, the readiness to lay down one's life for the country that gives us birth, protection, liberty, prosperity. Once this unification is attained, the fulfillment of the national aims of greater social justice will not be long waited for.—*April 19, 1916.*

THE BRITISH NOTE

To-day, on April 26, 1916, is published the British answer to our note of October 21, 1915, denouncing the British "blockade." In the six months which the leisurely government of his majesty has taken to prepare its reply, a masterpiece of literature could have been produced. So far as length goes, the note is unexampled. It is over 13,000 words, a veritable book. The British may fairly claim that they have broken the diplomatic long-distance record, both in the time they took to answer and in the longitude of their effort.

Whatever the purpose of those 13,000 words, their effect is not to clarify but to becloud the issues they touch. Not even this long note can contribute one atom toward explaining the British position in terms of international law and humanity. The simple reason is that in these terms the British position is unten-

able. Nor can all the dust in all those 13,000 words blind us to this staring fact. No matter how polished or profuse the language which declares that black is white, the truth remains the same.

The English contention of 13,000 words can be answered in one-tenth that number. There is no easier way to rend the British web than by using the very means this note puts in our hands. In this, as in previous communications, the claim is made that during the civil war, in our blockade of the Confederacy, we took measures against British trade with the southern states which now justify Britain in her measures against our trade with Germany. The claim on first view is plausible. The conclusion which Britain draws is that we are now lying in a bed we ourselves made, and that our hands are tied against protesting a procedure we invented.

The true nature of the British position is very clearly brought out by contrasting their present "blockade" with our civil war blockade, which they call upon for a precedent. Washington well knows the fallacy of this argument, touched upon in previous British notes. But the average citizen needs to refresh his memory on our civil war practice. Whoever takes the trouble to recall the facts will find himself assured that the British contention is false, namely, that during the civil war our blockading squadron established precedents which now prevent us from abolishing the present British lawlessness.

In this crisis the thinking citizen wants the simple facts, no flight of rhetoric or appeal to passion. What is the nature of the British blockade, what is the history and status

of our negotiations with Britain regarding it, and what is the application of our civil war procedure to the case in hand?

On March 11, 1915, England announced that she would stop all goods she could seize going to or from Germany directly or via neutral countries. England calls this an Order in Council; she has never dared to call it a blockade. That is why people write British "blockade" with quotation marks. A blockade of Germany, to be lawful, must be a naval operation effectually shutting all neutrals out of all German ports. But Britain dare not send her fleet into the Baltic and invest the German ports of Lübeck and Stettin. With these ports the Scandinavian countries trade unhindered. A Swede can ship a cargo of lumber to Stettin, but an American cannot ship a cargo from Mobile. Swedish manufacturers of fertilizers can get potash from Lübeck, but the manufacturer at Norfolk cannot. England would intercept such an American shipment as it passed through the English channel or north of Scotland. The very essence of a blockade is that it shall be effective and bear equally on all neutrals. So the thinking citizen discovers why England does not call its action a blockade.

With no blockade existing, Britain's lawful interference with our German trade is restricted to the right to search German-bound vessels for contraband of war; our other goods—like foodstuffs and cotton—must be allowed to pass free. Britain has no right to touch a single shipment moving from Germany to us. To the extent that Britain in her restrictions on our German trade is exceeding this limitation on our exports of contraband

—to this extent Britain is acting in defiance of international law.

When we look at the plain facts we find that Britain has not only killed all our trade with Germany but has crippled our trade with European neutrals, on the excuse that they might be letting food and supplies through to Germany. To be specific, the thinking citizen will find that the Holland-America Line boats dare not accept a shipment for Holland not certified by the British consul-general in New York. If the boat carried such a shipment it would be taken to a British port, searched and detained at a loss (in earnings) to the owners of \$2,000 per day. The British consul-general will approve only shipments consigned to the Netherlands government or the Netherlands Overseas Trust, a "British-led, British-ruled" band of Dutch merchants who have given England a heavy cash bond that they will allow nothing to move through to England's enemy. But no commodity may go even to these consignees unless it is on an export embargo list which Holland has been forced to enact, designed against Germany. The Scandinavian countries, lest they starve for want of overseas supplies, have been driven into just such a situation as Holland.

It is this unheard-of interference in commerce between America and neutral Europe that England seeks to justify by civil war precedents. Therefore to-day it is well worth while briefly to pass the civil war cases in review before our eyes.

During that war it was found that the Confederacy was drawing large quantities of supplies from the island of Nassau in Bermuda. It

appeared that British vessels were carrying supplies to Bermuda, where the cargoes were trans-shipped. From Bermuda small blockade runners waited their chance to slip through the cordon of Federal warships before southern ports. Warships of the United States then intercepted British vessels bound for Nassau and brought them before our prize courts, where all their Confederate supplies were condemned, on the ground that the ultimate and not the immediate destination was the controlling factor. That is, to those Confederate goods was applied the doctrine of "continuous voyage," previously developed in British courts.

These, then, were the Bermuda cases. But we seized the British vessels because their cargoes were on their way to pass through an American blockade, acknowledged lawful and interposed between Nassau and the Confederacy. How does this justify England seizing our exports moving to Scandinavian countries? Such goods, if destined for Germany, are on their way to pass from Scandinavia over the open Baltic to Stettin. No blockade is interposed between the Scandinavian peninsula and Germany. *The point is, we have a right to ship direct to Stettin.* Then how have we no right to ship to Stettin via Gothenburg? Why may a Swede ship his own goods to Stettin and yet be estopped from forwarding to the same destination goods received from America?

When Britain establishes the conditions we maintained in the Civil War by interposing a blockade squadron in the Baltic—then we shall allow her to call our Bermuda cases to her help and not before. Britain cannot assume the privileges

of a blockade without accepting the responsibilities.

Obviously the Bermuda cases could not be cited to justify British interference with our trade to Germany via Holland, for that trade is to be forwarded to Germany by land, not by sea. Here the British have called up another set of "continuous voyage" cases, also of civil war time, the Matamoras cases. These, when examined, are a two-edged sword for Britain to play with. They cut not for, but against, the British contention.

Federal war vessels held up British goods destined for Texas via Matamoras, Mexico, on the Mexican bank of the Rio Grande. Brownsville, opposite Matamoras, was blockaded by the Federal fleet; Matamoras obviously was not. Our Supreme Court decided that we might seize only the contraband on board such ships, and then only if it had a clear destination for Confederate use. That is, absolute contraband destined overland to the Confederacy was condemned, but all other goods with the same destination were ordered released.

For America to have interfered to greater extent than described with the lawful traffic between England and Matamoras would have been intolerable, and would never have been suffered by Great Britain. To be sure, the limitation imposed seriously impaired the tightness of our blockade of the Confederacy. But we had something else besides our own wishes to consider. As the Supreme Court said:

Neutral trade (all but absolute contraband trade) to and from a blockaded country by inland navigation or transportation is lawful, and therefore that trade between London and Matamoras, with intent to supply goods for Texas from

Matamoros, violated no blockade, and cannot be declared unlawful. Such trade * * * with unrestricted inland commerce between such ports and the enemy's territory impairs undoubtedly, and very seriously impairs, the value of blockade of the enemy's coast. *But in such cases as that now in judgment, we administer the public law of nations and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage of our own or another country.*

Even if Britain were maintaining a blockade of Germany—which she is not—our Matamoros cases would forbid her to stop any of our exports to Holland except contraband of war, demonstrably moving to Germany.

President Wilson knows this, Washington will not be confused with the fine phrases of the British note. Nor need any American be confused, if he cares to examine the facts. We know that in the Civil War we did nothing that now ties our hands. We know that to-day America is the arbiter, judge, protector of international law, which to-day we apply on behalf of the peaceful world. "In cases such as that now in judgment we administer the public law of nations." We shall administer it against both Germany's and Great Britain's wrongdoings with even-handed justice.

In administering this law of nations we shall be conscious of enforcing not only the cold letter of the law but also the burning dictates of humanity. The illegal blockade which we shall break is above all a starvation campaign leveled against the German civilian population. We shall recall the words and spirit of Thomas Jefferson. In 1793, when Britain was practicing just this sort of interference with our exports to her enemy, France, Jefferson declared:

She (Britain) may indeed feel the desire of starving an enemy nation, but she can have no right of doing it at our loss nor of making us the instruments of it.

Under such circumstances, Jefferson concluded:

If we permit corn to be sent to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally bound to permit it to France. To restrain it would be a partiality which might lead to war with France, and between restraining it ourselves and permitting her enemies to restrain it unlawfully is not different.

These are the plain simple facts of the case; these the issues that confront America. The case is so plain, so open to every one's view and judgment, that it cannot be confused by Sir Edward Grey's graceful phrases, nor by all his references to the Civil War, nor by all his claims of the changed conditions of warfare. As we tell Germany, so we tell him, that the principles of humanity and the immutable laws of justice, fairness and right do not change with the changing years.—April 26, 1916.

THE BALTIC AN "INLAND SEA"

The unexplained and unexplainable defect in the British "blockade" is the open Baltic. So long as British warships do not invest German Baltic ports like Lübeck and Stettin, and so long as Sweden and Norway ship unhindered to these ports, just so long is it a flaming discrimination against our commerce to stop our exports destined to those ports, whether moving direct or via Sweden.

In the British note, published yesterday, refusing our demand for the abolition of this lawless "blockade," Britain tries to escape from the

clutches of the law by the novel contention that the passage of commerce to a blockaded area across an inland sea has never been held to interfere with the effectiveness of a blockade. That is, we are told that the Baltic is an "inland sea," that shipments from Sweden to Stettin are not in the same class with shipments from New York to Stettin. The British statement is that the Baltic waters are not the high seas but an "inland sea," to which the established principles of international law do not apply.

The Baltic an inland sea! Presumably the British choose to call it an inland sea because it is entered only by the narrow straits between Denmark and the Scandinavian peninsula. On the same principle, the Straits of Gibraltar make of the Mediterranean an "inland sea," outside the realm of international law. If so, the German submarines can reign there as they choose. If so, we had no basis for our demand that the Persia sinking be investigated, and no ground for our protest over the Ancona outrage. If the Mediterranean be an inland sea, then we may hand back to Germany the guarantees which our warnings wrung from her, with regard to forbidding the sinking without notice of any merchantmen in the Mediterranean.

The new British contention will be as repugnant to Washington as it is to the average citizen's reason. Neither can proceed quite fast enough to follow the sophistries of his majesty's Foreign office.—*April 27, 1916.*

STRANGLER IMPORTS

On March 1, 1915, the British government, to the amazement and

discomfiture of the business world, declared that it would seize all goods moving from Germany to this country, either direct or via neutral countries. On that date there were many American merchants liable for large orders which they had placed with German firms. In view of the fact that the British have never declared or maintained a blockade of Germany—and nothing but a blockade would justify such an interference—Britain agreed to extend the period during which goods so ordered by Americans might be brought out of Germany. The time extensions were not sufficient to enable the orders to be filled and shipped. Now, when such time extensions are long since past, millions of dollars' worth of German goods lie in German factories or in European ports, and Americans are responsible for payment for them.

The efforts of the State department to help importers without compromising the government on legal questions have resulted in a curious official complication. Our State department has never recognized the legality of the British "blockade," yet two of the officials, its foreign trade advisers, were deputed to act as representatives of American shippers in giving to the British embassy at Washington proofs that their desired imports from Germany were ordered before March 1, 1915. It is officially stated that these advisers do not represent the government, and that nothing they may do can legally bind their superiors. But they are government officials and they are acting with the British embassy in its method of enforcing what their department says is an illegal stoppage of our commerce.

The situation could be paralleled

in our treatment of Germany. We protest vigorously the sinking of passenger vessels with Americans aboard. We might now appoint two foreign travel advisers, attached to the State department. Their function would be to inform prospective travelers what ships the German embassy in Washington, on behalf of its government, would agree not to torpedo.—*April 28, 1916.*

TWO BRITISH MINISTERS ON OUR SIDE

In these days, when Britain is doing her best to evade the clutches of international law, it is interesting to discover that ever since the reorganization of the British cabinet in May, 1915, it has held two members who, to be consistent, must support America's contention regarding the illegality of the present form of the British blockade. These two members are Mr. Balfour, first lord of the admiralty, and Lord Lansdowne. These two men, by their public admissions, are bound to support our cause when our State department determines to press it with the real force which we have at our disposal.

In our note to Great Britain of March 30, 1915, we declared our right to trade with Germany via neutral countries, even if a blockade of German ports were maintained. To renounce this right, we declared, would be to renounce our neutrality. But we denied that Britain was maintaining a legal blockade. We stated its weakness in these words:

The Scandinavian and Danish ports, for example, * * * are free, so far as the actual enforcement of the order-in-council is concerned, to carry on trade with German Baltic ports, although it is an essential element of blockade that

it bear with equal severity upon all neutrals.

In other words, we declared that England had no right to bar our commerce with German Baltic ports.

Mr. Balfour, before he joined the cabinet, publicly admitted the truth of this contention. In all fairness, therefore, he must now support our case in the British cabinet. In an interview cabled from London to the *New York Times* on March 27, 1915, discussing this novel feature of the British blockade, he ably explained the rule that a blockade must bar the commerce of *all* neutrals with a belligerent:

It (this rule) is designed to prevent the blockading power using its privileges in order to mete out different treatment to different countries, as, for instance, by letting the ships of one nationality pass the blockading cordon while it captures the ships of another. Such procedure is on the face of it unfair. It could have no object but to assist the trade of one neutral as against the trade of another, and arbitrarily to redistribute the burden which war unhappily inflicts on neutrals as well as on belligerents.

Mr. Balfour, while agreeing that England's present blockade violates this principle, then offered the excuse that "the discrimination, if it be so designated, is not the result of deliberate policy but of a geographical accident."

But this excuse did not even convince Mr. Balfour. He finally admitted:

But, after all, it is the equity of the allies' case rather than the law which mainly interests the thinking public of America and elsewhere.

This is the insufferable assumption that Britain is fighting our battle and therefore we must let her do as she pleases in destroying our

commerce as a means to attain her end.

If, then, there is no blockade which we can, as neutrals, admit, and none which the first lord of the admiralty in the British cabinet can defend, we turn to another distinguished British statesman to learn what our rights are. At the time of the Boer war, Lord Salisbury stated that conditional contraband (food) could not be stopped by a belligerent unless *shown* to be destined to the military of the enemy.

At this point the second member of the British cabinet, Lord Lansdowne, tells us our further rights in the matter. He tells us that we must not recognize the action of a belligerent (an English) prize court which stops our foodstuffs (to Germany) in violation of the principle Lord Salisbury laid down, a fundamental principle of international law.

In 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, Russia seized food destined to the civil population of Japan. Lord Lansdowne, then foreign secretary, wrote a letter to Joseph Choate describing the warning which Britain issued to Russia:

His majesty's government further pointed out that the decision of the prize court of the captor in such matters, in order to be binding on neutral states, must be in accordance with the recognized rules and principles of international law and procedure.

That is, Lansdowne seems to say that every one of the hundreds of British seizures of vessels with American cargoes would have been illegal even if they had been destined for Germany. In the cabinet he must contend that the British seizures of our exports to neutral ports were doubly beyond the pale of all law.

Our government cannot more effectively present its case than by calling these two British cabinet ministers to our aid.—*May 1, 1916.*

SIEGE AND BLOCKADE

Many half-informed persons are persuading themselves and others that the present British "blockade" of Germany corresponds exactly with the siege of a city. They say that the attempted starvation of the German civilian population is in no way different from the starvation of the civilians of Paris when the Germans besieged it in the war of 1870-71. It may be worth while again to point out the difference between a siege and a blockade, and between a lawful blockade and this present British measure.

When a city is besieged it is cut off from all communication with the world. This is a recognized way to reduce the city and capture its military forces and political leaders. It is inhuman, but so are other measures of war. War itself is the deepest savagery.

The besieging force occupies the territory of the enemy. This distinguishes the siege in principle from the blockade, where the besieging force consists of warships which occupy the seas. The seas are not the territory of the attacker or attacked, but the joint territory of all nations. If the British were to besiege all Germany, they would have to bar all access by sea and also all access by land, by drawing a cordon of soldiers around Germany's land borders. There is something of discrimination when you cut the communications of the neutrals which must trade with Germany by

sea, without being able similarly to cut the communications of those neutrals who trade with Germany by land.

Though this may be considered a discrimination in principle, it is not so considered in practice. It is lawful for England to isolate Germany by sea if a blockade can be maintained; that is, if all neutral nations can be barred from all German ports. In other words, it is lawful to besiege a nation by sea whether or not you can besiege it by land. To be sure, in international matters the United States has always fought this right of blockade and contended for the immunity of private property at sea in war time. But the potent influence of Great Britain, who wished to retain the ability to exercise her sea power in the very way it has been exercised in this war, has sufficed to perpetuate the power to make use of the blockade, if it be effectively and impartially maintained.

But the British "blockade" is neither effective nor impartial. The submarines make a blockade of Germany impossible. The British fleet does not venture into the Baltic sea. Sweden trades unhindered with German Baltic ports, like Lübeck and Stettin. The statistics of the millions of tons of shipping which in 1915 plied between Sweden and the German Baltic shores are an unanswerable commentary on the *effectiveness* of the "blockade." The fact that Sweden can send these millions of tons of shipping to Germany, while we cannot—this is, for all who will read, a demonstration that the "blockade" is not *impartial* and does not bear equally on all neutrals. *Effectiveness* and *impartiality* being the marks of a lawful

blockade, what shall we call this British procedure?

Since the British "blockade" is not lawful, it stands unpardonable as an inhumane attack on the lives of the civilian population of a country. The military, of course, is served first. It is the civilians who will starve, if any one does. The wickedness of the British attempt is in no way mitigated by the fact that the German people, by going on short rations, thwarted it. If I dodge a murderer's bullet, that does not establish his innocence.

The lawless stoppage of *our* food shipments to Germany makes us parties to the starvation attempt. In our note to England of March 20, 1915, we said that for us to acquiesce in this British policy

would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain which is obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this government in the present circumstances.

We said that on March 30, 1915. Up to the present moment we have continued thus to assume an "attitude of unneutrality towards the present enemies of Great Britain." Not only do we fail to assert our right to ship food to Germany. We do not even insist on the right to ship to the central empires Red Cross supplies for whose passage Britain refuses "permits."

In 1793 Britain—just as now—without maintaining a legal blockade, was stopping our grain moving to France. Jefferson said we could not lawfully continue to supply food to one belligerent if we acquiesced in its illegal stoppage of our food for its enemy. In a note to Pinckney, September 7, 1793, he said:

She (Britain) may indeed feel the desire of starving an enemy nation, but she can have no right of doing it at our loss nor of *making us the instruments* of it.

Neutral newspapers in America cannot but point out this piece of British inhumanity, practiced since the outbreak of the war. It is necessary to weigh this attempt on the life of a whole nation against the endless protestations of German barbarity, contained in every British diplomatic note. No doubt our President, who is the spokesman for humanity, proposes, among other things, to abolish this particular piece of British inhumanity and obliterate our participation in it.—
May 8, 1916.

NO HOSTILITIES AGAINST ENGLAND

As supplementary to our note to Germany, Secretary Lansing published the statement that our relation to England is different from our relation to Germany because we have a Bryan arbitration treaty with England which binds us to submit any dispute to a year's arbitration before entering into hostilities with each other.

It is quite true that we have an arbitration treaty with England which binds us to submit to arbitration or investigation all disputes that cannot be settled diplomatically. It is also true that we should repudiate such a treaty if it bound us to submit to third parties questions of national honor. Mr. Lansing intimated yesterday that even if we had had with Germany a treaty like the one we have with England, we should not have been willing to settle the submarine matter under the terms of that treaty.

If our present dispute with England does not reach the point where we feel it a matter of national honor to force the right to reopen trade with the European continent—until that time we are bound not to institute hostilities against England.

The secretary of state of course realizes that our relation to England is in another way different from our relation to Germany. To bring pressure to bear on Germany we had to threaten a diplomatic break, and war; we had no other force to apply. So it was fortunate that our hands were tied by no treaty whatever.

In the case of England we can apply pressure of quite a different sort. By war orders totaling over a billion dollars—most of them yet unshipped—England has pawned with us her future. We can make her redeem her pledge by obeying international law. Without our supplies of food and raw materials England could not fight a month. In the simplest manner we can indicate a possible stoppage of certain exports and forthwith crush the British rebellion against law, with no thought of opening hostilities; with the mere desire to conserve our national resources, to reduce the high cost of living in this country, or to hold and valorize cotton until our farmers could get a decent price for it.

That is, we are happily in such a position that the British arbitration treaty in no way embarrasses us. There is going to be no need of opening hostilities against England.

If the declaring of an embargo were a hostile act, England would long ago have committed a hostile act against us. In the first days of

the war she issued an embargo list—a list of goods that could not be exported from England—and the list has been repeatedly increased. It includes or has included caustic soda, manganese, wool rags, tanning extracts, molasses, pigskin, hides, hemp cordage and binding twine, and a thousand other articles. Moreover, England refuses to let hundreds of articles enter from this country. Canned and dried fruits, musical instruments, private automobiles, hardware, furniture, lumber, most cotton and woollen manufactures, chinaware, soaps are examples.

No, indeed, the laying of an embargo is no hostile act. The best proof is that we are not at war with England now.—*May 11, 1916.*

LLOYD GEORGE'S VISION

One of the most important events of the war has occurred, almost unnoticed amid the avalanche of political news. In a statement of Lloyd George is an announcement of the greatest single step that England has yet taken toward a successful prosecution of this war. England definitely renounces faith in economic pressure; namely, in the attempt to starve the population of Germany into submission. There are those who say that England's renunciation is due to the fact that this policy was rendered ineffective by the internal measures which Germany took to meet it. But let us accept what Lloyd George gives as a reason, that England realizes that such a victory would be an unsatisfactory one, and that England does not want a peace brought about by starving German women and children. He says:

I have never despaired of victory. The task will be hard, but the end is sure. It is Germany's military force that we must beat. It is not enough to force her to submission by economic pressure. A peace imposed on Germany exhausted in food and materials only would not be endurable. It would be a moral defeat for the allies. The Germans could say that they had beaten us in battle and made peace only because we had starved their women and children. That peace we don't want.

There are two great lessons to be learned from this statement. In the first place, it is clear that Great Britain is at last aware that this is, after all, a man's war. It will be won, if at all, in the good old way, by strong men who take arms in their hands and go forth to battle. A great disservice was rendered to the British empire by Winston Spencer Churchill, as first lord of the admiralty, when he taught the people to rely on the silent pressure which their fleet could exercise, in cutting off Germany's supplies and food. The false sense of security thus aroused, and a total popular misapprehension of the efficacy of such measures, are what delayed for a year a proper organization of the British munitions output, and delayed for over a year universal military service. The theory of "economic pressure," so far as this war is concerned, is dead. The British are on the right track at last.

The second lesson is intended for the United States. We are not wholly without interest in those German women and children. Under international law we have the right to send foodstuffs to the civilian population of Germany. More than this, our government has said that it is our duty to exercise this right if we are to maintain our neutrality. We have thus far been barred from so

doing by measures which the British themselves do not call a lawful blockade, measures which our government has denounced as a blockade that is "ineffective, illegal and indefensible." The burden of the British defense of these measures has been "military necessity," long familiar in this war. Now Lloyd George says that there is no "military necessity" for barring food from women and children in Germany; nay, to starve them would be undesirable and would deprive England of a more glorious, more lasting victory.

Our government can now, with every prospect of success, renew its proposal to England of February 20, 1915, that she should allow our food to pass to Germany, consigned to our government officials there, to be distributed only to German civilians. In February, 1915, we proposed that England should allow this and that Germany should cease her submarine warfare. It is recalled that Germany agreed, England refused. We finally forced Germany to accept our proposal alone. Lloyd George now invites us to recommend to England a similar return to the limits of international law.—*June 13, 1916.*

A BLOCKADE OF OUR OWN

If war with Mexico eventuates we shall see an interesting situation develop between us and England. Our first measure against Mexico would be to bring to bear on her the pressure of our naval power, by a blockade of her ports. One of her ports is Tuxpan, the shipping port for the oil of Lord Cowdray's fields, almost the sole reliance of the British Admiralty to supply its oil-burning

vessels with fuel. To carry this Admiralty oil, over two score tank steamers ply between Tuxpan and England. A blockade stops all traffic moving to and from the blockaded country. Our blockade would stop all tank steamers from going into Tuxpan or out of it.

England has for fifteen months been maintaining against us a blockade which we designate as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible," destroying our commerce with Germany and crippling our commerce with European neutrals. The State department at Washington has long protested in vain against this "blockade," but has felt the lack of any pressure to bring to bear on England. Our blockade of Mexican ports will be complete and flawless. The navy may hand the State department the pressure for which it seeks.—*June 23, 1916.*

WHERE THE BLOCKADE LEADS US

At the present time we are allowing Great Britain to stop all our trade with Germany without maintaining a blockade of Germany. Our State department calls the British blockade "ineffective, illegal and indefensible." We say this of the British blockade because it does not shut off all countries from trading with Germany. British warships, for fear of German submarines, do not enter the Baltic and prevent Sweden from exporting to German Baltic ports.

Therefore, we contend, England has no right to shut us off. So we say, yet our action is to assent to this very blockade. It is worth while to picture a situation where,

with sea power differently distributed and other belligerents engaged, the latent danger of the precedent now being established would come to light.

Suppose that Japan and England are at war and that Japan's fleet rules the high seas. Japan decides to starve England, since that is simpler and less strenuous than defeating England by military force. Japan therefore declares a blockade of England. Its blockading cordon, however, because of the efficiency of the British submarines, is not able to invest British ports, operate around the British Isles, or even hold the North Sea. Great Britain, undisturbed, trades overseas in that direction. Yet the Japanese squadrons, a thousand miles off the British coasts or even across the seas, intercept Argentine grain and meat as it leaves Buenos Ayres.

Japanese ships stop and confiscate all American exports of wheat, flour and provisions on their way to England across the Atlantic ocean. They stop not only the exports destined for England, but also those destined for the rest of Europe, on the ground that they might be transhipped to Japan's enemy. All during these hold-ups of American commerce Russian grain would move unhindered to Britain, for Japan would not hold the North Sea. Danish provisions would supply the market that once Americans held. England would not starve: It would be American citizens dependent upon the British market who would starve.

Yet, if Japan took such action, we should have no ground for protest. Japan would be doing precisely what England is doing now. What we are to-day assenting to is

the new and strange principle that a sea power may blockade the wide oceans whether it can blockade the narrow seas or not. It is a principle fraught with damage for us in the future, for we are separated from all our leading foreign markets by wide oceans. In war time these markets could—even if we were blocked off—continue trading with other neutral countries over narrow seas like the Baltic, the North Sea and the Mediterranean.—*July 17, 1916.*

HELPING AMERICA OR GERMANY?

There is some misapprehension as to the motives of those who want the United States to break the British blockade of Germany and adjacent neutral countries of Europe. There are honest people who think that such action on the part of the United States is being advocated in the interest of Germany. These people admit the illegality of the British measures, but insist that nothing should be done to break the British strangle hold on Germany. They feel that our action against Great Britain, in enforcing our rights, would weaken the pressure of British sea power and give Germany too great an advantage in the war.

There may be persons who advocate our standing up against British aggression because they think that the lawless British stoppage of our trade with Germany, Holland and Scandinavia is in some way hurting Germany in a vital way and preventing her from winning the war. Such persons may be right, but all the evidence is against them. There is

no evidence that the resumption or continued prevention of our trade with Germany will have the slightest effect on the outcome of the war.

The Germans have all the houses they need to live in. They have enough clothing, or can make enough patch or shoddy garments to keep themselves warm for a decade. The army is reported in a state of unexampled health, while the death rate among the civilians at home is lower than the peace level. People have had to cut their food rations heavily, but owing to the even distribution of supplies that are available there is no starvation. Foolish stories of food riots are the same tales spread a year and a half ago, and are denied by Americans direct from Germany. Three-quarters of the civilian industrial population is working on war material; the other quarter is fully employed, as is shown by the out-of-work percentages of German labor unions. There is no oversea raw material necessary for warfare for which the Germans have not found another supply or a substitute. All these are simple demonstrable facts.

If the civilian population is, and can be for a decade, properly housed, clothed and fed, as well as fully employed; and if there is no lack of the materials of warfare—then where is this “iron ring” pressure that is throttling Germany?

The most intelligent opinion in Germany is that the blockade does not hurt, but helps Germany. They say that the blockade will pay Germany's bill for the war. By this they mean that the German population has been forced to do without a vast importation of foreign goods for which they would otherwise owe. They owe nothing except to them-

selves. The Germans have been forced to so reduce their scale of living, to practice such intense individual economy, that they can—easier than any other belligerent—bear the tax burdens that will fall on them after the war. When international trade is resumed and they again get the international scale of wages, the Germans can increase their present standard of living, pay the government taxes and never feel that they are economizing.

Whatever may be the situation after the war, the one thing clear and certain is that economic pressure is having no effect upon its outcome. Americans can lift their voices on behalf of our right to send mails and non-contraband goods to Germany, and on behalf of the right of our own merchants not to be ruined by the British government, without suspicion of furthering any cause save that of their own country.
—July 25, 1916.

BRITISH HOLD-UP IN HOLLAND HARD BLOW TO NEW YORK FIRM

In drygoods manufacturing circles there is much interest in the effort Namm & Singer, of 24 and 26 East Twenty-first street, have been making to get a large shipment of buttons from Rotterdam, Holland, to this country.

The buttons have been lying on the wharves of Rotterdam since March of last year. Appeals have been made to the American consul-general at Berlin, to the consul at Rotterdam and to the State department at Washington, but without any sign that either the consular or

diplomatic branch of the government has done anything for the merchants.

Namm & Singer own the goods, which were bought and paid for before they were sent out of Germany. The goods are not contraband. They play no part in warfare. They are needed in this country. The hold-up has entailed a heavy loss to the firm and threatens to bring on one still more burdensome.

What aggravates the matter is that tobacco from the United States is going through Rotterdam in large volume into Germany, Austria Hungary and Bulgaria at the request of the United States government and by leave of England. The State department, it appears, has used its influence for the benefit of Kentuckians, but it ignores the affairs of New Yorkers.

Here is a copy of a letter the firm, tired of its long pleading with Washington, has sent to the Secretary of State:

Letter to Lansing

"Hon. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

"Honorable Sir.—On December 3, 1915, I personally filed before the American consul in Berlin an application for relief of some sort to release goods which have been lying at Rotterdam and had been purchased and paid for previous to March 1, 1915, as per documents attached. I was told by our Berlin representative to call and see the American attaché at The Hague, which I did, and was told there that according to the English idea and their way of procedure, my papers should have been filed not on the other side, but owing to changes made in London my papers should

have been filed in Washington previous to November 1st.

"On my return to New York, which was some time in December, 1915, I immediately took this matter up with my attorney, who in turn made application to both the State department and our foreign department at Washington. We were advised at that time by a Mr. Holder, foreign trade adviser, that our case was a very good one and a meritorious one, and that he would suggest that we do not present our case at the present moment, but leave matters stand for the time being. We have followed the advice of our foreign department and let matters rest for fully six to eight months. We then again attempted to present our case, but the British authorities refused to entertain it.

"We understood a Mr. Wyvall, of the foreign department, contemplated leaving for London with a number of cases, and we called on Mr. Wyvall and arranged to have him take our case to London. Mr. Wyvall now returns our papers, stating he is very sorry, but since our case was not presented to the British embassy in Washington, he cannot entertain it, as per his letter inclosed.

"The fact is, firstly, the foreign department advised us not to present our case and then they tell us that they cannot do anything for us because our case was not presented. All in all, we are the victims of circumstance. My attorney, Mr. Edward Lazansky, former Secretary of State of New York, and I made a special trip to our foreign department regarding this matter and they again told me my case was a just one, but since it was not filed through their office when the British

embassy was in Washington, they could not do anything for us.

"We feel that something should be done. We were asked to have patience, which truly is a virtue, but when it has gone so far as to the collapse of our entire business and nearing our ruin, you will admit that patience does come to an end.

"Our Mr. Namm, who is president of the Button Importers' Association, has decided to have the association and the different individuals connected with it who are affected by such as the above, who feel there is a lack of activity and lack of forcefulness on the part of the different departments in Washington, contribute to a fund for the purpose of advocating retaliation of some form or other. I personally would like to avoid the above and believe that a personal letter of appeal to you might save lots of time and embarrassment and also assist us in our efforts. Up to now we have simply been told in diplomatic language our departments could not bother with us.

Other Appeals Vain

"We have taken this matter up before and addressed our letters to the attention of the Honorable Mr. Lansing, but we find that our letters were always called to the attention of a gentleman by the name of Marion Lechter, acting foreign trade adviser. Since Mr. Lechter seems to be helpless, we trust this letter will be handled by some one who will not have to work by routine, but will handle this matter in such a way that we may find the relief we are entitled to as American citizens.

"We are inclosing to you papers in detail showing you where goods were bought and paid for previous to

March 1st, along with proofs from our bankers confirming payment of merchandise in question.

"Trusting that your honorable self will be able to assist us in the above, we are, dear sir,

"Very respectfully,

"NAMM & SINGER."

—Sept. 14, 1916.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

Will Secretary of State Lansing ever find time to give attention to the case of Namm & Singer, of 24 and 26 East Twenty-first street? Probably not.

It's only a matter of buttons. For seventeen months a shipment of buttons has been held up on the wharves in Rotterdam because the British refuse to permit it to come to America. The buttons were made in Germany and Austria, were bought and paid for by Namm & Singer, but England puts up its protesting hand and for nearly a year and a half the State Department at Washington has done not a thing to aid these American merchants.

Is it possible Mr. Lansing cannot see that every branch of American industry is concerned in matters affecting our commerce? The man who raises corn or he who raises hogs is interested. Of our 3,000,000,000 bushels of corn the surplus goes abroad to lands where grain crops are insufficient, or it goes in the shape of lard from hogs corn fed in this country. The pay comes back in goods manufactured in European countries where labor is cheap. Buttons and other products of her industries make it possible for Europe to buy our agricultural products.

Namm & Singer merely are merchants, so the State Department gives scant attention to them, although they may be ruined by Great Britain's act. With the tobacco raisers of Kentucky it is different. When their staple was shut out of Europe's markets they turned loose the senators and representatives of Kentucky in Congress, insistent, influential men, who argued and threatened to such good purpose that now all Europe is open to American tobacco. Shipments from America destined for Germany and Austria go over the wharf on which for seventeen months the buttons bought by Namm & Singer are detained.

The State Department can open the gates of continental Europe for the Senators of Kentucky, it seems, but it cannot spare time to consider the affairs of merchants of New York.

Possibly Namm & Singer would do better by appealing to London. A statement of the facts might get the buttons here by inducing England to give her leave.—*Sept. 14, 1916.*

CENSORING OUR EXPORTS

The latest British measure restricting our trade is a logical continuation of the course long followed. The innovation is the plan of "rationing" Holland and Scandinavia; that is, the plan of allowing them to import from us no more than in peace years. They have been importing from us too much to suit Great Britain; so our exports to them of certain commodities are to stop until Great Britain thinks it proper for us to resume.

Great Britain's reason for this

action is said to be the fear that some of our goods are going through these neutral countries to Germany. That may be true. If it is, such transit trade is wholly within our rights. Our State Department denies that the allies are maintaining a lawful blockade of Germany. The main ground for the denial is the fact that the allies cannot interpose a blockade on the seas between Sweden and Germany; and if Sweden cannot be barred, we must not be.

Therefore, our diplomacy contends, we have the right to ship to Germany, direct, everything but contraband of war. Mr. Lansing further says that, even were it to be admitted that the present blockade were lawful, effective and impartial, still Great Britain may not lawfully stop our noncontraband shipments to Germany via neutral countries. Neutral countries cannot be blockaded, under international law, which further provides that Great Britain has no right to apply the law of "ultimate destination" to anything but contraband shipments moving through a neutral to a blockaded belligerent country.

However, it is unlikely that any of our supernormal exports to European neutrals were destined to Germany. Discouraged by our refusal to act jointly with them to prevent British violations of international law, all those countries have placed re-export embargoes on everything imported from us. All these countries, but Sweden, have also had to consent to the establishment of British-led companies like the Netherlands Overseas Trust, the sole allowable consignee for Dutch exports, outside the Dutch government itself. Finally no steamship line running to a neutral European country will ac-

cept any shipment not approved by the British ambassador at Washington, the regulator of our foreign trade. This permission is granted after a long cable correspondence between the British ambassador here and the British authorities in the neutral country that wants to buy from us. All of these measures make it fairly certain that nothing can get through to Germany.

More likely the British action is directed against us rather than against Germany. Those neutral countries are deprived of their usual sources of supply in Russia and the Balkan states, and Germany cannot spare them many exports she formerly sent—for example, sugar, coal and wheat and flour sent from east Germany to Scandinavia. Therefore, the neutrals naturally try to buy more from us. This tendency is accentuated because they are rich and prosperous, and will be for years after the war. The common people there are living as they never did before.

England would be blind to her own interest if she did not use her sea power to prevent us, in her hour of trial, from getting a stranglehold on the rich new markets of Holland and Scandinavia. That the British know how to use their power to hold down our trade has been amply demonstrated. Witness the use made of our business letters rifled from United States mail sacks on the seas. Witness the black list. Witness the action of British steamers from New York to South America which, according to our Department of Commerce, have destroyed the established equality of freight rates that formerly applied to South American ports both from Liverpool and New York. For-

merly the same rates were charged from New York to Buenos Ayres as from Liverpool to Buenos Ayres. Now the rates from New York are twice as high as those from Liverpool.

England is nobody's fool. She dominated the world's trade before the war and she intends to dominate it after the war is over. Any one in this country who dreams that England will sit idly by and see us occupy her throne, is demented. England will go just as far as she can in suppressing us. So would we if we were in her place.

Her attempt has been by no means without success. For the year ending June 30, 1915, our exports to Holland and Scandinavia amounted to \$340,000,000; for 1916 this total dropped to \$260,000,000. That was a drop of \$80,000,000, somewhat more than a drop in the bucket.

How would it do to ration Great Britain? If abnormal war conditions do not justify neutral countries in buying from us more than their normal peace supplies, then what of our exports to the United Kingdom of \$1,518,000,000 for the year ending June 30, 1916, compared with \$594,000,000 in 1914? We can stop these exports or any part of them, and give Great Britain a taste of her own medicine. For example, in the two years since the war began Great Britain has taken from us 400,000,000 pounds of copper, while her normal consumption in two peace years is 300,000,000 pounds. She is eight months ahead of her quota. Our exports of iron and steel articles, mainly to England and her allies, amounted to \$621,000,000 in 1916, compared with \$251,000,000 in 1914. This last year Great Britain and her

friends took over two years' supplies. Suppose now that we were to apply to them the yardstick they apply to our neutral trade, and require Great Britain to wait eight months for copper and two years for steel?

Of course there are many things that Washington can do. But it could have done them at any time.

—Sept. 19, 1916.

DANGER ON THE CANADIAN LINE

The bulk of the iron ore that supplies our many great steel mills comes from the beds near Lake Superior. The ships that transport this ore for the mills in the Lake Michigan territory pass through the locks of Sault Ste. Marie. The ships that carry the ore for the mills in the Lake Erie territory pass through the Sault Ste. Marie locks and the long strait connecting Lake Erie and Lake Huron. The locks and the strait have Canada on one side and the United States on the other.

It is difficult in the present activity to keep the mills stocked with sufficient raw material. For months the ore carriers of the great lakes have been worked to the limit, yet it is feared that when navigation closes on the lakes there will not be enough ore at the mills to keep them going until spring.

Before the war Canada was a pledge of peace. It was a matter of pride to the United States, Great Britain and Canada that the line between the United States and Canada was unfortified; that the feeling of confidence and good will between the United States and Great Britain was so well established that Canada, with no military establishment,

could be left with its doors open to the United States, and that the United States, with little of a military establishment, could leave its doors open to Canada.

Time and the war have made changes. Canada has sent many men to the battle fronts in Europe. When the war ends several hundred thousand fighting men, trained to the highest state of efficiency in the use of guns and in all branches of military service, will return to Canada.

The war has not improved our relations with Great Britain or Canada. When, all appeals to reason failing, we threatened reprisals for British violation of America's trade rights, the attitude of Great Britain was defiant, bitter, almost truculent.

Great Britain is not insensible to America's weak points. Possibly she considers that, with the European war ended and Canada's fighting men back in Canada, several hundred thousand trained men sweeping over the border could seize the ore beds of Lake Superior, paralyze the steel industry, capture or destroy the locks of the Sault Ste. Marie, and command the strait at Detroit.

Canada does not appear at this moment much like a pledge of peace.

—Sept. 20, 1916.

THE BRITISH JOKEBOOK

There is a proverbial saying, in this country, that Englishmen have no sense of humor. The truth is that Englishmen either have no sense of humor or are convinced that we have none. Otherwise they would not perpetrate upon us the ridiculous solemnities which come across the cables.

The latest solemn joke is the British reason for suspending permission for us to export certain commodities to Holland and Scandinavia, such as clover seeds, hides, tanning materials, linen thread and apples. His majesty's government cannot allow this nefarious traffic to proceed further because Great Britain is already faced with a large bill for detention caused to neutral steamers which were taken into Kirkwall and, after long delay, found innocent and released without coming before a British prize court.

The New York *Times* dispatch from London says Great Britain is shutting down on our exports to neutral Europe because of the growing bill with which Great Britain is being pressed by neutral governments for demurrage and other expenses incurred by taking suspected ships into Kirkwall and other ports for examination. So far as is known, no machinery exists at present for adjusting these claims because many of the cargoes never actually reached the prize court. When shippers ask for compensation they are referred to the prize court, which thus far has declined to consider their claims, on the ground that they have no standing in court.

In the history of international law, is there anything to compare with this situation? International law requires England to find on a neutral steamer for Scandinavia proof of the presence of contraband with German destination. The proof must be found on the steamer, which may not otherwise lawfully be taken into port to be unloaded, ransacked and detained.

But his majesty's cruisers take such neutral vessels into Kirkwall and there unload, ransack and detain them. No evidence is found to justify taking goods or steamer before the British prize court, for they are innocent. Therefore, British justice can devise no means to reimburse the ransacked goods for damage and the steamer for detention, caused by a belligerent that had no right to touch them at all.

That is British Joke 349.

Query: Would his majesty's government be as impotent if faced with the problem of suggesting a means for some other belligerent to make amends for similar damage lawlessly done to British steamers and goods, if Great Britain were neutral in this war? History has no lesson that is clearer than British insistence upon the rights of neutrals in war time.

But the jest does not end here. His majesty's government, faced with the insoluble problem of providing justice for acknowledged damage to innocent goods and vessels lawlessly seized, cuts the Gordian knot by ordering vessels and goods off the seas.

That is British Joke 350.

Some day, when this war is over, or perhaps earlier, a Mark Twain will arise in America capable of writing the proper supplement to the text-books on international law.

In the meantime, the three White Books of our official diplomatic correspondence, issued by the State Department, upholds the best standards of British humor, or lack of it.

—Sept. 21, 1916.

The Freedom of the Seas

A MENACE TO THE WORLD

The interests of the world are so bound together in this advanced stage of commercial and social development that no nation can apply any policy which breaks up the fabric of international relations without doing serious injury to many nations.

A case in point is the death of the New York nurse in Germany from infection caused by the lack of rubber gloves in her work of ministering to the wounded. Great Britain had put a ban on the attempt of the American Red Cross to send such gloves to Germany. The protests of the American ambassador at London had failed to obtain a relaxation of the British refusal to admit rubber hospital supplies into the enemy's country. The assurances of Mr. Gerard, American ambassador at Berlin, that he himself would undertake to see that the rubber gloves proffered by the American Red Cross were applied solely to the charitable purpose for which they were intended, had no better result. Great Britain has persisted in her insuperable obstacles to American humane impulses and has added to the sufferings and the hazards of those who are devoting themselves to the alleviation of suffering in Germany.

This effect of British sea power upon an American nurse, and doubtless upon the entire hospital person-

nel of a great country with which we are in friendly relations, is one manifestation of the infinite possibilities of control of the oceans when it is vested in the hands of one nation. Another such manifestation out of the hundreds which have developed since the war began is seen in the embargo just placed upon logwood by Great Britain. Logwood is the basis of the only natural dyes which have proved a satisfactory substitute for aniline dyes, now under the ban of the British admiralty, much to the distress of the American manufacturers. Britain has prohibited the exportation to America and other neutral countries of this wood, most of which has been coming from Jamaica. The British manufacturers, however, can get all they want of it.

Like the prohibition of the supply of rubber gloves to Germany, the withholding of logwood from the United States is based upon Great Britain's unquestioned supremacy on the sea. It is made possible by the power of the British navy, which deprives American manufacturers of an essential product while it assures to their British rivals an uninterrupted supply of the same product.

If exclusive rights on the sea are to remain the accepted rule in the future as they have been in the past, Great Britain might as well have them as any other power. But the time is past when the world can af-

ford to intrust such power over life and of commerce to any nation. The control of the seas should be vested, not in a nation nor in a group of nations, bent upon the exploitation of their sovereignty for their own selfish purposes, but in a council of all the maritime nations, pledged to administer its trust for the benefit of the entire world. That is the only solution of the problem.—*Dec. 9, 1915.*

LORD NORTHCLIFFE'S "GERMAN TIGER"

Whether Lord Northcliffe is authorized, or not, authoritatively to announce British policies, no doubt he is able to voice the sentiments and feelings of a considerable portion of the British people. In his address to "at least" 50,000,000 Americans, therefore, what he says doubtless reflects a measure of British opinion, especially as what we are about to quote coincides perfectly with a recent pronouncement of President Runciman, of the British Board of Trade and a member of the privy council. Describing what he characterizes as "tigerish" German qualities, and professing to believe that Great Britain has the "German Tiger where we want him," he concludes:

Finally, the main policy of Great Britain is: First, to keep German ships off the sea so long as a single German soldier remains in allies' territory and so long as an indemnity to Belgium, France and Russia is unpaid.

If that be the main British policy, and events should enable Great Britain to carry it out, the nearly 5,000,000 tons of German merchant ships that are laid up in all parts

of the world will be about as useful as "a painted ship upon a painted ocean," because they will rust into useless hulks long before Germany could pay such an indemnity as doubtless will be exacted, should the allies win the war. It would mean, not the annihilation of German sea-borne trade, but that the conduct of that trade would fall into British hands, largely, and the development of it would be subject to British regulation. If in this manner some 5,000,000 tons of shipping is to be withheld from use because it happens to be German-owned, 5,000,000 tons of other shipping will have to take its place, and who can supply it but Great Britain? It means, in short, that the price that Great Britain intends to exact from Germany, if she can, will be the permanent relinquishment by Germany of her merchant marine. Thus the most formidable competitor upon the seas that Great Britain has met during the past three-fourths of a century will be permanently disposed of.

There is something for the people of the United States seriously and gravely to consider in these identical statements issued by President Runciman and Lord Northcliffe. Should differences arise, as they may, between the United States and Great Britain, in the competition between the two nations in their quests for foreign markets for their surplus products, and in the building up of their shipping with which to carry on their foreign trade, and these differences should lead to misunderstandings eventuating in war, it might easily happen that the people of the United States would develop qualities that the British would regard as "tigerish," and that

it would become necessary for Great Britain to subject American shipping, and thus American foreign trade, to such regulation as Great Britain would deem proper, should Great Britain be the victor in such a war.

That is to say, the policy Britons intend to apply to German shipping, if the allies succeed in winning the present war, is the policy that Great Britain regards as best calculated to serve British ends. Germany, for the moment, is the contemplated victim. The victim, the next time the application of the policy may be necessary for the furtherance of British interests, may happen to be the United States—would, most likely of all other nations, be the United States.

Of course, such a fate may be spared our shipping if we pursue the course we have pursued for the past half century or more or voluntarily depending upon foreign (chiefly British) shipping for the conduct of our foreign trade, and of allowing American shipping to disappear utterly from the seas. In that case the development of foreign markets for our surplus products, to the extent that there would be any such development, would be subject to such regulation, no doubt, as Great Britain should determine would cause the least interference with the development of British foreign commerce.

Great Britain plans that the outcome of the present war, in short, shall be the strengthening of Great Britain's grip upon the mastery of the seas. If we presume to contest that mastery, we may properly, and very wisely indeed, adequately prepare to protect ourselves, or subject our shipping, our foreign trade and

our country to such restraint and humiliation as Great Britain expects to apply to German shipping, German foreign trade, and Germany, if she can.—*Jan. 8, 1916.*

ENGLAND'S BAD BET

"Mistress of the Seas" has been a picturesque name for England, but not an exact designation. England has been, rather, the trustee of the seas. Other nations have permitted her to hold the keys to the narrow gates of the oceans so long as she observed a certain degree of fairness. If she administered decently her custodianship of Gibraltar, nations were willing to forget that she came by that important rock under clouded circumstances. If she used properly her control of the Suez Canal, nations ceased to question the methods by which Disraeli gobbled that great cut to the east. Nations have not asked England "How did you get it?" but "Are you using it rightly?"

But now England seems to be regarding the seas as property in fee simple. The trusteeship is to be used as a club, striking neutral as well as foe. Command of the sea is to be used as command of the world. Not every one in England is blind to the follow of such procedure, else there would not be such internal debate over the wisdom of the proposed blockade. An English writer on naval affairs, Archibald Hurd, sounds in the *Fortnightly Review* the note of warning to the trustee:

"The enemy's peril arises from the fact that he cannot use the sea to obtain supplies; ours from the fact that we can, and that we are abusing our sea power, thus, it not imperiling our eventual victory, at any rate delaying it

and making it far more costly than it need be."

Mr. Hurd sees that England is on the way to lose an economic bet so large that losing it would ruin her. He sees that England has made her fat living off the sea because she used it honestly. But now, as he says:

"Every condition on which our welfare depends has undergone a change since hostilities opened except the command of the sea, and on that support we are leaning to an extent which may lead to unfortunate consequences. Sea power is merely the maritime expression of man power and money power; money power depends on economic power. We have been withdrawing and are withdrawing thousands of men from factories and workshops, with the result that our exports have fallen; we are using 25 per cent. of our merchant navy for the war, with a corresponding shortage of tonnage for commercial purposes."

England's sea power, hitherto so craftily administered as to be unobjectionable to most of the nations, is what has held together the British empire. Nations have not all appreciated how huge that sea power is. Britain, drawing the velvet glove from the hand of steel, will show them, and the very act must arouse a spirit of antagonism throughout the world. Men have seen what dominion of the sea means when honestly used. Now they will see what it means when the dominant power decides to disobey the spirit and the letter of the law of the world.—*Jan. 29, 1916.*

REAL BASIS OF SEA DOMINION

If the military and naval value to a nation of numerous thoroughly up-to-date shipyards, with experienced and trained shipbuilders, has

not yet been completely demonstrated to the American people during this European war, then the case of the United States is absolutely hopeless. All the world has seen that, not militarism, but navalism, dominates the world, and that navalism is synonymous with Britishism.

The sustaining power of the British navy is the British merchant marine, while the British navy safeguards British mercantile shipping from serious injury, in which the navy is fortified through British possession of controlling strategic bases that dominate all of the trade routes of the world. But British war and merchant ships are predicated upon dominant British shipbuilding. It is inconceivable that Great Britain could be the dominant sea power that to-day she is if the nation were dependent upon other countries for its warships or its people were dependent upon other countries for their merchant ships.

It is not too much to say that, to-day, the foreign trade of the world is conducted by permission of Great Britain. The growth of the world's foreign trade serves Britain's ends. It is an endless chain of profit to Britons. For any nation seriously to contest British maritime supremacy is to court destruction. And this is so because Britons believe that successful rivalry of British sea dominion means the passing of the Great Britain that, for centuries, the world has grown accustomed to.

The basis of this is British control of the world's shipbuilding. If she does not do the carrying for all the world, her shipbuilders build most of the ships engaged in the world's carrying, a condition satisfactory to Britons, because the ar-

rangement is one that does not threaten—on the contrary it serves to promote—Britain's control of the world.

Nor is the lesson which, in blazing letters of fire and blood the world is now being taught, more than partly learned, if it is not as clear as crystal to all mankind that navalism is a greater political instrument than it is commercial or maritime.

If the United States is to expand commercially, as it must expand, in time its rivalry of Great Britain will become acute. The United States has no desire to expand in any other way than commercially. Shall we wait until we have reached the stage of acuteness before we realize that one of the most useful safeguards with which now we may surround our foreign trade is a merchant marine wholly home-built? Not for a single moment would we permit ourselves to be dependent upon other nations for our warships; we know that would be nationally suicidal. We have yet to realize that it is equally suicidal, nationally, for us to be dependent upon our greatest, our most astute rival, for the instruments essential to the conduct of our foreign trade—merchant ships.

If our commercial expansion is to be restricted, if it is to be kept within what Great Britain may conceive to be reasonable limits—that is to say, so abridged as in no manner whatsoever to threaten any abatement of British sea dominion and British commercial expansion—then, of course, as President Wilson said in his annual message to Congress last month, "our independence is provincial, and is only on land and within our own borders,"

which is but a veiled manner of saying that we are not independent at all, so long as we have the need of increasing foreign markets for our rapidly growing surplus products.

We have every resource within ourselves, in the most ample abundance, for shipbuilding—material and men. Manifestly our commercial independence is to be had only through the possession of a merchant marine of our own fully equal to all of our commercial requirements. Perhaps our political independence can only be assured through a merchant marine of our own. Is it wise—is it sane—for us to depend upon others, particularly our most formidable rivals, for our merchant ships?—*Jan. 31, 1916.*

A STRUGGLE BEGUN IN ANTIQUITY

One of the greatest authorities on the law of the sea was born in Holland on Easter Sunday, 1583, 333 years ago to-morrow. His name was Huig van Groot, although he is better known under his Latinized name of Hugo Grotius. Long before the birth of Grotius a king of France, whose uncle was king of Spain, wrote to his august uncle in Madrid in response to Spain's invitation to France to keep off the seas:

If you can show me a deed signed by the Almighty making over to you the ownership and guardianship of the seas of the earth, I shall recognize your claim to those rights. Otherwise I will contest them.

Before this somewhat irreverent declaration of the freedom of the seas by that king of France, the question had been fought out by great nations, some of which have now ceased to exist. Rome, chal-

lenged by the growing commercial and maritime influence of Carthage, accepted that challenge and entered upon a historic struggle to disprove the validity of the claim to exclusive domination of the Mediterranean—the seven seas of that period—which the Carthaginians were gradually developing. Because of the preposterous claim to sea sovereignty which Carthage was formulating, Marcus Portius Cato enunciated the famous phrase which has thundered down the ages: “*Delenda est Carthago*”—“Carthage must be destroyed.”

In the first and second Punic wars Carthage *was* destroyed after prodigies of valor and of military skill which have made the names of the Carthaginian generals, Hannibal and Hamilcar, synonyms for strength of soul, inflexibility of purpose and a patriotism unquenchable. In the end Carthage fell—and with her fell the theory of exclusive domination of the seas. Also the Carthaginians ceased to exist as a nation.

Earlier than even the Punic wars another of the world's historic struggles had been waged over the same principle—the freedom of the seas. That war was the long siege of Troy. Situated at the mouth of what is now known as the Dardanelles Strait, Troy, with her king, Priam, was in a position to levy toll and cess upon the sea-borne trade of Greece, in the same way as the pirates of Gibr-Al-Tarik, the modern Gibraltar, levied upon ships that passed into or out of the Mediterranean at a much later period. Troy fell after a heroic defense, and the theory of exclusive sea-rights fell with it. The Trojans also ceased to exist as a nation.

Grotius, the citizen of a country which had a large sea commerce menaced by Portugal, codified the principles for which the Punic wars and the Trojan war had been fought—the principles which the irreverent king of France had upheld in his impertinent letter to the king of Spain. After giving to the world a work on the law of sea prizes, he wrote a treatise on “*Mare Liberum*”—“Free Seas.” In that work he maintained that all nations had equal rights on the oceans of the world and that no nation could lay claim to exclusive rights.

An Englishman, Selden by name, at a later date gave expression to England's views on the subject in a treatise entitled “*Mare Clausum*,” or “A Closed Sea.” The doctrines which Grotius had enunciated were refuted by the British navy—the first distinctive navy of that period.

And the struggle which has its origin in the mists of the remotest history is being fought out once more in the greatest war the world has ever known. Germany has attempted to contest Britain's claim to sea-domination. Britain has uttered the phrase of Cato, brought up to date: “*Delenda est Germania*”—“Germany must be destroyed.”

Will the teachings of Grotius prevail, or will those of Selden carry the day? The world is deeply interested in the answer to that question, which is being written amid the smoke and stress of battles.

—Apr. 22, 1916.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

We hear much in these days of the freedom of the seas, and yet our popular ideas on the subject are so inexact and vague that the ex-

pression means little to our minds. Germany declares that she wants the freedom of the seas as one outcome of this war. England says that for Germany to talk of the freedom of the seas is pure foolishness; the seas have been free, and in their freedom Germany developed a merchant marine second in the world and an export trade whose growth knows no parallel.

The freedom of the seas surely concerns neutrals as well as belligerents, for the seas are the common property and highway of us all. At the coming peace negotiations the question will play an important part in the settlements there made. It is important for us to make clear to ourselves just what the freedom of the seas means, in the interest of the United States.

Freedom of the seas means, if it means anything, immunity of private property on the seas in war time. Obviously the seas are free in peace time. Nobody interferes with their unobstructed use by the trade of all nations. But in war time the stronger of two belligerents captures or chases off the ocean the enemy's merchant ships, and intercepts all contraband of war destined to the enemy. If a blockade can be maintained by the dominant sea power—that is, if ships from all neutral nations can be shut out from all enemy ports—then the enemy can be literally besieged by water and deprived of all communication by sea. This is lawful and neutrals must accept as gracefully as possible such interference with commerce. A neutral nation is at one end of every trade route thus closed.

Civilization has meant the gradual elimination of areas where war was a regular occurrence and their

replacement by areas of peace, commerce, prosperity. The record of this progress of civilization on the high seas is what we call international law. International law records the establishment of treaties and precedents by which the ability of a sea power to annihilate the enemy's trade was limited—not in the interest of the enemy thus aided, but in the interest of neutrals who had no part in the making of the war. In every war some strong neutral—usually Great Britain—has forced the belligerents to recognize these neutral rights, until they came to represent an established step toward freedom of the seas.

In this war the duty has fallen upon the United States to uphold these neutral rights—that the dominant sea power should not, unless it maintained a lawful blockade, interfere with the commerce of neutrals except to intercept our shipments of contraband of war.

It is this duty which we have shirked. Great Britain is the dominant sea power. She is not blockading Germany, keeping ships from all nations shut out of German ports. Sweden trades unhindered with German Baltic ports. Then why shall not we? Great Britain, without assuming the obligations of a blockade, assumes its privileges; that is, Great Britain seizes all our trade with Germany and much of our trade with European neutrals. It is the destruction of the freedom of the seas. It is a step back toward that marine barbarism from which the world has slowly evolved.

Now the interest of this great country is wider than the interest to prevent present and future losses from the damming of trade currents hitherto stamped as lawful. The

greater principle at stake is that, if this is to prevail, no nation in the future will dare depend upon over-sea supplies of any necessity of life. Every nation must put a Chinese wall about itself and raise at home everything it needs, for war is always possible, war with a stronger sea power, which would mean national destruction for that sea power's enemy. What is done in this war is a precedent for all others.

All this would mean the obliteration of half the currents of world trade, and the rescinding of that international division of labor and exchange of products which makes us all prosperous. If we allowed Great Britain to carry through her present operations to the end of the war we should be the enemy of civilization.

That is why the United States is going to force England—in her own and the world's interest—to abide by the law of nations on the sea. That is why the United States at the peace congress will try to crown its efforts through all the nineteenth century to have adopted the principle of the immunity of private property at sea in war time.—*June 12, 1916.*

CONCERNING OUR FOREIGN TRADE

In the midst of our prosperity we pause and ask ourselves: are we preparing for prosperity in the future? What is to be the influence of our international policy, for example, upon the future of America?

Our future prosperity is intimately connected with the growth of our export trade. We need for-

eign markets to absorb our surplus production, both agricultural and industrial, but mainly of manufactured goods. We have always been an exporter of products of farm, forest and mine. If anything happens to close the foreign markets for cotton, wheat, lumber, copper, oil, the un-taken foreign quota weighs upon the home market and brings adversity to all producers. This was graphically illustrated when the export cotton movement was dammed in August and September, 1914.

So it will be with most of our industries after this war. We shall find ourselves with a factory production far beyond our consuming power. Oversea markets must be kept open.

What will be the future influence of the administration's foreign policy upon this question of oversea markets?

In this war we have allowed Great Britain, the dominant sea power, to abolish the rights of Germany to receive from us food, cotton, lumber, oil, phosphate rock, and all necessities of life and industrial activity. Great Britain did not do this by a blockade; she does not dare call her action a blockade. Our State department denounces it as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible." It is a series of orders in council, a substitute for international law. We denounce and protest, yet we submit.

Now the important point is not the fact that we violate neutrality by continuing to ship to England while refusing to exercise our right to ship to Germany. One much more important thing is that Germany is being driven to devise sub-

stitutes for our products and will never turn to us again.

But that is not the main issue. It is: No nation in the future can dare become dependent on us for indispensable supplies. The principle has been established that a superior sea power may cut off a country's whole trade, even if the sea power cannot maintain a legal blockade—which is probably rendered forever impossible by the development of the submarine.

Every nation, except England, may find itself at war with a superior sea power, and must be prepared to meet this contingency. How, then, can any nation, during peace, make itself dependent upon oversea supplies which may be cut in war and starvation result?

It is this consideration that shows what "the freedom of the seas" means. It means the assurance that in war neutrals will force the recognition of international law and will not allow your enemy to cut your oversea supplies of anything but contraband. Without that assurance, that confidence which is at the basis of international trade, disappears. In self-protection nations must become self-supporting in all necessities of life, not interdependent.

This is the real significance of our acquiescence in the lawless British procedure. We are not hurting Germany or helping starve her—she has met the situation. But the administration has betrayed the future of international commercial relations and has done its best to help create a world of nations mutually distrustful and hostile in economic as well as military fields—Sept. 6, 1916.

PRINCIPLE OF FREE TRADE THREATENED

By DR. M. J. BONN

Free traders have never had much difficulty in refuting the purely economic arguments of their protectionist adversaries. There was a political argument which always gave them trouble. In time of peace, this argument runs, free trade is excellent. By relying on imports from foreign countries, and by sending exports to them, nations flourish. A kind of economic internationalism, based on mutual advantages, is bound to arise. The friendly relations which exist between the United States and England, for example, are due, in part at least, to British free trade, which has linked the prosperity of many American industries with the safety and the welfare of the United Kingdom.

Few big nations, it is true, followed a policy of absolute free trade. But they relied largely on imports from abroad of raw materials and foodstuffs. This dependence on foreign markets and on foreign supplies has become more marked every year, notwithstanding protectionist tariffs. A policy of free trade would have greatly accelerated it. The adoption of such a policy was most effectively impeded by the fear that increased dependence on foreign trade might greatly endanger the nations in time of war.

Trade Bars Want

War breaks up the commercial intercourse between nations, depriving them of their accustomed supplies. As most commodities can be had from many sources, there is little danger of serious want as long as the trade with neutrals continues.

Overland trade with neutrals cannot be stopped by the belligerents, but a large share of international trade—especially the trade in foodstuffs and raw materials—is oversea trade, which can be cut off by them.

Outside the three-mile limit the sea is a neutral area, open to all nations alike in time of peace. In war time the belligerents have assumed the right to seize all ships belonging to the enemy; they have the right to stop and search neutral vessels; they confiscate goods they consider contraband, even if they belong to neutrals; they have the right to close the enemies' ports against all trade by means of the "blockade."

England's Sea Policy

The strongest advocate of these rights in the past was "free trade" England. Being an island, she was not compelled to spend much money on land defense; she could afford to build the biggest navy on earth. She controlled most points of vantage on the trade routes of the world. These combined advantages enabled her to intercept all direct oversea trade of her enemies at strategical points like Gibraltar or Kirkwall. As long as her communications could not be interfered with in straits controlled by her enemies, or as long as her naval supremacy was unchallenged, a predatory state of international maritime law suited her convenience.

As her population increased she became more dependent on foreign food supply. Her supremacy at sea was not so unchallenged as before. Her island situation was no longer safe, for modern speed shortened distances—and modern transporta-

tion made an invasion less difficult. On the other hand, the great development in railroad communications made continental countries less dependent on sea-borne trade; they could get oversea supplies by indirect imports from neighboring countries. The British people had to be protected against starvation in case of failure of the British navy; while the navy wanted to maintain her right to destroy the enemies' trade. England did not advocate the freedom of the seas, but she insisted on the freedom from seizure of foodstuffs and raw materials. She insisted in 1885 and again in the Russian-Japanese war that "foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be considered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the enemies' forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used; it must be shown that it was in fact their destination at the time of seizure."

These views were shared by the leading sea powers. They made a nation's starvation in time of war nearly impossible. England could enjoy free trade in time of peace, as her food supply was guaranteed by neutral shipping in time of war, even if British naval supremacy failed.

Declaration of London

To bring about complete uniformity in international law relative to naval warfare, England invited the powers (February 27, 1908) to a conference, which elaborated the so-called Declaration of London, (February 26, 1909). This declaration is a codification of the existing law; it does not contain any new law. It provided that foodstuffs were "con-

ditional 'contraband' and as such liable to seizure only if destined for the enemy's forces; most raw materials, cotton, wood, ores, oil, etc., were on the free list, and not subject to seizure "as they may not be declared contraband of war." It provided that a blockade "must not be directed against a neutral port in spite of the importance to a belligerent of the part played by that neutral port in supplying its adversary." Goods documented for a neutral port which are classified as conditional contraband cannot be confiscated; "no examination will be made as to whether they are to be forwarded to the enemy by sea or land from that neutral port."

Indirect trading via neutral ports was to be free, with the exception of absolute contraband. The Declaration of London was the Magna Charta of free trade in time of war. Hardly a fortnight after the outbreak of the present war, England destroyed this instrument which was to be the safe foundation for the development of free trade across the seas.

England's alliance with France, Russia and Japan prevented Germany from cutting England's over-sea connections. England can do at present without the protection of the Declaration of London, though she was reluctant to discard it on account of its possible use in future.

She put a stop to direct over-sea trading with Germany in foodstuffs, by means of neutral boats, by making them liable to seizure if addressed "to an agent of the enemy state, or to or for a merchant or other person under the control of the authorities of the enemy state." All persons in Germany with the exception of the foreign diplomats

are under the control of the German government. She prevented indirect trading via Holland or Denmark by making neutral cargo on a neutral ship bound for a neutral port liable to seizure, if there was a suspicion of their reaching the enemy. When it could be proved that the enemy drew supplies from a neutral country (for example, from Holland), "a neutral vessel which is carrying conditional contraband to a port in that country shall not be immune from capture." She declared articles like wool, which were on the free list, contraband, and practically wiped out the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband.

Lastly, she closed the entrance gates to Germany to all neutral shipping and to all free neutral goods directly or indirectly destined for Germany. She did not declare a blockade, for a blockade cannot be made effective as long as the allies do not control the Baltic; it is inadmissible under these circumstances; she merely assumed a control of the mouth of the North sea in contradiction to all international law.

Supposed Power of Neutrals

Free traders always have acknowledged that belligerents might try to break the existing rules of international law. In that case, they argued, the neutrals would protect their own commercial right and with it the principle of international trade by insisting on the maintenance of existing law. They would see that foodstuffs and raw materials would reach the belligerents by sea in neutral boats, as long as there was not an effective blockade; and by land via neighboring countries, if such a blockade was declared. It seemed to them quite safe to rely

upon foreign supplies in time of peace if they were sure to go on during war. They have been very much mistaken.

The smaller neutral states, like Scandinavia and Holland, are dependent on the import of foodstuffs and raw materials for the use of their own people. Great Britain stopped their supplies from neutral countries until they levied an embargo on exports to Germany. They had a perfect right to do what they liked with neutral imports; but they had to choose between insistence on their rights, followed by starvation, and a sacrifice of international law. Of course, they chose the latter.

The only country strong enough to vindicate the rights of neutrals

was the United States. They were the great exporters of foodstuffs, raw material and manufactures, upon whose good will the allies depended. They have been the traditional champions of the free sea. The United States government has been unable to safeguard the rights of neutrals and the unhampered trade in peaceful goods. They insisted successfully on the exercise of the contested right of American citizens to travel in a zone of war on armed belligerent vessels carrying the worst sort of contraband—explosives; they were unable to enforce the uncontested right of American citizens in sending foodstuffs to the civil population of the central powers.



SEA DOMINION.

ARE we using our undoubted dominion of the sea to the utmost? We are not! Why? Because we have a lawyer Government which, apparently, does not know its own mind for five minutes together.

Oh, God, for a man with heart, head, hands,
Like some of the simple great ones gone
For ever and ever by,
One still, strong man in a Nautical land
Whatever they call him, what care I,
Autocrat, democrat, autocrat—one
Who can rule and does not lie.

We hope—we trust—that our military War Minister is such a one. But as the Sea Service (mercantile as well as naval) has ruled events from the very beginning, how is it that we have no naval War Minister? How is it that this civilian Government, of ours cannot, apparently, face the conditions under which this war must be conducted if we would win? "American interests" forsooth! Why! if we rigidly enforced a blockade and agreed to pay for any loss in "interests" and could by this shorten the war by one single month, it would save us money. We are told that we are spending £8,000,000 a day, that is £180,000,000 a month; would not such a sum pay for every interest that suffered by a rigid blockade? Of course, it would! and there would be a month's less loss of life. Yet this Government continues to write letters to the American Government. Was it not an American who said, "The pen is mightier than the sword?"

No doubt, for the getting of dollars; yet unless we are careful, the "pen" may undo us. What are marine laws to us! Why write a mass of verbiage relating to seizures of vessels and the material loss sustained? America is piling up her heap of dollars, growing enormously rich upon this European war, and a very large proportion of these American business men who are crying out are Germans, or of German parentage. President Wilson is a mere weakling; had there been a man like Abraham Lincoln at the head of that nation, we should have had America's help instead of her hindrance long since.

America says that she claims that her non-contraband trade with Germany is exempt from British interference. Away with such a claim! American experts know perfectly well how things are. They know that never has there been such a war as this. They know that to lay down rules is merely to hamper us, and we sincerely trust that in this life and death struggle our Civil Government may even yet be bold enough to take a strong line without hesitation and small-mindedness. — Yet where is our naval War Minister?

Let all neutrals be plainly told that we shall do anything we choose in the effort to cripple the enemy. At present we are playing with this matter, and our fleet is—a great part of it—idle. But in doing this we must be careful that no steps are taken except for purposes of war. We must see that no complaint can be laid against us that we are enforcing a blockade in the interests of British trade. Aside from this let us enforce a stern blockade on every neutral, and listen to no protests.

We command the sea, and that command will in the end decide the issue whatever setbacks are before us, why then waste that power by trifling in the interests of neutral trade. With such a war as this neutrals cannot reasonably expect to go about their business without interference; they may be thankful that they are spared the burden of war and that in spite of interference, they are heaping up riches.

Just now the two Central Empires are pressing on towards Constantinople. Suppose that they get there, can they retain their conquests? Suppose that Germany overruns Asia Minor, can she remain there? Not unless she can gain command of communication by sea, and this she cannot do. Sea power then, British sea power, will, in the end, decide the war whatever happens on land. Where, then, is our naval War Minister?

THE EDITOR.

Principles of Free Trade Sacrificed

What was at stake was not a mere commercial advantage, which can be easily adjusted by compensation; what was really sacrificed was the principle of free trade. If the neutrals cannot safeguard the rights of peaceful trading in time of war, belligerents will not respect it when military necessities are in question. And if nations are confronted with the risk of starvation in time of war, because they relied on foreign supplies in time of peace, they may shape their commercial policy in future in such a way as to be fairly self-supporting. The experience of the central powers during the war has shown that this can be accomplished in a considerable way at a very heavy economic sacrifice. As

security is more important than wealth, nations will be willing to bring such sacrifice. It cannot be done without very heavy tariffs. All over the world there is a revival of the protectionist spirit. The plans for a customs union of central Europe and the economic proposals of the allies illustrate that quite as clearly as the new American dumping legislation. It owes its strength to the breakdown of that right of peaceful trading in time of war which the declaration of London as well as the existing customary international law seemed to have secured forever for mankind. It was destroyed by "free trade" England. And America, the traditional champion of the free seas, has so far been unable to re-establish it.—*Sept. 11, 1916.*

(From New York Evening Post.)

Mail Seizures

RESCIND THE SUSPENSION OF PARCEL POST TO GER- MANY AND AUSTRIA

Every rule of fairness, every instinct of humanity, presses hard upon the national administration at Washington to rescind its recent order suspending the parcel post service to Germany and Austria.

During the week that has elapsed since the suspension was announced, hundreds of protesting letters have reached President Wilson and Postmaster-General Burleson, entreating them to insist that the steamship companies carry out their contract with our government to accept and deliver its mails without discrimination as to destination or character.

It should not be possible for any private corporation to nullify part of its undertaking with our government on the ground that another nation—in this case, England—will harass its ships if it lives up to its full agreement. It should not be possible for any foreign government to issue instructions to its sea fleet to interrupt the United States mail, on any pretext, without vigorous protest from Washington and firm insistence upon the prompt withdrawal of such an order.

President Wilson took a splendid position as the "spokesman of humanity" in the Lusitania tragedy and brought Germany to realize

that, whatever her necessities, she could not sacrifice the lives of Americans to accomplish her purpose.

In the more recent cases of the Ancona this government, with the same vigor and determination, has pressed home to Austria our firm intention not to tolerate such outrages upon our citizens.

The principle of humanity upon which our protest against Germany's submarine campaign was based lies also at the very heart of the question involved in the suspension of the parcel post service to Germany and Austria. It should be understood that our government is not merely abandoning property when it allows this service to be withdrawn. What is property to us is life to the women and children of the two embattled nations thus abruptly cut off from communication with us. The interrupted trade may mean starvation and death to many of them; it certainly means more acute and lasting distress than otherwise they would be called upon to endure. Torpedoing vessels on the high seas when carrying innocent women and children staggers humanity, but is it not equally atrocious to starve women and children in their homes by shutting off the only remaining channel by which they can secure foodstuffs?

At this time of year it is the practice of thousands of our people to send their tributes of love and

helpfulness to fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters—even friends less fortunately placed abroad. This year, because of the critical food conditions in Germany and Austria, that holiday boxes ready to go by parcels post, but now held up, were more than tokens of affection; they meant life itself, in many instances, to the thousands of families that are playing martyr rôles at home, though they have no part in the war.

These Christmas boxes or other packages of help from America cannot go on their merciful errand unless this government insists upon the unrestricted carrying across the seas of every package bearing its stamp. Our present official attitude is not only against insisting upon this sovereign right, but actually abandons it.

Our great, big, national heart, generous and humane at all times, even to a foe, seems suddenly to have ceased responding to its true instincts—at least so far as our government is concerned.

In Cuba, back in 1898, when our army surrounded Santiago, we asked that non-combatants be sent out of the city before our guns began their bombardment. For two weeks before the surrender of the Spaniards our commissary fed the starving women and children. Our own army had none too much for its own needs at the time, yet we gallantly spared enough of our stores to relieve the hunger of an enemy population.

The women and children of Germany and Austria are not our enemies. They have many ties that link them closely to us. Yet, unlike its course toward the women

and children of besieged Santiago, our government seems willing, at the behest of a steamship company, to abandon a service it has so far during the war rendered the people of these two nations.

"In the name of humanity" our government forced Spain to take its oppressive hand off Cuba. "In the name of humanity" our government forced Germany to abandon its submarine menace to American life.

The President has emphatically and in explicit terms declared his unalterable determination to stand as a champion of international law. For what reason, and in what cause, does a government with such a record now say to its citizens that they can no longer use its postal facilities to succor relatives and friends in distress?—*November 20, 1915.*

RESTORE THE PARCEL POST

It is not surprising that the Hungarian-American Federation at its tenth annual convention held in Pittsburgh last Thursday should have asked President Wilson to give them cause for thanksgiving by ordering the resumption of the parcels post service to Austria-Hungary.

The government's order suspending this service two weeks ago came no doubt as a shock to the members of this organization. Most of them had prepared their usual Christmas box for the folks, little and big, back in their native country, and it is no stretch of imagination for one to sense the feeling of pride with which this year they were hurrying forward their messages of help and good cheer from this land of peace

and opportunity. Did they not hear glad voices back at home crying joyously as they unpacked the clothes and food, "This is what America does for us! This is what our boy over there is able to save and send us out of his wages! The land of peace—the land of plenty—what a heaven it must be!"

We may be sure, too, that the scene in the family home when the boxes would be opened was pictured in the minds of the men and women more colorful and affecting than the brush of any artist ever painted.

Those of us who are now planning to send our Christmas boxes of parcels post to relatives and friends can measure in some degree the bitter disappointment of those Americans of Hungarian birth when they read the post-office announcement that their boxes would not be carried. They have now asked that the order be rescinded during holiday times, and—if needs be—put in force with the new year. There is hardly enough military advantage to England in stopping these Christmas tokens to justify a refusal of such a request by our government—if request it must be. As a matter of fact, the Washington authorities never should have suspended any feature of our mail service for any reason. They should have insisted upon carrying our post to any land we care to. However, since insistence upon our rights is not the policy pursued at Washington toward England's sea-lordship, perhaps the Hungarian-American appeal may result in a request from our government that we be permitted to send the holiday packages on their beneficent mission.—*November 27, 1915.*

FREEDOM OF THE MAILS

England has had a series of new and wonderful explanations of her seizure and examination of Dutch mail for the United States.

First, she said that she seized only such mail as ships voluntarily brought into English territorial waters; that is, three miles from the English coast. It was soon pointed out that no Dutch vessel could go through the English Channel without entering British territorial waters. British mine fields are so laid as to force the Holland-America line vessels to enter the British waters, and there his majesty's cruisers seize and examine them on the ground that they are lawfully subjected to his majesty's sovereignty.

This first falsehood being nailed, the British government said that Dutch vessels did not have to come through the English Channel anyway. They could go through the North Sea, around the north end of England and so on to destination. The implication is that Dutch steamers could thus avoid coming into British waters and so avoid seizure.

Nothing is further from the truth. On November 2, 1914, the British government declared that the free North Sea had been sown with British mines. The admiralty declared that the only safe course for American vessels en route to Scandinavia was to follow the east coast of England almost to its northern extremity, from which a safe course to Norway could be laid. This means that England has sown floating mines in the main body of the North Sea and the only safe passage is through British territorial waters off the east coast.

Therefore the course suggested by his majesty's government to the Dutch ships would assure them the same seizure which they enjoy to-day.

We await with interest the next British move.—*February 26, 1916.*

RIFLING THE MAILS

Privacy of commercial and personal life, in international affairs, is destroyed. No longer can an American write to a business firm, a sister or a son, in Europe without having his letters opened for the inspection of the British censor. All useful business information in the letters is transmitted to the British Board of Trade for the use of rival British merchants. There are no more American trade secrets. There is no personal element in correspondence any longer free from the impertinent gaze of the attendant of the Mistress of the Seas. On her depends whether messages of anxiety, love, hope, death itself, may pass between America and the countries of Europe. Your notice of father's death, your anxiety for some relative in the war zone may be judged a coded letter and so destroyed.

This week the last open route for correspondence was closed, the steamship line to Scandinavia.

For a long time letters to and from Holland have been taken off in England, opened, delayed two weeks, thence forwarded if the British approved of them. The British excuse was that these letters were not captured on the high seas. Such capture they admitted to be forbidden by The Hague and Geneva conventions regarding the inviolability of the mail. The Dutch

mail, the British said, was taken from vessels which voluntarily came into British territorial waters, and hence were subject to British laws and interference. But his majesty's government omitted to state that the Dutch liners went into British territorial waters because British mine fields, illegally laid on the high seas, forced the Dutch steamers to take the safe course pointed out to them by the British admiralty, a course that led them along the British coast and so into British territorial waters. There they were seized.

But still a way lay open for us. The whole ocean north of England could not be mined so as to force Scandinavian steamers to call at a Scottish port. That was too great a task. Scandinavian liners had to be met by British patrol boats as they passed north of the British Isles and brought into Kirkwall. Because their mail was captured on the high seas, Great Britain contented herself with removing the parcel post; the letters were left inviolate. We still had this route open by which we could correspond with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Holland and Switzerland.

We can do so no more. This week two Scandinavian liners, the *Hellig Olav* and the *Frederick VIII.*, have been taken into Kirkwall and both parcel post and letters removed. The vessels proceed; the correspondence will follow at a later date, in so far as his majesty's government approves of it.

This week we have received from Britain an answer to our protest against her seizure of first-class mail. She defends such seizures whenever and wherever made.

Little Sweden is preparing to do

more than protest. What will America, the master of its destiny, do? Is international law itself to be under the control and protection of the peaceful neutral nations of the world? Or is it to be annihilated by this vampire of the seas.—*April 5, 1916.*

MAILS ON THE HIGH SEAS

Now we have read the American note to England on mail seizures and it is time to see what we have really said. What we have really said is important, because it determines the status of postal correspondence in this and, perhaps, in future wars. Moreover, the tone and import of this note indicate what the nature of our blockade protest to England is likely to be, and so give us a clew to the probable course—if not the outcome—of our entire controversy with England.

We agree with Britain's principle of treating parcel post like merchandise, and rightly. There is no international law that protects parcel post from examination. However, we indicate that England's right to stop parcel post for Germany is limited to her right to stop merchandise: namely, the right to stop the passage of contraband goods; no others. The final settlement of the extent to which England may confiscate our parcel post to the central powers will, therefore, wait on the settlement of our "blockade" controversy regarding merchandise.

The present issue is with regard to the assumed right to open, seize and destroy our first-class mail moving on the high seas. Our rights are set forth in the universally accepted Convention 11, Article I.,

signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907. It reads:

The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its official or private character may be, found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay.

Inviolable means "not to be opened." Mail is violated when you break the seal that protects its private character. A sealed letter is a secret. When the seal is broken so is the secret. In our note we point out that during our civil war, as in the Boer, Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese wars, mail-bags on captured steamers were forwarded unopened.

Note the new construction which Britain puts upon the word "inviolable." In her note to us, dated February 15, 1916, she said:

2. That the inviolability of postal correspondence stipulated by the eleventh convention of The Hague of 1907 does not in any way affect the right of the allied governments to visit and, if occasion arise, arrest and seize merchandise hidden in the wrappers, envelopes or letters contained in the mail-bags.

3. That, true to their engagements, and respectful of genuine "correspondence," the allied governments will continue, for the present, to refrain on the high seas from seizing and confiscating such correspondence, letters or dispatches, and will insure their speediest possible transmission as soon as the sincerity of their character shall have been ascertained.

That is, "inviolable" no longer means "not to be opened," for Britain says The Hague convention does not prevent her from visit, arrest and seizure of merchandise hidden in envelopes and letters. But no one can visit merchandise in a letter without opening the letter. The assumed right to search for mer-

chandise in letters results in the inevitable violation of the mails as the term violation has always been understood.

When this Hague convention was framed the possibility was in mind that small dribbles of merchandise might leak through in first-class mail-bags. But this insignificant impairment of the right of a dominant sea power was subordinated to the superior right of international communication not to be censored, expurgated or suppressed. And this immunity of first-class mail from being opened was supposed to be secured by a solemn international treaty. In every treaty there is a weighing of interests and a decision between them. In this Hague convention regarding mails the decision was against the belligerent and in favor of the neutral. Britain, as a belligerent, now constitutes herself judge and reverses the decision.

As reference to the quoted paragraph (3) of the British note shows, Britain did not agree not to search first-class mail found on the high seas. She merely agreed to forward such portions of that mail as were found to be "genuine correspondence." But not even this insufficient promise has been kept. Letters, rare documents, fire insurance claims, United States patents for inventions have been lost or destroyed in British hands. And the British claim is that this is not contrary to their promise (3) in the February note. They there agreed not to seize and confiscate genuine correspondence found "on the high seas." But British agents take off this mail while the ship is in a British port—whether conducted or frightened into it—and so, the British claim, in their territorial waters,

where they can exercise more "rights" than on the high seas.

All this we point out in our note. We denounce the illegal jurisdiction assumed by England over vessels forced to call in her ports, and we demand that she exercise over them no more than the rights she may exercise over them on the high seas. But we do not dispute Britain's definition of the immunity she will grant mail intercepted on the high seas, namely, that she will open and search it, but forward it all promptly. That is, we accept the British view that the inviolability of the mails is not infringed if they are sent on after being violated. If England will only forward promptly the letters she has scanned we shall apparently be satisfied.

Other passages in our note confirm this impression. We specifically admit the right to search letters for articles of contraband, and for stocks, bonds, coupons, drafts, checks, notes, money orders—all of which we admit to be contraband. No letter bears on its outside the evidence of containing a money order. So every letter may be searched.

There will be no serious controversy with England. She will modify her procedure and promptly forward letters which she has opened, scanned and noted in contravention of international practice and a solemn treaty, The Hague convention of 1907. Privacy of intellectual, social and commercial life between nations is gone. The postal correspondence section of The Hague convention is dead, and we assist at its burial.

It is a little sad to contrast the part we are playing with the part we could play in international affairs. It is a strange rôle for the

world power which unhesitatingly assumes the championing of the rights of the neutral world.—*May* 30, 1916.

INSPECTING OUR MAILS

It seems a petty thing for Great Britain to insist upon this "right" to open letters seized upon the high seas. She will continue this procedure, for in our recent protest we admit the British claim of a "right" to open all letters to and from us. We admit this by implication, for we admit the right to search our first-class mail for contraband, in which we include checks and money orders. Our admission of this right of Great Britain means, of course, our acquiescence in the abolition of Hague Convention 11, Article 1, which provides that postal communications on the high seas is *inviolable*, meaning "not to be opened."

We shall be satisfied if the British Post Office Department forwards our mail after it has been opened and expurgated of the taint of "contraband."

What is the real advantage which Britain derives from this obnoxious violation of the law of nations? No sane person believes that Great Britain really fears that Germany will be provisioned or munitioned by articles sent in first-class mail bags. The amount of bread or bullets or copper on which first-class postage could be paid would in any case be so infinitesimal as to have no possible influence on the military campaigns. Can there be any other object in opening and scanning all our correspondence? If we did not have good evidence, we should hesitate to

accuse the British government of using its inspection of our business letters for the purpose of getting the business secrets of American merchants dealing with the continent. Unfortunately only too much evidence of this kind is at hand.

We have been clamoring to have American banks established in South America because we did not want the shipping documents (including invoices) of American exporters to pass through the hands of foreign bankers in Rio or Buenos Ayres in the process of collecting the drafts to which these documents are attached. Experience shows that information thus collected as to our business connections and terms is transmitted to our competitors in the foreign bank's home country. To-day, while we urge our banks to establish South American branches to free our citizens from the espionage of foreign banks, we accede to the act of a foreign government in abrogating a solemn treaty, in opening and inspecting all our business correspondence and documents. British censors then make for the Board of Trade a permanent record of all the facts of our private business relations. Read the instructions to British censors handling this correspondence:

11. Statistics. (1) Particulars are to be exacted from appropriate correspondence and submitted on index cards of all direct shipments to Europe (i. e., shipments from neutral to neutral, including shipments on through bills of lading), whether actual or pending, of the following commodities, viz.: Cocoa, cotton, cotton yarn, waste and thread; fuel oils and lubricating oils; hides, skins and leather; maize; metals and ores of all kinds; nitrates; oil, cakes, including poonac; packers' products (meat, bacon, lard, jus, oleo, or any

edible animal fats); rosin; tanning extracts; wool and such other articles as may be added from time to time.

Up to the present the British have been not only scanning but also destroying the business correspondence of Americans who have competitors in England. Mr. Lansing in his note gives an instance:

Business opportunities are lost by failure to transmit promptly bids, specifications and contracts.

The Standard Underground Cable Company of Pittsburgh, for example, sent by mail a tender and specifications for certain proposed electrical works to be constructed in Christiania. After several weeks of waiting the papers have failed to arrive. The American company was told that bids could not be longer held open, and the contract was awarded to a British competitor.

If Britain now accedes to our protest, as is likely, she will forward our future bids and specifications after carefully noting and tabulating them on cards to be filed at the Board of Trade. Does any one imagine that this data will not be available for British exporters? In the future the Standard Underground Cable Company will, to be sure, have its bid forwarded and not destroyed. But common sense predicts that the next bid of the Standard Underground Cable Company will be sent on to Christiania in the same mail bag with a British bid a few hundred dollars lower.

From whatever angle viewed, our abandonment of the historic position that "inviolability" means "not to be opened" is a calamity for the country and for the cause of international law. International law comes out of each war as strong as the insistence of the strongest neutral. What are we doing to build up or tear down that law?—*May 31, 1916.*

WEASEL WORDED PROTESTS

Mail seizures go merrily on. Great Britain opens all our first class mail, our letter correspondence with Germany and with all neutral countries of Europe. Mail is taken off neutral ships in far eastern waters, and if a suspicion exists that a German sympathizer is related to writer or addressee the letters are destroyed. The Spanish steamer *Eizaguirre*, en route from Spain to Manila, has just been stopped at Singapore. She had 104 sacks of Manila mail opened and censored. That is, British officials read it all and forwarded such of it as they considered proper reading for Americans in the Philippines.

Travelers returning from Great Britain on neutral steamships carrying between us and Europe are now reporting that the British post office department no longer takes all our mail sacks to London for examination. Some of them are simply dumped into the sea. It is probably because the mail examiners at London are overburdened. For they must not only look through the mail for military secrets. They must also copy on index cards, for transmission to the British Board of Trade, the details concerning our business letters. These are the official instructions of the British censors, as reported in this year's *Congressional Record*, page 1858. These index cards, appropriately filed, are a rare collection of what used to be America's business secrets. It will be a valuable aid, and is a valuable aid to-day to the British export trade.

But there is no use complaining. We have officially acceded to the abrogation of the principle of the

inviolability of the mails. Having agreed that our letters may all be opened and scanned, we cannot complain if novel uses are made of the material therein. Nor can we logically say much about destroying letters. For if Great Britain may search them, is that not evidence that they may contain something unlawful? And who is to be judge of what is unlawful, if it is not the censor persons whom we allow to search them? Then, if they contain wickedness, shall they not perish? As already repeatedly demonstrated in the strange American diplomacy of this war, we put ourselves in an impossible position for an independent nation, and then repine at the necessity of drawing the inevitable conclusions from our own acts.

The inviolability of the mails was supposed to be secured by Convention 11, Article 1, signed at The Hague October 18, 1907. Inviolability of the mails meant that they could not be opened. Previous to this war no belligerent has dared to open mail sacks with first class mail, sealed by one government and in transit to another. The Hague Convention reads, or used to read:

The postal correspondence of neutrals, or belligerents, whatever its official or private character may be, found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay.

On February 15, 1916, Great Britain denounced this Hague convention. She did it by claiming the right to open this correspondence to search for merchandise en route to Germany. The British February 15 note read:

2. That the inviolability of postal correspondence stipulated by the eleventh convention of The Hague of 1907 does not in any way affect the right of the allied governments to visit, and if occasion arises, arrest and seize merchandise hidden in the wrappers, envelopes or letters contained in the mail bags.

3. That, true to their engagements, and respectful of genuine "correspondence," the allied governments will continue, for the present, to refrain on the high seas from seizing and confiscating such correspondence, letters or dispatches, and will insure their speediest possible transmission *as soon as the sincerity of their character shall have been ascertained.*

Great Britain's excuse for this action is that she found certain small consignments of raw rubber in first class mail sacks moving on the seas from Brazil to Rotterdam. Therefore she claims the right to open letters seized on the high seas of all the world. Nobody knows whether bonafide shippers attempted the crazy and uneconomic operation of paying first class postage on rubber into Germany, or whether the rubber was shipped by British agents for the purpose of providing the excuse.

In any case, the dribblets of rubber or any other commodity that could stand the international first class postage rate would be infinitesimal. The possibility of such tiny shipments was before the minds of the framers of The Hague convention, but was rejected as of no weight compared with the ancient principle of the inviolability of letter mail bags. Yet we admit the novel contention of Great Britain as sufficient to subvert an ancient principle of law. Secretary Lansing wrote to Great Britain on May 24, 1916, that our government

does not admit that belligerents may search other private sea-borne mails for any other purpose than to discover

whether they contain articles of enemy ownership carried on belligerent vessels or articles of contraband transmitted under sealed covers as letter mail.

Not only may Great Britain open bulky first class mail to search for rubber or steel, but may open letters to search for papers. Therefore the thinnest letter may be opened. We go on to say:

The government of the United States is inclined to the opinion that the class of mail matter which includes stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities is to be regarded as of the same nature as merchandise or other articles of property and subject to the same exercise of belligerent rights. Money orders, checks, drafts, notes and other negotiable instruments which may pass as the equivalent of money are, it is considered, also to be classed as merchandise.

Our complaint is not that letters are opened and scanned, but that they are not promptly forwarded all-ways after the violation has been perpetrated! We say:

Delays in receiving shipping documents have caused great loss and inconvenience by preventing prompt delivery of goods. * * * Business opportunities are lost by failure to transmit promptly bids, specifications, contracts. Checks, drafts, money orders, securities and similar property are lost or detained for weeks and months.

That is, our complaint is not as to the violation of the mails, but as to their prompt forwarding after the act is done.

What does all this mean? How can we set about to retrieve American rights? Here, as in the matter of the British blockade, and the trading-with-the-enemy act, we long ago gave our rights away. Having abandoned the principle, on what ground can we oppose the ramifications which logically flow from that abandonment?—*July 22, 1916.*

RESULT OF WEASEL WORDS

Our State department wrote what people thought was a protest against the British mail censorship. There was general public applause. After months of delay Great Britain replies, summing up her answer as follows:

The specific complaints do not support the general charge against the efficiency of the British censorship. * * * His majesty's government will always be ready to explain in detail the working of the censorship, as there is nothing regarding it which they wish to conceal.

Britain is right. There is no misunderstanding. We did not protest against mail seizures at all. Our weasel-worded protest, on careful reading, resolves itself into a polite request to please be quick and not cause any unnecessary delays to those letters that the mail censor deigns to pass.

By inference we accept Great Britain's mail censorship. With one note we break down all previous tenets and international conventions that made mail matter inviolable.—*July 24, 1916.*

BLOCKADING THE NEWS

A striking thing is an editorial in the New York *World* commenting on the manner in which the British censor destroys information sent to this country by American newspaper correspondents in Germany. The *World* says:

Since no military purpose can be served by such methods, the conclusion must be that Great Britain is intent upon deceiving the world outside of the war zone as to conditions existing therein. To this extent, therefore, its censorship exhibits hostility toward neutrals without inflicting damage upon the enemy. The situation in Germany is not changed by the mutilation or de-

struction of messages giving an account of it. * * *

There must be some reason for this policy. Perhaps American money lenders and merchandisers, extending vast lines of credit to the allies, mostly in the dark, will be disposed to inquire as to its real purpose.

In the spring of 1915 our papers carried daily reports that the Dardanelles were to fall. As a result the price of our wheat went down, because of the prospect of unlocking the Russian wheat supply, waiting in the Black Sea. Long after it was known in England that the Dardanelles could not be taken, the same misleading news kept coming to us and British merchants and authorities kept buying the wheat of American farmers at ten cents a bushel below its value.

In the fall of 1915, commissioners of the British and French governments came to this country to negotiate a loan for \$500,000,000. By a strange coincidence a British drive was instituted on the west front, and the news of its success shared the news columns with details of the loan negotiations. Not until the loan was consummated did we learn—what the British military authorities knew from the beginning—that the drive was a costly failure.

Recently we have loaned \$100,000,000 to France, \$50,000,000 to Russia, and a further credit for England is pending. These financial operations also seem to have coincided with the allied drive upon the east and west fronts. The British censor ought not to call into question the soundness of his country's position by suppressing all but twenty-one of the seventy-two dispatches to the *World* from Germany by Mr. von Wiegand, its correspondent in Germany. The British cen-

sor ought not to drive American newspaper correspondents at Berlin to petition Ambassador Page for relief from a practice which prevents them from getting to this country news of the military situation abroad. Those who seek banking and mercantile credit should be held to reveal and not suppress the facts upon which their request must be judged.—August 5, 1916.

“EXPLAINING” MAIL SEIZURES

Our helpless state is again brought to our attention and to that of the civilized world by the latest “statement of the British Foreign Office,” which “explains” the “delay” of our mails on the high seas. The State department must be immensely flattered to find that the British government no longer troubles to answer it officially. Instead, the British Foreign Office issues a “statement” to the American press and our mail seizures protest goes officially unregarded.

It is not the first time. Great Britain's favorite procedure during the discussion of her seizures of our meat ships to Scandinavia was to issue press statements in London. They reached American opinion as thoroughly as an official note, and, as they were merely press statements, they did not have to adhere to the facts. They could include all manner of insinuations against American shippers, insinuations wholly without fact and incapable of insertion in a formal note. The press statements could even demonstrate that the State department was out of its mind to make the protests it did make.

So with the blacklist. The only formal answer to our protest has been the sending of a supplemental list containing thirteen additional American names. The discussion of our note has been through interviews which Lord Robert Cecil gives to American correspondents in London. Lord Robert seeks to make us ashamed of ourselves. If we are not properly ashamed but still vexed, the final official note can make some unimportant concession which the administration can compare with Lord Robert's big talk and claim a victory, Cecil feels us out.

The present official "statement" is so very reasonable. It says that coffee, rubber and jewelry have been found in our first-class mail bags for Scandinavia, supposed to contain only correspondence. Bags ostensibly containing innocent newspapers carry German propaganda. Therefore all our mail bags for neutral countries must be taken to London, opened and searched. "Innocent" correspondence is forwarded on with as little delay as possible.

But what is innocent? It seems that an American bid for a contract in Sweden is not innocent and is delayed until a British firm can get in and get the order. Read the instance that Mr. Lansing gave in his note to England last May:

Business opportunities are lost by failure to transmit promptly bids, specifications and contracts.

The Standard Underground Cable Company of Pittsburgh, for example, sent by mail a tender and specifications for certain proposed electrical works to be constructed in Christiania. After several weeks of waiting the papers have failed to arrive. The American company was told that bids could no longer be held open and the contract was awarded to a British competitor.

This situation is not an isolated one. American firms find their business over all the world censored by the British mail officials. Letters to Hong Kong never arrive. Traders with Russia report that they cannot get either their business cables or business letters through. Norwegian papers report whole strings of letters being picked up on the Norwegian coast, apparently dumped in the sea by the overworked censor.

What is the law? It is simple and clear. The whole world understood it. The law was that first-class mail on the high seas was "inviolable," could not be opened. The principle was thus stated in a Hague convention of 1907:

The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its official or private character may be, found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained, the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay.

In practice this provision of international law has always meant that first-class mail bags, even if found on captured *enemy* ships, were not to be opened, but immediately forwarded to destination. So it was in the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars. The *Eitel Friedrich*, when she interned here in 1915, delivered to our postal authorities, inviolate, the mail bags she had captured from enemy ships.

Great Britain began opening first-class mail taken from neutral (Dutch) ships and claimed she found in them rubber en route from Brazil to Rotterdam, hence to Germany. Of course when The Hague convention was framed every one knew that little consignments of contraband might be moved in letter bags. But the amount of con-

traband that could stand first-class postage is infinitesimal compared with the sacred rights of letter correspondence.

The British took first-class mail bags off neutral steamers plying between neutral countries and opened all the letters. For they claimed that even money orders or securities were contraband. The thinnest letter might contain a money order.

What did the United States do? Stand for the body of international law? We made a protest which, when examined, proves an admission of every British contention. Mr. Lansing said in May that our government

does not admit that belligerents may search other private sea-borne mails for any other purpose than to discover whether they contain articles of enemy ownership carried on belligerent vessels or articles of contraband transmitted under sealed covers as letter mail.

That is, Great Britain may search private sea-borne mails for these articles. It may also search for money orders and so open every letter:

The government of the United States is inclined to the opinion that the class of mail matter which includes stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities is to be regarded as of the same nature as merchandise or other articles of property and subject to the same exercise of belligerent rights. Money orders, checks, drafts, notes and other negotiable instruments which may pass as the equivalent of money are, it is considered, also to be classed as merchandise.

Our only complaint was that the violated mails were not forwarded promptly after violation. The latest British statement explains that the expurgated remainder of our mails is being forwarded as rapidly as is convenient.

Having admitted the new "right"

that Britain may open all our letters, what do we expect? *Of course* the information will be tabulated and sent to the British Board of Trade. *Of course* the Standard Underground Cable Company and a hundred others will lose contracts to British competitors. *Of course* Russian trade will be hampered in all possible ways. One of the main aims of Great Britain is to hold on to her pre-war trade. What better means is there than the one we offer: the right to expurgate or control the correspondence on which our trade is based?

As in the case of the blockade and the blacklist, so with mails. I do not care to protect any American rights; let us abrogate them all. But in the name of truth let us not underhandedly abrogate what we loudly and hypocritically claim to protect.—August 16, 1916.

FAIR PLAY!

So much attention has been paid to the commercial aspect of this British expurgation of international mails that its human side is neglected. To be sure, our business houses suffer, but what of our citizens? Their losses cannot be measured in dollars and cents; they are rather registered in anguish of the mind and sickness of heart.

We have several millions of American citizens born in the central powers or descended from parents born there. Are these citizens to be without rights?

These citizens are bound by the closest ties of kinship and love to fathers, mothers, brothers, cousins on the other side of the ocean. The

central powers are engaged in a devastating war; perhaps the fathers and brothers are dead.

How can we find out? Not by letters, for Great Britain makes no promise, no pretense regarding the forwarding of mail to Germany. There are families here who have not heard for many months from relatives in Germany or Austria. Consider their distress.

Perhaps both father and brother are fallen and a stricken mother needs support. Can the son here, an American citizen, send her a money order issued by the United States postoffice? Oh, no, he cannot. The State department has accepted Great Britain's unheard-of contention that a money order is contraband of war. Therefore all letter mail may be opened, to look for these tainted slips. Money orders and letters may be thrown into the sea. The mother may go begging or to the poorhouse for all the protection that the American citizen's government will give to its own postal orders. She may die without one word from her son for all the protection his government will give to letter correspondence solemnly designated as "inviolable" by a Hague convention.

The rule seems to be that your rights are not according to your citizenship, but according to your descent. The British-blooded American citizen, by the threat of war, has upheld for him the last full measure of right to ship ammunition to the country of his birth. No one can object to that. It is the law. But the German-blooded citizen is not accorded even the poor right to correspond with the loved ones in the home of his childhood,

to soothe their and his anguish and bitterness of soul.

The time is coming when a judgment will be passed upon this administration by the American sense of fair play, decency, national honor.—August 18, 1916.

JACK

In New York is a chauffeur with a wife and baby in Hungary. He is an American, born in New York. His wife is a New York girl, educated in the public schools. Her parents live in a village on the Hungarian plain. When the war broke out she and the baby were visiting them. In spite of the dangers of travel, Jack wants them back in America, now that life is hard over there.

He cannot get money to them. Our government has admitted money orders to be contraband of war. He cannot communicate with them. In four months the British censor has let no word from her cross the ocean. Jack is a very wretched man. During the day it is not so bad, but at night he cannot sleep for the visions that come to him. He does not know whether they are alive or dead. He thinks, perhaps, it is not the censor. Perhaps they will never write again. But her people cannot even send him word of that.

He feels bitter at the government that will not protect his messages to his wife and baby nor help him hear from them. He feels bitter at a government that will not allow him to help them. For, after all, are they not Americans, too, just like all of us? They are all he has in the whole world.—August 19, 1916.

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

By mining the British channel and leaving only a narrow strip open along the shore the British force all traffic along that highway of the sea into one narrow path which they control. But the path of safety has been made one of shame and humiliation. Within the three-mile limit over which a nation has jurisdiction the British treat the passengers and the crews of all vessels as if they were enemies or suspects on British soil. American citizens, men and women, bound to or from America on neutral or British ships are searched as if they were criminals. No one is above suspicion.

Of course, a vessel can go around by the Orkneys. But the trip is very much longer and the cost of the trip so much larger as to be prohibitive. So, in the narrow channel available for the world's traffic, British warships hold up the

shipping of the world, and seize, inspect or destroy mail communications between the United States and the Scandinavian countries, on the ground that it may be bound to or from Germany.

Now, there are millions of American citizens who are bound to Germany by origin, kinship or business interests having nothing whatever to do with the war. These American citizens cannot communicate with their civilian friends in Germany, except under the eye of the British censor, just as the friends of a prisoner cannot communicate with that prisoner except under the eye of a turnkey. Domestic affairs of American citizens, business secrets of American citizens, innocent missives of every sort belonging to American citizens, are equally subject to British official scrutiny.

To these millions of American citizens, in no way involved in the war or its outcome, is denied the "leave of England."

The British Blacklist

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

From far off China comes the news that the American representatives of the New York house of Alfred Richter, of 59 Pearl Street, are not permitted to ship goods from Chinese ports on Japanese vessels to American business men in American ports because Mr. Richter's name suggests that he is of Germanic origin. It happens that Mr. Richter has been an American citizen twenty years and a New York merchant nearly all that time. He has agents at Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin, but because of his name the British government, through its consuls, blacklists him.

At Tientsin curios and carpets consigned to the Japanese Fan Company and Messrs. Bollenstein & Thompson, both of New York, were held up, too, by order of the British authorities until proof was forthcoming that they had not been bought from German, Austrian or Turkish subjects or were shipped in the interest of such a subject.

Europe is closed to American merchants except for munitions and foodstuffs for the aid of Great Britain and her allies. And now the ban includes Asia. Only Africa and South America remain for American merchants to do business with "by leave of England."—*January 25, 1916.*

THE BLACK HAND

The putting of American firms upon a blacklist is a perfectly logi-

cal, even if lawless, thing to do. It is a logical outcome of a condition which, by our inaction, we have allowed to become almost legalized, namely, the British blockade. If Great Britain is maintaining a lawful blockade of Germany, then the great mass of our people will not see the injustice and illegality of Great Britain in boycotting American firms who try to circumvent the blockade and deal with Germany either in goods, money or credits.

To be sure, the government at Washington has declared the British blockade lawless and indefensible. We said that on March 30, 1915. We said it again October 21, 1915. But we have never supported one single shipper in his attempt to exercise the right—which we diplomatically proclaimed that he had—to ship to Germany any goods but contraband of war. We stood by and saw the meat packers forced to sign an agreement with the British government that they would cease trying to trade with Germany and submit even their shipments to neutral countries to the direction of the British admiralty. We stood by and saw Standard Oil forced to sign a similar contract. The State department has maintained two foreign trade advisers whose function has been to transmit to American exporters, from the British ambassador at Washington, information as to how these American exporters can send shipments to European neutral countries without incurring

suspicion that the shipments are destined to be forwarded to Germany.

Well, then, the British government decides to punish, by blacklisting, the wicked American bankers and exporters who have been offending against a lawless British measure, against which our State department protests but which our State department helps to enforce. Who—including the British government—can fathom what we mean, if we mean anything?

Theoretically, Great Britain is all wrong and violating a fundamental of international law. A firm incorporated in the United States is an American citizen, no matter whose money is in the corporation. American citizens are supposed to be protected by our treaties with Great Britain in the enjoyment of unabridged rights to trade. These rights are now withdrawn by Great Britain, who sets out to ruin American citizens and corporations accused of doing what their State department told them was lawful—trading with Germany.

These men are to be ruined. No British ship will carry their goods nor will any neutral ship owner carry for them, lest the offending ship be detained in a British port ten days at a loss of \$5,000 per day. The blacklisted firms cannot trade anywhere in the world.

We are to protest again. That our protests will not avail is made certain by the indefensible position into which we have put ourselves. Having admitted so much as we have, we shall with difficulty save anything from the wreck of international law. We shall not get much relief during this war, after the gratuitous declaration of the State department, attached as a

“rider” to our last note to Germany, to the effect that our controversy with Great Britain was not a pressing one, but one for leisurely discussion and arbitration, if agreement cannot be reached. As yet there is no sharp disagreement. Whatever we say by our words, by our actions we acquiesce in the whole British policy.—*July 20, 1916.*

CUMULATIVE VETOING

Why all this sudden clamor of protest against the British blockade? Neither in principle nor practice is it any deviation from the policy followed by Great Britain from the outset of the war.

In September, 1914, and again in October and December of the same year, Great Britain issued successive contraband lists—articles which she would seize if going to the central powers or to any suspicious person in countries of neutral Europe. Great Britain declared as contraband a host of articles which in all previous wars have been on the free list. Finally, every important article of our exports was so banned, even cotton. This was blacklisting all American producers of such articles, including cotton—all American producers whose markets lay in central Europe.

On March 11, 1914, Great Britain issued an order in council saying she would seize all goods to and from Germany, whether on previous contraband lists or not. No pretense was made, or is made, of maintaining a lawful blockade of Germany. This was simply blacklisting all Americans who made their living from distributing or manufacturing imports from Germany. Included in this number were American im-

porters who were obligated to pay for goods that were to be manufactured in Germany. In the same way American manufacturers of typewriters, sewing and washing machines, cash registers, agricultural implements, were blacklisted so far as concerned their markets in the central powers.

In March 1915, deprived of all support of our State department our copper producers were forced to sign an agreement with the British admiralty to ship only to those consignees in neutral European countries who are approved by the admiralty. Hundreds of former customers of our copper exporters are on the British blacklist. The meat packers and Standard Oil Company have been driven to similar agreements with the admiralty, pledging themselves not to try to ship to Germany and submitting to the admiralty's direction the quantity and consignees of their annual shipments to neutral Europe. Whoever would not join such combinations in restraint of trade was blacklisted, forbidden to ship at all.

Having admitted the greater thing, why all this fuss about the lesser? We have silently seen abolished the protection which international law was supposed to give to the commerce of the neutrals in war time. We have sat by while whole countries that were our markets and sources of supply were eliminated. We have joined Great Britain in proclaiming the principle that all letters seized on the high seas may be opened and their business secrets tabulated, so long as the captor forwards on to destination such letters as he cares to pass.

Why, then, all this discussion of a list of names of eighty blacklisted

American firms, most of whom—so far as practice is concerned—state that they have long been on the blacklist? If you may blacklist whole sections of the trade of a country, why may you not blacklist the trade of its individual citizens?—*July 27, 1916.*

THE REAL BLACKLIST

The real British blacklist and its method of operation are not realized in this country at all. The real blacklist is in the hands of British consuls in American ports. For fear of detention, no ship, British or neutral, will clear from an American port for any oversea destination until its manifest, or list of shipments, is officially approved by the British consul. It is therefore absolute arbitrator of the commercial lives of American business men in the foreign trade. That is why so many of those on the published blacklist expressed no surprise. They have been blacklisted all along.

British consuls in our own ports, the British censors of European cable dispatches (which must all pass through London) and the British censors of American business letters stolen from sealed mail bags on the high seas—these are the agencies that have it in their hands to destroy what American firms they choose. Who can trade if he cannot correspond, cable or ship? That is why Great Britain was unpardonably foolish in publishing that blacklist of eighty American firms, for she had already shut off hundreds and was able to shut off hundreds more, without exposing the weasel that sucked our golden eggs of war trade.

Our acquiescence—through non-enforcement of our rights—in what

we call the lawless attempt to intercept our trade with Germany, was the great blunder, the father of this entire set of disagreeable diplomatic children. Once tacitly admit the iniquity of trade to and from Germany and we are in no logical position to combat British measures to suppress that trade, even though such measures ruin American firms and submit to British suppression or dictation our commerce, cables and correspondence with the entire neutral world.—*July 27, 1916.*

HOLLOW ISSUES

The blacklist is being "explained." Neither its explanation nor its modification nor its withdrawal will aid shippers in this country, nor be anything but a paper victory for the administration. If the administration won its present contentions with regard to the blacklist, as well as the mail seizures and the blockade, we should be in no palpable degree better off than we are to-day. The reason is that in regard to England we have either failed or refused to ask for essentials.

The blacklist, to withdraw it is to cancel a published list of about eighty American firms. Withdraw that list and Great Britain could still prevent these people from shipping to any part of the world that Great Britain chose to bar. It has long so prevented many of these new blacklist names from shipping, and scores of other Americans as well. British ships will carry for no one disapproved by their government. Neutral ships, by long and expensive detentions in British harbors, have been taught to accept no American shipment not vised by a British consul at our ports. These British of-

ficials have for over a year operated a blacklist of merchants in this country and neutral Europe—a blacklist compared with which this published list is a trifle.

Will our government order these British consuls to cease their dictatorship of our foreign trade and so get at the root rather than the surface of the difficulty? Will our State department then enforce the mandate of international law which forbids Great Britain to stop and unload any neutral ship unless there are found on board proofs that she carries contraband for Germany? Or does our State department care to enforce our asserted right to trade with Germany via adjacent neutrals, even though England maintains a lawful blockade of Germany, which our government denies?

The administration has the chance to show whether it is in any way in earnest in its stand against Great Britain. By persistently choosing sham issues, whose settlement would settle nothing, the administration can demonstrate its insincerity in the whole matter.—*July 28, 1916.*

THE PATHETIC NOTE IN DIPLOMACY

The report may not be true that the Statue of Liberty cracked at the news of our protest to the British blacklist. Later and more trustworthy advices favor the more prosaic explanation that the cracking is connected with the New Jersey explosions.

However that may be, this is the pathetic note in the history of all diplomacy. In breadth of failure or unwillingness to face the issues, the equal of this note has never been

seen. There has never been such an attempt to say something and at the same time to say nothing; to be vigorous and at the same time docile. Secretary Lansing needs to be recalled at once from his vacation.

Read these extracts from our protest against an illegal measure that destroys the business of dozens of Americans and American firms and puts the entire contents and destination of our foreign trade at the dictation of his majesty's government. The news of the blacklist

has been received with the most painful surprise by the people and government of the United States, and seems to the government of the United States to embody a policy of arbitrary interference with neutral trade against which it is its duty to protest in the most decided terms.

The government of the United States begs to remind the government of his Britannic majesty that citizens of the United States are entirely within their rights in attempting to trade with the people or the government of any of the nations now at war, subject only to well-defined international practices and understandings which the government of the United States deems the government of Great Britain to have too lightly and too frequently disregarded.

It is manifestly out of the question that the government of the United States should acquiesce in such methods and applications of punishment to its citizens.

Whatever may be said with regard to the legality, in the view of international obligation, of the act of Parliament upon which the practice of the blacklist as now employed by his majesty's government is understood to be based, the government of the United States is constrained to regard that practice as inconsistent with that true justice, sincere amity and impartial fairness which should characterize the dealings of friendly governments with one another.

There is no purpose or inclination on the part of the government of the United States to shield American citizens or business houses in any way from the legitimate consequences of unneutral acts or practices.

It (our government) hopes and believes that his majesty's government, in its natural absorption in a single pressing object of policy, has acted without a full realization of the many undesired and undesirable results that might follow.

It is to be hoped that Great Britain will not be angry with us for writing her. After all, we only ask for an explanation of her action. She will explain. She will abide by the promise given in her last note regarding mail seizures, wherein she bound herself to explain to us any detail of her system, for, she said, she had nothing to conceal.

The *London Times* seems to have gauged the true meaning of our note. The *Times* calls it a

political maneuver designed to elicit a British disavowal which will be proclaimed as a great triumph for President Wilson's administration.

The *London Times* and the British foreign office know too well that Great Britain can grant the little asked in our note without in the slightest degree modifying their boycott of such American firms as she chooses to boycott. The formal printed blacklist itself could be withdrawn without affecting the long-standing measures by which Great Britain has terrorized neutral shipping into joining her own in refusing cargo not passed by officials of the British government.

Our note does not look the main problem in the eye. It does not even handle with directness that insignificant offshoot known as the British blacklist.—*Aug. 1, 1916.*

THE REIGN OF TERROR

A long British blacklist carries the names of many of the most prominent buyers of South America. You cannot send to one of these firms to-day an American shipment larger than a parcel post package. No steamship will take your goods.

Try them. Try the British Houston line, running to Rosario, Montevideo, Buenos Ayres. Try the British Prince line, or the British Lamport & Holt line, running to Brazil and the River Platte. Try the American Norton line to the River Platte. Even the Norton line will not accept your shipment.

Why? Among other things, the American steamer might be refused British coal at coaling stations between here and Buenos Ayres, or at Buenos Ayres itself. The steamer might be hauled into British Trinidad, as neutral ships for Scandinavia are taken into Kirkwall, and inadvertently held up a week while it was unloaded and the shipment searched for.

Even if you could get your shipment on board—which you cannot—try to finance it! Draw on your blacklisted buyer and your American bank will not discount your draft. So large are the blacklists to-day that the larger banks in New York employ blacklist clerks to keep track of neutral concerns with which the bank and its customers may not do business. American firms, blacklisted, are being asked to withdraw their accounts from New York banks. American banks are refusing to accept for deposit checks drawn on other American banks on the British blacklist.

A commercial reign of terror is in force which is quite unexampled in

our history. This crippling of our trade with South America cannot possibly be justified on the ground that the goods we ship might get through to Germany, because every vessel that sails from South America to Europe flies an allied flag.

To this date the only official British answer to our Mr. Polk's protest against the British blacklist has been the forwarding to us of a supplementary list, containing thirteen additional names.—*Aug. 11, 1916.*

MEETING THE BLACKLIST

Very quietly, on August 18, the Senate met the challenge of the British blacklist.

On that date the Senate, *with no dissenting voice*, adopted an amendment to the shipping bill, providing that the secretary of the treasury be authorized to refuse clearance at our ports to vessels that refused to take cargo tendered by American citizens, unless the ship shall be already full or proper stowage shall forbid the acceptance of the cargo in question.

That is, cargo may not be refused because the shipper is on any British blacklist.

On August 22 the allied embassies at Washington awoke to what had happened and started to protest.

The provision will not affect our shipments to allied countries, for no one there will dare buy from an American on the British blacklist, so no shipments will be offered.

The bill will mightily affect our trade to neutral Europe. At present lines to Holland and Scandinavia dare not accept cargo from an American blackballed by England.

Now they dare not refuse such cargo.

If they accept it they will face long detention in British ports, while their whole cargoes are unloaded and ransacked. But if they refuse cargo from blacklisted Americans, they can take nothing from our ports at all.

Perhaps when Washington finds every outward sailing from here halted in England a week en route simply because the ship took what we required it by law to take—perhaps then Washington will want to

bring further pressure to bear. Before adjourning it will be well for Congress to put further powers in the executive's hands for this emergency.

Of course, the shipping bill is not yet law. It is before a conference committee of the House and Senate, and the allied embassies have by no means exhausted their influence.

In any case, it is a novel and interesting situation, worth following closely.—*Aug. 24, 1916.*

Ship Seizures

THE SEIZURE OF THE HOCKING

The seizure of the American steamship *Hocking*, sailing from New York to Norfolk, two American ports, by a British warship brings a vital question to a sharp issue. The British theory of sea-domination, as concertedly put by a British commander, is: "Britain's first line of defense is the enemy's coast." Carrying out this dictum to its logical conclusion, Great Britain has come into American waters and seized an American vessel engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States, and sent it to Halifax with a prize crew.

The reason given by the British admiralty for this high-handed act is that the *Hocking*, which came into American registry from Danish ownership, is suspected of having been backed by German capital. In other words, the British government declines to recognize the validity of the transfer of the steamship to American registry under the operations of American law.

By this seizure the control of the American registry list is, in effect, taken from our government. If allowed to stand, the United States will be deprived of the power to decide whether or not a ship is to enjoy the protection of the United States flag. Are not American laws to be applicable even to American commerce, carried on in American

waters adjoining our own coast? Does the claim of Great Britain to sea dominion make the acts of our government relating to tolls, contraband and registry subject to revision in London?—November 2, 1915.

A PROTEST THAT IS NO PROTEST

There is not one word in this government's note to England that will stop a British gunboat hauling an American ship to port "on suspicion," or lead a British prize court to hasten its extremely deliberate judgment on the interned vessel and her cargo. The document recites most exhaustively all that England's war vessels have done the past year to interrupt American sea commerce with other neutral nations; it also gives a history and analysis of the rights of neutrals under accepted international law; but as the "protest" of a nation determined to end a menace to its shipping, and to bring promptly to an issue the asserted right of another nation to continue such menace, it is by no means the kind of message that an Andrew Jackson would have penned. Nor is it in line with what would have been expected from a Grover Cleveland, in view of the virile presentation of American rights made by that statesman during the controversy with England over the Venezuelan

boundary. President Cleveland's note woke up England thoroughly and closed the incident. No one will claim that yesterday's message to England had any such result. Unlike a motion picture, which is action without words, the Lansing note is words without action.

We have not closed a controversy; we have merely cleared the way for another one. We have not protected a single American cargo on its legitimate voyage; we have made still more certain its unwarrantable detention in an English port, with a far-off decision in international courts as its only compensation for an interrupted voyage and confiscated goods. Every point that our government makes in assertion of the sea rights of neutrals is left still open to question by England, or, for that matter, by Germany. The neutral nations that looked to the great United States for a decisive interpretation of international law and a firm declaration of neutral rights will have to turn for it to their own notes to the English government, rather than to ours. The sharp, decisive tone that gives vitality and effect to words—that means results—is utterly lacking in the Washington message.

England will be shrewd enough to realize this round-the-circle quality of our so-called protest, just as the fighting factions in Mexico realized and interpreted the past three years this government's various notes designed to protect American lives and property there. They failed to do either. Mexicans continued to insult and murder Americans as they pleased, and destroyed their property at will. They have not stopped yet.

With the "triumph" of our diplomacy in Mexico as an example of our protection of American life and property, is it a matter of wonder that England takes so calmly our rehearsal of her year's record of assaults on American shipping, and our failure to insist upon their continuance as "an unfriendly act"?
—Nov. 9, 1915.

**DO AS YOU PLEASE NOW,
PAY FOR IT LATER, IS
ENGLAND'S INTERPRETA-
TION OF SEA LAW**

Yes, we are going to protest the seizure of the *Hocking*. Protest vigorously, so the dispatches from Washington say. Protest surely? No—"probably." Or, perhaps, the Washington Associated Press dispatches meant to say that our government will surely protest and "probably vigorously."

Whichever way you read it—whether "probably protest" or protest "probably vigorously"—the qualifying word is there, and it has all the nullifying traits of a hole in a dam. No water backs up behind such a structure.

So the good ship *Hocking*, seized by the English battleships off our coast, is "requisitioned" at Halifax, without even the prize court hearings that other American craft have sooner or later (usually later) been accorded by the English government. One of her owners—not her principal owner, but a stockholder—is said to be a German by birth though an American by naturalization. Our own government, after investigation, gave the ship American registry. The vessel was on its way from New York to Norfolk—certainly neutral

ports—when taken over by the English cruisers, and is now treated as a captured enemy ship. She is to be placed in commission at once in the English transport service. She thus becomes a most substantial aid to England in her struggle.

Against this new violation of international law, committed within sight of American shore, involving a vessel plying between two American ports, our government at Washington has presented a protest at London. The protest should be pressed energetically.

So far, our series of protests has not resulted in the release of a single American ship or American cargo or in securing recognition from the British government of a single point raised at Washington. The British plan has been to go on doing as that nation's interests at sea demanded, regardless of the rights of neutrals, and regardless of established precedents in sea law.

Even the Marquis of Lansdowne in his speech in the House of Lords last Tuesday did not attempt to justify the English policy in this respect, or to indorse the drastic action of English prize courts. He took the ground that whatever was unlawful in England's course could be settled AFTER THE WAR by an international tribunal.

That may be well enough from the English point of view, for it accomplishes England's purpose of sweeping the seas during war times of all vessels about which there is English suspicion. In other words, this policy reduces the sea commerce of the war period down to such as England feels warranted in permitting.

As we have said, that is well enough from England's point of

view, but how about the American point of view? Our State department is under no obligation to keep in mind England's necessities; it is under obligation, however, to keep in mind American interests. We have none too many on the seas, as matters now stand; but if such interests as we have can be raided at will by English cruisers, we may be sure that our sea trade will be reduced to a negligible quantity unless the war ends quickly. Meanwhile, England increases her sea domination.

Is Lord Lansdowne's reference of these ship seizures to an international tribunal several years hence the last word to be said on the subject? Lansdowne's claim that whatever wrong England is doing can be adjusted when peace returns is, in fact, an admission that wrong has been done. It is also a declaration of purpose to continue perpetrating that wrong, and to pay afterward whatever damages American owners can recover in long-drawn-out international litigation begun when war ends.

There should be no let-up and no surrender in the State department's action.—*December 6, 1915.*

THE TRENT DECISION REVERSED

The holding up of the Porto Rican liner *Carolina*, an American vessel flying the American flag, by the French battle cruiser *Descartes*, and the seizure of Carl Schade, a German subject, recalls with striking faithfulness to detail the Trent incident.

At the time when the American frigate *San Jacinto* sent a boarding party on board the *Trent*, bound

from Havana for England, on the 8th of November, 1861, to demand the surrender of J. M. Mason and John Slidell, commissioners of the Confederacy, Capt. Moir, the commander of the British vessel, declined to give up his passengers. The Confederate officials, he pointed out to Lieut. Fairfax, U. S. N., the officer in command of the boarding party, were under the protection of the British flag and could not be surrendered.

Upon the declaration by the American officer of his purpose to take Mason and Slidell off the ship by force, Commander Williams, R. N., in charge of the British mails on board the *Trent* assumed command of the ship and made the following declaration to Lieut. Fairfax:

In this ship I am the representative of her majesty's government, and I call upon the officers of the ship and the passengers generally to mark my words when, in the name of that government, and in distinct language, I denounce this as an illegal act—an act of violation of international law—an act, indeed, of wanton piracy, which, had we the means of defense, you would not dare attempt.

The protest of the British commander was disregarded, Mason and Slidell and their secretaries were taken off the *Trent*, transferred to the *San Jacinto* and eventually lodged in Fort Warren, Boston harbor.

Intense indignation was aroused in England when news of the affair reached London. Preparations for war were immediately begun at the British arsenals and navy-yards; troops were dispatched to Canada. In the meanwhile the British government presented a vigorous demand at Washington for the release of Mason and Slidell and for

an apology for the violation of the dignity of the British flag.

The incident aroused much feeling in this country, and one of the immediate expressions of public sentiment took the form of a vote of thanks by Congress to Capt. Wilkes, of the *San Jacinto* for his success in capturing the Confederate officials, one of whom had been designated as ambassador to Great Britain and the other to France. President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward, however, did not share in the popular approval of the seizure. Consequently, without much delay, Mason and Slidell were taken from Fort Warren and put aboard a British steam vessel in Boston harbor, and eventually reached their destination in England.

By repudiating the action of the American commander, President Lincoln acquiesced, inferentially at least, in Britain's contention that the seizure constituted a violation of international law—that it was, in fact, "an act of wanton piracy," as Commander Williams, R. N., had characterized it. And the repudiation came quickly. President Lincoln did not wait until the end of the war; with the bigness of mind which makes him a landmark among the men of his generation, he gave satisfaction to Great Britain, promptly and completely.

And now Britain, which controls the sea policy of the Quadruple Entente, has taken a position in direct conflict with that which she took in 1861, and which the United States gracefully conceded. Will the "act of wanton piracy" committed by the French cruiser *Descartes* be repudiated now, or will France wait until the end of the war?

There is a third alternative—that the United States will acquiesce in silence in the latest violation of the American flag by a belligerent. But such an eventuality is hardly conceivable.—*Dec. 14, 1915.*

FRANCE YIELDS QUICKLY

There is something of the traditional Gallic courtesy in the promptness of the decision of France to surrender the German subjects taken off four American ships by the *Descartes*. The seizures were plain violations of the law of nations as established by the *Trent* affair in the closing year of the Civil War. The State department acted with firmness and without much loss of time. The response of the French government has come quickly, and the men who were taken illegally from the protection of the American flag, flying over American ships, have already been handed over to the American consular authorities at Port de France.

The incident is now closed with the complete vindication of the honor of the American flag. The only wonder is that the French should ever have undertaken to violate so plain a principle of international justice on the sea.—*January 4, 1916.*

THE BLACKLIST OF THE SEA

Eighty-five ships of peace owned by citizens of America, Norway, Sweden, Greece and other countries and flying the flags of neutral powers are fugitives of the ocean. The freight rates between the United States and Europe are higher than ever before in history. For-

tunes could be made by the owners of these ships if they could employ them in the transatlantic trade. But they dare not, for the British would seize the vessels wherever they found them. Shut off from the rich commerce of the transatlantic, the owners keep their vessels in such business as they can get with South America and distant ports where British warships are not likely to be lurking.

If these eighty-five steamers could be utilized in general commerce it would lighten to some extent the terrific strain on ocean tonnage, somewhat lessen the freight blockade on American railroads, make possible the shipment of more goods and, consequently, be of benefit to every branch of American industry.

But the eighty-five are on the British blacklist of the sea. They are proscribed. Their names, their tonnage, their crimes are catalogued as are the names, the fingerprints and the offenses of human criminals. They are to be hunted down, seized and detained wherever they are found by warships of his Britannic majesty.

The crime of the eighty-five pariahs of the deep is that the British authorities know or suspect that some one of German nationality or German sympathies has a financial interest in them.

A dozen times over owners of some of these ships have tried to sell their vessels, but the British will not sanction such dealings. They persist in classing the ship as criminal, and refuse, whether it is innocent or guilty, to permit it to divest itself of its criminal attributes.

Due to scarcity of available ships,

ocean freights increase, returning enormous profits to the foreign owners of ships, over fifty per cent. of whom are British.—*January 27, 1916.*

CENSORSHIP OF TRAVELING

A dispatch from London tells us that "neutral diplomatic circles" are convinced that Britain will release the thirty-eight citizens of the central empires unlawfully taken by a British cruiser from the American steamship *China* en route from Shanghai to San Francisco. We have had one note from Britain telling us that she would not free these captives. Early this week Secretary Lansing wrote a sharp note demanding their immediate release. To-day we have the interesting evidence that when we make a sharp demand on England it is met.

Controversies with England on this subject are over a hundred years old. Before the war of 1812 British warships, applying the doctrine of "once an Englishman always an Englishman," searched American vessels and impressed into the British service naturalized American citizens of American birth. This indignity was one of the reasons why we went to war with England. In the peace treaty of Ghent, closing that war, no mention was made of this impressment matter, but the practice was dropped by England and the world knew that it would never be resumed.

In 1861 the British ship *Trent* was held by our warship *San Jacinto* and our captain, Charles Wilkes, removed two Confederate commissioners, Mason and Slidell, en route for Great Britain. There

was great rejoicing in New York and Boston when the Confederate commissioners were brought to port, but Great Britain peremptorily demanded their release. Secretary Seward was disposed to assert what he considered as American rights, but President Lincoln counseled moderation:

We fought Great Britain for insisting by theory and practice on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done.

Lincoln's view prevailed and the Confederates were set free.

The matter slept for over forty years. In the earlier part of the European war French cruisers took from American vessels trading to the West Indies various German members of the crews. On strong representation from our State department France released these captives. In regard to one of them, August Pipenbrink, our State department wrote to France.

There is no justification in international law for the removal of an enemy subject from a neutral vessel on the high seas bound to a neutral port, even if he could be regarded as a military person.

France assented to the principle, England did not. In our first note protesting the China seizures we pointed out to her the analogy of the *Trent* case, but she retained the thirty-eight men taken from American sovereignty, from under the American flag. Sir Edward Grey informed us that some of the captives on arrival in America might have engaged in plots against England. The seizure could so little be supported that even the newspapers of Japan, Great Britain's ally, denounced it as a violation of international law. To-day Great Britain submits.

It is possible to measure ex-

actly the right which Great Britain had to take off an American ship the subjects of a power with whom we are at peace. Great Britain had the same right to do that as she would have to send troops across our border, take the same persons from an American railroad train and carry them off to Canada.

Above all, is it possible that Britain, this writer of stern notes, this arbitrary maker of sea law in defiance of neutrals, is really so tractable when she is sternly spoken to? Is our Mr. Lansing a Petruchio who is about to demonstrate the "Taming of the Shrew"?—May 6, 1916.

THE WILHELMINA SETTLEMENT

Eighteen months after the American steamship *Wilhelmina* was unlawfully seized by Great Britain while on her way to Germany with a cargo of foodstuffs, the owners are recompensed by Great Britain. There is a tendency to regard this settlement as in some way satisfactory. Even those who admit that the British settlement does not atone for the violation of principle seem to think that this payment proves that the wrongs Great Britain is doing us can be paid for, while those of Germany cannot. Such is the opinion of Saturday's *New York World*:

As neutrals see it, the seizure of the *Wilhelmina's* cargo was as truly a grievance as the sinking of the *Lusitania*. But it is John Bull's immense advantage that wrongs like the *Wilhelmina's* can be righted at any time by payment, while all the sorrowing years will not bring back the *Lusitania's* dead.

The *World* will think differently when it looks deeper. Not even the

wrong to the W. L. Green Commission Company, which chartered the steamer, is righted by the payment. The company eventually made a good profit upon that one cargo of foodstuffs, but their attempt to re-establish their business with Germany failed. Had it succeeded, they would have made a profit not on one but on a hundred cargoes.

The *Wilhelmina* carried grain and flour and provisions. After this ship was seized no one dared to attempt to ship foodstuffs to Germany. This meant a great and permanent loss to producers of foodstuffs in America, a loss not of to-day, but of to-morrow and all the future.

To be sure, farmers have received high prices for their produce during this war, thanks to the central powers, who locked up the Russian wheat supply and made the neutral and allied nations dependent upon 'sn

But a state department must look further than immediate effect. The stoppage of the *Wilhelmina*, and our accession in that stoppage, has for all time closed the German foodstuffs market to us. Germany is now either producing all she needs or importing it from her allies, and will continue to do this after the war. We shall sell no more wheat, flour or provisions to Germany, and little fodder. We shall sell them no more oil, phosphates, steel, naval stores, copper, cotton, in so far as they can by the greatest stretch of ingenuity find substitutes at home or in friendly countries accessible by land.

After the British use of sea power in this war no country will in the future dare to depend on an oversea

source of supply for the necessities of life. Least of all will the central powers again risk such dependency. The currents of international trade have suffered a permanent diminution. We have refused to enforce our asserted right to ship to an unblockaded country all goods but contraband of war. Thereby we have infinitely reduced the worth of oversea sources of supply, yet we are an oversea source of supply for all our export markets except Mexico and Canada.

We have stood by while the sea was being made a barrier that separates us from nations, not a link that binds us to them. For this precedent is part of the international law of the future; it is by precedents that international law is made.

No, the \$392,000 paid the ship-

pers on the *Wilhelmina* does not settle with America. It does not settle with us any more than the \$15,000,000 in gold, paid us by England, settled for the harm done us in the Civil War by the *Alabama* and her sister ships, Confederate privateers fitted out by England. They sank half our merchant marine and drove the other half to the British flag to escape destruction.

During the Civil War we were a weak nation, fighting for our lives against the Confederacy. We could not effectually protest against the wrong Great Britain did us nor stop it in its course. To-day it is different. We are the most powerful nation in the world. No belligerent can resist our demand to return to the limits of law. Germany could not. Nor can England.—*July 18, 1916.*

Red Cross

"BY LEAVE OF ENGLAND"

The American Red Cross is thwarted in its charitable purposes by the unwillingness of England to admit certain kinds of medical supplies to countries with which she is at war. Such supplies, it appears from an official letter written from Red Cross headquarters in Washington, can be forwarded only by leave of England. To the suggestion that such supplies, urgently needed to carry on the work of the American Physicians' Expedition of New York, be taken to Germany on board an American warship, the reply from Red Cross headquarters in Washington is that as England has objected to the transportation of such articles on merchant vessels, she would object equally to their being sent on an American warship.

Such is the outcome of the attempt of the American Physicians' Expedition, of which Mr. Arthur von Briesen is president, to obtain a removal of England's ban upon rubber gloves and rubber bandages for the use of the four surgeons sent out from New York, under the personal guarantee of the American ambassador to Germany, that the gloves and the bandages would be applied only to the purpose designated.

One member of the expedition, Miss Emma Duensing, of New York, has already died in the midst of her noble work from infection against which rubber gloves might

have protected her. The expedition, as an article on another page of this issue will show, has sought the aid of the Red Cross, and through that organization, of the government at Washington, in its attempts to protect the remaining four members of its staff in Germany from a misfortune similar to that which has laid Miss Duensing low.

And the reply is that England would not consent to relax its stringent regulations even to make possible the continuation of the laudable hospital work of Americans who are tending the wounded of all nationalities alike.

Since when has charity become contraband? Since when have the laws of nations permitted England to kill the wounded or the surgeons or nurses in the hospitals by denying them supplies indispensable for their protection from deadly infection? And since when has America acquiesced in such a heartlessly arrogant policy?

How much further is our status in the world to be determined "by leave of England"?—*Dec. 23, 1915.*

THE AMERICAN RED CROSS

For many months the allies have refused "permits" for the passage to Germany of Red Cross supplies collected in this country. Our State department has informally negotiated with London, but in vain. At last, on April 18, the American Red

Cross had to write and ask donors of Red Cross supplies for the central powers to take back their gifts or allow a different disposition to be made of them.

This is the message that had to be passed on from the State department:

The American Red Cross has received notification through the State department of the decision of the British government that Red Cross supplies destined to enemy countries will not be passed through the blockade established by the entente allies.

Under such conditions the American Red Cross loses its name and nature. It becomes nothing more than an auxiliary branch of the hospital and ambulance services of the entente allies.

But American members of the Red Cross were not satisfied with this disposition of the case. After much urging Mr. Taft, chairman of the organization's central committee, was induced to write to Secretary Lansing and ask him to formally protest the British action:

The authorities of the American Red Cross believe that, under the Geneva convention, to which the United States and all the belligerent powers are signatories, the United States has the right to

insist that articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded, in the form of hospital supplies, shipped by the American Red Cross to the Red Cross of the central powers, shall not be declared contraband, but shall be allowed safe conduct to their destination.

Secretary Lansing—so Washington announced on May 12—is to make a formal protest.

Americans cannot help feeling a hope that the secretary will insist on our "treaty rights" with all the mighty force at his disposal. That force is an irresistible one. He proved it when he compelled the release of the German and Austrian subjects unlawfully removed by a British cruiser from the American steamship *China*. He will prove it when he comes to apply that force to the removal of the illegal British blockade.

The secretary has a logical and consistent mind. With unanswerable logic he insisted on our lawful right to ship munitions of war to the allies.

Then—O God of Christian peoples!—is there anything in human or divine law to prevent us from insisting on our right to heal the very wounds we make?—May 16, 1916.

Humanity and Atrocity

WAR'S HORRORS VISUALIZED

The columns of the press of the belligerent nations are teeming with ghastly reminders of what war means to the individual, to twenty millions of individuals scattered in the world's battlefields. In a London publication, just arrived, the excellence of a large variety of artificial limbs is set forth for the benefit of its readers. Here are some of the descriptive phrases which occur:

Artificial leg for amputation above the knee.

Double ball-bearing ankle-joint.

Supporting and operating harness for artificial arm.

Raising the hat by means of artificial arm.

The artificial foot and ankle-joint.

Ball-bearing knee-controller.

Sponge rubber foot; ankle and foot action obtained by stepping as with the natural foot.

Picking up a coin with artificial hand.

Side view of artificial arm, showing operating mechanism.

And so on down the appalling list of mutilations, the work of shot and shell and bayonet, of tearing and thrusting and rending implements of destruction.

All these tragedies are not enacted in pitched battles, deciding the fortunes of campaigns. For the most part they are the work of those obscure and futile exchanges of projectiles that are going on day and night along fighting lines extending more than 2,000 miles upon the scarred face of Europe. These

engagements may mean nothing in the long run of military operations. They may not result in the loss or gain of a single yard of ground. But the killing and the mutilation goes on, even in those casual, routine, matter-of-fact workings of the military machine which in the official reports are characterized in a stereotyped paragraph, something as follows:

In the Gorizia sector everything was quiet to-day.

Quiet? Yes. The quiet of newly made graves. The quiet of silent, inanimate objects which once were men. The quiet of the death which Europe is dying many thousands of times a day.—Nov. 30, 1915.

PILING UP HATRED

Our neighbor, the *Globe*, prints prominently a long article from its European correspondent, Mr. Herbert Corey, in which, on the authority of an unnamed "major of Canadians," two horrible stories are linked. The first of these concerns a Canadian sergeant, unnamed, who is said to have been crucified at Ypres, where he had been found, wounded, by the Germans in a shed which the Canadians afterward retook. As Mr. Corey tells it:

"I saw him myself," said the major of Canadians, talking in Paris, "crucified on the door of a sort of a shed like. They had jabbed holes through his hands and feet with their bayonets and then

thrust wooden plugs through them to sustain his weight. We all saw it. I tell you, we went mad."

And the other story, the sequel, as Mr. Corey tells it:

"We had some prisoners," said the major. "Twenty-three, I think. The boys killed them and cut their bodies in pieces and strewed them in the road along which the Germans must come. On some of them we pinned the Canadian emblems from the uniforms of our dead, just so they would know how Canada takes revenge. Ever since then the Germans have been afraid of us. They believe that we do that often. They think we are savages."

The *Globe* correspondent does not vouch for the stories himself. He sprinkles the recitation with a few comments intended to suggest his own doubt about the crucifixion, such as: "It is a bit too inhuman, that story; too hellish." As for the alleged killing of the twenty-three prisoners, he indirectly suggests that it was not possible for men like the Canadians to have done such a thing.

The most important thing about the matter, from the American point of view, is that a story printed as prominently as this was printed is believed in toto by a large number of persons whose willing minds automatically discard all suggestions of doubt as to the truth of the tales. Your anti-German will come to the end of the column raging over the idea, welcome to his imagination, that the Germans crucified a Canadian. Your pro-German will be incensed at the supposed butchery of the German prisoners.

It was an Englishman—Jerome K. Jerome, we believe—who advised his countrymen early in the war not to say too many wild things about the foe. "Whether we like it or not," he said, "we have got to

live with Germany for a long time." Similar advice might well have been given by cool men in every country in Europe, for the nations of Europe have got to live with one another after this war is over—at least until there is another war—just as we will have to live with Canada, even if this Corey tale were a thousand times true.

But nations do not live any happier with their neighbors for things like this, true or false. If true, these horrors should be dealt with as crimes. If untrue, then the crime of calumny is at somebody's door, perhaps the unnamed major's. There have been in this war so many atrocities, the records of which have been set down with names, places and dates, that there is no need of drawing upon the imagination for fresh hellishness. We do not say that Mr. Corey's story is manufactured, but we do say that to print it without naming the source is unfair to our neighbors, the Canadians, and unfair to the Germans, too.—*Dec. 17, 1915.*

WHERE WOULD REPRISAL END?

It seems to be the intent, in certain political quarters of Germany, to throw away a grievance by avenging it, even when that very grievance has indeterminably great value. We refer to the unanimous demand, made at a recent session of the Reichstag, that the government avenge the reported murder of the German submarine fleet in the *Baralong* affair.

In that particular matter Germany had what appeared to be a "good case"; one in which she

could at least prove that brutality was the weakness of other nations; one in which, by sane procedure and patience, she could show that she had not discarded the laws of war. Germany's brief in the *Buralong* case was a moral weapon, for it appealed to every neutral.

If Germany, blinded by fury, turns to bloody reprisal against the British, lawless brutality will increase, instead of ending, the ratio of horror, doubling as it goes on. It would be impossible to forecast the end if both Germany and England should abandon all the conventions of battle.

England and Germany have been appealing for American sympathy in cases like the tragedy of Miss Cavell and the seeming horror of the *Buralong*. The appeals have been made, not to our government, but to the American people, who can do little more than murmur and regret.

It is time for the government of the United States to do something—to appeal to these two nations not to disgrace what remains of twenty centuries of Christian civilization by acting like wild beasts. Let us offer our services for an inquiry. With an umpire looking on, we believe, foul work would stop.—*Jan.* 29, 1916.

WARRING FOR HUMANITY

On March 10 a letter from Premier Asquith was published in London giving 3,153 as the number of noncombatants killed by the atrocious Germans in the war, through coast bombardment, air bombs and submarines. On March 9 Lord Bryce published in London a pamphlet explaining that Britain was

warring "especially for the exemption of noncombatants from the suffering and horrors which war brings."

Three thousand one hundred and fifty-three noncombatants. It is a terrible number. Naturally the British have taken every care that no such charge as this can be laid against their souls, in their righteous struggle for the exemption of noncombatants from the sufferings of war.

Have they been successful in the accomplishment of their high aims? When the war broke out England began to seize every shipment of food going to Germany, whether consigned to the army or to civilians. No pound of food that the British fleet could capture on the high seas has gone through to Germany. Such procedure is not only inhuman, it is even unlawful, unless an effective blockade is maintained. Not until March 1, 1915, did Britain attempt any such measure, and she has not to this day dared to call it a blockade. It is an unexampled interference with our commerce on the seas. It is an interference to which we cannot accede—so Mr. Lansing contends—without surrendering our rights and violating our neutrality.

To return to the sturdy British fight in behalf of noncombatants. Britain has refused even to let us send food to Germany to be distributed among civilians by our own consular officers. It could not be plainer proved that the British measures are directed against women and children in Germany. No one imagines that the German army is going to suffer from shortage of food. They are fed first. The hope is that the nation will sicken at the

view of the suffering of these non-combatants, for whose protection Great Britain is warring. There are 35,000,000 females and some tens of millions of male babies and other male noncombatants in Germany.

The campaign has not been without its effect. Judge Ben Lindsey, of Denver, has come back from a few weeks in Germany. He told a New York audience of a million civilian deaths in Germany last year; 500,000 were children and a very great number of these died from lack of milk. That is because American fodder, used to feed German cattle, could not get through the British fleet.

The Russians, retreating in Poland, kill all the cattle they cannot drive away. To-day there are no more babies in Poland. But Russia does not pretend to be warring for noncombatants. England does.

Britain is fighting "especially for the exemption of noncombatants from the sufferings and horrors which war brings."

How long, O Lord, how long? O noble nation! O liberty! O hypocrisy! What crimes are committed in thy name!—*March 21, 1916.*

ATROCITIES AND SANITY

What horrible tales are daily cabled to the American people. tales of unspeakable barbarity not only by Serb and Bulgar, but also by English, French and German, whose civilization we call our own. We hear of soldiers with mutilated ears and tongues, of Red Cross workers and hospitals deliberately attacked, of civilians slaughtered, violated, crucified. Are these the British and Germans we knew? Have our

Anglo and Saxon brothers sunk to the level of the lowest beasts? Is our own immediate human nature thus red in tooth and claw?

The saving thought is that it may not all be true, not quite true. On Saturday, November 11, 1758, the gentle Dr. Samuel Johnson wrote in the *Idler*:

In time of war the nation is always of one mind, eager to hear something good of themselves and ill of the enemy. At this time the task of news writers is easy; they have nothing to do but tell that a battle is expected, and afterward has been fought, in which we and our friends, whether conquering or conquered, did all and our enemy nothing.

Scarcely anything awakens attention like a tale of cruelty. The writer of news never fails in the intermission of action to tell how the enemy murdered children and ravished virgins; and, if the scene of action be somewhat distant, scalped half the inhabitants of the province.

Among the calamities of war may be justly numbered the diminution of the love of truth which interest dictates and credulity encourages. A peace will equally leave the warrior and the relater of wars destitute of employment, and I know not whether more is to be dreaded from the streets filled with soldiers accustomed to plunder, or from garrets filled with scribblers accustomed to lie.

On Saturday, November 11, 1758, the news writer at the front was very much as he is to-day. But in 1916 we have more highly trained correspondents, official news bureaus and all the conveniences of cable and wireless to invent and spread the same old tales.—*March 30, 1916.*

MAKING WAR NEWS

The many fantastic shapes that war news sometimes takes in the course of its wanderings from producer to consumer are pointedly illustrated by the adventures of Lady

Ralph Paget. When the Bulgarians entered Uskub on the heels of the fleeing Serbians, Lady Paget chose to remain in the invaded temporary capital of Serbia and carry on her work of succoring the Serbian wounded and refugees. No sooner had the Bulgarians occupied Uskub than a variety of cable messages describing atrocities perpetrated upon Lady Paget and her companions began to vibrate across the Atlantic. The allegations ranged somewhat as follows:

1. The Bulgarians have arrested Lady Paget and her life is feared for.

2. The Bulgarians have seized all of Lady Paget's supplies and have made prisoners of most of the members of her party.

3. The Bulgarians have razed Lady Paget's hospital with artillery. There is grave anxiety for Lady Paget.

Lady Paget and her staff of fifty-four have just arrived at London, and a leading member of the party thus describes their experiences:

The Bulgarian advance was so rapid that we were cut off. The line of battle passed practically through the hospital, but when the Bulgars saw the Red Cross they did not fire in our direction. They took possession of the town in an orderly way and gave us a great amount of liberty. Lady Paget was allowed the independent use of her stores in helping refugees. At one time we supplied food to between 3,000 and 4,000 refugees daily.

Which would make it appear that Lady Paget herself was not aware of the terrible things that were happening to her during the time when she was in the power of the ferocious Bulgarians.—*April 6, 1916.*

ROYAL ALMS

The news reports an event of international importance. It is the collection by Mrs. Cornelius Van-

derbilt of a \$300,000 American relief fund for royalty. Thirty contributions of \$10,000 each are sought, and \$140,000 has already been contributed. The \$300,000 is to be distributed in equal parts to Queen Mary, the Czarina and President Poincare. They are to use the \$300,000 as they please.

Come to think of it, it is stupendous that the deserts of these innocent victims of the war should have been overlooked, amid the more clamorous demands of widows, orphans, refugees and soldiers maimed in the war. Royalty has been simply too well bred to voice its suffering. It is a proud day for America that we have citizens to feel and realize this hidden need.

Investigation proves that the czar's income from the crown lands is a bare \$20,000,000 per year. Obviously too little—in these days of high prices—to properly care for both himself and the czarina. Then what shall we say of the niggardly \$2,330,000 annually allowed the king and queen of England for privy purse, household expenses and charities? And as for the president of France, with a yearly alms of \$240,000, or less than \$1,000 per day—it can't be done.

It is high time for help, and prompt help. The only pity is that subscriptions were limited to thirty persons who could afford \$10,000 each. That prevents the fund from being a national one in the widest sense; there are so many that cannot give quite \$10,000 and yet whose hearts yearn to give their mites.

There are 200 American soldiers in hospital on the Mexican border. Who will start a fund to aid them?

—*April 8, 1916.*

THE DECLINE OF THE SENTIMENT OF PITY

By S. S. McCLURE

I asked Prof. Eucken what would be the most permanent result of the war. He said, "Hatred." He might have added, as an immediate result, the decline of the sentiment of pity. A proof of this is the way the civilized world endures the incredible tragedy of the Armenians.

It is possible that history may furnish a parallel to the horrors taking place to-day in Asiatic Turkey, but certainly nothing more terrible has ever been recorded.

I publish to-day a few extracts from the great mass of reports by eyewitnesses. Nothing can occur in Asiatic Turkey without being known to the Europeans, who are there as officials, business men, missionaries, etc. Most of what I print is from German sources. The German government has sought in every way to mitigate these cruelties. The American ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, worked continuously to the same end.

Many of the victims of the most atrocious tortures were men and women of wealth and refinement, oftentimes educated in Europe.

I met many children in Constantinople whose parents, brothers and sisters were among the victims, and those children had all the refinement and sensibility to be found in the children of any land.

Talaat Bey has punished in many cases Turkish officials who were guilty of cruelty, but the punishment of a few of the guilty officials has not changed the policy and cannot undo the wrongs. The horrors of the last two years have dulled the power to feel.—*June 24, 1916.*

ZEPPELIN AND AEROPLANE RAIDS ON CIVILIANS

By S. S. McCLURE

When I was in Mannheim I saw a Zeppelin, LZ-97, circling around over the town. I had just visited one of the famous municipal kitchens, where hundreds of school children, some as young as six years, were having a delicious luncheon for five cents each. And I thought, supposing this were a hostile Zeppelin, and it should drop bombs among these little children; what a dastardly and unpardonable crime it would be!

When I reached Berlin I asked one of the ministers of the German government why they practiced Zeppelin warfare in France and England, especially as the Zeppelins generally killed mostly women and children. The answer was partly to satisfy the German people that the government was acting against England, and bringing the war home to the English people, and partly because the English and French dropped bombs on civilians in German towns. I told him I thought it was a mistake; that it increased hatred and detestation greatly out of proportion to the military value of the policy.

Now we read of French aeroplanes dropping bombs among helpless civilians in Karlsruhe. There were seventy-five children and five women and thirty men killed; and seventy-nine children and twenty women and fifty men injured.

Such warfare is inexcusable. Crimes of frightfulness, instead of bringing peace nearer, have produced such hatred as will undoubtedly be a potent factor in prolonging the war.—*June 29, 1916.*

MURDERING CAPTAIN FRYATT

Such is the description which a portion of the New York press applies to Germany's action in court-martialing and executing Capt. Fryatt of the peaceful British passenger steamer *Brussels*, plying between London and Rotterdam. There is no contention that the *Brussels* was armed. She was a peaceful British merchantman captured on the high seas and taken into Zeebrugge by German destroyers. Her captain has now been executed, murdered.

Such are the conclusions reached and the judgment passed by a portion of our press and by the foreign office at London. Intelligent Americans are accustomed to make their own conclusions from the facts. The facts in this case have been stated by the court that tried Fryatt, and are not denied by any one. On March 28 the German submarine U-33 rose and signaled the *Brussels* to stop, off the *Maas* lightship. The *Brussels* did not heed the signal, but turned and rushed at the U-33 to ram her. The U-33 submerged and escaped. For the exploit of the *Brussels* Fryatt and his chief engineer received and wore admiralty watches for bravery. The evidence of these watch inscriptions counted at the trial.

America is concerned in the event. On March 28 the U-33 was trying to exercise that policy of visit and search which our government forced on Germany as a substitute for unwarned destruction of British steamers. The British steamer was exercising that resistance to visit and search which, we declare, deprives a merchant steamer of im-

munity and justifies her destruction. Capt. Fryatt, by an act of attempting to ram the submarine, endangered the lives of all the passengers he carried.

Instead of having the U-33 way-lay Capt. Fryatt's steamer on her next trip and sink her, German destroyers capture her, tow her into port, put her cargo into prize court and try her captain. He was executed as a sea sniper, just as a land sniper would be executed if found by his enemy carrying a government watch for his prowess.

Some issues of this war are obscure and complicated. This one is simple and clear.—Aug. 1, 1916.

OPIMUM EMBARGOES

Great Britain has forbidden the importation of opium and cocaine into the United Kingdom. It may be that the embargo is connected with the reported spread of the drug habit among the Canadian contingent. In any case, an embargo on opium imports calls up to the mind China and its long fight with the deadly poison, and recalls, in interesting fashion, the opium war of 1840.

In 1840 China, just like England to-day, attempted to forbid the importation of opium into her boundaries. The embargo's principal effect was on the exports of opium from British India to China. To stop these exports would have caused grave loss to British-Indian interests. More than that, it would have ruined the finances of the British-Indian government, whose main income was from the opium export tax.

Great Britain went to war with

China on the issue. When the war was over, China was of course defeated, and the Chinese market for Indian opium again opened.

Great Britain is quite right in her action; so was China. Had China not been hindered she would have begun half a century earlier her fight against a national scourge.

The incident is worth recalling. It is one of the many illustrations in recent history of the fact that when it is to Great Britain's interest she defends the rights of small or weak nations; and when it is to her interest to do so, she abolishes those rights. Such was the case with China in 1840. Such more lately

was the case with Persia and the Transvaal. For any nation to claim to act in the interest of others is to fly in the face of history and to proclaim that a nation expressly renounces obedience to the first law of nature among individual men.

No nation can afford to be so hypocritical. What this country should lay to heart is the fact that no nation can afford to join any post-bellum scheme of international amity which has as its basis the impossible principle that our first duty in the world is to take care of other nations. Our first duty is, and will always be, to take care of ourselves. —Aug. 1, 1916.

Greece

ROME AND ATHENS

Greece hesitates; she is divided in her council. Venizelos, who wishes to throw the armed forces of Greece on the side of the allies, resigns because the king is unwilling to back his policies.

Many different influences are at work within the Greek nation and within the Greek government—some personal, as the presence in the king's household of the sister of the German emperor. The king weighs what the principle of efficient monarchy, as typified in Germany, will mean as a support to him and his country in the future, and compares the advantage to be derived with returns that will come to him if Russia becomes the dominant influence in the Balkan peninsula.

For Greece, however, the main question turns on Italy's position in the eastern Mediterranean. Italy, after centuries of quiescence, is re-awakening. Her population has begun to increase and the surplus of births is becoming greater each year. A revival of industry is giving her economic energy and has built, under the Italian state, a firmer structure of financial power. The benefits of the unification of the Italian people are beginning to accrue. Once more, as these new energies pulse through the Italian life, the dream of imperial power has stirred the hearts of the Italian people. Rome must reach out beyond the Italian peninsula. Her natural outlet would

be directly across the Mediterranean, on the north shores of Africa, but here France is already in possession and Italy's expansion has been blocked. She has been crowded east to Tripoli and is looking now to the island and the shores of Asia Minor for her reward.

Greece, too, has a surplus of births; to her, too, there has come a revival of agriculture and the beginnings of industry. In trade the Greeks are gaining position. The old Hellenic dream has been aroused after its century-long struggle. Greece has expected to find in the islands near her domain and on the shores of Asia Minor new points of power. She is unwilling to admit Italy to this sphere of influence.

Rome and Athens, to-day as 2,000 years ago!—Oct. 7, 1915.

GREECE AND THE ALLIES

The hazards and uncertainties of Balkan politics are strikingly brought home to the world by the crisis in Greece. The situation at Athens is pregnant with dramatic possibilities affecting the issues which have plunged the world into war. Venizelos before his dismissal was steering his country into a position where its direct participation in the struggle on the side of the allies of the entente would have been inevitable.

At the moment when London and Paris were awaiting the declaration

that would have bound Greece to the cause of the allies, however, the king intervened, Venizelos fell, and his fall sent a thrill of apprehension through the capitals of the entente.

As things now stand, the king and the deposed premier are committed to diametrically opposed policies. Venizelos is still confident of his ability to swing his country into the camp of the allies. The king, as brother-in-law of the German kaiser, is determined that Greece shall not draw the sword in opposition to Germany. The power behind both king and minister—the Greek people—is evidently inclined to back Venizelos against Constantine. Who will win? It may be assumed without much doubt that in the end the popular feeling will manifest itself in decisive fashion.

But in the meanwhile, and contrary to the views of the responsible head of the Greek government, Greece is definitely committed to the allies in a fashion which is without precedent in the annals of war. The allies have landed an army of 70,000 Frenchmen at Salonica, presumably to be used against Bulgaria in case she should attempt to seize Serbia's line of communication, the Guevgheli-Uskub railway. This violation of the neutrality of Greece was protested, but the protest was not backed by the use of armed force, as was the protest of the Belgian king. Incidentally this army of Frenchmen now on Greek soil, protecting the base of landing for additional troops, would prove highly useful to Venizelos as a means of exerting pressure on the recalcitrant government of the king. That action will follow soon is evident from the comment of the *London Times*:

"The situation demands prompt

decision by the allies and does not admit of temporizing or half measures. The first step is to ascertain unmistakably and without delay the intentions of King Constantine. Apparently we have to deal with him and not with any advisers he may accept in place of M. Venizelos.—*Oct. 7, 1915.*

ENGLAND AND GREECE

The dramatic exigencies of the Balkan crisis have led to a situation without parallel in history—the offer by a first-class power of a part of its territory to a third-rate nation, in an attempt to obtain its military aid, and the refusal of the tempting compensation by the third-rate nation.

Some inkling of the profound sense of irritation that has been produced in some British quarters by Great Britain's offer of Cyprus, the third largest island of the Mediterranean, to Greece, is furnished by the *London Post's* denunciation of the extraordinary project as a national humiliation which in all probability will fail of its purpose to induce the intervention of Greece in behalf of the entente in the pending operations in the Balkans—operations which Germany regards as promising a decisive effect upon the general world operations.

But the offer of Cyprus, to be ceded immediately, is only a detail of the proffered concessions, which include Bulgarian and Turkish territory almost up to the walls of Constantinople, and a liberal slice of Asia Minor, the land of Greek desires.

To all these flattering proposals, designed to turn the head of any nation—even the largest—Greece has replied with a refusal. The reason

for this refusal is to be found between the lines of the dispatches from Athens. Greece practically informs the British Foreign office, hard beset at home for the failure of its policy in the Balkans, that the entente does not hold the balance of power in the Balkans—in other words, there is a doubt in the Greek mind of Great Britain's ability to carry out its promises.

Furthermore, there is a suspicion in some Greek quarters that the expansion offered to Greece in Asia Minor has already been mortgaged to Italy.

Hence, Greece remains firm in its purpose to await the outcome of events, which just now do not appear reassuring to any prospective Balkan ally of the entente.—*Oct. 23, 1915.*

THE GREEK CRISIS

The defeat of Premier Zaimis in the chamber of deputies in Athens on an appeal for a vote of confidence in a controversy with Eleutherios Venizelos, the former premier, is a significant incident which may have an important bearing on the situation in the Balkans and on the European war as a whole.

Zaimis is the advocate of the maintenance of neutrality, for the present at least, by Greece, in spite of the existence of a treaty between Serbia and Greece, by which the latter country appears to be bound to aid the Serbians in the event—now an actuality—of an attack upon them by Bulgaria. Venizelos, on the other hand, has declared repeatedly that, in failing to carry out her treaty obligations, Greece has committed an act of bad faith. Venizelos, apart from his construction of the Serbo-Greek treaty as an agree-

ment binding his country to action under the existing international circumstances, is also convinced that the moment arrived, with Bulgaria's attack upon Serbia, for the realization of Greek national aspirations in the Balkans and in Asia Minor by a declaration of war against Bulgaria in conjunction with the Quadruple Entente.

For the moment, therefore, the war party is in the ascendant in Athens, on the assumption that the resignation of Zaimis, as the result of the lack of confidence expressed in the chamber, will be followed by the resumption by Venizelos of the portfolio of premier, which he relinquished at the behest of King Constantine several weeks ago.

King Constantine, on account of his relationship by marriage with the Kaiser—Queen Sophie is a sister of Wilhelm II.—and because of his conviction that the central powers will be victorious, has heretofore taken a decisive stand against intervention on the side of the allies, for which the majority of the people of Greece have been clamoring. His attitude, however, is evidently being modified by the increasing strength of the Entente forces which have been landed at Salonica, and it is not at all unlikely that he will soon co-operate in the purpose which was expressed as follows by Venizelos shortly after his relinquishment of power:

"The soul of Greece demands the destruction of Bulgaria."—*Nov. 6, 1915.*

GREECE'S BITTER CHOICE

Seldom in history has a country been confronted with so bitter a choice as that which Greece is fac-

ing at this moment of world-wide conflict. The entente has served upon the government at Athens a demand, amounting to an ultimatum, for the intervention of the Greek army in the war on their side. The force which they are able to apply to their demand is grimly indicated by the announcement from Paris and London that Greek shipping, the greatest commercial asset of the Greek people, has already been placed under a partial embargo. One more step and it will cease to exist.

With a long coast line exposed to naval attacks, for which the fleet of the allies is already clearing decks, Greece is considering the one alternative to such a disastrous eventuality, and that is intervention in behalf of the entente. But such an intervention, in view of the failure of the Anglo-French forces in the Balkans to check the Bulgarian advance toward the Greek frontiers, offers dangers hardly less menacing than a raid upon her coast cities by the entente. If Greece yields to the pressure from London and Paris, she will have jumped from the frying pan of Entente anger into the fire of Bulgarian wrath—and behind the conquering Bulgarians in Serbia are the swiftly advancing Germans and Austrians, with whom she would find herself automatically at war the moment she yielded to the demands of the Entente.

The full tragedy of the situation, so far as Greece is concerned, is to be found in the fact that the Greeks have no war of their own to fight in the present phase of the world conflict. They are urged to commit suicide in the war which is not of their own choosing, but in the interest of the powers of the entente.

Surely this war, undertaken by the allies for the defense of the rights of small nations, is taking some queer turns!—*Nov. 20, 1915.*

KING CONSTANTINE'S PLEA

There is a note of deep resentment in the appeal for American sympathy given to the world through the American press by King Constantine of Greece. The king, by way of clarifying his subject and bringing it home to the American mind, compares his desire for the maintenance of a neutral attitude with that of the United States. But, he points out, America has the advantage over Greece in the remoteness of this continent from the battlefields of the old world. The situation of his country, he submits, is of universal interest and significance, as the coercion of Greece by the allies in the present crisis would establish a precedent which might well affect "America, Holland or any other country to-morrow."

The determination of Greece to keep herself aloof from the struggle in the face of pressure from the quadruple entente which has reduced the people of the country to the verge of keen distress by reason of interference with her maritime commerce, the backbone of her prosperity, is calculated to evoke the sympathy of the neutral world. The king implies, although he does not explicitly say so, that Greece has no desire to take advantage of the opportunity for land-grabbing; no wild dream for greatness among the nations; no ambitious design to re-establish the glory and the greatness of ancient Hellas. His sole desire is to save his country

from the bloodshed and the devastation of a third war after the two in which it participated and for which it paid the price in lives and treasure.

The difficulty of the situation in which Greece is involved is accentuated by Constantine's clarification of one of the most obscure phases of an international problem which is wrapped in a heavy mantle of obscurity. It had been supposed that the allies landed their forces at Salonica for the operations against Bulgaria with the tacit good will of Greece. Constantine maintains that Greece permitted the landing of the Anglo-French troops and their consequent virtual monopoly of the greatest port of Greece because she could not help herself—because the overwhelming naval power of the allies gave her no choice.

Even an enemy of Greece cannot fail to be moved by the passionate summing up of King Constantine's case, when he says:

The entente's demand is too much. They try to drive Greece out of neutrality; they come into Greek territory and waters as though they were theirs. At Nauplia they destroyed tanks of petroleum, intended to kill locusts, on the excuse that they might be used by German submarines. They stop Greek ships; they ruin Greek commerce—as they have done with American ships, too—they want to seize our railways, and now they demand that we take away the troops guarding the Greek frontiers, leaving our country open to invasion or any lawless incursion. I will not do it. I am willing to discuss reasonably any fair proposals. But two things I will not concede: Greece shall not be forced or cajoled out of her neutrality; Greece will maintain her sovereignty and her sovereign right to protect herself at need.

Seldom has a king pleaded with deeper feeling for his people than

does Constantine of Greece in this appeal to the conscience, not *only* of America but of humanity.—*December 9, 1915.*

STARVED INTO WAR

A resentful official of the Greek government, in discussing the attempts of the entente allies to force Greece into the war against the central powers by the application of blockade measures along the Greek coast, thus summarizes the probable outcome of the Franco-British pressure:

Greece is much more likely to be starved into war than Germany is to be starved out of it.

Behind this bitter protest against the most modern method of suasion—suasion by hunger—there is a story of high-handed policy which has brought Greece to the verge of internal disruption. Aided by an undoubted inefficiency in the governmental organization of Greece, the entente powers by the enforcement of a vexatious embargo on many kinds of supplies have brought the country of Homer, of Sophocles and of Themistocles to a state of actual famine. In a country where the average rate of wages is not more than 50 cents a day, the price of potatoes has been boosted to 48 cents a pound. Coal is quoted at \$50 a ton—on paper, because it cannot be obtained even at that figure. Mutton sells at 19 cents, beef at 21 cents, fresh fish, in a country where fishing is one of the staple industries, as high as \$1.08.

These figures indicate an appalling state of affairs. The people of a country not at war are much worse off than the rank and file of

nations whose resources have suffered from the strain of a year and a half of fighting. Part of this distress is undoubtedly due to the operations of speculators whom the Greek government, despite the legal machinery at its disposal, is unable to check. But the exercise of the cupidity of these speculators is made possible primarily by the ban on importations which has been imposed by the friends and protectors of small nations—Great Britain and France.

So Greece, as the official quoted puts it, is being "starved into war." And she is being "starved into war," not against the central powers, but in all likelihood against the invaders of her territory who, not content with using the soil of a neutral nation for their operations against peoples with whom Greece is at peace, are wielding the power of famine in their attempts to drive her into a war in which she has nothing at stake.

Even if Greece succeeds in resisting the urgings of angry resentment and keeps out of active participation in the hostilities, it will be a long time before the Greek people forget the weight of the iron hands of the two democracies which are making themselves at home on the soil of Greece against her wishes.—*March 24, 1916.*

THE SCREWS ON GREECE AGAIN

The latest violation by the entente allies of the neutrality of Greece is the most far-reaching, and from the Greek point of view the most flagrant of the series of infractions of Greek rights which the Franco-British forces have yet com-

mitted. The Franco-British commanders, after seizing about twenty Greek islands at various times, cutting off railroad communications between Greece and Bulgaria, her sources of wheat supply, and put an end to Greek overseas commerce, have now gone much further than ever before in their gradual absorption of the soil of Greece for their own use and benefit and in the face of continued protests from the king of Greece.

Heretofore the entente powers have made themselves at home on outlying portions of the Greek kingdom—at Salonica, on the island of Corfu, on Crete. Now they are exercising rights of ownership in the very heart of Greece, and their sphere of activities has extended to Athens. They are using the railroad from Patras, on the east coast, to Piraeus, the port of Athens, for the transportation of the rehabilitated and reequipped remnant of the Serbian army—150,000 men—to Salonica. Against this fresh invasion of her rights Greece has protested vigorously.

Greece, now as since the beginning of the war, has made every effort to maintain her neutrality. Her unwillingness to join in the world-wide struggle is the outcome of her conviction that she has nothing to gain, and might possibly lose much, as a belligerent. In the present crisis her problem of maintaining neutrality is complicated by the representations of the central powers that they could not regard her acquiescence in the latest proceeding of the Anglo-French military authorities as anything but an act of open unfriendliness to them.

The answer of the Greek government to the central powers will be

that Greece is unable to prevent the transportation of the Serbian army; that she is no longer mistress of her own territory; that her sovereignty has been trodden under foot by the aggressive quadruple entente.

The suppression of Greek sovereignty is an interesting development in a struggle which was precipitated nominally because Russia could not suffer Serbian sovereignty to be endangered by an Austrian demand for satisfaction for the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne.

Greece has had plenty of cause to regret that the Anglo-French forces ever undertook the task of championing small nations in the Balkans—especially since her own sovereignty has been sacrificed to the cause of the sovereignty of other small nations.—*April 18 1916.*

GREECE'S SURRENDER

In yielding completely to the wishes of the entente by deciding upon the full demobilization of the Greek army, King Constantine follows the only course open to him. From the viewpoint of the entente, the demobilization of the Greek army was a military necessity. London, Paris and Petrograd had reason to believe that Greece was preparing to join the central powers.

The chief reason for expecting such a coup was the apparent fact that Greece, by negotiation, had permitted Bulgaria to occupy three strategic fortified points south of the Bulgarian border. This accusation threatened the safety of the right wing of the Franco-British forces in the event of an attempted northward advance against the Austro-German-Bulgarian forces.

The entente used the weapons of blockade and embargo with telling effect. Confronted with a complete ban upon her communications with the outside world. Greece has laid down her arms. By so doing she has given good guarantees that those arms will not be employed against the entente forces upon her soil.—*June 18, 1916.*

THE PLIGHT OF GREECE

The hazards which beset the lives of small nations in this war are pointedly illustrated by the situation in which Greece finds herself to-day. When the great war broke out Greece was animated by the hope that she would be able to accomplish what the great majority of Greeks regard as the manifest destiny of their country—the acquisition of additional territory in Macedonia and Thrace and the extension of the kingdom to Asia Minor by the absorption of at least Smyrna and its hinterland.

What has happened instead? Venizelos started out by laying before the entente powers a scheme for the march of a Greek army through Bulgarian territory for an attack upon Constantinople in conjunction with a Franco-British expedition working up Gallipoli peninsula. The entente allies rejected the proposal, partly because it involved an attack upon Bulgaria and partly because they were not prepared for a Balkan campaign on the scale which such an operation would have involved.

Then came Greece's second opportunity. Invited by the entente powers to carry out her treaty agreement with Serbia and send an army against the Bulgarian and

Austro-German forces which were attacking that country, the Greek government declined to entertain such an enterprise, on the plea that the allies did not possess a strong enough force to stand a chance of carrying it out successfully. Venizelos, who favored the allies' view of the duty of Greece, was dismissed from office. Misfortune after misfortune for his country followed his fall.

Against Greece's protest the allies landed at Salonica, seized the Greek railroad to the north, and conducted an unsuccessful campaign in Serbia. Recently the allies have ordered the Greek army demobilized, have vetoed an issue of Greek currency and made other demands on Greece which the censor allows to be intimated but whose details he will not pass.

If Greece will not comply she will starve; a blockade is now maintained against her.

In the latest phase of its international situation Greece is a government without a sovereignty, a nation without an army, without credit, without trade, and dependent for its bread upon the mercy of foreign powers with which it is nominally at peace. A pitiful spectacle.—*June 22, 1916.*

THE CONQUEST OF GREECE

A country without sovereignty. A king without power. A nation at peace whose territory has been made the battleground of warring powers.

Such is the plight to which Greece has been brought by the ruthless determination of the Entente allies to force her into war on their side. The successive steps by which Hellas has been bullied, overreached, starved

and hounded to a condition of helplessness by the statesmen and soldiers of the Entente furnish the elements of an unparalleled national tragedy.

The browbeating of King Constantine, the "builder of Greater Greece," began with the impending entrance of Turkey into the war. The allies invited him to join them in an expedition against Constantinople. He declined the invitation, as he publicly explained, because he was convinced the expedition would end in disaster. And his judgment was amply justified by the fiasco of Gallipoli, one of the most appalling in the history of warfare.

Then the following things happened in rapid succession to King Constantine and to his unhappy country:

The allies seized the port of Salonica and the country immediately around it. There they established a great military and naval base. King Constantine protested against this flagrant violation of the neutrality of Greece. He foresaw that if the allies used Greek soil for military purposes, the central powers would demand a similar right, and he was anxious above all things to save his country from the ravages of war. The allies scoffed at his protests—and continued the fortification of Salonica.

Having established themselves at the main seaport of Greece, the allies seized other islands and territories—Corfu, the line of the railroad to the Serbian border; all the region between Salonica and the Serbian border. Constantine again protested. The allies nullified his protest by a display of superior force, and proceeded with their violations of Greek neutrality.

When the Germanic powers began their great drive into Serbia and Bulgaria struck at the lands of which she had been robbed by Serbia in the second Balkan war, the Entente powers executed a diplomatic coup d'état at Athens. They unearthed a treaty. This treaty, they said, bound Greece to go to the aid of Serbia in case Serbia were attacked by Bulgaria. Constantine, who had drafted the treaty, denied that it pledged Greece to 'put its head into the lion's mouth by undertaking a war, not against Bulgaria but against Germany and Austria. Besides, Constantine pointed out, the allied expedition against Bulgaria and her allies was woefully inadequate and would result in another fiasco.

When the king's judgment of the military situation had been justified by the precipitate retreat of the Anglo-French forces before the Bulgarian advance, the allies started out to vent their spleen upon Greece.

The Greek constitution meant nothing to the statesmen of the widely advertised democracies which had entered the war avowedly for the purpose of sustaining the cause of democracy in Europe in its struggle with Prussian militarism.

They swept royal prerogatives aside like cobwebs; juggled minorities into majorities; dictated to the palace and to the Chamber of Deputies alike; dissolved parliament; trampled the laws of the country under foot.

They blockaded the principal ports of Greece, stopped imports of foodstuffs and annihilated Greek

commerce, the mainstay of the people. British naval power coerced the Greek people with the menace of starvation.

They commanded Greece to demobilize its army. The king, protesting vainly in the face of superior force, accepted the ultimatum of the allied generals.

They seized the telegraph system of Greece and its post-office machinery.

They divested the Greek government of its police powers and took police control of the capital.

And now that the allies have destroyed the machinery of government in Greece they are exerting the last ounce of pressure to force a disorganized nation into war. The end is foreshadowed by the publication, permitted by the British censor, that Greece is to join in the hostilities without much further delay. The allies will furnish the Greek army with guns and munitions, but it is announced from London that there are to be no pledges of compensation for Greece out of the expected spoils. Greece is to shed her blood without any promise of benefit to herself. She must enter a war which she abhors, without knowing what she is to fight for.

Such is the decree of the high protectors of the weak and the little among nations.

Like Ireland, like Egypt, like the Boer republics, Greece must fall before England's sea power. What mockery in the allies' slogan: "The rights of small nations!"—*Sept. 14, 1916.*

Poland

HOPE FOR THE POLES

The renaming of Novogeorgievsk by its old Polish name of Modlin, by the German invaders of Russia, is significant of the policy which the German administrators are adopting toward the Polish race. This detail of readjustment by the Germans stands out in sharp contrast to the first official act of the Russians, after they had entered Przemyśl, in changing the name of that ancient Polish city to Peremysl, after the Russian fashion.

In Posen, since the final division of Poland, the Prussians have applied measures of denationalization which have earned for them the hatred and distrust of the Polish population. It is evident that since the war began the Prussians have learned the lesson presented to them by the discontent of their Polish fellow subjects. The results of that lesson are now to be seen in a general change of the official attitude toward the Poles.

In the unmistakable evidences of the desire of Germany to befriend the Poles, now plainly apparent not only in conquered Russian Poland but also in Posen, a gallant race with a brilliant past is beginning to see a hopeful future.—*Dec. 23, 1915.*

TOO LATE

Events have now come to a conclusion which will enable the hu-

mane world to judge who is responsible for the starvation of many scores of thousands of unhappy people in Poland. Unless new evidence comes to light, the terrible burden of that calamity will lie, more heavily than anywhere else, upon the shoulders of the British government.

Poland, a Russian territory projecting into Germany, has been fought over since the war began. Army after army has lived off the country, until what had been one of the granaries of the world became incapable of supporting its inhabitants. To crown the misfortunes of the wretched land, the Russians in their last retreat drove off or killed the cattle. That is why we have today the sickening message: "There are no babies in Poland."

The danger was that the adult population also would be decimated. On December 22, 1915, Mr. Hoover, head of our Belgian relief commission, asked Sir Edward Grey to sanction the shipment of certain foodstuffs through the British blockade for the Polish population. He explained that there were in Poland and Germany enough cereals and potatoes to feed the Poles; but there was a fatal shortage of fats, beans, some kinds of breadstuffs and especially of condensed milk for the children. Polish societies in the United States stood ready to buy and ship these necessities. Mr. Hoover begged Sir Edward Grey to be allowed to import them into Po-

land and distribute them under the auspices of the Belgian relief commission:

I am assured by the German authorities that *protection will be afforded to local and imported supplies for the exclusive use of the civil population*, and also that every facility will be afforded this commission in the task of organization and distribution under proper guarantee.

We have no desire to add to our burden, but if fourteen months' service in Belgium have commended us to the various belligerent governments, it is our duty to use the experience thus acquired in behalf of the Polish people.

But it was not to be. Sir Edward Grey, as a condition of consent, asked the impossible. He asked that the German and Austrian armies of occupation should not live off the territory they occupied. Like every other army on foreign soil, they were requisitioning part of their food in Poland and paying for it money with which the Poles, if allowed, could have purchased supplies in America or elsewhere. Grey wrote:

I fear it will be impossible to enter into any arrangement with you in regard to any scheme of relief until the German and Austrian governments have prohibited the export of all foodstuffs from Russian Poland, and have guaranteed that native foodstuffs shall not be drawn upon to maintain the occupying armies.

Hoover had already been assured by the German authorities that "protection would be afforded to local and imported supplies for the exclusive use of the civil population." So all of Grey's demands were covered except the one that the occupying forces of the central empires should abandon their fundamental right, and necessity, to requisition their own living on enemy soil. The British starvation

campaign against Germany and Austria had left them no surplus that justified them in refusing any food to which they had a lawful right. Sir Edward Grey knew all this.

So Poland starved. The situation became too terrible for England longer to sponsor. On April 12, 1916, came a dispatch from London saying that

The Pope has approached the representatives of the allies in Rome, asking that facilities be given for the importation of foodstuffs into Poland.

A favorable reply has been given, but with the reservation that effective guarantees must be given that the foodstuffs will reach the suffering Poles, and not be confiscated for the benefit of the German troops.

This was precisely the guarantee that Mr. Hoover had from the German authorities on December 22. The American Commission for the Relief of Belgium is above reproach. No one has ever stated that a pound of food sent to it in Belgium has been diverted from the use of the Belgian people. It would not have been otherwise in Poland.

So, on April 22, there was a prospect that the pope's intercession might save some of those who were left, after a slow exchange of correspondence that brought the needed British consent. Yesterday, on May 11, the British government officially arrived at the unofficial conclusion indicated in the London dispatch of April 22. The British government makes its acceptance of the plan to allow America to feed Poland "conditional" on certain things.

First, the Germans must use the food to feed the Poles in territory occupied by Austrians as well as by Germans. This was the German in-

tention from the first, clearly indicated. Second, the central powers must properly care for the civilians of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania—where, every one knows, German and Austrian authorities have busied themselves caring for the population ever since military occupation. Third, the American food is to be sent in German ships under neutral flag—which has been the plan all along.

The British government tries to give the impression that in allowing America to feed the starving in Poland it is insisting on a particular degree of humanity on the part of the Germans. Those who have followed the matter know the truth: that Britain, in finally allowing aid to go to this unhappy land, insists on no humane methods not already devised, but merely withdraws untenable and unprecedented demands: namely, that occupying armies shall not provision themselves from conquered territory.

In the meantime the civilized world will know where to place the blame for the death of thousands of Poles—especially children—who famished in the five months between December 22, 1915, when Mr. Hoover made his offer to Sir Edward Grey, and May 11, 1916, when the British government indicated its willingness to accept this same offer.

—May 12, 1916.

BUILDING UP POLAND ANEW

A great work is going on in Poland under the German administration. This work is of no less a scope than the reconstruction of civilization, razed to the dust by years of Russian misgovernment and in the last phase by the destruc-

tive fury of the Russian armies in the course of their retreat before the advancing invader.

When the Russians evacuated Poland, they left little behind them except smoking ruins and denuded fields. For many years Polish nationality had been gradually suppressed, the Polish language outlawed and Polish schools closed. Whatever of sanitation had existed under Russian rule had been largely destroyed in the confusion of war. There were no newspapers published in the Polish tongue. Hunger, Pestilence and Misery stalked in the wake of the retreating Russians. The name of Poland was a synonym for Chaos.

Against these odds the new administration undertook the work of rehabilitating Polish national life. Some of the results in this difficult campaign are told by Dr. Karl Helfferich, imperial vice-chancellor and secretary of interior.

The machinery of education has been started up again after years of repression followed by final collapse. And it must be understood that instruction is carried on, not in Russian as before the German invasion, nor in German, but in Polish—for the first time since Poland became a Russian possession.

A comprehensive system of sanitation has been established, such as had never existed under Russian rule. This achievement in itself must appear marvelous to those who are familiar with the grossly unsanitary conditions that formerly existed even in such rich industrial centers as Lodz, with its half-million inhabitants.

Civil order has been restored. The rights of all nationalities have been established. Jews can once

more send their children to the University of Warsaw and to the secondary and high schools. White, Russian, Lithuanian and Pole are on an equal footing before the law—a state of affairs which was never dreamed of under the Russian administration.

In the industrial life of the country the people have been aided effectively by the new administrators. Seeds have been distributed among the farmers. Army horses have been lent for the plowing and the reaping which is now begun in some sections. Throughout Poland the government official has stood in the light of a helper instead of a plunderer, as under the old regime.

And, most significant of all, the German is training the Pole in the art of self-government. Instead of sending out petty officials from Berlin, the Germans have entrusted the work of civil government largely to the Poles themselves. For the first time in the life of Poland since it became Russian, the people of Poland are enjoying a generous measure of self-government.

The Pole needs instruction in his struggle toward national life. He

is getting it from the German, and he is profiting by the advice and the example.

An illustration of the rapidity and the thoroughness of German reforms in Poland is furnished by the experience of a traveler who was in Warsaw on the day of the arrival of the Germans in the Polish capital. The main railway station was the scene of apparently inextricable confusion. Refugees, men, women and children, were running about without direction, and without hope of getting to their destination. One German in uniform in the station evoked order out of chaos in half an hour. The next day the station, which was littered with indescribable filth, was thoroughly washed. The day following it was white-washed as it had not been for years.

Such examples of system will not be lost on the Polish mind and character. Whether Poland is erected into an autonomous state, as the Germans hope to erect it, or whether it is restored to Russian rule, the influence of enlightened government, such as it is now enjoying by the hazards of war, will make a lasting impression upon the life of the Poles.—*July 27, 1916.*

The War in the West

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

The powerful German drive at Verdun, the strongest of all the French system of border fortifications, promises to open a new chapter in the history of the operations on the west front.

What might have appeared in the initial stage to be a feint, designed to preoccupy the French about Verdun in order to furnish an opportunity for a successful assault farther north and west, in the direction of Ostend or even Paris, now is developing into a movement in great force, aimed at the reduction of Verdun itself.

Since the beginning of the operations, four days ago, the Germans, under the chief command of the crown prince, have brought an army estimated at more than half a million men into action and they have gained from two to three miles along an eight-mile front. This constitutes the largest operation, with the greatest shifting of lines, since the allies' gains last September.

Verdun, strengthened since the beginning of the war by the latest devices developed by it, is the northernmost fort of the four which France has been developing ceaselessly since the close of the Franco-Prussian war as her main defense in the event of a renewal of the struggle with Germany. The other works of the famous quartet are Toul, Epinal and Belfort. These

constitute a continuous line of permanent or field fortifications, designed to offer a resistance to invasion which may be compared to that of a stone wall built to hold back a body of water.

A break in this line at Verdun and the establishment of a strong German defensive base at that fort would exert a damaging effect upon the entire French system of fortifications from Belfort to Ostend. It would cause a material retirement of French forces upon St. Mennehold and Bar-le-Duc. The French pressure upon the sharp salient at St. Mihiel would be relieved and the menace of a possible French advance upon Metz would be removed.

Important moral and diplomatic achievements are also within the scope of the movement which the crown prince is carrying out with such energy. For several weeks past official and semi-official declarations from Paris have been calculated to give the impression that the German army organization in the western theatre of events has lost its power, and predictions have been ventured that Germany had reconciled herself to a defensive rôle in the west. This impression, in fact, has been heightened by news which has emanated from time to time from Berlin.

That the German war machine has not lost its striking power may be gathered from the continued success of the present offensive. This

conclusion will furnish, and perhaps was intended to furnish, a subject for thoughtful contemplation at Bucharest, where the agents of the entente have been redoubling their efforts in the past two or three weeks to induce Roumania to throw in her lot with the anti-Germanic combination.

On public opinion in the entente capitals the successful advance upon Verdun is also bound to exert a powerful influence at a time when Prime Minister Asquith is once more repeating the determination of England and her allies to consider peace only after German military power shall have been shattered.

To the reiterated prediction of Germany's utter defeat to-morrow, Germany is replying with a mighty demonstration of offensive power—to-day.—*Feb. 26, 1916.*

THE ALLIES' GENERAL OFFENSIVE

The great test of endurance, of resources, of man-force in this war of exhaustion is about to come. It is now beginning, with what London officially admits to be the definite opening of the general offensive on all fronts by the allies of the entente. Heretofore there has been severe fighting at some point or another or at several points simultaneously across the scarred face of Europe. The operations which now are developing along all lines, however, will far exceed in scope, intensity and bloody destructiveness anything that has preceded the present phase of the struggle.

Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia, for the first time since the opening of the war, have developed

the power of co-operation in a simultaneous movement against the common enemy under a co-ordinate command. Russia led off in the combined offensive by a series of hammering blows at Austria-Hungary which have considerably damaged Austria's position, although they have glanced aside from the unyielding mass of German resistance. In his turn, von Hindenburg shows unmistakable signs of a purpose to deal at least blow for blow with the effectiveness which has become a tradition of his country.

As an outcome and accompaniment of the Russian offensive, Italy is developing a forward movement against Austria which is becoming a significant feature of the situation. On this front, despite the apparent collapse of their offensive by the withdrawal of troops to Galicia and Bukowina, the Austrians are keeping up an effective resistance. That Italy intends to intensify its activities is made evident by the summoning yesterday of the reserve classes of 1882 to 1895, and the third categories of 1882 and 1883.

The last power of the entente to be drawn into the general offensive on a full scale is Great Britain. Holding one-fourth of the line from the Channel to the Swiss border, a British army of unknown but undoubtedly great strength has been carrying on for the past week a continuous bombardment of the German positions. In this operation the British are applying the tactics upon which the Germans have been relying on both great European fronts—a long-continued bombardment for the destruction of works, as a preliminary to infantry attacks. But the British bombardment has been on a larger scale than anything

that has been attempted yet by the Germans.

To complete the circle of steel and fire with which the entente hopes to surround the central powers and their allies, Gen. Sarrail, at Salonica, is reported to be preparing to attempt an advance against the German, Austrian and Bulgarian lines on the Bulgarian frontier. The extraordinary pressure which Sarrail is exerting upon Greece to hasten the demobilization of the Greek army is an obvious move to prevent the possibility of Greek interference with the contemplated allied offensive in this region of the universal battleground.

Germany, despite recent Austrian reverses and the consequent necessity of stiffening Austrian resistance with a backing of German troops, is developing on her side a well-defined counter-offensive on the east front and an energetic defensive at all points except Verdun, where the German offensive is going on without signs of slackening energy.

Taken as a whole, the movements now in progress on all battlegrounds loom large, not only as events that will bring the war to a decisive issue but as international facts that will direct the future course of history.

—July 1, 1916.

BRITISH ARTILLERY PREPARATION

The events of the past week on the twenty-mile line north of the Somme mark the greatest development in the use of artillery that has yet been recorded in this great war of big guns. Taking a chapter from the book of the Germans, the English artillery experts have gone

much further than their teachers. The Germans have employed artillery for the purpose of destroying enemy defenses and clearing the ground for infantry advances. A notable instance of such preparation was the long-continued bombardment of French positions that preceded the initial advance at Verdun.

But the Germans have limited such preparations to comparatively small sectors, and have directed the destructive power of their guns at enemy positions.

The English, in their present spectacular offensive, have extended the region of intense artillery activity to a line of twenty miles; they have thrown the curtain of fire not merely at enemy positions but half a mile or more to the rear of such positions. Testimony to the value of such tactics is contained in the stories purporting to have been told by hungry German prisoners, that the curtain of fire thrown over their rear by the British gunners shut the German positions off from supplies and reinforcements. Incidentally, the English have utilized the confusion produced by terrific, long-sustained bombardments for the purposes of raids on enemy trenches.

This greater development of the use of artillery preparation has resulted in counter-measures by the Germans, who have been reported for the past few days to be hurrying enormous quantities of big guns to their menaced lines. The ultimate result will be an appalling loss of life, exceeding anything that this war has yet shown. The intimations permitted by the British censor of England's willingness to lose a few hundreds of thousands of lives if such a sacrifice should be necessary to the success of the pres-

ent advance, are a sinister indication of what the world may see in the near future.—*July 3, 1916.*

THE BARBOPHONE

The air is so full of reports of the growing superiority of allied strategy in this war that it is wrong to fail to detail one triumph whose news has scarcely passed the inner circles of British-French war councils. Strangely enough, the allied ruse has resulted in forcing the entire German trench contingents to shave clean.

Earlier in the war great masses of the German troops were bearded, especially the landsturm and landwehr contingents. When the wind blew from the east certain Australians, accustomed to the native music of bushmen in their own country, detected a strange harmony in the air, proceeding from the German trenches, as of numberless Æolian harps. Moreover, it was noted that the musical elements varied in the sounds from different sectors of the German lines.

A young Australian from Melbourne then set about to devise a barbophone, or beard sound-detector. Its success was startling. It magnified the sounds, and, to the inventor's surprise, the sounds from one sector rounded into a clear Tyrolean yodel, which meant Bavarian troops. From another sector the marvelous new instrument caught folk-songs from Pomerania, the Harz mountains and Dusseldorf. The process was repeated until the melodies of all Germany were charted, and so the disposition of German regiments along the entire western front revealed. When the Germans discovered the trick it was too late.

Private dispatches from London report the British general staff as slyly laughing in its sleeve at the German report that the shaving of the German army is for sanitary reasons.—*July 27, 1916.*

CASUALTY LISTS

British casualty lists reported in the month of July in all the war areas totaled 7,084 officers and 52,591 men.—*London Dispatch.*

This is a proportion of one officer lost to seven and one-half men. It is an unexampled heavy officer loss. Even in peace strength the British army has twenty-eight men for every officer. In war, with the regiments swollen by recruiting, the proportion of officers in the whole regiment is much smaller.

Before the war broke, Great Britain had an army of 269,000, including 9,700 officers. That last month should have brought losses of 7,084 officers and only 52,591 men is at least extraordinary.

The average proportion of casualties among officers and men in this war is about one to thirty. Applying this proportion we should come close to the German estimate that the British lost 230,000 in the month. We shall no doubt have either a supplementary list of British losses in enlisted men or else an explanation of the abnormal officer losses.—*Aug. 9, 1916.*

THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE

The general co-ordinated offensive by the entente powers since the beginning of June will stand in history as the greatest movement, in geographical extent and in numbers involved, that ever has been at-

tempted in war. It was designed to exert such pressure on all fronts upon the central empires as to break down their resistance.

The Russians led off in this general movement in the first week of June. Their problem was to deliver blows of such violence on the Austro-German line as to force the withdrawal of German troops on a large scale from the western front.

With accumulated munitions and a greatly augmented and thoroughly reorganized army, the Russians entered upon their task with an energy which seemed to promise success. The Austrians, who a few weeks previously had begun their offensive against the Italians, were found unprepared on their eastern line. The smashing Russian advance plowed through Bukowina with speed and precision. The action extended gradually northward until it became evident that the movement was not aimed solely at Austria, but at Germany as well.

Probably under the assumption that the German line in France had been sufficiently weakened by withdrawals, the British army, which had been comparatively inactive in France and Belgium since it took the offensive last August and September around Hoge, Loos and Hulluch, began the offensive north of the Somme. Its objective was Bapaume, an important railroad center twelve miles northeast of Albert, and about nine miles from the nearest point on the British line.

Simultaneously with the British advance on Bapaume, the French began a movement against Peronne, another railroad center about fifteen miles southeast of Bapaume. Proceeding on both banks of the Somme, the French strategists set before

themselves the problem of forcing the Germans back in the direction of their own frontier. The Anglo-French line of operations gradually extended to a line about thirty miles long.

These combined operations were frankly characterized by military experts in London and Paris as the opening of the movement that was aimed at the expulsion of the Germans from France. It was predicted at both Paris and London that the fall of Bapaume and Peronne would prove the prelude to a general retirement of the German forces in the direction of the old Belgian frontier.

What has happened in this region of the allied offensive?

After seven weeks of fighting the British have lost not less than 300,000 men—a total based upon the British lists of casualties among officers. The French losses it is impossible to estimate because the war office in Paris maintains the veil of secrecy upon its casualties. Measured by the British losses, however, the French losses cannot be much less than 200,000.

What have the Franco-British strategists accomplished by this lavish expenditure of human material? Hardly more than nothing, so far as any achievement of strategic value is concerned. They have gained a territory about forty square miles in extent. For the past two weeks both the British and the French have shown an inability to gain ground. The legend, "There is no change in the situation on the Somme," is becoming a stereotyped feature of the British official reports, and to a slightly less extent of the French. Bapaume and Peronne remain in German hands, and

the German line, after the first buckling under a surprise attack of unprecedented fury by two great nations, shows every sign of having fully recovered its firmness.

Franco-British gains like those reported from London and Paris to-day suggest no material change in the situation. Advances like these may be expected at any time; but they are of no telling value as indications of the allies' ability to pierce the German line.

In the meanwhile the Germans have kept up their unceasing pounding on Verdun. And the developments on the Somme in the past seven weeks have furnished an answer to the question, "Why did the Germans attack Verdun?" It was the German advance upon Verdun that has kept two-thirds of the French army busy miles away from the fighting on the Somme. To assume that the German high command had failed to anticipate a Franco-British operation at the point of contact between the French and British forces, just north of the Somme, would be to assume that the Germans have had no plan of campaign in France.

After the failure of the Franco-British forward movement in the past ten days, the only definite results that may be expected on the Somme is a further swelling of the enormous list of losses of life. The German line has demonstrated its ability to hold back the allied tide.

Simultaneously with the gradual checking of the allied offensive on the west front, significant events are coming to pass on the east front. The official bulletins from both Berlin and Petrograd for the past month have furnished conclusive evidence of the inability of the

Russians to cope with German resistance. In the Carpathians, the gateway into the plain of Hungary, with its rich harvests, the Russians are practically at a standstill. And the situation of the Russians, even if they could break into Hungary, is full of danger. So long as they fail to make any impression upon the Germans in the north, the shadow of disaster will hang over them—the shadow of Hindenburg, recently appointed to the general command of the Austro-German operations. It will be remembered that it was a series of defeats in the northern sector that brought about the great retreat of the Russians from the Carpathian line last year after they had approached much nearer to the plain of Hungary than they have now. History has a way of repeating itself.

The Italian successes on the Isonzo, admitted even in Rome to possess greater moral than military value, need not be considered in any estimate of the general situation. A retreat of the Russians from the Carpathians and a consequent release of Austrian forces in that sector would undo in a month what it has taken the entire Italian army more than a year to accomplish.—*Aug. 17, 1916.*

CAN THE ALLIES PAY THE PRICE?

The latest estimate of Anglo-French losses on the Somme discloses the appalling price which the entente is paying for its victories. The Germans say that between July 1 and September 15 the British have lost 350,000 men in killed, wounded and captured, and the French have lost 150,000, making a total of

500,000 in less than eleven weeks of fighting.

Granting that the German figures may be an overestimate of enemy losses, and deducting 20 per cent. from the total on that account, the price which France and Great Britain have paid for victories is still staggering. And what do the victories amount to? The avowed object of the offensive is to drive Germany out of France and Belgium. How near have the Franco-British sacrifices come to the accomplishment of their purpose?

That question is easily answered by a glance at the extent of territory which the English and French have wrested from Germany since the beginning of the great "drive." That territory is not a matter of estimate or of speculation. It is exactly measurable by miles and yards. The amount is 480 square miles. And that area is just 3 per cent. of the soil of France and Belgium which the Germans have held, with slight fluctuations, since the battle of the Marne.

At that rate of progress how many millions of lives will the allies have to sacrifice in order to achieve their avowed purpose? Can France and England pay the price? Could any four great nations pay the price?

To be sure, the Germans are losing in man-power in this terrible slaughter. But their losses are not so heavy as are those of the Franco-British armies. The Germans are fighting defensive battles, and they are calculating to a nicety the number of men they can afford to lose in order to frustrate British or French movements. On the Somme, as in all previous wars in all history, it is the attacking side that is losing far more heavily than the defenders.

It would be reasonable to assume that, as a smashing blow designed to reverse the fortunes of war, the Somme offensive is a failure, and the situation on the west front is practically a deadlock.

A similar condition of stalemate is developing on the Volhynian and Galician fronts. The extent of the failure of the Russian "drive" as a decisive factor of the war can be realized when it is remembered that after all the thrusts at the German-Austrian line, which have cost the Russians dearly for the past five months, the Russians have succeeded in recovering considerably less than 1 per cent. of the territory which the Austro-Germans took from them in the gigantic offensive of last year. And the best evidence of the failure of the Russian general staff to break down Austro-German resistance is to be seen in the fact that the Russian offensive, after five months of terrific effort and characteristically Russian disregard of life, is at a standstill.

Appearances indicate strongly, therefore, that on both west and east fronts the allied offensive has fallen so far short of the expected results that it may be regarded as a failure. The Italian successes are too trivial to count in any general summing up of results.

Remains the Balkan region. Here the latest acquisition of the entente powers is proving more of a liability than an asset. Since her entrance into the war after two years of watchful waiting, Roumania has lost more territory than she has gained. Her communications by sea with Russia are seriously threatened by the success of Mackensen's blows on the Tchernavoda-Constanza line.

The Roumanian capital is in increasing danger of a Bulgar-German attack. The momentum of the Roumanian dash into Transylvania has been stopped, and the Austro-Germans are already beginning a movement which offers grave possibilities for the Roumanian forces in Transylvania.

The indications are that in the southeastern corner of Europe the decisive battles of the war will be fought. The results of the operation so far distinctly favor the Germans and their allies. Despite the advance of the French and the Serbians against the extreme right of the Bulgarians, the allies have not even begun the task of driving Bulgaria out of Serbia and breaking the "bridge" between Berlin and

Bagdad. They are still fighting on Greek soil, and at the present rate of progress it would take a long time to drive the Bulgarians back to the frontiers which they traced with the sword in the previous Balkan campaign.

And delay in this instance will bring an ally to the central powers. That ally is winter—a white and severe Balkan winter—which will be felt much more keenly by the French and English on the offensive than by the Bulgarians on the defensive.

With the break-up of winter will come the real test of the Balkan campaign. And that test, unless all signs fail, will also be the test of the great struggle as a whole.—*Sept. 23. 1916.*

The War in the East

MEN AGAINST MACHINES

As the Russian offensive against Germany and Austria-Hungary progresses it becomes increasingly evident that the Russian commanders still have men to fling at the enemy's lines. The purpose of this movement is uncertain at this stage of the operations. It may be the beginning of an attempt to drive the Austro-Germans out of Courland and Poland. The probability is, however, that it is a demonstration in force, designed to embarrass the German general staff in its assaults on Verdun. Whenever the allies have felt the German pressure with especial weight in the western theatre, to Russia has been intrusted the task of creating a diversion in an attempt to lighten the Franco-British military burden in France and Belgium.

And Russia is placing her chief reliance for the success of this movement upon the sheer force of numbers. There are plenty of men in Russia—the great majority of them good men, who, because of the burden of oppression, have had no opportunity to show the things that are in them. But, good or bad, there are men by the million in the Czar's empire available for the uses of a military bureaucracy to whom human life is the least of considerations.

So these men, who, under happier conditions, would have made valu-

able contributions to civilization, are being flung in great masses against the German intrenchments. And these men, dispatches from Petrograd indicate with an unmistakable vaunt of Russian courage, are used for the most part in bayonet charges. The bayonet is the least expensive of all weapons. It does not consume costly ammunition. It does not involve the employment of vast ammunition trains, as the machine gun and the heavy artillery pieces do. It requires less skill, less brains, a lower grade of industrial organization than do the machine guns and the howitzers. Moreover, the Russians are short of artillery. Much of their original supply was taken away by the Germans in the German advance into Poland and Courland, and a great part of that which remained was badly worn by excessive use.

Therefore hundreds of thousands of Russians who have had no sort of chance in life are being flung to death, for the bayonet is a poor weapon against machine guns defending intrenched positions equipped with the most formidable instruments of destruction—the machinery with which German science and industry have been able to equip Germany's armies. It is a struggle of men against machinery, and the heavy toll of lives which has been exacted by the machinery up to this stage of the Russian offensive indicates the inequality of the contest.

But Russia has more men—millions of them—and at the discretion of high command she may continue to sacrifice them in an endeavor to distract Germany for strategic purposes. That is Russia's contribution to the war resources of her more highly organized allies.—*Nov. 25, 1915.*

THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE

The shadow of important coming events is spreading over the long line of contact between Italy and Austria-Hungary. In this region of military activities more blood has been spilt since Italy entered the war than in any other theatre, with the sole exception of Verdun. The Italians, with a resolute spirit which does them credit, have been hurling their strength against well-nigh insuperable natural barriers, manned by no less resolute defenders. Their progress has been so slow as to be characterized as "negligible" by some military observers. An officer of the Italian general staff, in describing the natural strength of the Austrian positions, said that "it seems as if God had built gigantic bulwarks to guard Austria from invasion along the Isonzo."

Behind these natural ramparts Austria, with one-fourth of the forces that face her, has carried on a defense with a notable degree of success. Now the operations are entering a new phase. Austria-Hungary, evidently assured of her ability to resist Russian pressure on Galicia and Bukowina, has massed a great army against the Italians. In its initial movements in the new offensive, this army has demonstrated a striking power which presages a bloodier struggle than any which has

yet been recorded in that shambles of two nations. If the Austrians succeed in pounding their way into the plains of Italy, the Italian general staff will be confronted with a difficult problem, chiefly on account of the Austrian superiority in heavy artillery, which the Skoda works are turning out in enormous quantities. On the other hand, a serious reverse for the invaders might well be the signal for an Austrian disaster, as the defeated Austrian forces begin their retreat through the exceedingly difficult country which would lie before them.

In either event, one of the decisive operations of the war is now going on in the Austro-Italian region—an operation which may have an important bearing upon the outcome of the struggle as a whole.—*May 20, 1916.*

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE

The rapid Russian advance into Asia Minor is becoming an important factor in the war. Unless the Ottoman armies check this extraordinary progress, the map of Asia Minor will figure as one of the most difficult problems on the green table of the peace conference. This possibility loomed large with the taking of Trebizond. It became a probability in the light of yesterday's news that a Cossack detachment, operating through Persian territory, had effected a junction with the British expedition under Gen. Sir Percy Lake in the valley of the Tigris, thirty-five miles south of Kut-el-Amara.

There appears to be every reason to suppose that the Russian armies in Asia Minor have been organized

and equipped on a scale sufficiently extensive to beat down any opposition which the Turks might be able to offer. When the Russian offensive on the German-Austrian front was brought to a standstill last February, the Russian general staff poured troops across the Caucasian border in overwhelming numbers. At the moment when the British were facing the inevitable surrender at Kut-el-Amara, several Russian armies were pouring southward and westward through Persia and Armenia in the direction of the head of the Persian Gulf and of Smyrna and Constantinople.

This movement was directed at the attainment of an object which Russian policy has pursued with persistence for centuries—the acquisition of an open port at Constantinople. The failure of the British campaign against Bagdad has been remedied by the Russian successes. Bagdad is the commercial and strategic heart of Mesopotamia, and Mesopotamia forms the barrier between the British possessions in northern Africa and those in western Asia. Mesopotamia in British hands would form the “bridge” which would connect Egypt with India, through the southern portion of Persia, which was allotted as England’s sphere of influence by the terms of the Russo-British agreement signed two or three years before the outbreak of the present war.

The services which Russia is rendering to her allies are enhancing her importance in the Quadruple Entente. Already she is looming up as the dominating factor in the international situation. In the words of Ellery C. Stowell, associate professor of law at Columbia University:

* * * If Germany is really ready for peace, Russia will then be the crux of the whole question and the most difficult peace problem of the peace congress to solve.

But even if the central powers should dominate the councils of the conference, Russia would hold a pawn of the greatest value as possessor of Mesopotamia. That highly desirable territory between the Tigris and the Euphrates has been the object of Germany’s political and commercial calculations for half a generation. The Bagdad railway is only a phase of the enterprises which German foresight has been pushing or contemplating in her near eastern policy for twenty years past. The value of Germany’s “bridge” through Serbia and Bulgaria was designed to connect Berlin not only with Constantinople but with the mouth of the Tigris and the head of the Persian Gulf. Russian mastery of Mesopotamia would detract greatly from the value of this “bridge” to Germany.

In Europe, Russia’s losses of territory to Germany are enormous. Concerning Germany’s purposes as to the future of this territory, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg said in his address in the Reichstag on April 5:

Can he (Asquith) possibly expect Germany of her free will to hand over again to the rule of reactionary Russia the people between the Baltic Sea and the Volhynian swamps, whether they be Poles, Lithuanians, Balts or Livonians, all these people whom the central powers have liberated? Never!

And concerning the future of Poland:

The Poland from which the Russian tchinovnik fled, extorting bribes as he went; the Poland from which the Russian Cossacks retreated, burning and pillaging—that Poland is no more. Even

members of the Duma have frankly admitted that they cannot imagine the return of the tchinovnik to the place where meantime the German, Austrian and Pole have honestly labored for the unfortunate land.

If the Russians had not succeeded in seizing the Turkish territory which they now have, they would have gone into the peace conference empty handed. As it is, they will have important objects of barter to offer in the long bargaining which will follow the furling of the battle flags.

In every way, therefore, the Russian victories in Asia Minor must be regarded as events of great importance in the European struggle.—*May 23, 1916.*

RUSSIA TO THE RESCUE

The Russian offensive on the east front represents the first result, on a large scale, of the recent amalgamation of the general staffs of the entente allies for the adoption of a general instead of a local plan of campaign. That this offensive is being attempted on an enormous scale and with adequate striking power may be inferred from the official announcement at Petrograd yesterday that the number of prisoners captured so far in the drive against the Austrian lines has been more than 25,000 men.

It is obvious that the Russian pressure upon Austria is the outcome of the decision of the entente council of war to create a diversion in order to relieve the Italian armies, subjected to smashing blows by the Austrians for the past month. Some such diversion has been foretold in the dispatches from Rome for the past fortnight. That Italy

needed help, and needed it badly, was made apparent by a glance at the Austro-Italian line of contact, which was constantly shifting southward, despite the utmost efforts of the Italian commanders to hold back the avalanche that swept down from the Alps and has been nullifying in days the military efforts which Italy had made in the preceding twelve months.

The unity of counsel between the western powers of the entente and their northeastern ally has been curiously betrayed by one of those accidents in war which sometimes disclose the secrets of strategists. Kitchener, accompanied by several members of his staff, was on his way to Archangel when the torpedo or the mine in his course ended his life. The British generalissimo was undoubtedly bound for Petrograd for a consultation with the Russian generals on a common plan of campaign, perhaps for a better understanding of the methods and purposes of the general offensive at which hints have been received from London at various times since last winter.

Whether the Russian offensive is only a phase of such a combined effort to force the common enemies of the entente back to their own frontiers may be made apparent in the next few weeks.—*June 7, 1916.*

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

In its present development the Russian offensive looms large as one of the great events of the war which may have a deciding effect upon its outcome. In ten days of fighting which began on a front of about 100 miles and is rapidly extending northward, the Russians

have inflicted losses upon the Austrians which may well cause the gravest apprehension at Vienna as well as in Berlin.

The apparent inability of the Austrians to offer effective opposition to the Russian advance is the result, partly of the fact that they are outnumbered by their foes in the ratio of something like a million men to 600,000, and partly to the fact that the blow descended upon the Austro-Hungarians like a bolt from the blue. It is becoming increasingly evident that Gen. Brussiloff has been making the most complete preparation for the present offensive for months past. How these preparations, along a line of at least a hundred miles, could have escaped the observation of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service is one of the mysteries of the situation.

It was not until after the Russian steam-roller had been pressing down toward Czernowitz and Lemberg for a week that the Austrian commanders, reinforced by German strategy and German troops, began to show some signs of effective resistance. That the Russians are at last feeling the force of this resistance is evident from the retarded rate of their progress in the past three or four days.

In the meanwhile, however, the Russians are not only demonstrating their continued ability to cope with the Austrian opposition, but are throwing large masses of men against Von Hindenburg's lines north of Lutsk. These last-mentioned operations may be the beginning of a serious attempt to drive the Germans out of Poland, or they may be strategic feints designed to prevent the dispatch of German troops in large bodies to the

aid of the hard-beset Austrians in the region between the Pripet marshes and the Roumanian border.

To the Hungarian people the prospect of a second menace of a Russian invasion over the Carpathians presents a national peril of the first magnitude. It is no secret that there has been a strong sentiment for peace in Hungary for the past three or four months. Confronted with a new Russian sweep in the direction of the plain of Hungary, the Hungarians are now rallying to a fresh struggle at a time when they have not recovered from the fatigues and losses of the original Russian invasion.

The continued success of Brussiloff's astonishing enterprise will depend upon the one element which worked Russia's undoing last year. Of men, Russia has practically an unlimited number. Her ability to obtain and forward supplies of ammunition on the scale on which they are now being supplied to the armies at the front is not so certain. True, Russia's communications are better in 1916 than they were in 1915. The port of Archangel is open, and the railroad lines leading from that point have been greatly improved and amplified. But whether the existing sources of supply and the routes of transportation will prove adequate to the demand when the present accumulation is exhausted, is the question which will decide the success or failure of the vast movement under way to crush Austria.

In the event of a breakdown of Russia's system of supply, a disastrous retreat like the one of last year would be the only alternative.
—June 15, 1916.

GERMAN CHECK TO RUSSIA

The ultimate outcome of the Russian offensive movement now depends, not upon the operations of the Austrians, but upon events in the north. For a week the Germans under Field Marshal von Hindenburg and Gens. Linsingen and von Bothmer have been engaged with the Russians. These commanders have been feeling out the strength of the opposing forces. The actions fought show that the Russians' movements against the Germans, far from being a feint designed to confuse the German strategists, was a bona-fide attempt to launch against the Germans north of Lutsk the successful offensive which has netted the capture of Czernowitz and a large number of prisoners—the exact number does not appear to be determinable—to the invaders.

This attempt, in the light of the most recent official bulletins from Petrograd, does not appear to be proving successful. On the road to Kovel, the key point of communication between the German and Austrian forces, the Russians have not only failed to make any progress, but they actually have been forced back by the German counter-attacks. At other points the Germans are demonstrating their ability to hold the Russians in check.

Even in the southernmost region of the operations, where the Austrians were caught by one of the great surprises of this war of surprises, the progress of the Russians is much slower than it was at the beginning of last week. This fact is expressly admitted by the War Office in Petrograd.

In view of these military facts,

the operations as a whole have not reached a stage that would justify some of the extravagant unofficial claims emanating from Petrograd. A strong German offensive, which does not appear at all improbable, would menace the Russian right flank and duplicate the strategic situation which last year compelled the Russians to withdraw rapidly from Galicia after they had advanced to the Carpathians.—*June 21, 1916.*

THE MAGYARS

The Magyars or Hungarians have performed two notable services in western civilization. Coming from Asia, they first acted as a buffer against the onslaughts of the Turk. In the last half century they have served as a wedge between the Russian Slavs and the Slavic races on the Balkan peninsula—Serbs, Bulgarians, Montenegrins and the Slavonic elements in the southern part of the Austrian empire, such as Dalmatia and Croatia. The Magyar wedge was the physical hindrance to the realization of Pan-Slavism, the movement to Russianize Europe east of the Adriatic.

Without understanding this no one can realize what it means in Petrograd to read that the Russian army is at the Carpathian passes looking down upon the plains of Hungary. It means the open road to Constantinople. It means the inevitable dominance of Russian civilization in Europe.

Whatever our sympathies may be in the world war, civilized neutral nations cannot but hope that the Magyar dam will hold, as it has held in the past.—*July 21, 1916.*

HINDENBURG

There is magic in the name of Hindenburg. Germany, confronting a complication of her military problem by the latest developments in the Balkans, has received with an impressive demonstration of enthusiasm his appointment as chief of staff.

The rugged, powerful personality of Hindenburg appeals mightily to the imagination of his countrymen.

His great feat in pounding the Russians out of East Prussia and all the way back to the Dvina has already made him a tradition of military force and thoroughness.

In the Napoleonic war the whisper "The emperor is here!" many a time sent an electric thrill through the French armies facing decisive battles. The German nation has responded in similar manner to the name of Hindenburg. — *Aug. 31, 1916.*

The Italian Front

ITALY AND THE ENTENTE

Whatever doubt may have existed about the future course of Italy as a member of the quadruple entente has been dissipated by the reiteration of all the powers included in that grouping of their purpose to maintain their common military action to the end of the struggle. The value of Italy's continued adherence to the purposes of the alliance is somewhat modified, however, by the previous declaration by Baron Sonnino, Italian minister of foreign affairs, that Italy will confine her participation in the Balkan campaign to furnishing supplies to the hard-pressed Serbians. This resolution is evidently the principle upon which the supplemental agreement among the members of the quadruple entente is based.

The presence of a considerable number of Italian troops in the Balkans, or their participation in any operations outside of the zone already occupied by Italy in Albania, would offer so many hazards to the entente that it is unlikely that Great Britain and France could consent to the reinforcement of their Balkan armies by an Italian contingent.

To begin with, the appearance of an Italian army in the vicinity of the frontiers of Greece would create a strong revulsion of feeling against the entente at Athens. The interests of Greece and Italy are

diametrically opposed, as both Italy and Greece aspire to territorial accessions in Asia Minor and Albania, and it is believed at Athens that Italy has received substantial assurances from Great Britain, France and Russia of acquisitions to which Greece considers herself entitled.

To Serbia, even in her present plight, the pretensions of Italy also present an element of peril from the Serbian point of view. Serbia lays claim to the northern part of Albania, of whose independence Italy has constituted herself the special guardian. Baron Sonnino's pledge of aid to Serbia (in the form of supplies) was coupled with the announcement that the integrity and the independence of Albania are vital features of Italian policy in the near east.

As between the prospect of alienating Greece and confronting Serbia with a new cause for apprehension, Great Britain, France and Russia have chosen a compromise course by dispensing with the direct aid of Italy in their Balkan campaign—for the present at least. What path they would pursue in the event of the decision by Greece to join the central powers is another question.
—Dec. 7, 1915.

THE ITALIAN SUCCESSES

These are stirring times in Rome. The exultant cry of "Italia Irreden-

ta!" is heard in the streets. There is some justification for the popular enthusiasm. For the first time since her entrance into the war, Italy is accomplishing quick results. Gorizia has fallen to the valor of the Italian troops. The success has been purchased at an admittedly high price. And it has been made possible by the weakening of the Austrian lines, due to the withdrawal of a large part of the Austrian troops for the defense of Hungary from the Russian menace. The Italians are fighting well under the circumstances. It is too early to say, however, that the taking of Gorizia furnishes any guarantee for further achievements on the same scale, or to predict the complete invasion of that part of Austria which the Italians claim, although it is inhabited largely by Slavic peoples.

The results of wars, even of successful wars, are not always logical. Fifty years ago to-day the Italian commander-in-chief was glad to sign an armistice with Austria in the war of 1866. In that conflict Italy was crushed on land and on the sea by Austria. The Italian army was defeated at Custoza. The god of battle frowned upon the Italian fleet at Lissa. It seemed that Italy would come out of the war a loser territorially.

But Austria at that time, as now, was fighting a foe far more powerful than Italy. Prussia had dealt telling blows at the Austrian armies in the battles of Sadowa and of Prague. Accordingly, Prussia dominated the peace conference of Presburg, and it was at Prussia's insistence that Italy, the defeated, obtained the province of Venetia.—August 11, 1916.

ITALY

Italy's declaration of war against Germany is largely a technicality. It merely imparts a legal status to a military act already accomplished—the appearance of Italian troops against the Germans in Macedonia. It probably does not foreshadow any material addition to the enemies with whom Germany is now dealing on various fronts. Outside of the part which she is playing in the Balkans—and it may be assumed to be a modest part—Italy cannot divert her activities from the Austrian border to any great extent. She needs all her available men on the front where she has been hammering away at Austria for fifteen months with results which are accurately described in Berlin and at Vienna as insignificant.

In a military sense Italy's break with Germany is an incident. In an economic sense it is an event. Italy, like Roumania, has been largely financed by German money and developed by German enterprise. Again, like Roumania, Italy would like to be rid of German financial control. What easier way of accomplishing this purpose than by the confiscation of German property? Laws are silent during war.

Italy has somewhat delayed her declaration against Germany. There is a reason for that—a sentimental reason. There are still men living in Italy who ought to remember that they owe Venetia to what is now Germany. In the war of 1866 Italy was soundly thrashed by Austria on land and sea. But her ally, Prussia, was victorious over the same antagonist. Prussia compelled Austria to cede Venetia to the Italians. It was a free gift to Italy.

In 1911, when Italy started her adventure in Libia, Germany remained her friend. The world was given to understand that the Triple Alliance stood behind Italy. Again Italy made a successful step toward the achievement of what she regarded as her destiny. As in 1866,

she did it with the help of Germany.

But 1911 is a remote date in these swiftly moving times. As for 1866, it exists only in the textbooks. Italy has forgotten it completely.—*August 29, 1916.*

In the Balkans

BULGARIA, THE DRAW-BRIDGE

Bulgaria, the drawbridge of the Balkans, is trembling on its pivot. If it decides to cast its lot with the Teutonic powers it furnishes an open way between Turkey and Austria and forms the connecting link in the empire of influence that Berlin now seeks to build by way of Vienna, Sofia, Constantinople and over the Bagdad railroad to Asia Minor and the plains of Mesopotamia. The pioneer work of this gigantic task was done long ago. The visit of the Kaiser to Jerusalem was the symbol of a later march to that point that may find its fulfillment now.

If Bulgaria follows the appeal of the Czar and declares her loyalty to the Pan-Slavic ideals, she opens a way from Greece to Russia. The consequences of this in the course of the war and in its after development will be tremendous. The Balkan states are likely to consolidate into a league of powers, subordinating their own internal differences in order to present a solid front to the outside world. This league, if Bulgaria yields, will come under the protectorate of Russia. Teutonic expansion toward Asia Minor and the near Orient will be checked. Such a league would have to consolidate its energies and present a strong front in the future.

Even though defeated now, it is hardly conceivable that two nations so prolific in men and capital resources as Germany and Austria should abandon an effort to find an outlet for trade expansion and support for her surplus population. These powers feel that a sphere of influence in the world outside of Europe is theirs by right of their growing numbers and of the cultural developments that they have attained. If thwarted by diplomatic defeat or military check in the present war, forces beyond the control of any individual or group of individuals that are urging those nations on will compel renewed efforts within a decade or two.

From their standpoint they feel they must fight until the demands that seem to them legitimate are recognized, and this national ambition will not be abandoned unless they are crushed completely. This is a fact that must be reckoned with in forecasting the future.

Bulgaria's decision is of more than momentary importance. Much of the history that will be written in our generation, and the war experience of the next decade will depend on Bulgaria's decision.

The drawbridge is ajar. We watch to see which way it will move. Or will it stand where it is?—Oct. 5, 1915.

ROUMANIA'S NEUTRALITY

The announcement by the Roumanian cabinet, after a careful consideration of all the circumstances of the situation up to date, to maintain Roumania's neutrality, is understandable on either of two grounds—an uncertainty as to just what Roumania wants in the way of compensation, and an apparent lack of exact knowledge as to who will win the war.

In the first place, Roumanians are unable to agree whether they want a part of Austro-Hungarian Transylvania, which is organized on the basis of individual ownership of land, or Russian Bessarabia, where the feudal system prevails and the mass of the people are tenants at the pleasure of the owning nobility. The advocates of the present Roumanian system of land control, which is almost identical with that of Bessarabia, would much prefer the acquisition of Bessarabia to the absorption of Transylvania, on the ground that the inclusion of the latter province within the boundaries of Roumania would add a disturbing factor to the existing forces of discontent.

Then, again, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Roumania, with its traditional cautiousness, is unwilling to throw in its lot with either side until it has found out who is more likely to be the winner. The Roumanian army, despite its unopposed progress into Bulgaria in 1913, at a time when Bulgaria was at war with four other nations, is an untried quantity as a factor in real military operations. There is a distinct impression abroad that the Roumanian forces, made up for the most part of a dis-

contented peasantry which does not own the land it cultivates, is not a formidable weapon of offense.

Now, the Roumanians, after the Scotch, are the canniest people in Europe, and it is quite reasonable to suppose that they will take no chances that are not fully warranted by a good and substantial assumption of success.—*Oct. 18, 1915.*

PAN-SLAVISM, A GREAT WORLD PROBLEM

Russia, as the Greatest of All Slav Nations, Center of Mighty Movement

BY SVETOZAR TONJOROFF.

There are more than two hundred millions of Slavs in the world, of whom a good three-fifths are included within the boundaries of the Russian empire. The unification of the remainder of the race, inhabiting parts of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Germany, with that part of it which is under the Russian flag, has been the problem of Russian nationalism since Peter the Great.

Even in Russia itself the process of unification has not been completed. The 25,000,000 little Russians or Ruthenians of the Ukraine are not yet assimilated with the mass of great Russians of *Vielko-Russi*, constituting the bulk of the population of the empire. No more have the 10,000,000 Poles, nor the 7,000,000 white Russians or *Bielo-Russi*.

Outside of Russia there is a sea of Slavs extending westward through east Russia well into Germany, and

from the Galician border southwestward to the Adriatic and southeastward through Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria to Adrianople and a little beyond.

The Outlying Slavs.

These outlying Slavs are: The Poles of German Posen, the Bohemians, Poles, Croatsians, Slovaks and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary, the Serbs of Serbia and the Bulgarians of Serbia, and Greek Macedonia and of Bulgaria.

The efforts which have been carried on from Petrograd to prepare the ground for the eventual welding together of all these unabsorbed Slavic populations constitute an interesting story.

Russia's systematic propaganda among these Slavic nationalities found its inception under that summary of Russian world policy which suggested to an imaginative Frenchman the historic forgery known as the "will" of Peter the Great, wherein the tendency of Russian expansion under the name of the Pan-Slavic movement is for the first time definitely set down.

In many of its manifestations the Russian aspiration to leadership of the Slavic world has worked incidental benefits to subjugated or oppressed nations. Under the combined motive of racial and religious zeal, Russia has played an important or exclusive part in the liberation of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke.

In the Austrian provinces, and to a less extent in German Posen (Polish Posen), the movement directed from Russia has been carried on through educational and relig-

ious agencies. In church matters the Russian agents have endeavored to strengthen or propagate the Russian Orthodox (or Eastern) confession as against Catholicism or Lutheranism.

Pan-Slavism and Catholicism.

In its religious aspect the Pan-Slavist movement is of vital interest to the Catholic Church, as the Russian conception of race unity distinctly implies religious absorption under the authority of the Russian Church. The fact that the population of Russia has increased far more rapidly during the past century than that of any other European state would indicate the importance of this issue to the Catholic Church. Rudolph Vrba, a Slavic ethnologist, points out that in 1780 Russia had a population of only 26,800. In 1912 it was estimated at 170,000,000.

Catholic authorities on the borders of Russia are asking themselves whether, in a generation or two, this vast growth of non-Catholic population will not have the effect of overwhelming the contiguous Catholic peoples.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Russian zeal, backed by the state, created the machinery of the Slavic Benevolent Association of Moscow, of which the chief function was the education of non-Russian Slavs in Russia and the aid of Slavic orthodox communities outside of Russia. This organization, with the aid of the political forces back of it, put a successful stop, in 1876, to the Bulgarian movement toward Rome, known as the "Uniate" movement, as a protest against the conduct of the Greek clergy, which at

that time was in control of the Bulgarian church.

In the same manner, on the eve of the outbreak of the great war, Russian influences were exerting themselves in Galicia to discourage a similar movement toward union with the Catholic Church, which, however, is an accomplished fact.

Russian Success in Serbia.

In Serbia the activities of the Russian propaganda have met with full success. Diplomats who were stationed in Belgrade during the first Balkan war recall that Baron Hartwig, the Russian minister to Serbia at that time, not only acted as the adviser of the king and of Pashitch, the premier, but frequently attended cabinet councils when grave matters of national policy were under discussion.

The Poles of Austria responded less readily to the Russian representations, and the Ruthenians, a large proportion of whom are Catholics or Uniates, showed only a partial inclination to sympathize with the tendencies of Pan-Slavism, while many of them emphatically opposed it.

A current manifestation of the official Russian attitude toward the passionate desire of the Ruthenians to maintain their race entity is furnished by the rigid prohibition which Petrograd has placed upon the plans of the Little Russians to celebrate the centenary of their poet Shevchenko—one of the brightest names upon the roster of Russian letters—as a great national anniversary.

The chief obstacle to the Russian movement outside of Russia devel-

oped in Bulgaria, the country into which the Slavic Benevolent Society, since transferred from Moscow to Petrograd—from the religious to the political center of Russia—has employed its best resources for nearly a half century.

Bulgars Crave Democracy.

The popular tendency in Bulgaria is strongly directed toward popular government—popular in form and in fact—the exact antithesis to the existing system in Russia, which now appears to be undergoing a change owing to pressure from below.

In Russian Poland itself the Pan-Slavist movement has been greatly retarded by the summary policy of race oppression which the government has been applying there for more than a century. The Poles of Russia deeply resent the attempt of the Russian administration to suppress the Polish language in schools, in churches and in all public places.

One of the features of the programme of reform advanced by the Douma is a material amelioration of the treatment accorded to the peoples of the border provinces, including not only the Poles and Ukrainians but the Germans of the Baltic region, who have retained their race consciousness despite their participation in the highest phases of the Russian military and civil administration.

The effect of the adoption of a more liberal policy toward non-Russian Slavs living within Russia will be well worth watching in the immediate future of the Russian struggle toward democracy and race-unity under the scepter of the czars.—Oct. 28, 1915.

CZAR OF BULGARIANS STRIKING PERSONALITY

Ferdinand Hardest Worker in the Balkans — Ambitious for His Country

BY SVETOZAR TONJOROFF.

There was some wonderment in the European capitals in 1909, when after the rejection by Bulgaria of the last vestige of Turkish sovereignty the announcement was made at Sofia that Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, until that time Prince of Bulgaria, had elected to revive the ancient title of the Bulgarian kings, "Czar of the Bulgarians."

As there were a couple of millions of Bulgarians at that time under Turkish rule, in addition to the Bulgarian colonies in Russia, Roumania and Austria-Hungary, the inclusive designation adopted by the Bulgarian sovereign as the head of the independent state furnished ground for much speculation and not a little apprehension, as indicating ambitions and aspirations which at some time might prove inconvenient to some of his neighbors.

Ferdinand's Calm Audacity.

Czar Ferdinand, however, carried his point with the calm audacity which has marked his career since he was called to the Bulgarian throne in 1887, upon the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, who had "laid his crown at the feet of the imperial throne of Russia" and had lost it at the nod of Czar Alexander III.

Ferdinand's career in the country which elected him to its vacant

throne has been marked by a vigorously conducted struggle—first for the achievement of the independence of Bulgaria from the Turkish suzerainty which the congress of Berlin had imposed upon it after its liberation in 1878, and then to the unification of the Bulgarians of Macedonia and of Eastern Roumelia, which had been severed from the newly created principality by the same congress, with those of Bulgaria.

The act of union between Bulgaria and eastern Roumelia became final and irrevocable in 1909, when Ferdinand proclaimed himself czar in Bulgaria and eastern Roumelia, and the powers acquiesced in his step.

Ferdinand's attempt to carry out the next phase of his programme by the annexation of the Bulgarian portion of Macedonia was frustrated by the action of Serbia, Greece, Roumania and Montenegro in the war that followed the expulsion of Turkey from Macedonia by the allied armies of the Balkan league in the war of 1912-13.

At the end of Bulgaria's unsuccessful struggle with her former allies, reinforced by Roumania and Turkey, Czar Ferdinand in a proclamation to his army announced that the problem of the liberation of the Bulgarians of Macedonia yet remained to be solved. Bulgaria's operations against Serbia at the present moment are an aftermath of that proclamation.

Bulgaria's Progress.

Ferdinand from the beginning of his reign gained the reputation of being the most astute of the Balkan rulers, as well as the most persistent

in carrying out his plans. Much that has been accomplished in Bulgaria in education, industry, social legislation and military organization since 1887 is due to the initiative of the czar, who at the outset placed before himself the task of bringing Bulgaria, only recently liberated from Turkish rule and at that time living in the middle ages, abreast of the European states.

British and French critics of Ferdinand and Bulgaria wrote volumes before the outbreak of the war to show that Ferdinand and his Bulgarians represented to a large measure the hope of democracy and civilization in southeastern Europe.

A grandson of Louis Philippe, of France, Ferdinand was a familiar figure in the streets of Paris before the outbreak of the first Balkan war, and followed with close interest the work of the scientists of France as well as those of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The czar of the Bulgarians himself has achieved eminence among European scientists, especially in the domain of botany. A monumental work on the botany of Brazil, of which he is the co-author, is to be found in European libraries. It was published in 1883, when Ferdinand was only twenty-two years old, and is entitled "Die Botanische Ausbeute von den Reisen der Prinzen August und Ferdinand nach Brasilien, 1879."

He is a gentleman farmer on a considerable scale, after the best English models, and has devoted considerable attention to the improvement of the breed of cattle, horses and sheep in his kingdom.

Among his literary contributions to Bulgaria is the publication of a

series of volumes entitled "Minister-ski Sbornik," which contains a complete collection of the folk-lore and folk-songs of Bulgaria and Macedonia, taken down in the dialects of the various localities which originated them. Twenty volumes of this work have already been issued under the direction of the ministry of education at Sofia, and the collection of further material is still going on, not having been interrupted even by the stress of the two Balkan wars and of the present struggle.

Czar's Soldier Sons.

Czar Ferdinand has four children (all by his first marriage, with the Duchess Marie Louise of Parma, who died in 1899)—Crown Prince Boris, Prince Cyril and the Princesses Eudoxia and Nadezhda (Hope). Boris, who bears the ancient title of Prince of Turnovo, took part with distinction in the first and second Balkan wars, and the popularity which he at that time gained by his democratic relations with his comrades in arms, down to the humblest soldier in the ranks, has made him the popular hero in the present conflict.

Ferdinand's consort, Queen Eleanor, Princess of Reuss Koestritz, endeared herself to her adopted people in the Balkan wars by her services to the soldiers in the hospitals, whom she tended in many instances with her own hands. In the course of her indefatigable hospital work, which she now has resumed, Queen Eleanor at times ventured close to the front line, and the efficiency of the Bulgarian sanitary service was due largely to her initiative and her energetic supervision.—Nov. 5, 1915.

PROPAGANDA IN THE BALKANS

The Balkans for many years have been the field for extensive propaganda operations by practically all the great powers in the pursuit of their own selfish purposes. In many instances agents of these powers, and especially of Russia, have succeeded in promoting political changes by the liberal use of money among leaders of minority parties, and even among chiefs of majorities. For a long time Balkan sentiment and Balkan policies have been regarded at various chancelleries as responsive to the appeal of money, and, if not of money, then of higher forms of bribes, such as the proffer of territory.

King Constantine of Greece, in his continued refusal to expose his country to the danger of invasion by espousing the cause of the allies at this time, has shown a capacity to resist the higher form of bribe—the cession of territory. He is a far-seeing statesman, whose survey of the future extends beyond the length of his nose. To popular clamor, largely induced by foreign agitation, as well as to concrete offers by ministers of entente powers, he has replied with a firm declaration to lend himself to international schemes which might compromise the future of his country.

That future, as he conceives it, is too great, and too closely bound up with the very life of his people to be hazarded upon uncertain enterprises for the benefit of great nations at war. His first aim is to demonstrate that Greece, as a sovereign nation, is subject to neither the threats nor the blandishments

of the entente or of the central empires.—*Nov. 6, 1915.*

THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN

The breakdown of the Serbian army is the dominant fact that strikes the eye in the operations of the Balkan campaign up to date. The primary object of the German drive through Serbia—the seizure of the stretch of the orient railway running through that country—has been either absolutely accomplished or else its accomplishment is contingent upon mere details of military movements of which the successful conclusion is imminent.

The Austro-German and the Bulgarian forces between them now hold almost two-thirds of Serbia in equal proportions, and a Bulgarian army, having established its grip upon the Salonica railway as far south as Veles, is effectively blocking all communication between the main Serbian army and the base of the allies at Salonica, handed over to the use of the allies under a construction of neutrality which Belgium denied to Germany at the ultimate cost which a nation can pay.

The primary task of the Austro-German-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia to all intents and purposes accomplished, the invaders are now pushing their operations toward the conclusion of the secondary phase of the campaign—the capture or destruction of the main Serbian army. To this end an Austro-German army is sweeping southward in the western region of the operations, and its activities are being seconded by a Bulgarian army which has made a swift advance into the interior of new Serbia—consisting of territory which is claimed by Bulgaria on ra-

cial grounds—almost as far west as the Montenegrin frontier.

The aim of this co-ordinated move by the Bulgarians is to cut off the retreat of the Serbian army to the south, and to prevent a junction of the Anglo-French and Serbian forces. To prevent the success of the Bulgarian plan, the allies are not only pressing up against the Bulgarian front from the south, but are landing fresh troops on what appears to be a large scale to augment this pressure and break through the Bulgarian lines.

Upon the success or failure of the strategy of the allies will depend to a great extent the ease or difficulty of the accomplishment of what yet remains to be completed of the Austro-German undertaking to open up direct communications between Berlin and Constantinople. A decisive defeat for the Bulgarians, which would compel them to withdraw from the line of the Salonica railway as far north as Vranja, would expose the German advance to a possible new offensive, reinforced by a Franco-British army. Such an army, however, would have to be of considerable size—say three or four hundred thousand men—as it would have to maintain its communication against flank attacks by the Bulgarians while it was operating against the Germans.

Whether London and Paris are prepared to throw such a force, or anything approaching it, into the Balkans is one of the questions that yet remain to be answered in the most puzzling phase of the great war that has yet developed. The forces so far lined up against the Bulgarians by the Franco-British general staffs do not appear to possess the strength required for the

accomplishment of their initial purpose, the loosening of Bulgaria's grip upon the Salonica railway at Veles. And until this has been accomplished it is idle to speak of a potential menace to the Austro-German advance through Serbia.—*Nov. 15, 1915.*

ROUMANIA'S NEUTRALITY

A few days after the Roumanian government had notified Berlin and Vienna that it would not permit the passage of German and Austrian warships through the part of the Danube which flows through Roumania, Bucharest now extends the same principle to Russia. The decision of one of the last two Balkan states which remain neutral in the great conflict may be taken as an indication of its earnest desire to maintain that attitude—for the immediate future, at least.

But its ability to keep aloof from the strife throughout its duration is not to be predicated upon its present policy of equal treatment of both great belligerent camps. There are so many inducements for the adoption of a more active policy at Bucharest, and so many possible dangers in the continuance of the present stand, that the alignment of the country with either the entente or the Teutonic alliance before the month is out would not be a surprise.—*Dec. 1, 1915.*

ITALY'S LOST OPPORTUNITY

The fall of Montenegro before the impact of the Austro-Hungarian battering ram has all but sealed the doom of Italy's endeavors to obtain a foothold in the Balkans. The day on which the Austrian flag rose

over the ruins of Lovcen was a day of fate for Italy. Had the Montenegrins been reinforced with men and munitions by the Italian War Office, as they easily could have been from the Italian base at Avlona, a check might have been imposed upon Austria's march through the Black Mountain. With Lovcen and Cetinje in the hands of the Austrians, an important obstacle on the way to Avlona has been removed.

At Avlona, which Italy seized before her declaration of war against Austria, on the ostensible grounds that disorders in the city and district demanded intervention in the interest of humanity, the Italian garrison, supported by a naval force in the roadstead, is awaiting the advance of the central powers and Bulgaria, just as the Franco-British forces are fortifying themselves against the same enemies in Salonica.

Co-operating with the Austrian advance into Montenegro, a Bulgarian army has been making progress in Albania, in pursuit of the remnants of the Serbian army, and has reached the town of Elbasan, fifty miles north and slightly east of the Italian stronghold. In its descent through Scutari, the Austrian army will have the co-operation of the Albanian tribesmen, who have been at feud with the Montenegrins for centuries.

A joint Austrian-Bulgarian attack upon the Italians is a salient feature of the coming phase of the Balkan operations. For the purposes of the contemplated advance upon the allies at Salonica, the destruction of the Italian menace upon the prospective right flank of the central powers is essential. And a successful resistance by the Ital-

ians does not appear probable, in view of their numerical and strategic inferiority to their enemies.

Unless the unexpected happens, the expulsion of Italy from Albania appears to be the next event on the schedule in the Balkans. And the loss of Avlona would constitute an irretrievable reverse for Italy in her endeavor to dispute the mastery of the Adriatic with Austria.—*Jan.* 17, 1916.

THE FIRST BREAK

Montenegro has surrendered. Never has such a sinister sentence been written in the previous history of the gallant little nation which for five hundred years stood like a rock before the sweep of the Turkish wave of invasion.

Montenegro has surrendered because the Great White Czar, whose faithful ally and follower the little mountain state had been for many generations, failed in his promise of aid and succor. Montenegro has surrendered because Italy, to whom her king is bound by ties of kinship as well as common interests, talked while the Austrian battering ram beat upon the steep slopes of Mount Lovcen. Montenegro has surrendered because England and France, co-guardians with Russia and Italy of her independence, did not strengthen her hands in these last fateful days.

Montenegro has fallen because every promise of assistance which has been made to its brave king and people proved mere sound without meaning. The Montenegrin eagle, which never before in all its stormy life had lowered its eyes before the sun, fluttered to earth with broken wings because it saw the fate of Ser-

bia, swept off the map by the enemy; of Greece, harassed and humiliated by its would-be friends; of Belgium, urged to hold back single-handed the mighty foe while those who had roused it to resistance blundered and muddled.

The final decision of the Montenegrians to yield to the inevitable and lay down arms which they had never laid down before, may not be a military factor of great significance, but it is bound to appeal to the imagination of the world, beligerent as well as neutral. The wild demonstration which greeted the announcement of victory by Count Tisza in the Hungarian parliament yesterday was no indication of exaggerated valuations.

Montenegro's surrender marks the first break in the ranks of the allies. The nation which, considering its size and resources, had borne the heaviest burden of the war, is the first to admit exhaustion; the first to seek terms at the hands of the conquerors.

Nobody can be so fatuous as to assume that the fall of Montenegro can have any decisive effect upon the final outcome of the operations as a whole. But Vienna, Berlin and Sofia may well be excused for reading the sinister import of the handwriting on the wall for their enemies into the short, pregnant announcement in the Hungarian parliament:

"Montenegro has surrendered."—
Jan. 8, 1916.

THE NEW BALKAN "DRIVE"

The enormous concentration of forces in Salonica gives color to the frequent predictions in entente quarters that one of the features of the

early spring operations in the world war will be an attack upon Bulgaria in an attempt to break down Germany's "bridge" to the East, and incidentally to punish Bulgaria for her choice of partners.

It appears to be a fact that there are now in Salonica no less than a quarter of a million French and British soldiers, with complete equipment of artillery and other supplies adapted to mountain fighting, such as will figure largely in the prospective "march to Sofia." In addition to these forces, the entente war offices are reorganizing 160,000 Serbs, the remnant of the Serbian army, at Corfu and Bizerta. It is estimated that the entente will be able to put at least 720,000 men in the field, including 200,000 Greeks, who, it is assumed in London, will join the entente army corps in their impact upon the Bulgarian frontier.

In addition, the entente strategists evidently rely upon the participation of Roumania in the operations against Bulgaria and her Germanic partners. Roumania can put 500,000 men in the field. The Roumanians have been carrying on a gradual mobilization for the past two or three months, and it is expected in London and Paris that they will be able to offer a serious military problem to Bulgaria along the Danube and in the territory bordering upon Dobruja, which Roumania annexed at the expense of Bulgaria in 1913.

With the addition of the Roumanian establishment, in the event of the alignment of Roumania against the central powers, the entente would be able to dispose of a grand total of no less than 1,200,000 troops, exclusive of the crews and marines from the ships in Salonica

harbor and other parts of the Aegean, for their advance upon the Bulgarian frontier. By the intervention of Roumania, too, the entente counts upon being put in a position to apply something like the famous German "nutcracker" to the German-Austrian-Bulgarian forces in Macedonia and what was formerly the kingdom of Serbia.

Against this formidable armament Bulgaria has now about 350,000 men along the Greek border and in the territory immediately to the rear. The Germans and Austria-Hungary, unless all estimates of their strength in the Balkans are far beside the mark, have a total of 150,000 men in contact with the Bulgarians. The persistent rumors that considerable forces of Turks have been concentrated along the Danube and on the Black Sea coast in Bulgaria may be dismissed as unreliable. The central powers, in all probability, have no more than 500,000 men in the Balkan region.

The discrepancy would be fatal to the cause of the central powers if it were not for the fact that the estimates of military advantage for the entente are based largely upon future contingencies which cannot be foretold with any assurance of accuracy. An attack upon the Franco-British army in and around Salonica at this moment would find the balance of numbers on the side of the central powers and Bulgaria. The explanation of the present inactivity of the Bulgarian forces, with their German-Austrian allies, on the Greek border is to be found in the perfect willingness of the Berlin general staff to permit the diversion of considerable numbers of French and German troops from the western line to the Balkan front. Up

to a certain point this diversion will not be interfered with. The moment, however, when the concentration of Franco-British forces at Salonica begins to present the prospect of numerical superiority for the entente, a swift movement against Salonica is a certainty.—*March 13, 1916.*

ROUMANIA'S ALIGNMENT A REVERSAL OF HISTORY

Fortification System Aimed at Russia, Not Austria—Bulgaria's Deep Resentment Against Her Neighbor

By SVETOZAR TONJOROFF

The Sphinx has spoken. Roumania has entered the war. And the entrance of Roumania into the war on the side of Russia and her allies is another of those reversals of the verdicts of history which has given a kaleidoscopic cast to great events of the pending struggle.

Defense against Russia has been the tradition of Roumanian policy since the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, when Roumania fought on Russia's side, to find herself rewarded at the congress of Berlin by the annexation to Russia of the Roumanian province of Bessarabia. Ever since that event Roumania has regarded a clash with Russia as an impending event in her national life.

This trend is plainly shown by the position of the Roumanian fortifications. There is only one system of these, north of the Danube, with the sole exception of the armed camps that surround Bucharest. These fortifications are on the River Sereth. The greatest is the bridgehead of

Galatz, close to the Russian border. The others are at Namalosa and at Fokshani. On the Austrian border there is nothing that might be called a permanent defensive work.

So friendly have Roumania's relations been with Germany and Austria that Roumania was the silent member of the Triple Alliance.

Roumania's industries are largely owned in Austria and Germany. German capital controls a great part of the Roumanian petroleum resources. There are many Germans in Roumania. In Bucharest there is a German high school with 3,000 pupils, and a trade school for boys and girls with a large attendance of Germans and Roumanians. German educational activities in the capital are duplicated to some extent in other large cities of the kingdom.

Transylvania the Consideration

And now Roumania, which had been regarding Russia as her chief enemy, has joined Russia against her former friends. The promptness with which the government at Bucharest has followed its declaration of war with an attack on the Transylvanian border of Hungary indicates one of the territorial considerations that have governed Roumania's choice of sides, and also gives some idea of the strategical purposes of the Roumanian general staff—a joint invasion of Hungary with Russia.

Such a joint employment of forces may be expected also on the Bulgarian border. Roumania has served in past campaigns as Russia's road to Bulgaria. She will serve as a road for Russian armies to Bulgaria in this war. In former conflicts, however, the Russian campaigns have

been directed against Turkey. The next campaign across Roumania will be directed against Bulgaria, in whose behalf former Russian enterprises were nominally undertaken.

The relations between Roumania and her southern neighbor, Bulgaria, have bred a legacy of hatred that is unsurpassed in any region of the present conflict with the possible exception of the Austro-Italian. The resentment is chiefly on the side of Bulgaria. It is the outcome of Roumania's activities in 1913, at the time of the second Balkan war. In that struggle Bulgaria, fighting four enemies on three fronts, was attacked by a Roumanian army from the rear.

At the peace conference of Bucharest at the close of that war, Roumania took over a strip of Bulgarian territory from the Danube to the Black sea, including the city of Silistria and about 3,000 square miles of the most productive soil within the borders of her neighbor.

This seizure of territory by a neighbor with whom Bulgaria had no quarrel is resented more bitterly by the Bulgarians than their losses to any of their enemies in that conflict. A Bulgarian soldier, who had taken part in the first and second Balkan wars, probably gave true expression to the intensity of Bulgarian feeling against Roumania when he said, shortly after his arrival in New York: "In the next war with Roumania, even the rats in Bulgaria will enlist against the enemy."

100,000 Bulgars on Border

There are more than 100,000 Bulgarian troops on the Roumanian border who have been awaiting the contingency which has now arrived.

In addition, there are a small number of German and Austrian troops, and possibly a Turkish division. The Bulgarian part of this army of defense is fully imbued with the national hatred of a neighbor who took advantage of Bulgaria's distress to despoil her of her territory.

By the seizure of the fortified city of Silistria, at the end of the second Balkan war, Roumania acquired the key to the famous quadrangle of fortresses, of which the other three angles are Rustchuk, on the Danube; Varna, on the Black sea, and Shumen. There is reason to believe that the Roumanians have been carrying on extensive preparations at Silistria since its acquisition, in preparation for a clash with Bulgaria, which was foreshadowed by the territorial transactions at the conference at Bucharest.

There are Roumanian railroads running to the Roumanian banks of the Danube opposite four Bulgarian towns—Sistov, Nikopol and Vidin, a fortified place which successfully resisted a Serbian siege in the Bulgaro-Serbian war of 1885. Korabia is another Roumanian railroad terminus on the Danube. Here a Roumanian army crossed the river in the operations against Bulgaria in 1913.

As to the quality of the army of 600,000 men which Roumania is prepared to put in the field, and most of which is no doubt already mobilized, there is a marked difference of opinion among experts. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 a Roumanian contingent under King (at that time prince) Carol made an excellent showing at the siege of Pleven. The fall of the famous Gri-vista redoubt, one of the most obstinate points of Ghazi Osman's defense, is credited to Roumanian

valor. Since that siege the Roumanian army has not been tested in battle, for the adventure into Bulgaria in 1913 may better be characterized as a marauding expedition than a military operation.

The Roumanian military officers to be seen on the streets of Bucharest are not described in flattering terms by foreign visitors, as a rule. They are somewhat lacking in physique, and convey an impression of over-civilization. However, it is possible that they may prove more effective in the serious business of war than their appearance in the extremely gay Roumanian capital would indicate.—*Aug. 29, 1916.*

THE ROUMANIAN INVASION

Once more the weak spot in the lines of the central powers is being demonstrated. It is Austria. Despite the evident expectation at Vienna of Roumania's ultimate alignment with the entente allies, the Austrian War office is caught unprepared. The retirement of the Austrians from a large part if not the whole of Transylvania appears to be in progress.

The overrunning of Transylvania by the Roumanians, however, cannot be a decisive event in itself. It is the co-operation of the Russians with their latest allies in the new region of operations that is the real danger confronting the central powers in the combined movement.

And this movement is pressing downward toward a vital point in the line of communications between Berlin and Constantinople. It is to the safeguarding of this line that German strategy is now addressing itself, probably under the strong guiding hand of Mackensen.

It is conceivable that the Germans have no intention of weakening their military power in the main region—the line of communications, by diverting troops for the defense of Austrian territory which has no special strategic significance. It is reasonable to assume, however, that when the Roumanians begin to approach within striking distance of the “bridge” they will find that all the necessary measures have been taken by the Berlin general staff to make that structure impregnable. When that stage of the Russo-Roumanian offensive operations has been reached, the allied invaders will bring up against the strong wall of German resistance which has frustrated Russian military power in the northern region of the Russo-German conflict.—*Aug. 31, 1916.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

There is something of the “call of the wild” in the methods apparently being pursued by the entente in their movement to detach Bulgaria from her alliance with the central powers. There is a strongly held theory in Petrograd that the Bulgarians are being held in thrall by Germany, and that they are awaiting the appearance of the “little brothers” from the Neva to break their shackles and attach themselves to their true friends. And the French and British allies evidently have adopted the Russian view that at the first Russian cry of “little brother!” the Bulgarian troops will throw their rifles away and rush to embrace their liberators.

Upon such a theory the allied press has founded a wonderful scenario which ought to be filmed. It has elaborated a story that a

pseudo plot' is already brewing in Sofia for a stage abdication of Czar Ferdinand before a staged storm of popular indignation. The next step, according to the allied “dope,” will be the accession to the throne of Crown Prince Boris, the formal adhesion of Bulgaria to its great and good friends, the protectors of small nationalities, and the closing of Germany's “bridge” to Constantinople.

To give color to this theory of the prospective “benevolent assimilation” of Bulgaria by the entente, it has been pointed out that Gen. Sarraïl has offered little opposition, if any, to the advance of the Bulgarian stoward the Greek coast of the Aegean and their occupation of Kavala. This Greek city, with its hinterland, it has been pointed out, is designed to figure as Bulgaria's compensation for the surrender of all or a part of the former Serbian Macedonia which is now held by Bulgaria. Thus, it has been argued, Bulgarian aspirations will be satisfied, Serbia will be reinstated in Macedonia and this cruel struggle between neighboring nations will end in a love feast at which the champions of small nationalities will preside beamingly with hands upraised in the “bless-you-my-children” attitude.

All of which is highly entertaining as well as creditable to the inventiveness of entente writers, including the fertile and ubiquitous Dr. E. J. Dillon. But there are certain facts that militate strongly against the soundness of the diverging conclusions fathered by E. J. Dillon & Company. The reason why the entente did not oppose the advance of the Bulgarians upon Kavala more vigorously than they

did was their desire to see Greek resentment aroused to the point of explosion by the loss of territory. This resentment, it was nicely calculated at Salonica, would force King Constantine into the entente camp by a declaration of war against Bulgaria.

This result may yet be accomplished; and its accomplishment would explain Sarraill's feeble activity much more logically than a desire to give Bulgaria a present. The only presents which the entente is now offering the Bulgarians are shells fired at their positions all along the line. And Bulgaria is returning these presents with promptness and energy.

In the meanwhile, however, the entente is actually carrying out an interesting movement of psychological strategy against the Bulgarians from the side of the Danube. A Russian army has crossed Roumania and is concentrating in the Roumanian province of Dobrudja, on territory which the Roumanians filched from Bulgaria in the war of 1913. This army is obviously destined to attempt an invasion of Bulgaria. It is an army for war and not for cajolery. Words far different from "little brothers" are upon its bearded lips. It is the bearer of the nagaika and not of the olive branch. It is the instrument of the vow which Czar Nicholas made when Bulgaria joined the entente, that he would punish with all due severity the children who had proved ungrateful to "Little Mother Russia."

This army may give the "call of the wild"; but to the Bulgarians it will sound not like an invitation but like a threat. And the Bulgarians are not likely to mistake the language of their "little brothers"—

the little brothers who now, as in 1913, are exposing them to the horrors of an invasion and a possible dismemberment by a non-Slavic race.—Sept. 1, 1916.

BALKAN OPERATIONS SHAPING UP FOR A DEATH STRUGGLE

By SVETOZAR TONJOROFF

The operations in the Balkan region are assuming an increasing importance in the military situation as a whole. Some well-informed military critics are of the opinion that between the Danube and the Aegean will be fought the decisive engagements of the war—the battles which will determine whether victory shall rest with the entente or the central powers.

A brief glance at the strategic situation in the Balkans is, therefore, of timely interest.

In this region the operations have developed no material change in the alignment of forces. What small advantages have been achieved rest with the Bulgarians, who have occupied the city of Kavala, on the Aegean sea, with its fortifications, after perfunctory resistance from their Greek garrisons and apparently without a serious attempt on the part of the Franco-British commanders to stop their progress. In addition, the Bulgarians at the beginning of the first allied offensive a month ago succeeded in pushing their lines into Greek territory at the extreme left wing of the entente armies, in the region of Florina, Kastoria and Lake Ostrovo.

By this achievement the Bulgaro-

German strategists placed a margin of safety between their territory and an allied advance, and also made sure that at least some of the fighting shall be carried on on Greek soil.

Solid Results Accomplished

In the northeastern region of the Balkan battlefields German and Bulgarian arms have accomplished some solid results which evidently are destined to play an important part, not only in the operations of the Dobrudjan front, but in those of the Transylvanian region as well.

The seizure of the fortresses of Turtukai (or Tutrakan) and Silistria, on the Dobrudja bank of the Danube, with more than 20,000 Roumanian prisoners and 100 guns by the Bulgarians and their German allies was a feat of some military importance. Turtukai and Silistria are in the territory which Roumania detached from Bulgaria in the second Balkan war. The acquisition was of strategic importance to Roumania because it deprived Bulgaria of two possible bases for operations against the Roumanian capital, Bucharest, less than forty miles northwest of Turtukai. At the same time it gave the Roumanians a fortified defense for their capital.

The rapidity with which the Bulgaro-Germans struck their blow in this region of the Dobrudja, and the inability of the Roumanians to offer effective resistance to the invaders, were events of disastrous import to the Roumanians, who since have been compelled to modify their Transylvanian campaign to a great event. The transfer of Gen. Averescu, the Roumanian commander-in-chief, from Transylvania to the Dobrudja gives some indication of the importance which the Roumanians

and their Russian allies attach to their reverses on the Danube.

Further progress by the Germans and Bulgarians in the Dobrudja is bound to lessen still more the Roumanian-Russian pressure in Transylvania. There is reason to believe that Austrian strategists counted on such an eventuality at the beginning of the Russo-Roumanian incursion into Transylvania. And the assumption by Austria of such an eventuality probably explains the perfunctory resistance which the Austrians offered to the Russo-Roumanians in their first rush over the Roumanian border.

Further Operations Likely

With a considerable part of the Dobrudja in their hands, the Germans and Bulgarians, under the supreme command of Field Marshal von Mackensen, are in a position to attempt further offensive operations against Roumania. It would be reasonable to assume that plans for such operations have been the subject of the discussions at the conference at German headquarters between the Kaiser and the Bulgarian Czar and Enver Bey, the Ottoman minister of war.

The purpose of this conference may well be a united offensive designed to solve the military problems presented by Roumania's entrance into the war and the events that have followed it.

There are two possible routes for an effective offensive against Roumania, from the Roumanian territory already won by the central powers and their ally. One is a march on the capital after a crossing of the Danube at Turtukai and Silistria, possibly supplemented by another expedition from Rustchuk.

The bank of the Danube opposite Silistria, as well as opposite Rustchuk, is connected by rail with Bucharest, and the crossing of the river in the face of opposing forces has been so frequently accomplished that its practicability is not open to question.

Such an operation, however, would leave the right flank of the advancing armies open to attacks from the east, by Russian forces landing at Kustendje (or Constanza). Constanza is the main Roumanian seaport. Through it the Russians have been forwarding men and supplies to their allies. The retention of this port by the Russo-Roumanians would always carry the danger of a strong attack in flank upon any army carrying out the offensive above indicated.

Must Take Constanza

Constanza, therefore, must be taken by the central powers before they can develop their present movement into Roumania to its logical conclusion. To the defense of Constanza the Roumanians and their Russian allies are devoting much of their attention, and there is reason to believe that behind the veil of secrecy which has been drawn over the German-Bulgarian operations in the Dobrudja for the past week, Marshal von Mackensen is carrying on his disposition of forces and materials for a blow at Constanza.

With Constanza in their hands, the Bulgarians and their German allies would have an open road to Galatz, the great fortified place of Roumania. This is the second possible route for a great invasion of Roumania. In their march from Constanza the invaders would be protected on their left flank for prac-

tically all the distance of a little more than eighty miles by the marshes which fringe the west bank of the Danube, and on their right for a part of the distance by lakes and marshes.

Galatz, is the apex of an inverted V which the Danube forms at the point of its confluence with the Pruth. On the north bank of the Danube after it breaks into a V, is another tangle of lakes and marshes which would protect an invading army from that direction.

The possibility of a successful demonstration against Constanza, and subsequently against Galatz, is an element with which the Roumanian general staff must reckon, especially if, as now appears likely, Germany and Austria decide to send considerable forces into Bulgaria to aid in the operations against Roumania through the Dobrudja.

Galatz, once in the enemy's hands, would be a grave menace in the rear of the Roumanian operations in Transylvania. This fortress is less than eighty miles from the Transylvanian border. An army moving westward from Galatz would have railroads at its command. But even if the invaders failed to take Galatz, the defense of that city, with its three consecutive lines of fortifications on the river Sereth, would require a force which would weaken to a great extent the striking power of the Russo-Roumanians.

And such a weakening of the Russo-Roumanian lines would furnish an opportunity for a counter-offensive by the Austrians from the west, which would place the Roumanians between two fires.

Is this the plan that is being considered at German headquarters? Developments in the next few days

may furnish an answer to that question.—*Sept. 16, 1916.*

SWIFT RETRIBUTION

The mills of the gods are grinding exceeding fine in the case of Roumania. And they are not grinding slowly. Roumania in the past three weeks lost about five thousand square miles in the Dobrudja. She has lost all the territory which she took away from Bulgaria in 1913 and a good many square miles in addition.

The circumstances under which Roumania took that territory from Bulgaria in 1913 are interesting. Roumania had no quarrel with her neighbor. She had no racial claim to the soil upon which she had cast a covetous eye. She simply wanted it. And when Bulgaria was hard beset by her former allies and Turkey—four nations against one—Roumania marched across her neighbor's frontiers and occupied the land she wanted. While she was occupying it she committed acts of violence against a peaceful civilian population which have left their mark upon the Roumanian army.

The Bulgarians remember the events of 1913 vividly. The Sofia official bulletins announcing the recovery of lost territory in the present operations apply a simple, short word to this territory. They designate it as "stolen by Roumania in 1913."

When Roumania three weeks ago reached the conclusion that the central powers were beaten and that her help was urgently needed by the victors, the Bulgarian people saw their opportunity. The swiftness of their blow at the despoiler took him completely by surprise.

Tutrakan — the Bulgarian — fell with more than 20,000 Roumanian officers and soldiers and large quantities of artillery and supplies. Then fell Silistria—the Bulgarian—which Roumania had picked for her stronghold against her neighbor. And now Mangalia, beyond the former frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria, is also in the hands of the Bulgarians under Von Mackensen. The next great battle of the Dobrudja campaign will be fought on a line twenty good miles beyond the frontier which Roumania violated in 1913.

Whether the decree of war as now written shall stand or shall be reversed by superior force as the campaign develops, the Roumanians already have reason to regret bitterly the wrong which they did in 1913 to a brave neighbor with whom they were at peace.—*Sept. 20, 1916.*

THE WAR MOVE IN THE BALKANS

The seizure by Bulgarian troops, with German co-operation, of three forts on the Greek side of the frontier, in the valley of the Strouma, need not necessarily imply the beginning of an offensive movement against the Franco-British stronghold at Salonica. By occupying the fortresses of Dragotin, Rupel and Spatovo, however, the Bulgarian commanders have carried out an operation which would be of great strategic value in the event of an offensive by their opponents.

All three positions are in close proximity to the railroad line between Salonica and the Bulgarian frontier at Xanthi. With this line under their control the Franco-

British strategists could have transported a considerable force eastward to the left wing of the Bulgaro-German positions and thus menaced them with a turning movement. Now that this line is in Bulgarian hands this danger to their left is greatly lessened, if not altogether removed.

Simultaneously with the operations in the Strouma valley the Bulgarians are evidently preparing for a movement into Greece from Xanthi, on the Mesta, in the direction of Kavalla, the Greek port which the Bulgarians wrested from Turkey in the war of 1912 and which was in turn taken from them under the terms of the treaty of Bucharest in the following year. This movement from Xanthi makes Kavalla the objective of two distinct lines of advance, one along the Strouma valley and the other from the east.

The possession of Xanthi would be an important strategic advantage to the central powers in any attempt by the Franco forces in Salonica, reinforced by the 80,000 Serbians who have just been landed there, to flank the Bulgarians in order to strike at Germany's "bridge" to the Orient. It has been reported repeatedly that the Anglo-French strategists had landed or were about to land troops at Kavalla for such an enterprise.

By fortifying themselves on Greek soil northwest of Kavalla, and within striking distance of that port, the Bulgarians have taken a reasonable precaution against the success of such an expedition. It is too early to say, however, that the movements on the Mesta and the Strouma are the beginning of an offensive by the central powers against Salonica and the 400,000 allied troops who have been fortifying themselves there all winter.

The Dardanelles

TROJAN WAR A STRUGGLE FOR THE DARDANELLES

**Contest Between Agamemnon and
Priam for Mastery of Straits
Recalled by Events of To-day**

By SVETOZAR TONJOROFF

One of the earliest sea powers in history—the mastery of Troy over the commerce between the east and the west—was the cause that precipitated the first organized siege known to the chronicles of man, the siege of the ancient city of Priam by the Hellenic expedition under King Agamemnon.

The situation at that misty phase of the story of the human race parallels strikingly that of to-day. Just as the Turks in 1915 are exerting a powerful influence upon world-affairs by keeping the straits closed in the face of half of Christendom, so Priam in about the year 1200 B. C. kept an iron hand upon his world—the Mediterranean world—by the same expedient, though applied by different means.

Troy dominated the straits by the combination of two accidental circumstances—the presence of a current in the straits which ran from the Aegean northeastward, and the control of the river Scamander, which constituted the only appreciable water supply for ships sailing into or out of the mouth of the straits, then known as the Hellespont.

The road between the treasure-house of the Euxine, now the Black sea, and the Mediterranean, the center of civilization and of the Greek race, was difficult to traverse owing to the presence of the current, which in the Narrows reaches a maximum velocity of six miles an hour.

This condition, in the infancy of maritime science, constituted an element of extreme importance, and ships going in the direction of the Euxine were obliged to await at the mouth of the straits a favorable moment for an attempt to make the passage. Sometimes this period of waiting extended into weeks.

Troy's Control of Trade

The point where navigators marked time for winds and currents was off the coast of Troy, where Priam and his predecessors had established a profitable victualling and watering place. In order to increase the profits of the enterprise the king of Troy devised the scheme of preventing through passages either into the Aegean or into the Hellespont.

All ships coming into the offing of Troy from the Hellespont had to transship their cargoes at that point, and all vessels coming from the Aegean had to transship for the voyage through the straits.

Thus Troy levied cess and toll upon the entire commerce of the Euxine-Mediterranean, which at that time constituted the extent of the commercial world.

This mastery of the mouth of the straits eventually began to weigh with crushing force upon the rising commerce of Greece. The Greek race had fringed the Euxine with colonies, of which the Chersonese, the present Crimean peninsula, was one of the most important. The land passage between these flourishing colonies and the mother country was impracticable, owing to geographical and political conditions, and the sea route was essential to the very existence of the commercial stations with which the Greeks had dotted the coast of the great inland sea.

So, like the allies to-day, they undertook the task of forcing the hand of Priam and establishing the freedom of the Hellespont. This freedom, however, they were bent upon holding under their own control, and did so hold it for many centuries. The myth concerning the adventures of Helen, whose name is coupled with Troy, is only a minor incident in the motives that underlay the historic struggle, perhaps invented to add glamor to an adventure based upon strictly commercial considerations.

After the fall of Troy before the combined strategy and military valor of the Greeks, the Hellenic conquerors took comprehensive measures to prevent a new mastery of the straits which should again hamper their main artery of trade. They established, at either side of the mouth of the strait, a fortified city—Sestos on the European side and Abydos on the Asiatic, close to the site of Troy itself, which is still marked by the remnant of colossal ruins, indicating the thoroughness of the measures which the king of Troy had adopted to maintain his dominion.

Greeks Masters of Straits

Just as Priam had been master of the Hellespont before the Trojan war, so the Greeks became its masters after that struggle—with the difference that the only traffic subject to their control was their own and so was exempt from ruinous impositions.

Eight centuries after the test of strength between Troy and Hellas the Greeks fell into a quarrel between themselves, and the fortunes of the internecine struggle called the Peloponesian war hinged largely upon the mastery of the same straits which are now the centre of a world contest.

Lysander, the Spartan admiral, availing himself of a moment in 405 B. C., when the Athenian commanders were at cross-purposes, sailed boldly from Abydos, proceeded up the narrows unmolested and eventually at the mouth of the Aegospotami, near the present town of Gallipoli, smashed the Athenian naval power and established, for the time being, Sparta as mistress of the Hellespont and of Greece.

From Aegospotami to the middle of the seventeenth century of the Christian era, when the Turks established their control of the Dardanelles by the construction of the two fortresses of Sedd-ul-Bahr and Kum Kale (Sandy Castle) at which the guns of the Allies have thundered with little avail, the story of the straits is a succession of wars.

Persians, Greeks, Romans, Venetians and Turks have hurled ships and hosts into battle in an attempt to wrest the highway of the ancient world commerce, which still remains the highway of commerce for Russia with her vast grain fields and oil

wells, and of the Balkan states with their rich agricultural products.

And the story that is being written in letters of flame to-day is only a repetition of the old, old story of the Trojan war and its underlying courses in all its essential features.

—Nov. 3, 1915.

QUITTING THE DARDANELLES

The abandonment by the British forces of the western coast of Gallipoli peninsula is a development of great significance. It constitutes an admission of the failure of the allied campaign in a region in which it was undertaken with confidence of an early victory. Taken in conjunction with the serious reverses which the British have suffered recently on the Tigris river, the latest decision by the War office at London may well be construed into an admission that the campaign against Turkey has accomplished negligible results and that it does not promise future successes on the lines on which it has been carried on heretofore.

When it is recalled that Great Britain, like France, has made enormous sacrifices on Gallipoli peninsula, the full meaning of the abandonment of Suvla Bay and the Anzac territory becomes apparent as an admission of defeat. On the other hand, British public opinion is quite justified in regarding the withdrawal of more than 100,000 troops with slight casualties as a successful military feat. As in Macedonia, British commanders have succeeded in saving their forces and their equipment.

In spite of this partial success—if it shall be chronicled as a success in the annals of the empire after the necessity of softening the blow to British pride shall have passed—the abandonment of the Gallipoli operations must be regarded morally and from the military point of view as the greatest reverse suffered by either belligerent camp since the battle of the Marne and the collapse of the Russian invasion of Hungary.

The British government and people based great hopes upon the Dardanelles campaign. It was their expectation that the swift forcing of the straits would place Constantinople in the hands of the allies, rally to their aid all the Balkan states and forever shatter the German dream of domination in Asia Minor. Those expectations have been completely frustrated. More than that, the event has given actuality to the predictions made by German observers and statesmen that the allies would fail in their Dardanelles campaign, and substance to their belief that, having failed to force the straits, the British would find the Suez canal and Egypt itself difficult to defend.

The British official report of the abandonment of the peninsula announces that the troops removed from there have been transferred to "another sphere of operations." Whether that sphere be the Balkans or Egypt, will become evident in a very short time. But to whatever sphere they have been shifted, the troops who have tasted defeat with total casualties of 100,000 men in one theatre of events are not likely to prove very effective human material in any other theatre.

The War in Asia Minor

ERZERUM AND AFTER

A new estimate of the military and political significance of the taking of the great Armenian stronghold of Erzerum must be made in the light of the information that has since become available as to the actual scope of that operation. The entente powers, grasping the opportunity of their first spectacular success since the surrender of Przemyśl by the Austrians more than a year ago, are seeking to promote an impression that the Russian victory marks one of the turning points of the war. Constantinople is silent. The German general staff has withheld comment on the event and its significance.

One fact must be kept clearly in mind in any attempt to estimate the value of the fall of Erzerum to the allies. That fact, now demonstrated by official admissions at Petrograd, is the escape of virtually the entire Turkish garrison, estimated at from 150,000 to 180,000 men. That force with its field and mountain artillery practically intact, is an effective army in being—an army which is offering powerful resistance to the Russians in their advance westward and southward. That army, it is now evident, is awaiting powerful reinforcements under the German general Liman von Sanders, who, contrary to previous reports from Petrograd, not only has not been captured, but was several days' march distant from Erzerum, on his

way there, when the Russians carried out their general assault at the bayonet's point.

Even this last-named picturesque detail, however, is shorn of much of its value by the disclosure of the fact that far from dealing with the main Turkish garrison, as was at first represented, the Russian assailants were confronted only by a meager fighting rearguard of the evacuating army. Even this fighting rearguard succeeded in making its escape after temporary resistance to the overwhelming Russian forces.

The utility of Erzerum to the Russians as a new base of operations against the Turks will be determined only by the outcome of the grand duke's forthcoming clash with the reinforcing Ottoman army under von Sanders. The situation in its purely strategic aspect almost exactly parallels that which obtained on the east front when Russia, having seized Przemyśl and Lemberg, abandoned both places with little fighting upon the advance of the Austro-Germans.

The political significance of the victory of Erzerum has been excusably exaggerated by the London commentators. The forecast of an early entrance into the war by Roumania and Greece, under the pressure of a revival of Russian military prestige, is at least premature. The scene of the triumph is far too remote from either Roumania or Greece to exert any such decisive

effect. Roumania did not deviate from her neutrality either when the Russian hosts were sweeping by her frontiers into the Bukowina or Galicia, or when the Germans beat back the Russian invaders and halted only within gunshot of the Roumanian border. Greece has not been induced to join the allies by the presence of allied armies upon her territory and the maneuverings of allied fleets along her coast. It is highly improbable that the course of either country will be determined at this late date by an incident of inconclusive military value more than a thousand miles away.—*Feb. 21, 1916.*

WILL TURKEY QUIT?

The withdrawal of Turkey from the Germanic alliance would have a serious effect upon the central powers' plan of campaign. It would place Bulgaria in a delicate position on the eve of the allies' advance from Salonica, which is scheduled to take place in the spring. It would place Germany under the necessity of sending much larger forces into the Balkan region for the purpose of guarding against an attack upon Austria from the south-east, over a prostrate Bulgaria than the German plans of campaign have contemplated. Finally, it would nullify the purpose and results of the Austro-German feat in establishing the famous "bridge" between the west and the east. And the moral effect of a break in the ranks of the new quadruple alliance would be highly damaging to the diplomatic position of that alignment of powers.

Therefore, the truth or falsity of the persistent reports that Turkey

has asked or is about to ask for terms for a separate peace as a result of the recent reverses to Turkish arms in Asia Minor is an important issue in the general situation. The rumors that Turkey is about to throw up the sponge are based upon the assumption that her resources and her physical powers of resistance have been spent; that a popular revulsion has set in against the leaders at Constantinople, and that the distress of the people is so profound that they are ready to resign themselves to any fate.

A glance at recent history will serve to demonstrate qualities in the Ottoman stock which throw serious doubt upon the correctness of these assumptions. To begin with, the Turks are a people of peculiarly tenacious purpose. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 Turkey was beset on two fronts—in Europe and in Asia Minor—by a victorious army. And yet, far from abandoning their resistance, the Turks fought the invaders all the way from the Danube to the gates of Constantinople. And peace did not come until the Russians were encamped before the walls of the Ottoman capital—and the decks of a British fleet in Besica Bay were cleared for action to prevent their triumphant entrance into the city of Constantine. From Pleven, through Shipka Pass to the Chataldja line, it was a last-ditch fight for the Turks, and they fought it in a last-ditch fashion which won them the admiration of the world.

The situation in 1877 was duplicated to a certain extent in 1912, when a Bulgarian army, inspired with the ardor of a war for the liberation of its brothers in Macedo-

nia, hurled itself impetuously upon a disorganized Islamic host. Yet, at the moment when Constantinople seemed to be within the grasp of the Bulgarians, Turkey developed a power of resistance at the Chataldja lines which halted the invaders—and held them there.

In the present war the Turks have accomplished a notable feat—a feat which will live in the annals of warfare. They have not only resisted but repulsed an attack upon the sea road to Constantinople by the combined sea-and-land operations of Great Britain and France. By that achievement they assured the safety of Constantinople. They have thrown back a strong British expedition marching along the valley of the Tigris. They have offered so determined a resistance to the Russians in the Caucasus theatre that the Russians, after a year's fighting, can point to only one victory of any account—the fall of Erzerum.

With such conspicuous victories to offset a defeat of no particular importance, the Turks have no special reason to lose heart. Russia is still a good 700 miles from Constantinople, and the intervening country, with its vast agricultural resources, is in the undisturbed possession of the Ottomans. There is an effective Turkish army of no less than a million men, inspired with the newly established traditions of victory over infidel invaders, in the field. Behind such a Turkish army, for the first time in history, are the technical resources and engineering skill of a combination of two great European powers.

The Turks, therefore, are better off in every respect than they were

in 1877 or in 1912. It is highly improbable that at this time they will reverse all their traditions and hand over the sword at an indecisive stage of affairs like the present.—*March 9, 1916.*

KUT-EL-AMARA—AND AFTER

The surrender of Gen. Townshend at Kut-el-Amara means much more than the loss of nine thousand soldiers to Great Britain. It means the complete collapse of the British campaign against Bagdad and the capture or disastrous retreat of Sir Percy Lake's relieving force. It means a crushing blow to Britain's prestige, both with the Mohammedan millions of India and with her European allies. Coming after the dismal failure of the Gallipoli campaign, the fall of Kut-el-Amara will confirm the impression of impotent muddling which the British War Office has managed to produce upon the minds of friend and foe alike.

But the indirect result of Townshend's surrender will be much more important and far-reaching than the direct results. The failure of British arms in Mesopotamia will give Russia an advantage in Asia Minor which is destined to operate as a force of cleavage between the two powers that jointly undertook the task of crushing Turkey. Great Britain cannot regard with equanimity any advance of Russia upon the Persian Gulf. The British march upon Bagdad was undertaken largely for the purpose of making such a Russian advance unnecessary. So long as Great Britain remained within striking distance of the

greatest city of Mesopotamia she was in a position to say to advancing Russia: "I am holding the lower Tigris valley. It will be an unfriendly act if you were to extend your lines into territory which I have already occupied."

With Kut fallen and Sir Percy Lake in flight in the direction of the head of the gulf, Russia will be able to explain her continued progress southward upon the ground of obvious necessity. She will be in a position to say to her ally: "You have tried to perform your share of our common military task and have failed, both at Gallipoli and on the Tigris. Now stand aside and let me try."

This is precisely the opening for which Russia has been looking, especially since the prospect of even a neutralized Dardanelles Strait vanished in the smoke of the Turkish guns that beat the British invaders from the peninsula. That Petrograd will take full advantage of the favorable turn of events may be expected confidently, in view of Russia's traditional search of an open port. It may be expected with equal certainty that such a proceeding on the part of Russia will arouse the keenest apprehension in London, where any move by a great power which would menace England's road to India is regarded with resentment and alarm.

As things now stand in Asia Minor, England's vital interests make Turkey and not Russia her natural ally, for a victory for Turkey would contribute to the safety of India, while a triumph for Russia would bring the paw of the bear within clawing distance of Bombay.
—May 1, 1916.

POETIC JUSTICE

The army of Gen. Townshend at Kut-el-Amara, starved out, **has capitulated after a heroic resistance.** All glory to these men for **their** bravery. We cannot look on the event without grave misgivings. Whether the survivors of the long Turkish siege numbered 8,700 or 13,000 is not important. The moral effect upon the East is the same. Western civilization may well rue the ill-fated expedition, with its demonstration to the Moslem world that the oriental Turk can overcome the occidental Englishman. The prestige and leadership of Constantinople will be immeasurably strengthened in all the populous East.

There is another interest in the event. There is something of poetic justice in the fact that England, which at the outset of the war set its entire military power at work to starve the German civilian population—that England itself first experiences this starvation, and experiences it on the part of its own military.

London to-day may recall the words of Macbeth as he hesitates to murder his king:

But in these cases
We still have judgment here; that we
but teach
Bloody instructions, which being taught
return
To plague th' inventor; this even-
handed justice
Commends th' ingredients of the
poisoned chalice
To our own lips.

The play may not have yet run its course. If the German submarines succeed in cutting the British food supply, Britain may feel that same "economic pressure" upon her

peaceful population which—in these days of Christian civilization—she designed against her enemy.—*May 2, 1916.*

THE TURKISH OFFENSIVE

The dispatches from the battle-grounds of Asia Minor make it evident that the Turks are making an attempt to resume the offensive against their hereditary foes, the Russians. For the past three months Grand Duke Nicholas has been advancing through Armenia, Persia and southward in the direction of the Tigris valley. The Turkish armies appeared to have lost the striking power which they had previously exhibited on the Gallipoli Peninsula and at Kut-el-Amara. The Ottoman empire, or what remains of it, seemed to face complete military collapse.

Perhaps misled by these signs of the increasing inability of the Turks to defend their soil, the Russian commander pressed his advance with rapidity. More than that, it is now evident that the Russians must have withdrawn some of their forces from the Turkish front in order to create a diversion in favor of Italy, and possibly of the French at Verdun, by launching an offensive movement on what seems to be a large scale against the Austrians.

With characteristic powers of recuperation and reorganization after defeat, the Turks are now showing their old mettle in an offensive movement against the grand duke with an energy which has repeatedly caused the Russians to retreat in the past ten days. And this offensive is centered on the Caucasus front. A glance at the map will

show the dangers which a successful Turkish offensive at this point will offer to the Russian armies which have marched southward to the immediate neighborhood of Kut-el-Amara since the surrender of the British in that stronghold, and eastward to Trebizond and beyond.

If the Turks should succeed in inflicting a decisive defeat upon the Russians in the Caucasus region they will place the Russian armies one hundred or more miles to the south in the gravest danger of being cut off. In any event, the Turkish strategists are already in a position to hamper the Russian lines of communication.

In spite of the reverses which the Turks have recently suffered in Armenia and in the region east and north of Bagdad, it is yet too early to count upon the success of the Russian operations. Even a crushing disaster for the Russians is not beyond the range of possibilities.—*June 6, 1916.*

FIGHTING ON SUEZ

The Suez Canal has been called the Achilles heel of England. It has been assumed by many military authorities that the final undoing of the British empire would be brought about by a powerful blow struck at the narrowest link of the short sea road between London and India.

Recently the attacks upon the Suez region by land and by air have furnished a minor feature of the news of the war. These attacks may or may not be the forerunners of a serious attempt to wreck the canal. But the admission of the possibility of such a movement on a

large scale by England's enemies is indicated by the large number of troops that have been massed along the route of the canal by the British War Office.

British military experts have flouted the possibility of an effective assault upon the canal. But the men who are responsible for maintaining England's road to India have taken ample measures to

guard against a national disaster in the neck of the woods that is called Sinai Peninsula.

The defeat of the Turkish expedition of 14,000 troops in the action near Romani, on the main caravan route out of Egypt, indicates England's ample preparations for the defense of the canal and the difficulties of any attempt to wreck it. —August 7, 1916.

The Naval War

WAR AND THE SPEECH OF GENTLEMEN

Speech, like all else, undergoes wonderful transformation in the crucible of war.

The right noble Lord Derby, inventor and manufacturer of the recruiting idea, the one-time substitute for conscription, has given us one of the fairest flowers in the new garden of diction.

In a recent interview in London he expresses the firm determination of his majesty's government to prosecute the conflict until their enemies are utterly overcome.

But the pearls that drop from his lordship's lips:

There shall be no peace until it is certain that there be no further war on this scale in the time of our children's children. That means "hiding" Germany to nothing. That means to whip her, then turn her round and "hide" her in the proper quarter.

It is such wonderful word painting. We see the Germans wince and try to pull their coat tails down. We see the kinetics and the geography of the whole situation.

Casting about for the probable agent for this unrelenting chastisement, we are forced to believe that it will be the British navy.

Come to think of it, the British navy has been "hiding" since the war began, somewhere in a landlocked harbor in the north, protected by mine fields and the restless patrols of destroyers.

The British navy has a long arm. It can hide while being hidden.

But all that does not lessen our gratitude to the noble lord for his contribution to the language of noblesse.—*Jan. 31, 1916.*

THE MOEWE

A new name has been added to the list of names which tell the glories of sea warfare. It is the *Moewe*. The *Moewe* is the German commerce destroyer which, disguised as a Swedish tramp, with false sides concealing an armament of ten-inch guns, sailed out of the Kiel Canal, worked her way through the entire British fleet, destroyed seven British vessels and then captured the British liner *Appam*, reported "missing" since January 15, and sent her into Norfolk with a prize crew and the German flag flying at her taffrail.

The *Moewe's* achievement is by far the most thrilling exploit yet recorded in the naval phase of this war. It lacks no single element of the most spectacular traditions of the sea—traditions which it was supposed had been made a thing of the past by the developments of the modern machinery of destruction.

And of this achievement the easy domination of the 430 passengers of the *Appam* by the *Moewe's* prize crew of a score of men; the stealthy crossing of an ocean swarming with the enemies' warships, and the tri-

umphant arrival into Hampton Roads in the murk of the morning, supply features to stimulate the imagination of a Joseph Conrad or a Clark Russell.

Whatever additional facts may be disclosed by the investigation into the details of the activities of the *Moewe* and of her valorous men, to them will remain the memory of one of the most brilliant achievements of the sea—an achievement requiring superlative seamanship, courage unsurpassable and the sort of hardy enterprise which all the world is bound to respect.—*Feb. 2, 1916.*

A SEA LAW PRECEDENT

The *Appam* incident will have an important bearing upon the sea law of the future. The decision which the United States will make on the significant question of the disposal to be made of the German prize involves the establishment of a precedent in a twilight zone of the rules of marine warfare.

Existing international practices governing the status of prizes in neutral ports are set forth in Chapter 13 of the Second Hague Convention. Article 21 of this chapter reads:

A prize may be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel provisions. It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral power must order it to leave at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral power must employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew.

Article 22 supplements the preceding provisions as follows:

A neutral power must, similarly, release a prize brought into one of its

ports under circumstances other than those referred to in Article 21.

Then comes the stipulation which, by contradicting the above rules, creates a zone of uncertainty in the law of nations. Article 23 reads:

A neutral power may allow prizes to enter its ports and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought there to be sequestered pending the decision of a prize court. It may have the prize taken to another of its ports. If the prize is convoyed by a warship, the prize crew may go on board the convoying ship. If the prize is not under convoy, the prize crew are left at liberty.

If Article 23 had been adhered to by all the powers signatory to the convention as a whole, there would have been no knotty problem to solve in the *Appam* case. England, however, voted against this article, as did her ally, Japan, and her protege, Siam.

England's reasons for withholding her adherence from Article 23 are apparent at a glance. Possessing colonies all over the world, Britain enjoyed, as she still enjoys, a position of supreme advantage for any naval operations over the rest of the world. Island bases marked off all over the map give her ports within easy access of any part of the oceans. In addition, she holds a vast strategic advantage over all other nations by her control of the gateways through which those countries would have to pass in taking prizes to their own ports.

The American delegates to the conference refrained from voting on this article, and when they reported to the Senate on their acts they said that Article 23 constituted "a revival of an ancient abuse." These delegates, be it remembered, were headed by Joseph

H. Choate, who always has been so English in his leanings that he has had difficulty in looking upon international problems from a squarely American viewpoint. In contrast to the British and American attitude was that of Renault, one of the French representatives of the conference, who construed the aim and the effect of the article as tending to prevent or make infrequent the destruction of prizes.

To Renault's representations the British delegates replied with the argument that such a provision was unnecessary even for the purpose designated, as the nations which did not desire to destroy prizes might agree not to capture any. This suggestion, of course, meant the abandonment by such nations of effective methods of sea warfare and the relinquishment to Britain of a sort of monopoly in the capture of enemy ships, to the aggrandizement of her sea power.

The decision in the *Appam* case will be binding upon the United States in any future war. In case of a conflict across the Atlantic or the Pacific, involving the establishment of a long-distance blockade, our navy would have to operate on the far side of either ocean. In such an event the question whether we could or could not use a neutral port on the other side of the Atlantic or the Pacific for our prizes would be of momentous importance to us in our efforts to avoid the destruction of captured vessels.

This is a vital consideration which the State department should keep clearly in mind in its endeavors to eliminate the twilight zone from the sea law of nations.—*Feb. 3, 1916.*

"PLAY UP, PLAY UP, AND PLAY THE GAME"

The British third officer of the *Appam* has given an interview. All other prisoners on that romantic ship praise the chivalry of their German captors. Only the third officer knows the motive behind this stage chivalry. The motive was fear of mutiny aboard. The twenty-two Germans were afraid to be rude. Otherwise the 429 English captives would have risen and overpowered them. Apparently the politeness shown was such as to overcome all thought of such treachery.

The third officer describes the forbearance which the fear-crazed Germans merely pretended to have:

The German officers were all under orders to be courteous and not take offense. Five or six times insults were offered them by passengers. This usually took the form of calling them "swine."

Once that kindly Englishman, Mr. Thackeray, wrote a verse which we commend to the attention of the third officer. He might even memorize it:

Who misses or who wins the prize
Go, lose or conquer as you can,
But if you fall or if you rise
Be each, pray God, a gentleman.

—*Feb. 9, 1916*

"HEADS I WIN; TAILS YOU LOSE"

The facility with which Great Britain has been reversing her position on important questions of the law of the sea is one of the impressive features of the war. When it suits her purposes, England adheres to the Declaration of London, which was called at her own behest, and

which was, in effect, a codification of the existing law. When the Declaration of London does not suit her purposes, England invokes the Hague Convention of 1907, which comprised a series of international enactments, and which Great Britain did not sign.

But despite her former rejection of the Hague Convention, Britain now invokes that instrument because it suits her to do so. Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, in his request for the release of the *Appam* to her British owners by the State department, points out that such action is imposed upon America by the provisions of an article of that convention, which provides as follows:

A prize may be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather or want of fuel or provisions. It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral power must order it to leave at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral power must employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew.

The invocation by Great Britain of an international code to which she did not subscribe and to which heretofore she has refused to conform, is explained by Ambassador Spring-Rice on the ground that although Great Britain did not append her signature to the article in question, that article expresses the latest principle of the law of nations.

This legal handspring, however, is after all not to be wondered at in view of Britain's persistent violation of all international codes and ordinances from the beginning of the war. The idea seems to prevail at London that a British fiat can change the contraband list at will, stop the sending of foodstuffs and

clothing to the non-combatant population of belligerents, hold up trade between neutrals, impose her own views as to the nationality of ships, irrespective of their flag and registry; take non-combatants of belligerent countries from neutral ships—the provisions of the Declaration of London to the contrary notwithstanding.

In the view of British legal authorities international law is law only when it enables them to win or bolster up a point in their own favor. When the code happens to controvert the British claim, so much the worse for the code!—*Feb. 12, 1916.*

THE MOEWE AGAIN

The return of the German commerce raider *Moewe* to a "home port"—presumably Wilhelmshaven—after sinking or capturing fifteen enemy ships and sowing "points of the enemy coast" with mines, closes the second chapter of a thrilling tale of the sea which any maritime nation might envy. The arrival of one of her prizes, the *Appam* into Hampton Roads, was the first.

How this tramp steamer, converted into a formidable engine of destruction, could have steamed out of Kiel canal in the teeth of the entire British naval power, to prey upon British commerce, is mystery enough. But how this daring "Sea Gull" could have steamed back unscathed, despite the mighty vow of the admiralty to capture or destroy her for the sake of the honor of the British navy, is a still greater mystery.

What hazards she must have risked! What expedients she must have employed to escape the grim

fighting machines that must have hailed her again and again! What cool courage, what sailorly resourcefulness Capt. Count von Dohna, the *Moewe's* commander, must have displayed in that unprecedented cruise of "several months," as the official report of his exploits issued in Berlin vaguely puts it.

The names of the *Moewe* and of her gallant skipper may well figure, even among British sailormen when peace shall have been restored, as rousing toasts of the sea.—*March 7, 1916.*

THE APPAM

The *Appam* case is not settled. The former British owners of the German prize are appealing to the United States District Court at Richmond to return the ship as being unlawfully captured. The Richmond *Evening Journal* thus describes the pending contentions of the two parties:

It is understood that lawyers for the Germans will claim that under the treaty of 1828 German prizes in American ports are exempt from such legal processes as the libeling of the *Appam*.

The British owners will contend that the 1828 treaty does not permit a prize to be run in unless it is accompanied by an armed warship. This was not done in the case of the *Appam*.

The pertinent clause in the 1828 treaty between Prussia and the United States reads:

The vessels of war of both parties shall carry freely the vessels taken from their enemies, nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched or put under legal protest when they enter the ports of the other party.

It has been reported from Washington that Secretary Lansing would

rule that the 1828 treaty entitled Germany to hold the *Appam* at Norfolk as a lawful prize. This ruling would automatically vacate the proceeding before the Richmond court, and settle the matter. But the desired ruling seems strangely delayed.

The application of the treaty is plain. No one denies that the *Moewe* was a war vessel. To "carry" prizes into an American port is not to lug them in. That would be impossible. It means to conduct them in. The *Appam* was conducted into Norfolk by the *Moewe*, by a crew of over twenty men from that war vessel. That the captor herself should have to accompany the *Appam* is not required in the treaty, and is repugnant to common sense.

America has more than a sentimental interest in the matter. Sentimentally we wish luck to the gallant Berg and his crew. Sentimentally we are a little critical of the mistress of the seas crying that she was not playing "for keeps" and wanting her marbles back."

But we have a deep national interest in the secretary's action. England wants to make it impossible for belligerents to send captured prizes into neutral ports unless accompanied by the captor. Obviously a captor cannot afford to give up its sea duty for this convoy work. A prize accompanied only by a prize crew, if Britain had her way, would have to make for a home port of the captor. But only England has colonies, coaling stations and naval bases so scattered over the whole globe that she can as easily make a home port as a neutral port. Great Britain asks us to shackle every nation but her, and to shackle ourselves, in the matter of making prize captures on the high seas.

In our next war we may not hold the seas. But American commerce raiders and seagoing submarines will take prizes far from our shores, in Asiatic or European waters. We want kept open the ability to send these prizes to the nearest neutral port in charge of prize crews. We do not want the efficiency of our war craft lamed by the obligation to run into port with every prize sent there; nor do we want the prizes compelled to make a perilous trip across the ocean to reach an American port.

Again and again—for example, in the Paris conference of 1856—America has stood for the immunity of private property at sea in war time. Britain has been that power which has successfully opposed this immunity. Well, let it be so. But if war ships can capture merchant vessels in war time, then let us all have the right of capture, and not have the right distorted so that it applies mainly to England.

In the *Appam* case the prize was a German ship, after the capture. Like other German ships, she deserves asylum in our ports until the war is over. Nothing but a forced interpretation of the treaty of 1828 can vitiate this right.—*March 28, 1916.*

THE NORTH SEA BATTLE

The first really important battle between modern war fleets is the North sea battle of May 31.

In the absence of accurate detailed knowledge it is impossible to benefit fully by the experience of the two fleets.

We may assume, however, that the Zeppelin has been shown to be as important and indispensable in sea

warfare as the areoplane is in land warfare.

Another consideration may be made. Naval warfare to-day involves the co-ordinated mastery of a whole realm of scientific and technical facts and principles. This mastery is only possible by utilizing to the utmost every invention and discovery and principle involved and by training men and officers until they have mastered the vast body of technical and scientific facts and practices.

Instinct and tradition are not sufficient. Making all allowances, one must conclude that the Germans have shown that they have learned sea fighting as it is to-day, and that their naval prowess must be reckoned as on a par with their military prowess on land.

THE APPAM

The *Appam* is handed back to England. Unless the Supreme Court grants the appeal of the Germans, an unexpected ending is given to one of the romantic events of the war.

In January the *Moewe*, a converted German tramp steamer with a German naval crew aboard, raided the trade routes off the west coast of Africa. Eight British vessels were sunk. Their occupants were accumulated and put aboard a ninth captured British steamer, the *Appam*, of the Elder-Dempster line. Under command of Lieut. Hans Berg, the *Appam* and her charges slipped through the allied patrol of the Atlantic and interned at Hampton Roads.

The British owners disputed the legality of the act and claimed that the vessel still belonged to them. The

question turned on the interpretation of the Prussian-American treaty of 1799, later adopted by the German empire. On this interpretation depended the British contention that German prizes, brought to American ports by prize crews, had no standing. The treaty reads:

The vessels of both parties shall carry (conduct) freely the vessels taken from their enemies, nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched or put under legal protest when they enter the ports of the other party.

Germany said that the *Appam* was lawfully conducted into Norfolk by Lieut. Berg, representing the captor. The British contention was that the *Appam* was not conducted into port, because the *Moewe* itself did not bring her in. The British contention was accepted by Judge Waddil, of the United States District Court at Norfolk.

The word "conduct" could be interpreted as America chose. So, in the interpretation adopted, farseeing consideration of our future interests should have played its part. The court had its interpretation made for it by Secretary Lansing, who in March delivered to Ambassador Bernstorff an opinion that the Prussian-American treaty did not pro-

tect the *Appam*. Thereafter the decision of the United States Court was a foregone conclusion.

As is so often the case in this war, the individual decision is unimportant, the principle affected is large. It makes no particular difference to us what happens to an individual German prize. The effect of our decision on the sea law of the future is important. For it is by such decisions that international law is made. Our official decisions in this war have not only upheld all previous rights of the dominant sea power to proceed against its enemy's commerce, but we have acceded to wide extensions of those rights. On the other hand, all our decisions have aimed at denying similar rights to the warcraft of the power that does not hold the seas. Its weapons are, and always will be, submarines and commerce raiders.

The policy is a good one for us if we have no interest in protecting ourselves against the contingency of war with a superior sea power. Or it is a good one for us if we have decided that such protection should be sacrificed in the interest of furthering the success of one belligerent in this war.—*July 31, 1916.*

Finances of the Belligerents

A VOICE FROM THE WEST

The following communication from a banker and manufacturer in Michigan is of especial interest at this time. Mr. C. K. Warren is of old Yankee stock, without prejudice or favor to either group of warring powers. He lives in close contact with a middle western community made up of all nationalities. He enjoys cordial and personal relations with a large number of his depositors and is at the same time in close touch with Chicago banking interests. This makes his judgment peculiarly illuminating.

E. R. WARREN & CO.

Bankers,

Three Oaks, Mich.

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*:

Sir—I certainly think it is a great mistake for the large banks of the United States to take up the loan of \$500,000,000 from the allies, or, as far as that is concerned, from any fighting power. The President of the country has declared the country neutral; that being the case, it is not consistent to loan the allies money.

Following this a very peculiar situation may develop, i. e., that the allies might come back for \$500,000,000 or \$1,000,000,000 more in order to finish this war satisfactorily, which would tie up the great mass of funds in the country.

Still another condition might develop: A very large percentage of the people in the United States are in favor of remaining neutral; fully 25 per cent. of the population are not in sympathy with the allies by birth. Should they make up their minds they would not stand by this kind of a loan, and start in systematically to withdraw their funds,

placing them as the people placed their funds in 1907, it would bring on a very disastrous situation in the United States, the result of which would be very unpleasant to contemplate. It is a well-known fact that the 25 per cent. of the above mentioned are the thrifty, saving element of the country, who have under control at least a considerable amount of the bank deposits.

I do not believe 5 per cent. of the bankers of the United States would loan their individual money to any one fighting power—loaning their depositors' money is different.

I think this loan will develop the most disastrous situation to the American people that has come to them since the war started.

Human nature is, if you loan a man money, you become very much interested in his success, and if you see that he is going to make a failure you will do everything in your power to help him succeed—especially if there is any chance of your losing your money.

Mexico has demonstrated thoroughly that no one need expect assistance from the American federal government in collecting any loans which are made with foreign powers.

The idea of the large eastern banks of the country loaning the great deposits of the Middle West to take up the large loan as contemplated in order to help out a very small percentage of the eastern manufacturers who are making ammunition will not prove to be sound business.

Very truly yours,

C. K. WARREN.

The Evening Mail does not endorse this viewpoint. The situation is such that some constructive action must be taken to aid in maintaining our export relations. This can be done by a loan based upon American stocks and bonds as col-

lateral. Given such securities a foreign loan will be readily taken by the American investing public and will stand as a straight commercial transaction beyond cavil from any source.—*Sept. 16, 1915.*

FINANCIAL EXHAUSTION, THEN PEACE

The Bankers' Association of England has urged the British public to thrift and economy. In the last analysis the present struggle is to be decided by silver bullets. The vast resources of the allies are finally being brought into motion and must, according to this reasoning, win the day if the financial strength is available to keep them in being.

Already the war has altered all conceptions of what is possible in finance. The volume of money needed has been so enormous that the biggest previous operations in private banking dwindle into insignificance by comparison. The collective power of a nation stirred by patriotism has produced billions instead of tens of millions of dollars, and demonstrated how much stronger the nation is as a whole than any restricted corporation or group.

War consumes shells, guns, iron, steel, clothing and foodstuffs. It wears down railroad facilities, roads and motor trucks, and it kills and maims men. To produce shells, guns and cannon requires the most effective factory capacity, and a high degree of industrial organization. New conditions arise in warfare for which there must be quick adaptation; the sciences must produce new devices. The nation that has the best factory system, and is quickest

and most skillful in applying scientific discoveries, proves its strength.

Habits of thrift, willingness to work long hours for the national cause, and to dispense with everything but the barest necessities; the vitality and breeding capacity to produce an excess of children to make up for human wastage, these, taken together, are far more important than accumulated capital, for these are the living dynamic factors, while capital is the static advantage which, if once expended in non-productive purchases, ceases to exist. European securities sent to this country in payment of ammunition and other war supplies deplete permanently the capital resources of the nation which has sent them.

An estimate of \$9,000,000,000 as the cost of the war for the coming year for England foreshadows a minimum national debt of over \$17,000,000,000. This means \$935,000,000 annually in interest charges. Before England could wage another war she must amortize this debt, which will require at least \$250,000,000 annually. Soldiers' and sailors' pensions will aggregate another \$225,000,000; in all \$1,410,000,000 of fixed charges.

Her normal budget for the last three years has been approximately \$900,000,000. In order to maintain her position in the future as a dominating empire England must keep a larger army, which will mean additional expense. She must broaden her system of social insurance and old age pensions, which will add to her financial burdens. The above items create an after-the-war budget of over \$2,310,000,000 yearly.

Can England, with 45,000,000 of population, permanently carry a budget of approximately two and a

half times the budget of the United States government, with a population of 100,000,000 people—a per capita charge six and a half times greater than that borne by the citizen of this country? If so, how much further can the burden be increased?

England's success in paying off the heavy debt after the Napoleonic wars has been pointed to as a precedent for the present situation, but the comparison does not hold. The end of the Napoleonic wars left England in practical control of the world's shipping, and international commerce at that time carried a margin of profit of from 50 to 100 per cent. instead of the mere handling charge that exists to-day. England led the world in introducing and utilizing the steam engine and the factory system of production.

Mechanical energy on a wholesale scale was, in England, brought to the aid of the human hand, and for almost two generations England alone was the workshop of the world. These peculiar circumstances created profits and opportunities which probably will never again come to any nation. The advantages that will arise from this war will come through the "super-organization" on a national scale of a nation's industrial energies, for it is becoming increasingly evident that modern industrial machinery is most productive when organized on a national scale. Recognition of this fact is the secret of the power of the German state and of German industry. After the war, with man-power impaired and industrial machinery deranged, a tremendous rivalry for commercial power will break out; and the times of fierce competition are not times of great profit, out of

which to pay debts measured by billions.

From the foregoing considerations it seems that the nations have reached the limit of their financial power because the burden already assumed equals, if it does not exceed, the taxing power of the state. This is true in a varying measure of all the nations involved. It foreshadows an early end to the war.—*Dec. 28, 1915.*

FINANCIAL GRATITUDE

Sir Edward Holden, the great English financier, tells us that "the government and people of the United Kingdom have been placed under a great obligation to American bankers for the magnificent spirit which they showed in buying straight out a loan of such magnitude." He is speaking of the Anglo-French loan of \$500,000,000 floated here.

Perhaps Sir Edward's sense of gratitude is enhanced by recollection of how differently England treated us in our hour of need. During the Civil War, R. J. Walker, who had been secretary of treasury under Polk, was sent abroad as special revenue agent in Europe to try to negotiate a loan. So bitter was the hostility of Lord Palmerston and Louis Napoleon that Walker had no success. But he found the confederate loan quoted on the London and Paris exchanges at par in gold.

That was in the days when British-built confederate privateers were destroying our merchant marine or driving it into British registry.

Well may Sir Edward Holden feel gratitude.

The most astute diplomacy of the war was that exhibited by the Brit-

ish and French commissioners who induced our bankers to advance to the allies \$500,000,000, protected by no deposit of American securities. At the time that our government was involved in grave diplomatic issues with both groups of belligerents, our bankers made a pledge of \$500,000,000 in American money that we would take no measures against one group, the allies.

No military success of the Germans and no diplomatic success in the Balkans is to be compared with the success of Anglo-French commissioners who, after staging on the west front an attack that gained nothing and lost 60,000 men, sailed away from our shores with \$500,000,000 of the money of Americans as hostages for our good behavior.

We begin to understand the deep and studied courtesy with which his majesty's government treats our notes on the freedom of trade and mails upon the high seas.—*March 7, 1916.*

"YOUR WARS IN FRANCE"

Those who see Sir Herbert Tree's great production of "Henry VIII." are struck with a passage in Act I., where are described the financial straits of England because of England's wars in France. The queen is telling the king of the general discontent through high taxation:

The subjects' grief
Comes through commissions, which compel from each
The sixth part of his substance to be levied
Without delay; and the pretence for this
Is nam'd, your wars in France. This makes bold mouths;
Tongues spit their duties out, and cold hearts freeze
Allegiance in them.

The king is impressed by the tales of unrest. The loyalty of his subjects is more important to him than the payment of his debts. So he repudiates them. He turns to Wolsey:

To every county
Where this is question'd, send our letters, with
Free pardon to each man that has denied
The force of this commission.

It is all so modern that one cannot but have a kindly feeling for the wag who, after Sir Herbert Tree had been called to the curtain, continued to applaud and cried "Author!"—*April 7, 1916.*

BRITISH AND GERMAN FINANCE PROBLEMS

The British government on Monday is to impose a special tax of 10 per cent. on income from American securities held by British investors. The effect of this will be to expropriate one-tenth of the value of these securities. It is expected that, to avoid such expropriation, British investors, who have thus far refused to give up their American securities in exchange for British war bonds, will now dig up their Americans.

The threatened expropriation is an interesting commentary on the difficulty of Great Britain to finance her vast purchases here. After these securities are mobilized and sold on the American market, what then?

The Germans cannot buy abroad. They are like a man in a closed room. He throws his money into a corner and then walks over and picks it up again. There is appar-

ently no limit to the number of transactions that he can make with himself. The door is closed and none of the money can blow out.—*May 27, 1916.*

ARMS AND CREDIT

It is interesting to observe the very close connection between military success and finance. We hear that wars to-day are financial, that bankers can and do hold in their hands the power to stop war. It is not true as to the war finances of countries which finance themselves. Bankers cannot refuse the last extremity of aid to their own government. Patriotism, public opinion and—in the end—financial conscription, all force them to render this support.

But bankers will support a foreign government only when its prospects for solvency are good, and military success is the best measure of this solvency. It happens that the allies are the ones who need foreign financing. They need American credit to pay for their huge purchases here. They do not attempt American credit except in connection with great military drives against the Germans. So with the British-French offensive last fall, which was followed by the half billion Anglo-French loan. And in connection with the Russian drive to-day we read that fifty million dollars has been loaned by our bankers to the Russian government. The pending French credit in New York awaits a triumphal repulse of the Germans at Verdun.

War is quite a military phenomenon, after all.—*June 16, 1916.*

A WISE CHILD

The new French loan has had a phenomenally easy and rapid road to travel. It was "out" Wednesday. On Thursday (yesterday) it was listed on the Stock Exchange before the subscription books had been closed.

Some children are born with silver spoons in their mouths. Some have to worry along with tin spoons, or no spoons at all, the best they can. Some loans have to welter about for months and years before they can be put through. Others are listed in a day.

It is all a matter of the judicious selection of parentage. Children cannot select their parents. Loans can make the choice, sometimes. And the French loan has proved an exceedingly wise child. It has selected its parentage with consummate skill.—*July 21, 1916.*

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

A great difficulty against which Washington runs when it makes any attempt to keep this country on an even keel of neutral conduct toward both belligerents is the fact that nearly our entire financial system is a stockholder in the enterprise of the allies.

The wide dispersal of the Anglo-French \$500,000,000 loan, the French \$100,000,000 loan, the \$50,000,000 of Russian notes, has permeated the banks and the moneyed classes of this country. Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

Whoever holds the securities of an enterprise is vitally concerned in its success, especially when, as in this case, success means solvency.

Any attack upon that enterprise comes to be regarded by the security holders as an attack on the solid foundations of society, on our civilization itself. A proper recognition of the impossibility of interested persons being impartial is expressed in our federal law that the Interstate Commerce Commissioners, who are to pass judgment on our railroads, shall not be chosen from holders of railroad securities. Such holding debars from the position.

The danger that financial participation in the war might ruin our neutrality as a nation was expressed by President Wilson in his proclamation of August 18, 1914:

We must put a curb upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

It was in accordance with this sentiment that, in this same August, 1914, the President told American bankers not to make a loan of \$50,000,000 to France. In the fall of 1915 an unsecured Anglo-French loan of \$500,000,000 was floated here. The reason generally given for allowing it was that our foreign trade could not continue otherwise.

The truth is that we could have forced the sale or mortgaging here of American securities and securities of neutral European and South American countries held in France and England. These securities have been thus sold or mortgaged to us since the Anglo-French loan began to be exhausted. Had we from the first insisted on sales of our securities or secured loans we should today have in our hands over a half billion additional of our own stocks and bonds and the stocks and bonds of neutral governments.

When we decided to finance the

only belligerent group to which we could sell, the great mistake was the unsecured loan. The mistake was not in the financial risk to the givers of the loan, for it is probably quite safe. The mistake was a national one. The mistake was to allow the financial interests of the country to give the allies half a billion of the country's money unsecured, for this put into the hands of England, with which we were engaged in a serious diplomatic controversy, a priceless hostage for our good behavior. This aspect of the loan was the great victory of the Anglo-French commissioners. It was the diplomatic victory of the war.—*July 31, 1916.*

ANOTHER BRITISH WAR LOAN HERE

There is to be another British war loan floated in the United States. As to its size there is no definite statement. It may be as big as the Anglo-French loan of \$500,000,000. There probably will be a lot of collateral hypothecated as security for the payment of the debt. This idea is not relished by the British. They consider the credit of his majesty's government sufficient guarantee. These are parlous times, however, and Americans are the only persons in the world with money to lend, so, as always is the case, the lender is able to prescribe conditions.

Foreign loans of this character may be pleasing to our vanity, but it is doubtful if they are going to do us any lasting good in their present form. The banking houses that handle them make immense profit and the interest is at a rate to tempt investors. But it never seems

to have dawned upon our financial leaders, or if it is known to them they have ignored the fact, that while we are stiffening and supporting Europe financially in the war game, Europe is taking care to safeguard if not to strengthen its grip on world commerce. Indirectly our money is made to maintain European control of international trade and prevent us from assuming the commanding position or control which otherwise would be ours.

Geographically and naturally we should control the commerce of South America. Praiseworthy efforts are being made by certain groups of men to promote good relations with Brazil, the Argentine, Uruguay, Paraguay and the other republics of Latin America. One of our banks has established a branch at Buenos Aires. A loan or two has been made to the Argentine government and we have been fed with promise of an enduring business.

Commerce follows money. The commerce of the Argentine is in the hands of the British because British money is invested in the Argentine.

Let us see where some of it rests.

Take the Argentine railroads, for example. The Argentine ranks ninth among the nations of the earth in railroad mileage. The principal transportation lines of the republic are the Buenos Aires Great Southern, the Buenos Aires Western, Midland Railway Company, the Buenos Aires and Pacific, the Central Argentine, the Cordoba Central, the Entre Rio Railways, Argentine Great Western and Argentine Transandine.

The chairman of the Buenos Aires Great Southern is David Simpson, of London.

The chairman of the Buenos Aires Western, Sir Henry Bell, of London, is a director of the Buenos Aires Great Southern.

The chairman of the Midland, Mr. Frank Henderson, is a brother of Lord Farrington, formerly Sir Alexander Henderson, senior partner of the London banking house of Greenwood & Co.

The chairman of the Central Argentine is Sir Joseph White Todd, of London.

The chairman of the Buenos Aires and Pacific is Lord St. Davids, of London.

The chairman of the Cordoba Central is Mr. Follett Holt, of London.

As with the railroads, most of the banks, gas and electric plants, the land companies and dock companies are under British influence.

Shares in Argentine corporations are dealt in freely upon the Stock Exchange in London. British ships carry Argentine products to Europe and transport British manufactures to the Argentine. To-day Great Britain is doing almost as much trade with the Argentine as before the war.

Has any one heard of the British selling their holdings of Argentine corporations to the United States in order to finance their war operations?

The Canadian Pacific Railroad, the greatest transportation system of the world as to mileage and potential possibilities, was built by an American, is managed by an American, has nearly 30 per cent. of its trackage in the United States, and is believed to be owned to-day by Americans, but is managed by British for British benefit and to American disadvantage.

Has any one heard of a British proposition to turn over control of the Canadian Pacific to American owners or to break down the tariff wall that strangles the free flow of commerce between Canada and the United States in return for the many hundreds of millions of dollars America has lent and is to lend to aid Great Britain in her time of greatest peril?

One of the largest oil fields of Mexico is owned by British interests of which Lord Cowdray, formerly Sir Weetman Pearson, is the head. Mexico is the next door neighbor of the United States. Oil is the fuel of to-morrow, more even than to-day. The Mexican fields promise to be the greatest of all producers.

Has any one heard of the English disposing of the great British company, the Mexican Eagle, to get funds for prosecuting their war operations?

The British have sold back to the United States a lot of British holdings in American railroads and American industrials, but they have guarded with jealous care everything which means assurance of British domination in world commerce.

This is right so far as it goes. Nations must be selfish so far as their material interests are concerned. By adherence to a fixed policy of subordinating everything to the good of Great Britain, to the fostering and preservation of British trade and commerce, the English have spread their business lines in every quarter of the globe, and have made Great Britain powerful and prosperous. British statesmen work with the one idea of the power, the prestige and the prosperity of the British Empire. British financiers

invest the funds of the empire with a design to expanding British commerce and British influence. They think of Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, Sutton, Newcastle.

America is passing or has passed from the stage of agriculture to that of manufacture. We are at the point where we have only a moderate amount of our farm production to sell to the outside world. We need our meats and our grains for ourselves. In fact, we import meats to-day from South America, and we have imported corn.

If our manufacturing industries are to develop as they should we must find broad markets for our boots and our shoes, our cotton goods, our steel, our agricultural machinery—everything we make—in every quarter of the globe.

We never can hope to do so, we never can expect to labor in this field except under a handicap while Europe owns the ships of the seas, the railroads of Asia, Africa and Latin America and controls the channels of finance.

The ships, the railroads and the banks make up the great vehicles of commerce.

How the wise gentlemen who sit in the council chambers and the counting rooms of Europe must smile when they consider the opportunity America has had and still has, but which American statesmen, American bankers and American business men do not see and have made no real effort to grasp.

How Downing street and Lombard street must gloat over the innocence of America that gives its hundreds of millions upon hundreds of millions at Europe's bidding and leaves to Europe the prize of the trade of the world.

It may be a joy to J. P. Morgan & Co. to earn through foreign loans in two years more than the late J. P. Morgan left as the result of a lifetime of activity; but what is there in that of lasting benefit to American industry?

Not a dollar of American money should be put out in the form of a foreign loan unless it means more business not only now but also in the future for America. We can afford to finance countries if such financing means opening up new trade for American industries, more work for American labor, more freight for American railroads, more cargo for American ships, more building of American vessels and more bills for American banks, but we cannot afford to apply the wealth that is ours to foster the monopoly of Europe in the field of international commerce.

We cannot afford to be fools. We have the example of our nominal ownership of International Mercantile Marine, with its dominance and direction by British interests for the benefit of Great Britain.

We have the example of our nominal ownership of the Canadian Pacific, with its domination and direction by British interests for the benefit of Great Britain and to our cost and detriment.

It is time to call a halt.

It is time, if we are to take advantage of the opportunity which is ours, to cease being the catspaw of European statesmen and European bankers.

We need some patriotism mixed with our banking and some business sense with our diplomacy. We need some thought in our Stock Exchange of the future welfare of American

industry as well as consideration of one-eighth per cent. commissions.

We need unity of purpose, co-ordination of effort, an appreciation of what the present abnormal situation in world affairs offers to us, and then the intelligence and the force to act.

We need financial statesmanship that will not permit us to drain our purse to our ultimate undoing.—
Aug. 14, 1916.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND FOREIGN LOANS

A reader of *The Evening Mail* asks us why the Federal Reserve Board has not intervened in the matter of foreign loans, just as the President has intervened in the railroad strike matter, for the purpose of compelling recognition of the larger interest at stake—the interest of the nation and the people as a whole.

It is pointed out by our inquiring reader that the true function of the reserve board is to voice this general interest as against the purely selfish interest of the banker, and to place our whole scheme of finance on a broader and higher plane than bankers' commissions and participations. To protect the public interest in this way was the theory on which the reserve board legislation was urged on Congress; it is the theory back of the rural credits law just enacted. Why then, it is asked, does not our Treasury department at Washington act with full comprehension of the vast possibilities for the promotion of our foreign interests, through the free use of our money resources by foreign nations,

soon to be keen competitors with us in the markets of the world?

The point made by *The Mail* reader is indisputably sound. The Federal Reserve Board has an undoubted right to a voice in the making of these loans and should exercise it. The day will come—let us hope not too late—when the reserve board's policies will be broadened beyond the narrow lines of commission house banking into the wider, more helpful field of statesmanship in finance. That is to say, the Federal Reserve Board, when it realizes its true function, will see to it, as the great government banks of Europe do, that the money of the people is employed in the broadest service for the care and promotion of the interests of the people, whether at home or abroad.

From the day that our vast western territory began to develop as the granary of the world, its progress was checked by the exorbitant demands of eastern bankers for the use of money to ship farm products to market. Year after year the ups and downs of the money market at crop-moving time were the football of stock speculation, and on more than one occasion involved the Treasury department at Washington in unpleasant notoriety. Its course, whatever it might be, was always the object of attack by politicians and speculators. The stock market responded feverishly to their manipulation. Farmers suffered, security holders suffered, until the policy of allowing eastern centers controlling huge sums of money to be the sole arbiters in the matter became too obviously against the public interest. Then came the federal reserve law, making it possible to meet the needs of the country without squeez-

ing money rates to exorbitant figures; now we have the rural credits law, which, despite its glaring faults, recognizes as a function of government the duty of encouraging the development of farm lands by loans under government direction.

We have thus made a fair start toward solving the problem of the most advantageous use of our money resources in domestic affairs through government co-operation; but a new duty faces the government as a result of the war in Europe, and a limitless opportunity to develop American trade and American interests abroad. What good to us is to be the money power of the world if we cannot use that power to be the trade power of the world? It will not long be ours unless we use it in that way.

The whole world is seeking our gold. We are no longer a debtor nation. The world owes us money and wants to owe us more. Herein lies the great opportunity for the America of to-morrow. Are we to lose it because we will not take advantage of the lesson offered us by the example of other nations? Unless we change our ways of handling the gigantic foreign loans we are making, America will reap little or no advantage, aside from seeing the interested bankers making their commissions and controlling highly profitable munition contracts. Their wealth as individuals is enormously increased; the nation's wealth and the nation's permanent industrial interests are not helped a bit.

It is little short of a crime against our national interests that the government should make no effort to clear the channels for American for-

eign trade through the medium of our foreign loans, however. Such loans would not be possible without the aid of the Federal Reserve Board, which, in essence, means without the great influence of the government in expanding credits. Why do we not say to England, as *The Evening Mail* has heretofore pointed out, that the loan to her will be made in return for a direct representation in the Canadian Pacific Railroad board? Every banking house that makes a loan insists upon such representation, or ownership. Why, then, should not this government ask the same terms of England or France or Germany—or any other nation that seeks to borrow from us? In the case of the Canadian Pacific, it would be wholly within our reasonable rights to insist upon representation in the control of a foreign-owned railroad that has one-third of its mileage within our borders. It competes directly with our own railroads, which are called upon to obey our more rigid

regulations, our high wage standard.

In a word, our money resources should be utilized in a national sense to develop and strengthen our place in the world. We should not withhold money from other nations, nor drive bargains as to interest rate, commissions and participations that are not creditable; that is the banker's part of the negotiations. The government's part is to see that American interests are directly aided by the transaction. We have many examples in South America of the wisdom of government participation in the terms of foreign loans. The trade of South America is practically controlled by England, Germany and France through their banking interests. Our merchants cannot make headway down there so long as our Federal Reserve Board goes no further in its activity in foreign loan matters than to O. K. the terms made by individual bankers and ignoring the higher interests of the nation.—*Aug. 16, 1916.*

Conditions in Allied Countries

CONSCRIPTION IN ENGLAND

If the war leads to the establishment of universal service as a policy in England, the benefits that England will thereby receive will go far to make up for the losses caused by the conflict itself.

The most successful nations in industry are those whose youth have the benefit of the physical training and discipline in groups that fit them for military efficiency. It would seem possible by a modification of the Swiss system to secure practical results.

The benefits to England would be enormous in every field of national activity.

One need only study the last century in the histories of France, Germany and Switzerland to realize the marvelous results that come from the "great outdoor university" that constitutes military discipline.

—Sept. 21, 1915.

FINLAND SEEKS OLD FREEDOM

**People of Grand Duchy, Bereft of
Rights, See Hope in Douma's
Stand**

By SVETOZAR TONJOROFF

Among the racial struggles that are being waged within the Russian empire, one of the most interesting is that which Finland is making for the recovery of its ancient rights.

From 1809, when Finland entered into a personal union with Russia by the election of the Czar as its grand duke after the defeat of Sweden in the closing phase of the Napoleonic struggle, to 1899, when Nicholas II. issued his historic "February manifesto," the Finnish people had been self-governing, and their rights had been secured by the coronation oaths of successive emperors.

In 1899 the Finnish estates, or separate houses of parliament, were stripped of all their powers except those affecting purely local issues, and Bobrikoff was appointed governor-general with plenary powers for the Russification of the country. The Finnish army, which up to that time had been maintained under the authority of the Finnish people for purposes of defense, became virtually an integral part of the Russian forces, available for use in any part of the Russian empire or for foreign wars.

Flood Land With Police

To facilitate the workings of the new system, Czar Nicholas II., who like his predecessors had taken the oath to maintain Finland's self-government, authorized the creation of a large Russian police organization in the grand duchy, supported from the Finnish treasury and designed to co-operate with the governor-general in the suppression of the national movement.

Against this policy the Finnish

nation protested in a manner unprecedented at that time, although a few years later tried with partial success in the struggle of the Belgian people for manhood suffrage and the prohibition of plural voting. Throughout Finland, in every industry, on every railroad, and even in some of the agricultural sections, a general strike was ordered and enforced with such success that in 1905 the Czar, as Grand Duke, issued a ukase restoring the liberties of the country in their entirety.

The organization of the first Finnish Diet under the new order of things, in 1907, demonstrated the progress which Finland, in spite of the dangers which had threatened its fundamental institutions, had accomplished in the direction of true democracy. The Diet was elected on the principle of proportional representation, and among its membership were 19 women, who took their seats in the chamber at Helsingfors on equal terms with men.

Few Illiterate Finns

As a background to this government of the people, by the people and for the people, was an educational system based on the most modern lines and designed to place the Finnish people abreast of the leading nations of the world. Illiteracy is practically unknown in Finland.

But this state of affairs was not destined to last long. In the period of reaction which followed the dissolution of the first Douma a new menace arose for the constitution of the grand duchy. Bit by bit, the Diet was shorn of its powers by decrees from the Czar's capital, until the country, despite the forms of de-

mocracy, was made amenable to government from Petrograd.

Most of the important functions of parliament were vested either in the Douma, itself struggling to maintain a precarious existence, or else were nullified by the power of veto, exercised by the ministry of the interior or other centers of authority in Petrograd.

But the revocation of rights which most seriously affected the Finnish people was the renewal of the order which took the army out of the control of parliament and made it, for all purposes except that of financial support, an integral part of the imperial Russian army, to be employed at the discretion of the ministry of war at Petrograd.

Finnish Judges Imprisoned

Against these measures Finland had a last line of defense—its judiciary. Judges of the highest courts protested vigorously against unconstitutional decrees from Petrograd. Failing of favorable decisions, the Russian government again and again imprisoned judges, tried them on the charge of enmity to the state and meted out punishment.

These protests by Finland, however, failed of their direct purpose. In the present war one of the most serious grievances of the Finnish people has been the employment of Finnish troops on the east front, despite judicial rulings of the principle involved in such employment as contrary to the wording and the spirit of the Finnish constitution.

Although they have found apparently irremovable obstacles at every point in their struggle with the autocracy, the Finns are confident of success as an outcome of the present world-conflict.

Their confidence is based upon the determination which has been shown in the past two months by the Douma to maintain its vigorous stand for the modernization of the entire Russian political system, and to the support which has been accorded to the Douma by some of the strongest men in Russia outside of the ranks of the bureaucracy.

Douma Gives Finns Hope

Among the items in the comprehensive programme advanced by the Douma is a demand for the restoration of the ancient rights of Finland, maintained by the Finns with a single purpose since their separation from Sweden and now swept away by imperial decrees.

The Finns, in common with all the liberal forces in the empire, cherish the conviction that the autocracy, under pressure of reverses, will realize the necessity of substantial concessions to the popular will, and that one of the first results of the struggle to be resumed by the representatives of the Russian people at the session of the Douma to be called next month will be the restoration of the Finnish constitution in all its vigor.—*Oct. 19, 1915.*

BRITAIN'S WAR TRADE

The growth of British commerce during the first year of the war, as shown by current statements of British banks and corporations, recalls the period of similar prosperity which Great Britain achieved in the Napoleonic wars. During the struggle with France, British ship owners acquired the carrying trade of the world, and shareholders of British ships and corporations

amassed fortunes while continental Europe was bleeding on Napoleonic battlefields.

In the present crisis history is repeating itself with impressive exactness. Something of the spirit that animated the commercial mind in England at the beginning of the war last year was indicated by the campaign to "capture the German trade," and was inaugurated with vigor soon after the first gun had been fired. That this slogan against England's foremost rival in the markets of the world has met with some measure of success is demonstrated by the jubilant statements of British banks and corporations.

On this side of the Atlantic there is food for profound thought in the fact that hampering restrictions upon American commerce on the high seas have accompanied this successful British campaign to capture Germany's world trade. The commercial opportunities arising out of the war belonged to America if to any nation.—*Nov. 3, 1915.*

FRANCE CALLS OUT HER BOYS

The intensity of the determination of the French people to keep up the struggle until a decisive end shall have been reached is indicated strikingly by the action of the Chamber of Deputies in passing the bill authorizing the government to call the recruits of the class of 1917—boys of eighteen—to the colors.

These boys, it appears, are more vigorous physically, stronger morally, cleaner-lived, better-bred, better-balanced than any generation since the Napoleonic period, as a result of the intensification and the

purification of the national life which have been born of legislative measure and patriotic appeal since the beginning of the war.

This force of 400,000 boys, grown to be men amid the stress of a gigantic struggle, France has decided to throw into the scales of war in the passionate hope of turning the balance of events. These are her dearest and her best, her hope of the future—the pledge of her very life.

If any evidence were needed that France is not prepared to listen to talk of peace at this juncture of portentous events, her latest decision furnishes it with dramatic force.

—Dec. 6, 1915.

THE BRAVERY OF THE IRISH

The Irish have met the Bulgarians—who would have dreamed it a year ago!—and have proved a match for the Balkan soldiers at their favorite weapon, the bayonet. The official report from London, in describing the escape of the Tenth division from capture or destruction on its retreat toward the Greek frontier, credits the achievement chiefly to the gallantry of the Munster Fusileers, the Connaught Rangers and the Dublin Fusileers.

In the three wars which they have fought since the fateful year 1912, the Bulgarians have shown a striking predilection for cold steel as a weapon of offense. At Kirk Kelisse, at Adrianople, at Tchatalja and at almost every engagement in between, the Bulgarian command, "Na nozh—at them with the bayonet!" has never failed to start the hardy, swift soldiery, literally a nation in arms, against the enemy with a dash and a reckless disregard

for death and mutilation which have won the undivided admiration of military observers.

And now it has taken the Irish to meet them at their own game—the fighting Irish who have covered the name of Ireland with glory and with blood during all the centuries whenever an appeal has been made to their responsive souls.

The matching of the Irish with the Bulgarians is to be explained on psychological grounds. There is a striking kinship between the two races in their songs, their belief in the supernatural and the ideal, their folk-tales and traditions. The sad note which the discerning ear detects in Irish folk-music is discoverable also in the folk-music of the Bulgarians, which always contains a tear concealed beneath the lilt. The Irishman, like the foe whom he has checked to the great advantage of a British division, facing capture or extermination, is quick, impatient, fiery, tenacious and careless of death.

Like has met like, and the Irish have gathered new laurels to add to the accumulation which the centuries have bequeathed to old Erin, the long-suffering, the undying. What a pity that two such gallant folk should be engaged in exterminating each other! What a pity that the Irish and the Bulgarians should have met, not with the hand-clasp of friendship, but with the murderous points of cold steel.—Dec. 14, 1915.

"THE SPECTER OF TOO LATE"

"I wonder if it is too late—too late, the fatal words of this war. Unless we quicken our movements, damnation will

befall the great cause for which so much blood has been shed."—*David Lloyd George, British minister of munitions, in an appeal for an acceleration of the production of munitions.*

There is something of world-wide pathos and significance in Lloyd George's plea to England, and especially to labor, in this critical stage of the great war. The lesson he conveys is of particular application to the United States. It must be remembered that it is the spokesman of the greatest industrial nation of the present or the past who is pointing out the peril of to-day to his countrymen. This peril consists in the failure of the vast industrial system of Great Britain to adjust itself to the requirements of the hour of fate. It is an admission of continued inefficiency after more than a year and a half of the most strenuous efforts to eliminate inefficiency that have ever been made by a mighty nation.

And the failure of the industrial branch of the machinery of that nation to do its work, when upon its work depends the very life of the empire, is a reflection of the inefficiency disclosed in other branches of the British mechanism—in a muddled War office, which has found it necessary to change commanders on the main fighting line in the middle of a campaign; in a bewildered Foreign office, which has been caught napping while Germany was opening up a way to Suez by diplomacy; in the entire social structure of the mightiest empire that history records.

Shall America take advantage of England's bitter experience, or shall we defer the vital work of organizing our resources—human and material—until it is "too late," and

"damnation" has befallen the great cause of our democracy?—*Dec. 22, 1915.*

AMERICA, AWAKE!

We can go to the trenches and say to the soldiers: "We are sorry we cannot get the necessary guns to enable you to win through in 1916, because trade union regulations stand in the way."

The other alternative is that we send to the kaiser and tell him frankly that we cannot go on.

Time is vital, time is victory, and time is life. There have already been 530,000 casualties, including more than 300,000 since the agreement between the trades unions and the government in March.

Victory is not possible unless the British workman follows the example of his French comrades and sets aside every rule and regulation that tangles the footsteps of victory.

The Russian retreat was due to the aid the German workman gave his comrades in the field by manufacturing an endless supply of guns and shells.

The French workmen have enabled France to successfully face this terrible machine.

This war is an earthquake which is upheaving the very rocks of European life.

All this chatting about relaxing a rule and suspending a custom is out of place. You cannot haggle with an earthquake.—*David Lloyd George, British minister of munitions, in a plea to British union labor urging a suspension of union rules in order to facilitate the manufacture of war supplies.*

The above utterances by the man whom England regards as the great leader in the crisis throw a piercing light upon one aspect of Britain's frantic efforts to repair the damage done by her unpreparedness. Another and equally vital aspect of the same condition of unreadiness for supreme events is suggested by the clamor which is raging about

the personnel of the Asquith cabinet. The cabinet is accused of inefficiency, of inexcusable delays, working sad havoc to Britain's cause; of incapacity to grasp big events and to deal with them in a big way.

Americans who think should draw a moral from this situation, bordering upon chaos.

First—It is criminal to send millions of men to the firing line and leave it to private interests to say whether these men shall be backed by the supplies without which their presence in the trenches is a form of suicide by orders from above. Every soldier at the front needs three men in the rear to see to it that he is furnished with the indispensable munitions in a plentiful and uninterrupted stream.

Second—Given the existence of such a system, working smoothly, and with automatic perfection, the nation must have absolute confidence in the management which is sending thousands of men to face death. That management must possess the ability and the far-sightedness which would justify such confidence—a confidence without which victory is impossible.

It behooves every thoughtful American to put to himself this question:

What must we do—what must every individual citizen do—to make certain that we shall have a government which shall deal efficiently with our men, our material and our factories when vital problems of existence shall press for a solution on any fateful to-morrow? We may already be on the threshold of that to-morrow.—*Dec. 29, 1915.*

"LOOK FIRST UPON THIS PICTURE AND ON THIS"

It is instructive to see how different men react to a crisis when it comes upon them. That response shows what the man is. It is doubly interesting to view the varying responses of nations to supreme tests.

A supreme test confronts England and Germany. The utmost of self-sacrifice and restraint are demanded from their citizens.

From Germany the news dispatches tell us that production of German breweries, long restricted to 60% of normal, has been reduced to 45% of normal, by order of the Bundesrath. From England we are told of the unexampled production and consumption of intoxicants. Fresh in every mind is the memory of the vain attempt, earlier in the war, to curtail drinking in the British Isles.

Is democracy a failure? Cannot a people of its own free will impose upon itself the restraint necessary for its salvation?

Now, Sir Alfred Booth, chairman of the Cunard lines, tells us that the carriage of materials for the breweries and distilleries of England is absorbing the services of the ships of the country on a gigantic scale. He says:

Before long the country may have to choose between bread and beer.

Is the democratic form of government doomed because to its citizens liberty means license and because they are unwilling to make the sacrifices of appetite necessary to guard their national existence?—*Feb. 3, 1916.*

THE GRANDMOTHER OF RUSSIA

There is a brave and gentle old woman of seventy-two, kept by the Russian government in exile in the Arctic circle, in a temperature which sometimes drops as low as 55 degrees below freezing. Her existence is apt to be forgotten by the world amid the roar of cannon and the fulminations of statesmen. Her name is Ekaterina Breshkovskaya. Her crime is that she collected in the United States, and took with her to Russia, a sum of money to help the cause of liberalism in Russia. Such activities are frequently regarded in the great northern empire, now avowedly fighting the menacing specter of Prussian militarism, as a high offense against the state. So Ekaterina Breshkovskaya—"Babushka" Ekaterina—was sent by a resentful and uneasy autocracy to the wilds of Irkutsk, where her voice cannot reach her countrymen across thousands of versts of snow.

She has been heard from again by her friends in Boston—this woman whom an autocracy found necessary to consign to the snows of the Arctic circle in order to stifle the pleadings of her heart for liberty, for justice. To Alice Stone Blackwell, who befriended her on the trip to America which proved her undoing, "Babushka" Ekaterina writes:

Every minute when I am out of doors I am followed by a row of policemen, and one of them enters the house and even the apartment where I am staying.

She is guarded with cruel closeness—this enlightened old woman whose eyesight is failing, and the great dread of whose life is that total blindness may bring the night

to her soul where her body is yet living. And yet, amid the spiritual mist which is closing upon her with the waning light for her eyes, this martyr to liberty—martyred by a self-exploited champion of democracy in its struggle against Prussian militarism—is cheerful with the cheerfulness of great souls which are strong in the justice of their cause. The gentle-spirited old woman who has frightened an empire writes to Miss Blackwell:

Do not be sorry for my eyes. The oculist says my eyes will serve me long enough when carefully used.

Long enough for what? Long enough for the days of snow-dazzling light which may yet remain to her. Long enough to read the letters from her friends which may yet reach her before those days shall have ended. Long enough, perhaps, to see her beloved people free.

And while "Babushka" Ekaterina is waiting for the realization of this hope long deferred, the government which sent her to that living grave among the snows is solemnly assuring Christendom that it is fighting for the cause of democracy against the menace of the confederated forces of militarism and of reaction.—*March 15, 1916.*

THE TREND IN RUSSIA

The resignation of Alexi Khvostoff as minister of the interior is an ominous sign of the direction of the political wind in Russia. When the appointment of Khvostoff to an important cabinet post was announced less than three months ago, every attempt was made by Russian official organs to emphasize the circumstances of his selection.

Khvostoff was a member of the Douma, who had participated in the criticism directed at the war office and the ministry of the interior for the shortcomings of the government in the conduct of the war and of the internal administration. The inclusion of this malcontent in the highest personnel of the empire was pointed out as an indication of the government's intention to admit the people to a share in the work of governing. The entrance of Khvostoff into office created, as it was designed to create, an impression abroad that the autocracy had been wrongly accused of a purpose to gag the Douma and ignore the people.

Khvostoff, however, quickly discovered that the inner ring in the cabinet had no intention of relinquishing any of its prerogatives or of permitting a representative of the people to do anything except lend his name to their irresponsible proceedings. His efforts to introduce something of popular government into the conduct of his ministry broke down against the blank wall of bureaucratic opposition. Like many good men before him, he found out that official Russian liberalism was limited to words and phrases borrowed from countries in which parliamentarism is a fact and not a blind for autocratic adventurers. So, bowing to the inevitable, he has relinquished his portfolio.

Thus ends another dream of the regeneration of Russia from above, and its reconstruction into a democracy by imperial ukase. And if conclusive evidence of the sinister significance of the withdrawal of Khvostoff were needed, it is to be found in the fact that he is to be

succeeded by Sturmer, the premier—Sturmer, the friend of von Plehve, of Kishineff memories; Sturmer, the man of Kishineff methods.—*March 22, 1916.*

A WARNING FROM RUSSIA

At the moment when the state and army chiefs of the entente are in conference in Paris, perfecting their plans for a closer co-operation for the remainder of the war, a significant drama is enacted at Petrograd. Selecting the time when the issues of the war, including possibly the terms of peace, are under consideration in the French capital, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, M. Sazonoff, lays a rough finger on one of the sore spots of the entente—the future status of the Dardanelles.

That important strait, which once was the main roadway of commerce and civilization, is not to be neutralized, M. Sazonoff informs the Duma in reply to a question. No agreement for such a neutralization has been made, announces the minister, and none will be made with the consent of Russia, he adds more significantly. It is not neutralization that Russia seeks. It is not neutralization that she expects from her two major allies whose fleets are cruising about at the mouth of the straits. It is possession that she will insist upon—not only possession of Constantinople but possession of the sea-way, without which Constantinople is of little value as the depot of Russian commerce.

And the selection of this moment to make the announcement is not the least significant circumstance of

the declaration. The conference in Paris is smoothing out the last wrinkles in the international situation as it affects the entente powers. While it is using the flat-iron of diplomacy on the international linen, along comes the plain-speaking Sazonoff with something that looks very like a threat to spoil the whole job. Lest the rest of the powers taking part in the conference should fail to apprehend the full meaning of his position, he takes pains to commit himself publicly before the Duma. Russia will have no neutralization of the Dardanelles—if she can prevent it.

Behind M. Sazonoff's little talk before the representatives of the Russian people is a bitter Russian disappointment with past performances and an apprehensive suspicion of present conditions. Russia noted with misgivings that, at the beginning of the Dardanelles operations, Great Britain seized the islands of Imbros, Lemnos, and Tenedos, with the Rabbit archipelago. By these seizures the British navy secured control of the mouth of the Dardanelles, a control so complete that even a seagull would be taking a serious risk if it undertook to fly in or out without leave of the British guns.

The islands thus seized were needed, ostensibly at least, for use as bases for troops and supplies during the Gallipoli operations. The Gallipoli operations ended, and still the islands which guard the gate to Constantinople and the route of Russia's commerce with the outside world, remain in British hands. This is a circumstance which was bound to produce intense irritation in Russia, especially in view of the fact that Russia could have been in-

trusted with the task of temporary caretaker of the islands after the Gallipoli adventure had been abandoned—and was not.

So now, in the last stage of the completion of a comprehensive agreement covering all points among the powers of the entente, Russia comes forward with her claim in an irretrievable form.

Will Great Britain yield for the sake of maintaining unity with her allies? Or will the traditional rivalry between Great Britain and Russia assert itself and move British diplomacy to an express denial of Russia's express claim?

Upon the answer to that question, if the entente is victorious, will depend the peace of Europe after the battle-flags shall have been furled at the end of the present conflict. For Russia is exigent, jealous, persistent and imperious despite defeats, and she will not be denied the achievement of an historic triumph.
—March 29, 1916.

CRIPPLED FRANCE

France is hard put to it to finance her continued enormous purchases of war supplies in this country. For the current fiscal year her indebtedness to us will amount to \$350,000,000 over the imports she sends us in payment. This \$350,000,000 must be provided in some other way. This is the present and pressing problem of French finance.

France can raise money to buy in France by floating domestic loans, or by simply printing paper. No further unsecured loan can be sold by France and England here; and they dare not sell a secured loan and so ruin the value of their first

unsecured issue of \$500,000,000. That \$500,000,000 is now exhausted. Great Britain will continue to pay us with proceeds of sales, in the New York market, of American securities which the British government has "mobilized" from British investors. France has no such fund of American securities to draw on. France has specialized on Russian securities, and there is no market for them here.

The difficulty France is having in arranging for continued purchases abroad is equaled only by the desperate need to continue such purchases. This is due to the economic victory which the German army achieved when it occupied and held the rich northwestern departments of France, which were both the industrial center of the country and large producers of foodstuffs. It is the situation in which this country would find itself if an enemy could occupy New England and shut off its textile plants, and occupy Pennsylvania and Ohio, with their coal, iron and steel industries.

German appropriation of 80 per cent. of the French textile and steel production has forced France to go abroad to buy its steel, cotton and woollens, as well as its direct war needs. It is a valuable lesson for America to learn the exact extent of the burden which this occupation imposed upon France. If France and her allies did not hold the seas, and so hold access to oversea supplies, she would have been forced to her knees in three months.

First, iron and steel. In 1913, the last peace year, France imported \$6,000,000 of iron and steel products; in 1915, \$71,000,000, so that the German occupation caused France to spend \$65,000,000 more

for steel than in the peace year. Also, in 1913 France exported \$59,000,000 of iron and steel or their manufactures; in 1915, only \$13,500,000, a decrease of \$46,500,000. Obviously, the real loss is this \$46,500,000 plus \$65,000,000.

One hundred and eleven million dollars is the total annual cost to France of German occupation of her steel districts.

Second, textiles. In 1913 France imported \$28,000,000 of cotton and woolen textiles and yarn. In 1915 France had to import \$207,000,000 of these commodities, an increase of \$179,000,000. Likewise in 1913 France exported \$141,000,000 of these textiles and yarns; in 1915, only \$33,000,000, a decrease of \$108,000,000. Obviously, German occupation of the French textile districts is costing France \$108,000,000 plus \$179,000,000, or about \$287,000,000 per year.

One item more. The occupied area is also a sugar, meat and wheat producing section. What France could no longer produce she had to import. From 1913 to 1915 imports of wheat grew from \$65,000,000 to \$82,000,000, an increase of \$17,000,000. Imports of wheat flour grew from nothing to \$22,000,000. Imports of meat grew from nothing to \$62,000,000. Imports of sugar grew from nothing to \$24,000,000. The total increased bill of France for these foodstuffs amounted to \$125,000,000.

The cost to France of German occupation, in these three items of steel, textiles, foodstuffs—this cost in the year 1915 was at the rate of \$523,000,000 annually. The first German blow put on France an annual burden of over half a billion dollars a year.

France has continued her very existence only because the seas were not closed to her. But an opponent that can land on America's shores will be one that will hold the seas. Then what will be our fate when an invader occupies the industrial eastern seaboard, including all our munitions works? Where shall we then turn for salvation?

We have ears and will not hear. We have eyes and will not see.—*April 12, 1916.*

THE CRISIS IN IRELAND

The seriousness of the situation in revolted Ireland is indicated by the comprehensive steps which the British government is taking to deal with it by force. Martial law is a measure of repression which British policy never has resorted to, in recent years, at least, without extremely good reason. The declaration of martial law throughout Ireland, after its local application to Dublin, constitutes an admission of the gravity of the problem which the British government is facing.

England may be expected to exert all the available force that can be exerted to quell the uprising. She realizes that the continuance of the revolt will produce a bad impression abroad; more than that, when the news reaches the trenches "somewhere in France" or even as far east as Salonica, it cannot fail to exert an unfavorable effect upon the spirit of the soldiers, Irish or English.

Therefore, it may be confidently expected that Gen. Maxwell, the newly appointed commander of the forces of pacification in Ireland, will act with all the power at his dis-

posal to suppress the uprising—within certain rigid limits. He will be greatly circumscribed by the necessity of avoiding any action that may appear excessively drastic. Too great a rigor against Irishmen at home would inevitably find no echo in the hearts of Irishmen who are fighting England's battles at the front.

Thus, by the political requirements of the situation, Great Britain is restrained from applying to their full extent the measures which may be imposed by the military necessities. John Bull is evidently headed toward a much deeper cleavage of sympathies and sentiment, at home and in the trenches, than the official bulletins from London have indicated so far.—*April 28, 1916.*

A TUNGSTEN MINISTER

Tungsten not only hardens steel, but keeps it hard at high temperatures where steel would ordinarily "lose its temper." Firing cannon makes them hot, and those that are best tungstenized can stand the most, and the most frequent firing.

At the beginning of the war most of the world's supply of tungsten was produced by England's colonies, although a considerable amount has been found in the United States. But England found herself without reducing plants for isolating the metal from its ore and, realizing the immense importance of tungsten in modern warfare, took immediate steps to protect the supply on hand and superintend all future production.

A definite place was created in the war department for Mr. T. R. Phillips, who was commissioned to

act practically as a sub-minister of munitions, specializing in tungsten. He was to do nothing else besides acquainting himself thoroughly with the world tungsten situation and see that not an ounce of British tungsten should be wasted. Reduction plants were started immediately, under the direction and control of the "tungsten minister," as Mr. Phillips might be called, and England escaped what might have been a national calamity.

For such an apparently insignificant factor as the possession and ability to utilize a rare metal might easily spell the difference between victory and defeat in a modern war. England had been asleep to the vital importance of tungsten, content merely to produce it and let it be treated by private individuals, and mostly by German chemists who had been perfecting the process ever since Scheele and Bergman first detected the metal in 1781. Now she awoke with a shock, and took another leaf from the efficiency text-book of Von Moltke, concentrating, specializing and putting an expert on the job clothed with unhindered power to command his own line of work.

Can we, the United States of America, learn this capital lesson in national preparedness without having to run so close a chance as did England in the case of her tungsten? Our conferences of mechanical and engineering experts, offering their services to the government, are a hopeful sign indeed, but what we vitally need is a stinging realization that the day of the expert has come, nationally as well as commercially, and that if we are to keep up with the march of progress after the war we have simply got to learn

this lesson of concentration and specialization which all Europe is being licked into learning. Whether any jolt less jarring than war can teach us this remains to be seen.—*May 5, 1916.*

THE GERMAN VICTORY IN ENGLAND

Germany has won. The German idea has triumphed. Whether a German military victory occurs or not is a very small matter in comparison.

The German idea has finally definitely won in England, the great foe to be overcome. British muddling, slackness, self-indulgence, inefficiency are to go—confessedly to make way for the German idea, for what the scholar calls German thoroughness, what the scientist calls German efficiency, what the business leader calls industrial organization, what the politician calls the German state, what the military man calls the German army system, and what the ignorant call Prussianism.

Since the war began the English air has rung with beseechings that England, in the aim of creating substitutes for the lacking raw materials of warfare, should adopt the German spirit and practice of scientific research. It was finally done and the tungsten and dyestuffs problems were solved.

Observing the terrific disparity between the shell supplies of German and British on the French front, Lloyd George realized that a closer form of co-operation between government and industry was needed. He demanded a munitions ministry. He was made munitions minister, in absolute charge of the

British shell supply, and now in private and government factories has 1,900,000 men working under him. It is a late imitation of the German state which guides, directs and co-operates with all German industry.

And now, at last, universal military service, conscription, the central tenet of "Prussianism" which Asquith has said he would resign before accepting. He said England would lose rather than become "Prussianized." And now!

Nor is Britain ignorant of what she is imitating nor of the supreme worth of what she imitates. In March, 1915, a writer in the *British Technical Journal of Engineering* said:

The industrial expansion of Germany, although it is much newer than that of England, has been laid out on more systematic lines and in such a way as to render the country more nearly independent of foreign aid. Under the difficult and strenuous conditions of war are demonstrated the extreme value of system and method, and the advantages which they confer on a nation when it is cut off from countries from which it draws raw material.

Last Sunday George Bernard Shaw told us:

There are plenty of men in the trenches, especially in the commissioned ranks, and possibly a majority in the scientific services who admire the Prussian system.

They have no patience with British muddle, British slummock, British lazy hatred of order and intellect and learning. Their one hope of any good coming out of the war for their countrymen is that it will knock the nonsense out of them and compel them to organize in the German fashion henceforth.

Last Saturday Lloyd George, defending his demand for compulsory military service, in a speech before his constituents in North Wales, confessed that:

Time is not our ally. It is a doubtful neutral, and it is not yet settled on which side it will be, but time can be won over by effort, determination, preparation and organization. No alliance ever worked more harmoniously than the central powers pooling their forces. Let us apply their methods to our means and we shall win. Compulsion simply means that the country is organizing itself in an orderly, consistent, resolute manner for war, which cannot be run as a Sunday school treat.

It all means the triumph in the world of Prussianism, the German idea, German kultur, or whatever you may choose to call it. Reduced to its simplest terms, the triumphant German principle is one that is a part of every intelligent being. It is the spirit of co-operation, progress, prosperity, success. It is merely the good old American doctrine that whatever is worth doing at all—including war—is worth doing well.—*May 10, 1916.*

BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT

The world does not yet realize the magnitude of the service rendered to Britain by her merchant marine in this war. This merchant marine has done four great things. It has provisioned a population of nearly 50,000,000, absolutely dependent upon foreign-grown food. The merchant marine has carried British exports to pay for these foodstuffs and to keep British trade alive in a war-torn world. British ships have done nearly all the carrying of munitions between this country and the allies. Finally, the merchant fleet has performed unheard-of marvels as a naval auxiliary. Vast oversea expeditions have been transported and maintained at the Dardanelles, Salonica and in Egypt. Many thousands of Russians have just been

brought from Vladivostok to Marseilles. And, it must not be forgotten, the entire British expedition in France is an oversea expedition, its lines of communication being formed by British ships.

The British tonnage of steam vessels, according to Lloyd's, is over 19,000,000 tons. Recently Beresford in the House of Lords complained of the small ship tonnage available for trade purposes. Curzon, for the government, explained that 43 per cent. of the total British tonnage had been requisitioned for military and naval purposes, 14 per cent. was engaged in carrying foodstuffs and raw materials on behalf of Britain and her allies, while the remaining 43 per cent. was operating under licenses from the admiralty.

Even with the supremacy of the British navy, England and her allies would long since have failed but for the British merchant marine. It is vain to hold the seas if you have not the ships to use them. Yet the British task is a growing one. Imports into England are being restricted to indispensable articles; others cannot have ship room. The population may yet be put on rations, like the Germans. Nor is the supply rapidly increasing; British shipyards are full of naval craft being built or repaired. The mercantile output of the British shipyards up to date has made up within 11,000 tons the losses caused by German activities.

The requisitioning of nearly half the British merchant ships by the admiralty puts severe hardships upon a country accustomed to employ nearly all that tonnage on its commercial needs. Of the total of merchant ships 3,100 are employed on admiralty or military business. It is estimated that for every soldier

landed at Salonica, four tons of shipping are lost to the uses of trade. There are over 300,000 soldiers in Salonica. Further use of ships to carry munitions means decreased ability to carry nitrates from Chili to the British farmers and decreased ability to carry British coal for export. Coal is now as good as gold in making payments abroad and in upholding the exchanges. Collieries in Wales are idle for days at a time for lack of ships to take the coal away. There are manufacturers who must shut down because they cannot get vessels to bring them raw materials.

None but a merchant marine of 19,000,000 tons could meet the enormous tasks which England is meeting, tasks whose complexity grows each day. The losses inflicted upon the British merchant marine by U-boats up to date amount to only about 6 per cent.—June 2, 1916.

KITCHENER!

No one will rejoice because Kitchener is dead. Peace and justice he brought to the fellahin of Egypt, security and justice to the Soudan. From his youthful work in Palestine to the war ministry of a great nation, he had always been in the service of his country.

He had always served the purposes of mercy and humanity. His work in the great war cannot yet be appraised. In less than two years under his ministry Great Britain raised an army of 5,000,000 volunteers.

Twenty-two months ago he was war minister of an unmilitary people. He died having achieved an incredible transformation.

It can be said of him that his fame is unblemished. His integrity and courage are absolutely unquestioned. His masterly achievements in many parts of the world, crowned by his extraordinary work of the last two years, are not dimmed by the slightest breath of detraction. He was a knight *sans peur et sans reproche*.

For nearly three thousand years has the white race been supreme. Kitchener carried the rule of the white man, which we believe the highest form of civilization, to distant parts. As leader in that capacity, he was the representative not merely of the British Empire, but of all the white men.

It is the tragedy of this war that two kindred branches of the white race should undermine each other's power. More than one Kitchener who might have carried the white man's civilization has already been lost.—June 6, 1916.

WAR AS A MORAL FORCE

Great moral movements under way in all the belligerent countries furnish a significant aspect of the war.

The world is thoroughly familiar by this time with the spirit of sacrifice which the German people, from the richest nobleman to the humblest workman, have developed under the pressure of unprecedented events. And this sacrifice, including the renunciation of foods which have been commonly considered essential to the maintenance of life and health, have been made with a cheerful unanimity which is nothing less than inspiring.

In France the war has sobered a

people who had been regarded as volatile, as easily discouraged under the blows of adversity, as incapable of sustaining for very long a struggle in which the eagles of victory did not soon perch upon their banners. And the state of sobriety into which France has been brought by a great national crisis applies to life in all its phases. The French have eliminated forever the impression which existed throughout the world before the battle of the Marne, that they "are a people greatly devoted to the dance, with a fondness for light wines," as the old school geography used to put it.

The French people to-day, as their foes ungrudgingly admit, furnish one of the most striking examples of heroic attachment to a great principle which history has recorded.

Russia presents an astonishing illustration of the power of nations, as of individuals, to achieve a moral regeneration. At the beginning of the war the Russian moujik, oppressed to exhaustion by a grinding system of maladministration, was sodden with vodka. Millions of them were seeking the solace of a peculiarly virulent form of alcoholic drink, and were achieving physical and economic self-destruction. With an unprecedented access of intelligence, the government shortly after the outbreak of the war struck vigorously at the national vice. It not only went out of the business of vodka selling, but it flatly forbade the sale of vodka throughout the empire.

The results of this prohibition on a national scale are to be seen in a marked diminution of crimes—reported by one court as 62 per cent.—and by a notable increase in the working powers and the earning

capacity of the farmers and the laboring men.

England, too, is responding to the call for a national mending of ways. The extravagant scale of living and the lack of thrift among the masses of the British people are so near an approach to the state of mind in the average American community toward these essential details of life that England's process of regeneration is of peculiar interest to Americans.

As one of the means of raising money for the purposes of the war, the British government is issuing bonds of the denomination of 15 shillings and sixpence (\$3.87), for the special benefit of working people. And the floating of these bonds has been made the occasion of a national campaign for the promotion of thrift which is affecting all classes of British society. Women of the working classes, enriched by highly paid employment in munition factories, as well as women of the nobility, are developing habits of thrift that are affecting the national character. Fewer and less elaborate clothes, simpler living, the elimination of the use of the automobile for pleasure riding among the rich, and a marked reduction in the expenditures for entertainment among the working classes, are outward signs of the spiritual change for the better which the English people are undergoing under the sobering and regenerating influences of the time.

Throughout the countries at war the same spirit of devotion has been evoked by the appeal of great causes. It will be a new Europe that American travelers will find across the Atlantic after the turmoil is over.—*June 19, 1916.*

SIR ROGER CASEMENT

Even those who radically dissent from Sir Roger's views of his duty will regret that he has been sentenced to death for his share in the ill-advised rebellion in Ireland. He was a distinguished subject of Great Britain. He has done good service to the empire and to civilization. His calm acceptance of his doom is the expression of his conviction that, in taking a leading part in the uprising against the government which he had formerly served with distinction, he was performing an act of patriotism.

Changes were needed in Ireland. Sir Roger Casement's belief is partly justified by the pressing measures which the British cabinet is taking for the amelioration of Ireland's condition. This new home rule movement is a direct result of the revolt for which his life has been declared forfeit.—*June 30, 1916.*

TOO LATE

The Senate resolution appealing for clemency for Roger Casement was not delivered to the British authorities until after Casement had paid the death penalty, it was learned here to-day.

The message was dispatched Wednesday afternoon and arrived in London that night. But, apparently due to the fact that the British government offices were not open until morning, the message was not delivered until that time.—*News Dispatch.*

This is a matter for prompt investigation. The question of interceding in Casement's behalf had long been pending in the Senate. On Saturday, July 29, that body debated and decided the subject. They passed

a resolution asking Great Britain to show clemency to Irish political prisoners, and they requested the President to transmit their resolution to the British government. Senator Stone, of the foreign relations committee, brought the matter up on that day so that, if the Senate decided to intercede, there would be ample time to get their message to London.

The resolution was passed July 29. It was not forwarded from Washington until the afternoon of August 2, when it was already night in London. It was delivered to the Foreign Office after Casement's death at 9.07 a. m., August 3.

Mr. Hughes has offered to him another striking example of the workings of our State department. It is well that Mr. Lansing has come back from his vacation.—*Aug. 7, 1916.*

WILL RUSSIA ABOLISH THE PALE?

The conscience of the world has spoken the word of humanity to some of the members of the Russian Duma in behalf of the Jews. Prof. Paul Miliukoff, the leader of the Constitutional Democrats in the Russian parliament, announces his intention to introduce in the Duma a bill abolishing one of the cruelist hardships ever imposed upon a race—the Pale. And this liberalizing act, Mr. Miliukoff admits, has been made politically possible by the effect which public opinion throughout the civilized world, and especially in America, has had upon the feeling of the Duma.

Among the powerful advocates of

equal treatment for the Jews in Russia are the late Count Witte, who visited America as Russian plenipotentiary at the peace conference at Portsmouth, and Baron Rosen, who was Russian ambassador to the United States at the time of Count Witte's visit and served as Count Witte's colleague at the conference.

During their stay in America both Count Witte and Baron Rosen had an excellent opportunity to observe the development of the Jewish race—many of them of Russian birth or antecedents. They also had an opportunity to sense the profound disapproval with which Americans regard the Pale, with all its horrors. They took back with them to Russia a realization of the heinousness of the policy which their country had pursued toward the Jews within its borders. Baron Rosen's public demand for the granting of equal rights to the Jews was one of the first signs of the working of a liberal leaven in Russia in the first year of the war.

Paul Miliukoff and Baron Rosen represent and personify young Russia—the Russia which seriously strives to take its place among the modern nations, as Baron Rosen put it in his famous plea for the removal of the disabilities under which the Jews suffer. But the mass of the Russian people, like the preponderating influences in the government, are against the reforms which Miliukoff is championing. It will be a difficult feat to strike the shackles from the wrists of the Russian Jews, if the task can be accomplished at all, so long as the autocracy remains in the saddle, bolstered up by European democracies for their own political purposes.—*Aug. 24, 1916.*

THE TEARLESS WOMEN OF EUROPE

But, as the train left, I looked at the host of women and girls who had come to bid farewell. I saw almost no tears, but there was a look of tender yearning, admiration, almost reverence, and, above all, of eager longing and mothering.

The foregoing is an extract from a letter S. S. McClure sends from London.

What courage, what nobility, and oh, what pathos there is in such a picture!

From the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from the Atlantic to the slopes of the Ural, the millions who are the mothers, the sisters, the daughters of Europe are sending their sons, their brothers, their lovers to die if need be, to be crippled perhaps, to shed their blood as blood never was shed before in all the world's history.

Glorify not the Spartan women.

The tearless women of Europe of to-day know all the bravery, all the fortitude and far more of sacrifice

than those of ancient Sparta.—*Sept.* 11, 1916.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

In the sneers that go up regarding the "conscientious objectors" to military service in Great Britain, it is likely to be forgotten that not all this class is composed of shirkers. The most striking example of those whose hearts would not let them bear arms against their fellow men are the British Quakers.

At the outbreak of the war the Quakers refused to enlist in the army and navy as fighters. It was not because they were themselves afraid to die. Far from it. They offered themselves for dangerous service on mine sweepers upon the seas and as Red Cross workers in the first trenches or in front of them. They would give their lives to save their fellow men, but not to destroy them.

"Life may be given in many ways," and the Quakers have not preferred the worst one.—*Sept.* 16, 1916.

Conditions in Central Powers

VERBOTEN

Germany is proverbially the land of verboten, forbidden. The word gets to look like the national motto to those who know just enough German to read signs and not enough of Germany to understand the institutions behind the signs.

It is verboten to spit in public places. It is verboten to play the piano in your flat after 10 at night. It is verboten to throw banana peels on the sidewalk or even on the street. Travelers in Germany laugh at these petty restrictions on personal liberty until they return to live in a flat or walk on the streets in America. Then they balance the two kinds of personal liberty.

The pernicious verboten spirit does not stop here. It is verboten to employ mothers for six weeks after childbirth. It is verboten to put into a street car more than the car can seat. Old age and invalidity insurance make it verboten for employers to use men up at forty and throw them in the scrap heap.

To-day they are wrangling in England over how to halt the vast increase in drinking. In Germany it has been verboten for any brewery to produce over 40 per cent. of its normal peace output. England's starvation campaign is met by Germany's making it verboten for any man to eat more than so much bread per week; there must be enough for all. Simple; and every man obeys, not because he is ignorant or servile

but because he has learned to bend his individual will before the common good.

Freedom in the individual man is the measure of his control over his "natural" self. He is free only when he puts laws of restraint upon his passions, appetities, lusts, subordinating them to his purpose, which is not enjoyment but attainment. If he does not master appetite, it masters him, and he is not free but slave. The athlete is not free; he trains and sacrifices. But he reaches the larger freedom of attainment.

So in social life. Freedom is the name for those self restraints which, by law, individuals contribute to the national purpose. These restraints, verboten, mean real freedom for all. The body politic, so trained and organized, is a body athletic. It can run and not be weary. It can conquer markets abroad. It can abolish all poverty, and half of disease, at home.

The old order changeth, yielding to the new. We shall see verboten all exploitation of the weak, the desertion of aged workers, the myriad forms of abuse of financial trust, the waste of national resources. This will mean less freedom only for those who now exploit the freedom of their fellow men.

This is Germany's message to the world. This terrible war has forced the world to look for the secret of her marvelous power. We cannot

escape or evade the issue. Each man faces the choice of self-indulgence or self-restraint and attainment. The nation faces this choice to-day. America will formulate its national purpose and subordinate to its attainment the selfish passions of individual gain and of individual freedom which means merely domination over those who are not likewise dominating us.—*Feb. 8, 1916.*

THE IMPLACABLE BLOCKADE

Lord Northcliffe, comfortably behind the firing line on the west front, cables us:

In view of the fact that the German stomach is beginning to cry famine as a result of the implacable blockade of the allies, I am awaiting violent explosions of German anguish on land and also on sea during the next six months.

Lord Northcliffe knows perfectly well the quarter from which German explosions of anguish will come during the next six months. He knows the fact which Judge Lindsey has just told the people of America: that the only shortage in Germany is a shortage of milk. The only persons affected thereby are those whose German stomachs are too young to do without milk. Lindsey tells us that half the civilian deaths in Germany last year were young children or infants, many of them carried off by the milk shortage.

What effect will this have on the outcome of the war? The effect can be precisely measured. Of the children now starved by the blockade, probably one-half are boys. Eighteen years from now the German army will have fewer candi-

dates because of British elimination of the infants of to-day.

As for the effect of the blockade upon the efficiency of the German army, Lord Northcliffe need only look about him at Verdun to be disillusioned. If he stays there long enough he will be able to send us reports, in his own thrilling English, of the way men can fight when their babies at home are dying of a milk famine.—*March 9, 1916.*

PRUSSIANISM

These days furnish a splendid commentary upon the widespread theory that the German government, an embodiment of Prussianism, is quite a different thing from the kindly, gentle German people, the people of Goethe and Schiller. The clear fact is that ruthless Prussianism, embodied in the imperial government is doing its best to make the kindly, peace-loving German people allow it to modify its submarine warfare to meet the views of the United States.

Every impartial observer writes from Germany that the obstacle to the attainment of a complete understanding between the United States and the ruthless German empire is the stubborn insistence of the German people and their responsible representatives in Parliament that the submarine campaign shall not be abandoned, but rather sharpened. The disciples of Goethe and Schiller—that sterling band of peace-abiding persons whom the allies would not destroy for all the world, though their medieval government must go—these German burghers want the submarines to sink every ship plying to or from England, no matter

what the flag and no matter who is on board.

The bloodthirsty government has to exert all its power to prevent the united political parties in the Reichstag from flaming forth into a demand that the submarines be unleashed. The German people have for over a year felt the pinch of strict self-denial, by which alone famine was avoided. Every textbook on international law, English or other, and every American note to England—all these tell the Germans that the British "blockade," by which starvation is aimed at the German civilian population, is illegal, indefensible and not a blockade at all. So these kindly Teutons want the same starvation aimed at the people of England, even if the only available German reprisal—submarine torpedoing of merchantmen—is also illegal.

It is interesting to see "Prussianism" obliged to champion the rights of neutrals on the high seas against the simple-minded German people. Does not the situation show the need of examining the sanity of some current opinions as to Germany? Moreover, the acknowledged extremity of the German government in pursuing a modified submarine policy contrary to the will of the German people ought to open all eyes to the fact that in Germany, just as in America, government in the last analysis is responsible to those it governs and subordinate to them.—*April 26, 1916.*

A MEATLESS GERMANY.

For many years a school of dieticians have been maintaining

that a meat diet is inferior to a vegetable diet for the production of the best brawn and the best brain. Individuals have practiced the preachings of the vegetarians with success, but never has a nation tested the soundness of the theory of life without meat. Such an experiment is foreshadowed by the announcement by Herr Adolph von Batocki, the newly appointed German food dictator, that for the next eight weeks civilian Germany will have to get along without meat.

The German people doubtless will accept the latest food restriction without loud complaint, as they have accepted previous restrictions imposed for the common good. At the end of the period of national abstinence from meat, German scientists will be in possession of valuable data on which to base scientific conclusions as to the wisdom or the unwisdom of the vegetarian theory.

Thus, out of the distress of war, results of the greatest benefit to the race may be achieved.—*June 6, 1916.*

THE "BLOCKADE" AND THE GERMANS

Nobody objects to the illegal British "blockade" because it is starving the Germans. Nobody knows whether it is or not; that depends on the outcome of the present harvest. Our government and our people protest against this "blockade" and propose to abolish it because it is a lawless interference with the course of international trade.

As for the Germans, the "blockade" is proving a boon to them. It is compelling them to make inventions utilizing native resources instead of imported. This is a gain for Germany, a loss for all those who sold to her, including the United States. The scarcity of certain raw materials has forced Germany to find new ways of making a given quantity of raw material turn out a larger manufactured product. This is industrial efficiency. The "blockade" has infinitely simplified the German financial problem, in that it has prevented them from buying abroad. They owe only themselves and are dependent for future credit on home patriotism, which lasts longer than the critical approval of foreign financiers.

Above all else, the "blockade" has forced the whole German nation, its labor, to accept the scale of living forty-five years ago. Meat, butter, sugar, delicacies of every sort, new clothing, are all luxuries foregone completely or wholly. The physical effect is good, so far as we can judge. The effect of two years of this self-denial will mean a vast increase in the competitive powers of German industry, possessed of a nation of laborers, trained to the simple life.

The saving power of that nation will be a new thing in history. Who has not said to himself, "If I could earn as I do to-day and live as my grandfather lived, I could get to be a rich man." A whole nation is going to find itself in precisely this position. Perhaps the "blockade" is putting the Germans in the position of being able to carry the whole heavy burden of the war debt, and feel it little.—*June 8, 1916.*

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GERMANY

By S. S. McCURE.

When I left Germany on April 26 the situation was this: Food was meager but sufficient, the only anxiety being the coming harvest, which no one could forecast. The supply of milk was about 60 per cent. of normal. There was over 95 per cent. the usual number of milch cows, but on account of a partial failure in fodder crops, and inability to import cattle foods, the supply of milk had decreased about 40 per cent. The health of the German people was generally above normal, including the men at the front. The most significant fact was the decrease of infant mortality, which both in Belgium and Germany was lower than ever before in the history of the country.

This was the situation the latter part of April. The latest definite news as to food and health in Germany is from Herr von Batocki, the food minister of the German empire, and the highest food authority, who said on June 25, just two months after I left Germany:

"There could be no talk of undernourishment among the people. Investigations, especially in the industrial regions, found the women and children looking healthy."

There were reports of food riots—always outside of Germany. I could find no traces of food riots. I found the German people absolutely confident of victory.

The latest information regarding the general situation in Germany is to be found in the *London Times* of June 22. I give herewith some quotations from the *Times* article, which will show that there was no

change in the situation in Germany between April 26, when I left, and the latter part of June, when the following article was written:

"An interesting description of present conditions in Germany and of the state of mind of the German people is given by one who left the enemy country a few days ago after a stay which began before the war.

"Since the days of mobilization in the summer of 1914, when a nation's manhood hastened cheerfully and with enthusiasm to the colors, there have been changes of temper and a gradual increase of inconvenience and actual hardship, but pride in German achievements and confidence in ultimate victory would appear to be still unshaken.

"There was more grumbling about food in February than is heard to-day. It was in that month that the pressure really began to be felt and the complaints were loud and general.

"A good deal is being written about food riots in Germany, but I never saw any rioting, and I think I can explain the circumstances which may have given rise to the stories. The distribution of articles like meat, flour, sugar and butter is regulated by the town councils or district boards. On a certain day a limited quantity of butter or sugar may be released for sale by a shopkeeper.

"The news is quickly known, and from every house, women, children and servants hurry out with their tickets to get a share of the supply. There is seldom enough to go round, and when the stock is exhausted a crowd is left clamoring outside the shop. Disappointment leads to angry words and there is a free airing of opinions before the people disperse,

but to call these episodes rioting is an exaggeration.

"Save that among most people the sinking of the *Lusitania* is now regarded as a mistake, there is nothing but approval of the German submarine warfare. The feeling is that, as England is cutting off food supplies, the government is right to take any measure it thinks fitting. The blockade is looked upon as brutal and uncivilized. In the eyes of the people the crews of the U-boats are heroes, whose bravery is held up as an example to the youth of the country.

Resentment against England is as strong as ever. The death of Lord Kitchener caused much excitement and satisfaction. At the house where I was staying the postman called in the morning bursting with the news. "We have got an Englander this time," he exclaimed, and unbuttoned and buttoned his coat with a fine swagger. Every German believes that the Hampshire was sunk by a German submarine.

"For the moment German confidence in the government and in the army and navy is, I believe, unshakable."—From the London *Times* of June 22.

Take it all in all, the state of mind of the German people and the situation as to food and health is the same as I have already described.

Absolute assurance of ultimate victory is felt equally by the people of Germany and England.—*July 7, 1916.*

GERMAN FOOD RESTRICTIONS

One of the best pieces of news which the week has brought across

the water is confirmation of the fact that babies in Germany are not starving for lack of milk. There is no one who will not rejoice at this assurance, even those who are such ardent advocates of a "blockade" whose sole pressure is on the civilian population of Germany; that is, the women and children. Along with relief over this particular phase of the situation, most of us will not restrain our admiration for the manner in which the result was achieved.

We read, in a report from the American embassy at Berlin:

It seems clear that through scientific management, conservation of the milk supply, even under the present conditions of restriction in production, prevention of waste, and restrictions, or, in some instances, abolition of the use of milk as a beverage for adults, and in the preparation of food for adults, the German authorities have succeeded in securing sufficient milk to cover the needs of nursing mothers, infants, children up to the age of puberty and the sick of all ages.

When this war broke, Germany was importing 7,500,000 tons more of fodder than she exported. It immediately became impossible to continue this importation, and herein lies the key to all Germany's food difficulties: meat, animal fats, milk. Home supplies of fodder were increased by an invention that turned an unexportable surplus of sugar into cattle feed, by a larger use of potatoes in feeding swine and by a heavy reduction in the number of swine, through slaughtering and preserving, until a larger new potato crop could be grown.

With the head of swine reduced, the meat demand turned to cattle.

The need of conserving them for milk supply forced the use of meat cards, and recently more severe restrictions, almost abolishing the use of meat among civilians until autumn. No one is dying for lack of meat, people do not die of hunger in a land with Germany's social power of organization and individual power of self-sacrifice. Until the present young cattle grow up and the out-turn of the present harvest is ascertained, healthy adults in most parts of Germany can have no milk.

Think what it would mean if the richest man on Fifth avenue could buy no milk so long as the east side had a single nursing mother, a single child, a single sick person, who was unsupplied.

Once Alexander the Great and his army were near the end of a long march through the Syrian desert. They were famished with thirst. A single tiny pool of water was found. It yielded one shield-full of water, and this water the soldiers brought to Alexander and his generals to drink. But Alexander took the shield in his hands and poured the water out upon the ground. He would not drink what his soldiers could not share.

For the present emergency, differences in wealth in Germany are largely eliminated; for differences in wealth mean differences in ability to purchase and enjoy. Some call the process an unexampled extension of socialism, enfeebling those whom it aids. Some call it the world's grandest example of all the citizens of a nation being welded into one by common sacrifice for a common cause.—*July 15, 1916.*

GERMANY'S EFFICIENCY AS J. J. HILL SAW IT

This country has produced no keener mind than James J. Hill. It is instructive to recall his description in 1906 of German industrial efficiency and the manner in which Great Britain felt that competition. It is instructive to note his appreciation of the national social value of the agriculture which Germany insisted on maintaining and developing, while Great Britain abandoned hers and became dependent on overseas sources of supply. This war is demonstrating new phases of Germany's wisdom in protecting her agriculture. She gains her reward in her immunity from starvation and in the value to her of the large agricultural contingents in her army.

In 1906, before the Agricultural Society of Minnesota, Mr. Hill said:

There are no more instructive studies in national efficiency than this. The German Empire has nearly 60,000,000 people compressed within a little more than 200,000 square miles of territory. She has not tied her fortunes to a single interest. Her manufacturing industries are thrusting themselves into the markets of every country. How to meet German competition is today the study of every intelligent leader of industry and every cabinet on the continent of Europe. It will be found that a large share of her world-wide success is due to symmetrical national development. Agricultural industry has not been slighted.

Behold a contrast that throws light upon the idle hosts of England's unemployed marching despondently through the streets, whose shop windows are crowded with articles of German make. Between 1875 and 1900 in Great Britain 2,031,428 acres, which were under cereals, and 755,255 acres, which were under green crops, went out of cultivation.

In Germany during the same period the area under cultivation grew from

22,840,950 to 23,971,573 hectares, an increase of 5 per cent., and the area given over to grass shrank one-third. While her foreign trade was making the great leap from \$1,800,000,000 to \$2,650,000,000, the yield of her cultivated fields per hectare made the following advances, measured in kilograms: Wheat from 1,670 to 1,970; rye, from 1,480 to 1,650; barley, from 1,480 to 1,950; oats, from 1,070 to 1,840, and hay, from 2,230 to 4,450. The wages of the agricultural laborers rose about 25 per cent. between 1873 and 1892, and have advanced another 25 per cent. since then.

This is the work of intelligence, of a complete appreciation of the national problem as a whole, of universally practical and technical education and of infinite patience. To agriculture as to other occupations will apply the conclusion reached by Prof. Dewar after a study of German industry and progress as a whole:

"The really appalling thing is not that the Germans have seized upon a dozen industries, but that the German population has reached a point of general training and specialized equipment and possesses a weapon of precision which gives her an enormous initial advantage." . . .

In the west of England, which was a great center of broadcloth manufacturing and of the weaving of other woolen goods, the output is less than a quarter of what it was twenty-five years ago. Germany is taking the cutlery trade of Sheffield. The German people, who have cared jealously for their farming industry at the same time when they were learning economy and efficiency in all other forms of production today lead the world, or any period in its history, in scientific industrial intelligence and systematic management.—Aug. 9, 1916.

ROOTED IN THE SOIL

James J. Hill's words on this page should serve to recall to this country the supreme value of our agriculture, compared with which all other forms of activity are of minor importance. On the solid basis of agricultural

production this nation is built. To increase that production is a duty that transcends the call for industrial development and the increase of foreign trade.

Over one hundred and fifty years ago Dr. Samuel Johnson, that human compendium of observation and thought, warned Great Britain of the dangers that menaced her from the threatened over-specialization in manufacturing, at the expense of farming. He said:

Of nations, as of individuals, the first blessing is independence. Neither the man nor the people can be happy to whom any human power can deny the necessities or conveniences of life. There is no way of living without the need of foreign assistance but by the product of our own land, improved by our own labor. Every other source of plenty is perishable or casual.

Agriculture alone can support us without the help of others in certain plenty and genuine dignity. Whatever we may buy from without the sellers may refuse; whatever we sell, manufactured by art, the purchasers may reject; but while our own ground is covered with corn and cattle, we can want nothing; and if imagination should grow sick of native plenty and call for delicacies and embellishments from other countries, there is nothing which corn and cattle will not purchase.

Dr. Johnson's words are as true to-day as they were when they were written. They point the way for this country. The agricultural credit bill is only the first of the measures which will help us in the direction we should travel. We still need good roads, education in agricultural and household economics, reclamation of waste lands. The nation has nothing to fear whose roots are deep in the soil. It has everything to fear when those roots begin to loosen.—*Aug. 9, 1916.*

SAVE THE CHERRY STONES!

Every one who has felt the scarcity of fats and oil in a disagreeable way on his own body, as we all have, will not permit the pits of fruits to be wasted. Ten cherry stones yield enough fat for soap to wash one's hands and face; one hundred cherry stones enough oil for a goodly portion of salad. The Red Cross and schools are gathering well-washed and dried pits of peaches, apricots, plums and prunes. The actual cash value of this nation-wide collection is turned over to charitable purposes. Therefore, collect your fruit stones. Allow nothing to be wasted.

The above communication of the German war nutrition department to the public tells a whole story without further comment.—*Aug. 24, 1916.*

THE GERMAN SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT

No matter what the outcome of this war, it will serve to center the attention of the world upon the marvelous attainments of the Germans in industrial science. The achievements of the German army and navy have their lessons for us, to be sure. But the vital lesson that Germany has to teach is that of the industrial efficiency, and the one most important for us to learn. We can and probably shall avoid a military conflict with Germany. It is wholly impossible to avoid an industrial conflict upon the markets of the world.

The German scientific spirit and method were wonderfully illustrated by Senator Smoot last week, in a debate on the dyestuff tariff:

I used to buy a great many coal tar dyes from Germany. I went to Germany to meet the people with whom I had done so much business. When going through the largest plant in the world, I was shown into the chemists department. Among the hundreds of chemists that were working at that great plant I was shown into a room where I was told that the chemists there had been experimenting for nearly twenty years to produce a dyestuff that would take the place of indigo blue. Our government used to specify indigo blue for soldiers uniforms; every government on earth used to do the same. Those enterprising German manufacturers undertook to find something that would answer the purpose of indigo blue, and yet which would cost less money.

While there I talked with a chemist, and I asked him if he had yet discovered an article that would take the place of indigo blue. He said, "Not yet," but I was told that those chemists were put into that room with but one instruction, and that was never to give up their investigation until such an article was discovered. No matter how much money it might cost, and no matter how long it might take, they were instructed to find something that would take the place of indigo blue.

What would have been the result if a manufacturer in the United States had thirty years ago undertaken to discover an article that would have taken the place of indigo blue? Why, Mr. President, perhaps he would work at it for six months, and if he had been a very patient American he might have worked at it for a year, but at the end of the year he would have said, "Oh, life is too short; I shall not bother further with anything like this."

And yet, we must "bother" in just this way. When the conflict is over, Germany will again set the industrial pace for the world, and it will be a pace still more rapid than before, quickened by the moral strength which comes to the people during the war.—*Sept. 15, 1916.*

TEAM PLAY

From Germany comes the announcement that Arthur von Gwiner has gone on the directorate of the Hamburg-American and the North German Lloyd.

Through him the shipping companies of Germany are to be linked up more closely with the agricultural and industrial interests of the nation, to work with a better understanding when the war ends and to plan with an appreciation of what is of greatest benefit to all. He goes on the directorates not so much as the representative of the Deutsche Bank, of which he is so high a figure, as the representative of the German people.

It would be well if something of this spirit was in evidence in America.

Who is there in Wall street fitted to represent the agriculturists of America, or who has even a slight measure of the confidence of the men of the soil?

Who is there in Wall street who has the confidence of the heads of the national government?

From Lombard street to Downing street the distance is short in reality and in feeling, and it's only a stone's throw from the Reichsbank to Potsdam.

But the distance from Wall street to Washington!

It is time this chasm of suspicion, opposition and hate were bridged.

This nation needs the spirit of nationalism nowhere more than in Wall street and Washington.—*Sept. 18, 1916.*

Conditions in Neutral Countries

THE TRAGIC FATE OF SMALL NATIONS

History of recent date is repeating itself with startling accuracy in the attitude of great nations toward their smaller brothers.

When Germany thought it necessary, in the opening phase of the struggle, to step over Belgium into France, she offered to the Belgians three alternatives—the granting of free passage through Belgian soil for the German armies on their way to northern France; the participation of Belgium in the war as an ally of Germany, or a declaration of Belgium's adherence to the cause of the triple entente.

Confronted with a choice, Belgium made the heroic decision to fight to the end for the maintenance of her individuality as a nation.

In the present phase of the struggle it is the entente that has offered a choice of the same three alternatives to the small nations of the Balkan peninsula. Bulgaria, facing a request which was officially defined at Paris as partaking of the character of an ultimatum, to declare her adherence, replied to the vigorous representations of the entente by taking the field on the side of the central empires.

Roumania is still waiting, and the allies of the entente are still pressing her for a decision on one of the three lines of conduct. In the meantime, on the Roumanian fron-

tier a Russian army is waiting to cross into Bulgaria.

Greece, also playing for time, is feeling the increasing pressure of Great Britain, France and Russia for an active participation in the operations, in spite of the privilege which she has already granted to the entente for the free passage of their troops through Greek soil—a privilege which Belgium denied to Germany.

Dependent upon overseas sources for many of her supplies, Greece, like Sweden, is suffering in her daily life from the power of the countries that control the seas. Her only way out of the embarrassment may be through an acceptance of the allies' demand for the active aid of her armies as well as the right of way which the allies have already acquired.—*Oct. 22, 1915.*

SMALL NATIONS IN THE GREAT WAR

The policy of reprisal declared by Sweden against Great Britain as a result of continued seizures of mail bound for Sweden brings to light the resentments which have been bred in small countries by the acts of belligerent nations in violation of international law.

Not content with the seizure of British mail as a means of giving expression to its determination not to brook further interference with

its communications with the outside world, the Swedish government has issued a decree prohibiting the exportation of chemical wood pulp, and by so doing has cut England off from its main source of paper supply. The effectiveness of this protest by deed instead of by words is indicated by the following comment on the situation by the *Westminster Gazette*:

This act of the Swedes is a reminder to those who have been urging a complete blockade of neutrals that these have a power of retaliation which may be even more inconvenient to us than the loss of our supplies. The paper difficulty can probably be adjusted, but only by concessions on our own side. Interference with neutral trade may not prove quite such smooth sailing as some persons fondly imagine.

In his recent speech from the throne King Gustaf plainly conveyed the threat that a continuance of the British policy of irritation would result in an abandonment of neutrality by Sweden. And in such an event Sweden would naturally align herself with the central powers—for the dominant factor in the mind of Sweden is the fear of Russia. That fear has been the basis of the international policy of Sweden for many years, and it found expression on the eve of the great war in a material augmentation of the military resources of the country.

And yet, with every opportunity of sounding the underlying sentiment of the Swedish people, and their tendency to regard at least the Russian partner of the Quadruple Entente with suspicion, British statesmen are pursuing toward Sweden the policy which has turned the sentiment of Greece, normally strongly pro-ally, into active opposition to the allies. They are driv-

ing Sweden into the arms of Germany.—*Jan. 22, 1916.*

RUSSIA AND SWEDEN

The value which Russia places upon a possible intervention of Sweden in the war on the side of the central powers is indicated by the public effort which is being made by the Russian government to allay fears of Russian designs upon the most powerful of the Scandinavian countries. Sergius Sazonoff, minister of foreign affairs at Petrograd, has this to say to Sweden in an interview given to a deputation of newspaper men:

It is evident that in Sweden, as elsewhere, there has been a chauvinistic movement. It is possible that Sweden may feel the need of taking measures for the defense of her frontiers, but we can declare categorically that she will not have to defend them against Russia and that this side of her frontiers is perfectly secure.

M. Sazonoff's declaration, however, is hardly likely to affect public opinion in Sweden, which for the past three years has worked along the line of preparedness for defense against a Russian attack. Back of that strong sentiment is a long national memory of spoliation by Russia, which culminated at the end of the Napoleonic period, when Russia occupied the Swedish province of Finland. That is a historic reason for Sweden's suspicions of Russia. There is also a racial reason why Sweden, if it should decide to enter the war, would enter it on the side of Germany. The Swedes are a Germanic race; their traditions are Germanic; the earliest appreciation of their achievements in art and letters came from Germany. The majority of the Swedish people un-

doubtedly look to Germany for the realization of their own political and racial ideals.

M. Sazonoff's assurances come several centuries too late to accomplish the results of changing historic hate and suspicion into love and confidence.—*Feb.* 1, 1916.

THE FATE OF PERSIA

One of the results of the war will be the elimination of Persia as an independent state. If the quadruple entente dominates the deliberations of the peace congress that will follow the conclusion of the war, it may be assumed, as a matter of course, that Russia and Great Britain will carry out the provisions of the Russo-British treaty which was negotiated before the opening of the present struggle. Under the terms of this agreement Great Britain recognized Russia's pretensions to exclusive political and commercial privileges in the northern part of the remnant of the empire which Xerxes raised to the pinnacle of power. At the same time Russia recognized England's pretensions to economic and political domination in the southern part of Persia—the part that lies nearest to India and to the Persian gulf.

On the other hand, if the central powers carry the day on the battlefield and enter the congress with the mandate of victors, it may be accepted as an axiom of common sense in statesmanship that they will define the exact status of Persia in the new order of things. That status will be decided, no doubt, in favor of Turkey. Turkey, as a Mohammedan state, separated from Persia only by a frontier and by minor differences in the interpreta-

tion of the Islamic faith, has advanced a claim to the right to exert a preponderating influence upon Persian affairs, external and internal.

It is highly probable, if not absolutely certain, that the central powers, in the event of their ultimate success in the struggle, will support Turkey's contentions in regard to Persia, and that that country will become, in effect if not in name, an Ottoman province.

Whoever wins, the termination of the semblance of an independent Persia will be one of the results of the crime of Sarajevo—a far cry, perhaps, but by no means the most inconceivable detail in the vast world changes that will follow in the wake of the pending world-nightmare.—*Feb.* 14, 1916.

SWEDEN, CHAMPION OF LAW

There is something that appeals powerfully to the imagination as well as the conscience of mankind in the gallant stand which Sweden has taken against British invasion of the sanctity of neutral mails. Sweden has a population of only 5,700,000, as against the 46,000,000 of the United Kingdom; a navy that could be shattered by a single British cruiser squadron; an army of 80,000 now under arms, as against Britain's host of 5,000,000 men in the field or in training camps.

And yet Sweden has taken up the challenge to the rights of nations which Great Britain has cast into the world's arena by her assumption of the right to seize, censor and destroy not only parcels post packages on neutral ships, bound from neutral countries to other neutral countries under the protection of

the flags of neutral sovereign states, but also first-class mail belonging to such countries and conveying legitimate trade secrets and personal matters having nothing to do with the war or its operations.

For months past the Swedish government has offered to the United States its co-operation in an attempt to enforce respect for the violated rights of neutrals. Once more, in a formal note to Washington, Minister Ekengren has presented the issue to the State department, and has urged joint action. These representations are based upon Sweden's realization of "the danger for the future if these rules (of nations), which are of infinite worth to civilization as a whole, are not preserved."

Sweden accuses Great Britain of a direct and unpardonable violation of the law of nations, as codified in The Hague convention. On this head the Swedish note to Secretary Lansing says, after referring to the seizure of parcel post packages, which are not under the express protection of that international instrument:

However, England's present practice of censoring also first-class mail sent by neutral vessels from one neutral country to another is an even greater violation of the rights accorded neutral powers by the rules of international law. It is not necessary particularly to point out how contrary this practice is to the stipulations in the above-mentioned Hague convention, which stipulations or rules must be considered to have been in existence even before the promulgation of this convention.

Failing to obtain the co-operation of the United States in this grave crisis—grave not only for Sweden but for civilization—the Swedish government will not give up the struggle to reinstate the shattered

law of nations. It is demonstrating to Great Britain that it can and will stand up for its own rights and for the rights of the neutral world.—*Feb. 19, 1916.*

ROUMANIA'S CONTRACT

The signing of a commercial treaty between a neutral power and a belligerent in time of war is not an event of purely commercial significance. No neutral nation would care to bind itself by commercial ties to a nation which faces defeat. The results of such an agreement would be too disastrous for the neutral signatory, which would be exposed to retaliatory steps by the victorious belligerent after the war, if not during its course.

By signing the new commercial treaty with Germany, in spite of the active opposition of the entente powers, Roumania has plainly intimated to the world its belief that Germany, if it is not victorious, certainly will not be defeated.

Apart from its political significance, however, the agreement between Germany and Roumania is of immediate commercial interest to America, and especially to the American farmer and the American banker. Germany in normal times buys enormous quantities of rye from Russia. By the amount of rye which Germany will now purchase from Roumania under the new agreement, Russia will lose a market in the future—for Great Britain, France and Belgium, the three other grain-buying countries of Europe, do not use rye in any considerable quantity.

Roumania in normal times exports grain valued at between \$100,000,000 and \$125,000,000. Most of

this surplus has been going to the western, as distinguished from the central, powers. If a way had been kept for the exportation of American wheat to Germany, the American farmer would have enlarged and developed a profitable market in Germany. This way was not opened, and Roumania now has acquired the German market by the commercial treaty.

Thus the American manufacturer who has been selling to Russia, and the American banker who has been financing Russian purchases here are confronted with the prospect of a diminution of Russia's paying power because of the loss of her only market for her second most important product—rye. At the same time the American farmer loses a market for his wheat—for it is very unlikely that the Roumanian-German agreement is not designed to govern the relations of the two countries for many years.—*April 14, 1916.*

SWEDEN'S NEUTRALITY

The dangerous stress at one point upon the heaving surface of neutral Europe has been relieved somewhat by the resources of entente diplomacy. Confronted for the past year with the possibility of an open clash between Sweden and Russia, which might have involved the entire Scrandinavian league, Christiania and Copenhagen are breathing easier because of the recent announcement by the Swedish premier that the relations between Sweden and the allies of the entente, and especially Russia, have been improved by assurances of pacific purpose received at Stockholm.

But the popular agitation against Russia is continuing in Sweden with a degree of intensity which is regarded in Norway as a menace of fresh complications. There is a general feeling of resentment among the Swedish people against two phases of entente policy. One is the interference of Great Britain with Swedish commerce, and the other is Russia's military operations on the mainland of Finland and on the Aland Islands. Of these two causes of concern at Stockholm the Russian operations are by far the greater irritant.

Swedish advocates of preparedness, among whom King Gustave is the chief, point out that the concentration of Russian troops along the Finnish border cannot be regarded as a pacific measure, especially when it is taken in conjunction with the reconstruction of Russian railways in Finland to correspond with those of Sweden in gauge. But the greatest grievance which the Swedes cite against Russia is the fortification of the Aland Islands. This archipelago, once a possession of Sweden, is only within a hundred miles steaming distance of Stockholm. The Swedish advocates of preparedness point out that a fortification of the Alands can be aimed at Sweden alone, and on the strength of that conviction they have increased the military resources of their country to an extent which is not publicly avowed.

British diplomacy, itself confronted with a difficult task because of Stockholm's protests against British interference with Swedish trade rights, has exerted itself in an energetic endeavor to smooth out the relations between the Russian ally and the Swedish neighbor. This endeavor evidently has met with some

success. The friction has been reduced for the time being, but the anti-Russian party in Stockholm remains firmly convinced that the issue has been deferred and not eliminated.—*May 22, 1916.*

SWEDEN'S STAND

Sweden has at last rebelled against the action of Great Britain in taking control of all trade between this country and the neutrals of Europe. England has been refusing to let American goods go to Sweden unless consignees would guarantee that they would not be re-exported. The purpose was to prevent any transit trade to the central powers. Sweden has passed a law forbidding any of her citizens from making any such contract with the British government, on the ground that it is an infringement of Swedish sovereignty and an insufferable interference with Sweden's right to trade, under international law. The new Swedish law revives and vitalizes the question of British interference with commerce of neutrals.

The crux of the whole problem is the right of Britain to stop non-contraband goods from moving to Germany. We denied any such right in our note to the British government of March 30, 1915:

It is confidently assumed that his majesty's government will not deny that it is a rule sanctioned by general practice that even though a blockade should exist and the doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory be rigidly enforced, innocent (non-contraband) shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition or confiscation.

And no claim on the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with these clear rights of the United States and its citizens as neutrals could be admitted. To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this government in the present circumstances.

This is precisely the ground upon which Sweden stands. Like us, she claims that Britain has no right to stop innocent (non-contraband) goods moving from America through Sweden to Germany. Like us, Sweden says that she would violate her neutrality if she acceded to any such action on Britain's part. Therefore she forbids her citizens to join the British admiralty in a lawless combination in restraint of international trade.

Has the United States similarly prevented its citizens from joining the British admiralty in such an illegal restraint of our commerce? Our packers shipped over \$20,000,000 of provisions to Scandinavia. The provisions were thrown into prize court by Britain and condemned in contravention of a direct protest from our government. The only condition on which the packers could get a cent in payment was to make an agreement thus described by the British government:

The settlement further provides that his majesty's government, in consideration of a sum of money paid to the packers, shall regulate the entire shipment by the packers of all packing house products to neutral European countries during the continuation of the war. The government considers this provision to be of importance.

This is but a type of illegal agreements in restraint of trade forced on Standard Oil, on our copper dealers, on our rubber and wool manufacturers.

All honor to Sweden. No American can fail to echo the sentiments of admiration for that brave little land voiced by Senator Hoke Smith in the United States Senate:

Mr. President, that splendid country, Sweden, those brave people, are standing out for their commercial rights. I want to reach a hand across the ocean and say, "We stand by you," not in a spirit of war, but in a spirit of courage and manhood; not in a spirit of bullying. What I ask is that we let it be known that we understand our rights, not to bully Great Britain, but to call on Great Britain to return to law, to return to the law which she has made, and give Sweden's great statesman the support that action on our part would furnish to stand out against lawless acts. I long to see those principles of international law that Great Britain and the United States together have given to the world fully followed by both nations; that they may mitigate the evils of war and help to strengthen the rights of those at peace.—*June 1, 1916.*

ROUMANIA NEARING A DECISION

The exact scope of the recently concluded agreement between Roumania and Germany becomes a matter of intense interest as the Russian offensive in Bukowina develops. If this agreement, contrary to the general impression, provides for military as well as commercial co-operation between Roumania and the central powers, then Austria is assured of a diversion in her favor by Roumanian troops operating against the Russian invaders. If, on the other hand, the existing agreement is of a purely commercial character, then Roumania is free to intervene on behalf of the entente. The psychological moment for the adoption of either course of action is apparently at hand.

The entrance of Roumania into the war on either side will be an important event, diplomatically if not in a military sense. Roumania can put at least half a million men in the field. Military preparations have been in progress in Bucharest since the intervention of Bulgaria in the operations last fall. All reports indicate that, so far as equipment and material are concerned, the Roumanian army is in an excellent condition to take the field. But whether the Roumanian army proves its effectiveness or not in the first stages of the operations, the adhesion of Roumania to either one side or the other will be rightly valued as the greatest diplomatic achievement of the war since the decision of Bulgaria to align itself with the central powers.

As the Russian troops advance into Bukowina, the pro-ally politicians in Bucharest are exerting themselves to bring about a declaration of war against Austria. Roumanians, rightly or wrongly, regard Bukowina as one of the unredeemed provinces of Roumania. Také Jonescu and his partisans are pointing out in these eventful days that with each day that elapses without action by Roumania the chance for the presentation of a valid claim to Bukowina by Roumania dwindles.

On the other hand, the pro-German camp is assiduously pointing out the probability that the Russian offensive may soon turn into a retreat, as it did last year, and that, in such an event, Roumania, as an ally of Russia, would find itself between the devil and the deep sea. As Roumania is determined to be on the winning side this argument continues to have much force at Bucharest.—*June 20, 1916.*

Peace

FOUR THINGS AGAINST PEACE

To the Editor of "*The Evening Mail*":

Sir.—In the admirable editorial written for *The Evening Mail* by a writer of great vision and insight four powerful influences continuously at work for peace are pointed out.

The four influences—motherhood, the Catholic Church, labor, and capitalism—are very strong, just as gravitation is very strong, dragging all the rainfall back to the ocean level.

But there are four forces working against peace, forces stronger than the forces working for peace, just as the evaporative power of the sun is stronger than earthly gravitation, which can only drag back what the sun previously lifted, and perhaps not even that much.

Instinct of Destructiveness

The first of the war forces is the universal instinct of destructiveness and pugnacity in man. Even the constructive instinct is first destructive.

Why did 10,000 people take the long trip to Carson City? To see two men batter each other with their fists for a few hours! Why, every year, do 30,000 crowd into the great arena at New Haven, with 3,000,000 more envious and regretful because they can't go? To see

twenty-two college youths batter each other into insensibility.

CONSOLATION

Visitor—It's a terrible war, this, young man; a terrible war.

Mike (badly wounded)—'Tis that, sor: a tirrible warr. But 'tis better than no warr at all.—Punch.

This is why several hundred thousand young men enlisted in our little quarrel with Spain. They craved the excitement of war! And the women are as intense as the men. In the Indian fight against Gen. Forsyth on the upper Arikaree the squaws squatted on the bank and urged the warriors on to death. In London to-day why do women wave white feathers at men on the streets? One poor wight, who had been refused enlistment three times, because unfit, was taunted into suicide. One young woman writes of her husband: "Harry is like a schoolboy enjoying a great experience. He says he would not be anywhere else for anything, and I agree. All men who are men should be out there, and I am delighted that he exchanged, and hope he will be able to remain until the end. He says discomforts make you enjoy your time off all the more."

I have before me the highly entertaining story of a "deplorable" French soldier, sentenced to two years' imprisonment—after the war—because he constantly deserted his own regiment (not yet in active service), taking his outfit with him.

But he was given a medal during the war because he was always in the thick of the fight with some other regiment.

I have also that wonderfully deep and pathetic letter of the German recruit who alternates pastoral reminiscences of the home farm with descriptions of the soldier's frenzy.

The fighting races of mankind are not yet pacifists. Their forefathers survived because they fought, and while extinction is no longer the lot of the meek, the fighting strain still dominates.

I am keenly sorry that my father died before the war occurred; he would have taken such an interest in it. I am keenly glad that I am alive while it is going on. To have missed it would have deprived my life of one of its greatest experiences!

National Resentment

The second great influence for war is the rankling sense of injustice and injury felt by every people engaged. It matters not whether the cause is real or imagined, the aching grievance is there.

The Serbian resented the occupation of Serb lands by Austria. Austria resented the murder of her crown prince. Russia resented the threats by big Teutonic and Hungarian Austria against the little Slavic Serbian brother. France and Russia resented the declaration of war by Germany. Belgium resented invasion. England resented the broken peace and broken treaties, and Germany resented European meddling in its allies' private quarrel and also the threat of a world combined against her.

Nothing smarts and galls like injustice, and as long as any people

thinks it is suffering from intolerable injustice and that it has a chance to win it will not lay down arms!

Fear of the Future

The third influence in favor of the war's continuance is the fear of the future. Belgium fears national extinction, France fears further dismemberment and imposition of staggering indemnity, England fears loss of her far-flung dominion, Serbia (like Belgium) fears extinction, Russia fears the fate of France in 1870, Italy fears fearful retribution, if Germany wins. Not one of these countries dares admit that it can lose. The blood curdles at the thought.

Germany most sanely fears not only annihilation of all German ideals of systematic expansion, as well of ideals to be secured by world expansion, but in addition fears six-fold punishment if the six allied powers win. What they separately and singly would like to do to her, Germany and all the world know; and all that stands between these plans and their execution is Germany's power not only to resist but to defeat her enemies. Her strong suit is not diplomacy, it is military organization and skill.

The old conditions have passed away, never to be restored.

Reconstruction Through Destruction

The fourth influence against peace is the hope of reconstruction through destruction. I have seen engines tear up in a single day hundreds of acres of green, flowering prairie sod. The cruel plows tore and rended, made the beautiful living green a waste of dead brown,

but the destruction contained the hope of future crops of wheat to feed the world.

Every nation has its instinctive inspired ideal for which its statesmen strive and its commoners die:

Deutschland über Alles!

Of these the Belgians were the most brave!

Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves!

Allons enfants de les patrie, le jour de gloire est arrivé!

Banzai! The orient for the oriental!

The Cross once more above the Crescent. Constantinople once more the capital of the eastern empire!

Italia irredenta!

Does any nation want peace not only with these ideals unrealized but sinking into darkness like a falling star?

Besides these four great war forces there are many minor ones—the fearful disappointment, the wounded pride, the desire for revenge that grows stronger with every added death, the fears of tottering dynasties, the blind credulity of those who think they have an infallible system, whether diplomatic or military.

From the beginning of the world down Mother Eve has not been able to keep her sons from killing each other.

From the dawn of Christianity the great Catholic Church has not been able to induce men to turn the other cheek.

Fear is more powerful than any labor leader—even just ordinary fear which prevented the Socialists from resisting military service in times of peace.

Capitalistic opposition did not prevent the American revolution nor the French revolution, nor our Civil

War nor the Balkan troubles, nor the present war.

At our very doors we see in a small scale and in a backward country what is happening in Europe on a larger scale.

How is motherhood bringing peace to Mexico?

How is the Catholic Church in that most Catholic country bringing peace?

What successful resistance has the starved peon offered to his own destruction?

What power do the enormously great capitalistic interests in Mexico exert?

What have the four great peace forces accomplished in Mexico? Nothing.

What will the four great peace forces accomplish in the world war? Nothing.

They are not forces for peace as against war, they are upbuilding forces when war is over, when the wilder instincts are sated and drugged! They are influences which retard before war begins!

After a religious war, a war for ideals is begun. It should be waged fast and furiously to a decisive end, to a peace from which to date a new era.

The giants, by their strength, helped the gods build Valhalla. The dwarfs by their cunning destroyed the gods. But the twilight of the gods was the dawn of humanity.

HARRINGTON EMERSON.

New York, Sept. 18, 1915.

A SIGN OF PEACE

"Freedom of the seas a debatable matter," the House of Commons heard again on October 13 from

Under Secretary Lord Robert Cecil. The reiteration of this statement, after the serious criticism of Sir Edward Grey's earlier remark, is the first definite sign that the minds of England and Germany are not so far apart that their differences cannot be compromised.

Bethmann-Hollweg and other German spokesmen have repeatedly stated that their battle was for the freedom of the seas. In this matter, it was stated, the whole issue of the war has been involved. Unless Germany has plans of conquest that cannot be compromised in a peace conference, there exists now an opportunity for a disinterested effort to end the war. Perhaps the opportunity for which our President has been waiting is at hand!—*Oct. 15, 1915.*

MR. FORD'S PEACE SHIP

Opinions may differ widely as to the practicability of the peace movement represented by Henry Ford's projected trip to the warring nations on board a peace ship. Some regard it as one of the most futile of all splendid ventures since the children's crusade. Others see in it the possibility, through its very idealism, of an effective appeal to the conscience of mankind.

On one phase of Mr. Ford's sincere attempt to reach the mind and heart of warring Christendom all men may well agree—that it is a tangible expression of the thought that is dominating the peoples of the world, with the exception of the council chambers of one or two mighty nations. That thought is one of numbing weariness of war; of a deep and passionate desire

that the slaughter of the race be stopped; of the time when the nightmare will be over and civilization will resume its interrupted sway.

As the author of a tangible expression of this profound universal thought and feeling, Mr. Ford is doing a service to his generation.—*Nov. 27, 1915.*

MR. FORD FACING THE FACTS

Two irreconcilable forces are in imminent conflict with the plan proposed by Mr. Henry Ford to call the warring armies out of the trenches by Christmas. These forces are the powers of the entente on the one hand and the powers of the Teutonic alliance on the other.

Is it conceivable that Great Britain would show the slightest disposition to lend a patient ear to any talk of peace while the Germans remain in Belgium, or while Germany shows not the most remote sign of a willingness to restore the kingdom of Belgium in its integrity, as demanded by the oft-repeated British declaration on the subject?

Is it conceivable that Germany would listen to any proposal to sheathe the sword before the acquisition of her irreducible minimum of conquest—a port on the English Channel, which she regards as essential to the security of her future share of the freedom of the seas?

Is it conceivable that Russia will prove amenable to any argument in favor of peace but the argument of army corps, while more than seventy thousand square miles of her territory is in occupation by the Germans?

Ask the women of France, Mr. Ford, if they are willing to surrender the richest part of France to the enemy who is now occupying it? Ask the women of Germany if they would consent to leave the task of their country unfinished after the enormous sacrifices which they have made?—*Nov. 30, 1915.*

MR. HENRY FORD

It is part of my daily work to read the editorial pages of two or three hundred newspapers. I have found only one newspaper approving his great venture. There is ridicule, sarcasm, scolding. He is the only man in the United States of great force of character, supreme ability and enormous wealth who has been willing to undertake a movement to crystallize and organize the deepest desires of all the peoples of the world. Let us imagine what might be done if the other masters of American achievement should combine with him.

Some years ago, when the indications of this war were first visible, I visited, as an editor, the capitals of England, France and Germany. It soon became obvious to me, as it does to any observer, that the basic cause of national animosities is the rivalry of the merchants, manufacturers and financiers of one country competing with those of another country to exploit the resources of the less well-organized regions of the world—Morocco, China, Asia Minor, etc., etc.

It was essentially a problem of co-operation or competition. Such a problem as faced the business men of America during the last thirty years, and which led to such organizations in America as the

United States Steel Corporation; and it seemed to me that, if the business powers of competing nations would combine as the various enterprises that were unified in the steel trust, war among nations could be avoided, just as war among steel mills was avoided.

There was one man, possessed of marvelous ability, in such work, and he further enjoyed a singular position of power and influence with the nations of Europe, namely, Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan.

I had a vision of the leading manufacturers, shipowners, financiers and publicists of the United States, England, Germany, France, Russia and Japan, to the number of one or two hundred, coming together and, under the presidency of Mr. Morgan, with a map of the world before them, agree on various spheres of influence, on territories where the interests of the various nations would co-operate, and settle by negotiation and agreement the conflicting aims and purposes, instead of by war.

England and France had settled their mutual differences after centuries of rivalry and war. England and Germany had made most encouraging progress in the same direction.

I saw a great deal of Mr. Morgan at Aix-les-Bains between my visits to the various capitals. He was somewhat reluctant to enter upon this plan, but he saw good in it. He finally expressed his willingness to co-operate toward the great end in view if our government would authorize him to act in this matter.

For reasons not at all connected with the feasibility of this scheme, this purpose came to nothing. In a recent conversation with Mr. Gary,

chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, he said that at an international meeting of the steel manufacturers held in Brussels the men present said that if they had authority they could settle the rivalries of the nations.

Would it not be possible to organize such a parliament even now? It certainly would if the men of Mr. Ford's standing and power of the nations at war and the great neutral nations should get together. At least hopeful progress might be made.—*Dec. 3, 1915.*

IT IS HERE!

The German and Bulgar armies may be crashing their way through Serbia, the Russians may be plunging desperately through the snow-drifts of their invaded country, the British and French may be exploding their mines under German trenches in Belgium and France; but while this devastating and tragic work is going on within the war zone, a mightier force than sword and gun is steadily taking possession of the minds of men throughout the world, shaping with compelling force the close of the terrific struggle. The blood-baited nations now engaged in destroying each other are not to be the final arbiters of their own fate. It is apparent now that the sober judgment of mankind at peace is to be the trumpeter that will sound the recall to the fighting armies.

The humanities of civilization are to triumph over the horrors of war, and the better, nobler impulses of man are to rise above the savagery of the battlefield. The world of to-day does not live by the sword; it

will not be permitted to perish by the sword. Slowly, at times almost imperceptibly, the influences for peace are multiplying throughout the world and shaping the destinies of the contending nations. The battle bulletins are no longer scanned as the index and forecast of war's end. Their daily boastings of triumphs and defeats have come to be regarded now as merely so many evidences of man's inhumanity to man. Unconsciously, the world has turned from the field of passion to the calmer field of peace for its new Appomattox. Armies of half millions and armies of millions may tramp the devastated countries over and score their triumphs in each other's blood as they will; but constantly looming larger as the controlling factor in ending this wastage of mankind is the judgment of the world—the world at peace—that war must cease.

That judgment has been formed.

Baron Eiichi Shibusawa, Japan's leading financier, voiced it in his speech at the banquet in his honor in this city last Wednesday; Judge Gary and Frank Vanderlip voiced it in their recent addresses to business men; the motherhood of the world makes its prayerful plea that its noble function and sacrifice should not be in vain. It must not be asked to give men to the world merely for slaughter.

The humanities are winning their way over the lust for blood and the lust for gain; from the high towers of peace, built upon saddened hearts and desolated homes, where tear-dimmed eyes are watching through blackest night, comes back the hopeful and inspiring word, now loud, now faint: "Lo, the dawn appeareth!"—*Dec. 3, 1915.*

A SANE VOICE FOR PEACE

A clear, sane voice comes from Switzerland, the stormless center of Europe's storm. It is the voice of Gen. Wille, the commander-in-chief of the Swiss army, one of the few first-class soldiers of the world, but a student of men and nations as well as of force and strategy. Gen. Wille bluntly suggests that it is up to the "two most powerful forces in the world" to combine to end the war. These forces he believes to be President Wilson and Pope Benedict.

"A united appeal from these two most powerful influences in the world," says Gen. Wille, "seconded, as it would be, by other neutrals, could not but be heeded by all the warring nations."

Gen. Wille knows the power this country might have if it would exert it. He knows, although he is not a Roman Catholic, the broad influence of the Pope, whose spiritual children are warring upon one another. Were these two forces combined as a center for the other neutral nations to gather about, it is unlikely, as Gen. Wille believes, that their mission would be in vain.

To many of us an early peace has seemed out of the question because we have been assailed by the cries of the Furiosos of Europe and America. To take them at their words, nothing will satisfy any nation engaged in the war except the unconditional surrender of the foe or his complete destruction. This is as ridiculous as the talk, at another extreme, just before the war started. There couldn't be such a war; it was unthinkable; Europe had not gone mad; cool heads

would prevail; it was only one of those crises, etc., etc.

But Europe did go mad, and blood-letting has restored a part of its sanity. Little stands now in the way of peace except about ten different varieties of pride. If a neutral combination could tactfully shelve that pride, the rest would be easy.

These warmakers are not demigods, these kings and kaisers, diplomats and general-staffs. Take away their studied calmness, their padded uniforms, their broad red ribbons and the babble of their trade, and they are just poor human things with limited intellects, shoemakers' chests—and heartaches. Nothing props them up in times like this but national unity. When that unity is for war, they are for war. When it is for peace, they must be for peace in spite of all their dissembling and circumlocution. But, like other humans, they need to be led.—Dec. 20, 1915.

FORD

Henry Ford is on his way home, apparently beaten early in his effort to bring about European peace. Apparently, we say, because Americans will refuse to attach much importance to the continuation of his crusade by others, no matter how many millions Mr. Ford may contribute. Ford himself was the spirit of the adventure, and the spirit may be broken.

The person most surprised at the unfortunate outcome of the mission must be Henry Ford. He is, as he always has been, a man of the kindest nature. He has succeeded in business, not by conflict, as many men succeed, but by kindness, ex-

pressed in the practical terms of fair treatment and co-operation. All his life has been devoted to improvement, whether of men, of birds, or of machines. It was his spirit of kindness that led him to sail away on what seemed a quixotic errand. He had no thought except that it was time for peace, and that some method—nebulous, perhaps—might be found to bring together the peace sentiment of the world. It matters little whether he understood conditions in Europe or not. He had a dream, and many things have come of such dreams.

Yet this much was certain from the beginning: That Ford could not succeed, or even hope to succeed, unless he was surrounded by people who dreamed his own dream, who thought of nothing but peace, who were willing to sacrifice anything—as he was willing—in order to bring peace.

Instead of having such fellow-voyagers, the luckless Ford found as soon as he had put to sea that he had shipped not Unity, but Babel. What he needed was encouragement, and he got argument. There was a mental mutiny against the gentlest of captains. So ready was the company to quarrel that it split upon the question of America's need for preparedness. So far as Ford's mission was concerned, this subject was no more germane than a discussion of predestination or pedestrianism would have been. If it hadn't been preparedness, it would have been something else, for these many minds wanted to strike sparks instead of uniting in one flame. Instead of hoping, dreaming and talking peace, so as to get themselves into Ford's own spirit, his guests reveled in the unholy joys of

individualistic conflict. The simple purpose of Ford was nothing to these geniuses, each with his or her pet plan. He was going over to bring about what must be a great compromise, a fusing of national minds, but the geniuses of the *Oscar II.* would have no compromise in theirs.

And the geniuses had their way. Every extraneous topic about which a quarrel could be waged was dragged into make a holiday for the comedians of the world. Perhaps it never occurred to these people that one thing—and one only—should have been in their minds. If it did occur to them they dismissed it as something that would dim their individual brilliance. Each wondrous personality must shine, even at the cost of the whole purpose of the voyage. Happy Columbus, who had only one Martin Pinzon!

So Ford has apparently failed for the reason that his companions lacked two of the most important things in the world, good sense and good manners. Apparently failed, but not so evidently that the failure may now be written down as complete. At least Ford made an honest effort, even though it was thwarted by the selfishness of those whose unselfishness he had taken for granted. At least Ford knocked at the door. If it swings open soon it may be because of his quixotism and in spite of the bitter fate that befell his venture.—*Dec. 30, 1915.*

THE TERMS OF PEACE

Belgium must be restored and indemnified for the damages it has suffered by war before the allies of the quadruple entente will put an end to hostilities.

Such is the declaration of the entente powers, transmitted to the Belgian government at Harve, after the conference which the statesmen of Great Britain, France and Russia have been holding in Paris. This action by three of the powers signatory to the treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium has the sanction of Italy and Japan, the two members of the entente which did not sign the agreements of 1831 and 1839. The declaration, therefore, constitutes the joint resolution of the five powers ranged against the central empires.

This definition of policy comes at a psychological moment of the war and of history. It comes at a moment when Europe, staggering under the burden of fast-accumulating billions of indebtedness, and bled white by the carnage of more than a year and a half, is crying out for peace. In such moments nations do not babble of trifles. When they speak, as the entente has, spoken, they speak with a sense of responsibility, with an appeal to the feeling and the conscience of the world.

To ascribe the declaration to the desire of the entente to reassure Belgium would be to invest a solemn international utterance with a character of triviality. The assurance to Belgium must be read in the light of an international situation beyond precedent. Germany has announced that she is prepared to consider terms of peace. In the document transmitted to the Belgium government the allies may well be taken to indicate the minimum of concession which they intend to impose upon Germany—if they can.

The terms of that minimum indicate that a great change has been wrought in the spirit of one-half of

Europe; that it stands now much nearer to the other half. Here is no talk of the crushing of Germany; no word of the destruction of Germany's defensive and offensive power; no suggestion of any hope of subjecting one-half of the civilization of the old world to the domination of the other half.

"Restore Belgium, compensate it for its losses, and we shall be willing to talk peace."

Such is the revised reply of the allies to Germany's announcement of a receptive frame of mind. It is a reply upon which it is possible to build hopes for the restoration of sanity in the councils of nations, for an end to the orgy of destruction.—*Feb. 18, 1916.*

CECIL RHODES'S DREAM

Not only from Germany, where Dr. Rohrbach talked of it with Mr. McClure, but from other parts of the world, come echoes of the suggestion of world union—a combination of powers so great that it would dominate the earth.

The thought is not new. William T. Stead had it to write of in his day, as H. G. Wells writes of it now. It has been a fascinating topic for the dreamer, this idea of a white man's benevolent rulership of the world. There was one man who tried to make it real. To Cecil Rhodes a great thought was useless unless it took living form. He was a man of glorious visions—visions on which most men are content to live. He was not content unless his visions took tangible shape.

He saw Africa as a continent that should be taken over by the white man before the black and yellow men should seize it. To transform

the vision of a white man's Africa into reality he literally forced his own government to send its flag into the jungle. Some who watched him believed him a pirate, an unscrupulous grabber of wealth, a breeder of wars. In his own mind, doubtless, he would have been a bloodless Napoleon, leading united white men to a vaster white man's world.

Rhodes looked centuries behind, centuries ahead. He saw the advantages that had come to the white races—accidentally or otherwise—through climate, location, literature, invention, religion and all the other influences that cause a people to go ahead or fall back. Behind the procession of Caucasian progress he saw the ranks of darker men, picking up as they plodded the benefit of the white man's invention. He saw the day, perhaps centuries ahead, when the darker races, armed with their copied knowledge, would menace the white empires. Against this possible day he planned a white man's union and sowed the seeds of it in the Rhodes scholarships, which would bring together the youth of England, Germany and America; youth that was particularly fitted, not only in mind and body but in the peculiar and equally important gifts of manhood and leadership.

It was Rhodes's idea that this would be the beginning of a movement that would result in a white internationalism. He believed, as he said in his will, that "a good understanding between England, Germany and the United States will secure the peace of the world; and educational relations form the strongest tie." There would be mixed with the Englishmen of Oxford ninety Americans, seventy men from the British colonies and fifteen Ger-

mans. For three years these men would be in daily contact.

Great dreams like this come true slowly. White nations are using their science to kill one another. Black men and yellow men watch and wonder—and wait.

Down in Matabeleland, on the top of a great rock which he hoped might some day be the capital of a white man's Africa, are the bones of Rhodes, the dreamer. Yet the dream is not forgot. Even now, in the midst of war, wherever white men meet, some one recalls it.—*Feb. 26, 1916.*

THE PEACE SCARE

Yesterday, between 2 and 3 in the afternoon, this country had an experience unique in the memory or history of man. In the closing hours of the New York Stock Exchange it had a "peace scare." Not only war stocks, but also standard securities like Reading, Canadian Pacific, Tobacco and American Woolens, dropped from one to three points. The world was informed that with our whole industrial power we had bet upon a long war, and we are now afraid we might lose.

The "peace scare" has passed. The news which would have lifted the heavy load from a hundred million hearts was false. The Stock Exchange breathes free again.—*March 21, 1916.*

RESTORING OPPRESSED RACES

There is hope for submerged nationalities in the purposes of Germany as outlined in the address delivered by Chancellor von Beth-

mann-Hollweg in the Reichstag the other day.

Belgium is to be restored, but it is to be a new Belgium, in which the rights of the Flemish people, denied by the Walloons, are to be guaranteed. As an earnest of its intention to rehabilitate the Flamands, the German administration several months ago reopened the Flemish university in Belgium.

Poland is not to be returned to Russia, but its national life is to be re-established. No longer is the Polish language to be outlawed; no longer is the Russian language to be forced upon the Polish people in their schools, their universities and their public institutions. By way of a beginning of this work of restoration, the Germans have already reopened the Polish university of Warsaw, suppressed for many years by Russia.

Courland and Lithuania in all probability will be annexed to Germany. Such an annexation would constitute an act of simple racial justice, which the Courlanders would welcome with enthusiasm. There was a time within the memory of the present generation when Courland was a German-speaking province in all branches of the administration. It is still German-speaking, despite the oppressive measures which the Russians have applied in their attempt to Russianize it. Like Courland, Lithuania is much more German than it is Russian.

By re-establishing the rights of suppressed nationalities in Belgium, Poland and that portion of the Baltic provinces which is under her control, Germany would eliminate friction in three of the danger-spots of Europe; she would extinguish three

of the sparks which, smoldering under the surface of the old world, have kept it on the verge of a conflagration.—April 10, 1916.

"RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE WAR"

In a public lecture at New York University Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, the famous English publicist and pacifist, recently spoke on "Reconstruction After the War." He outlined and urged the plan of ex-President Taft's League to Enforce Peace as a preventive of future wars.

The ideal situation, Mr. Dickinson said, would be the formation of a world state on the lines of the United States of America, its constitution modeled on ours, "the best that exists." Russia would be one of the states of this international United States, Germany another, we another. Each state would have two senators in the Senate, while representation in the lower chamber, the House, would be on the basis of population. Universal suffrage would elect an international president and he would appoint a Supreme Court and command the joint international military forces. But, Mr. Dickinson said, the very statement of such a plan runs upon universal incredulity and dissatisfaction. We are trained to think and act on national lines. Such a transformation is not practicable.

As this ideal is not attainable, Mr. Dickinson urges as a practicable step in that direction the League to Enforce Peace. America is asked to join this league, whose main principle is that its members shall first cease commercial intercourse and, if necessary, declare war upon any nation which attacks another without

first submitting its dispute to investigation and awaiting the results of that investigation before declaring war.

The League to Enforce Peace is a good thing for us to keep out of. Membership in it would obligate us to rack our economic structure and enter into armed conflict whenever any small state by its actions or its weakness invited aggression. This is the sort of entangling foreign alliance against which Washington so solemnly warned us. It is the sort of foreign alliance from whose necessity our isolated position protects us. It is all simply not our affair.

It is possible to appreciate the sincerity and earnestness of Mr. Dickinson without wholly agreeing with him. Not only does his ideal international state go too far, but his League to Enforce Peace also goes too far. At this stage of the world and of man's development we cannot hope to prevent all wars, nor do we desire to assure ourselves participation in these wars. What we can do is to see to it that in future wars those who fight shall injure only themselves.

To attain this end what we need is a League to Enforce Open Sea Routes in Wartime. This means that we invite the nations of the world to form a league which will enforce the principle that private property at sea is inviolate in war as in peace. The members of the league would agree—as in the case of the proposed compulsory peace league—to first cease commercial intercourse with an offender against this principle of the free sea routes; then, if that did not suffice, to take up arms against the outcast. For America to take up arms in behalf of the right of our citizens to pursue

their accustomed vocations, manufacture and sell in their established markets, travel on the free seas without let or hindrance—this is a very different thing from taking up arms as a participant in European political quarrels whose origin, merits and outcome are none of America's affair.

If this principle of inviolate sea routes were established and enforced, there could never again be a repetition of the wrongs and humiliations forced on us in this war, in whose making we had no part. Torpedoing merchant carriers, seizing ships and confiscating cargoes, rifling international mail, suppressing cable communications, are all for the purpose of interrupting commerce on the sea and so starving the enemy. Their effect is to go far toward starving some neutrals and toward disrupting the economic stability of others.

For immunity of private property on the sea in wartime this government has contended from the treaty of Paris in 1856 to this day. Immunity of belligerent merchant vessels from seizure is another necessary corollary to the principle in question. The only object in seizing them is to starve the enemy by depriving him of his carriers. But this starvation process, in the interest of neutrals, is to be forbidden. Likewise is to be forbidden confiscation of the carriers on which neutrals have come to rely. It may not be generally recalled that the United States refused to sign the treaty of Paris in 1856 because it did not provide that enemy merchantmen should not be appropriated.

Nor has our government ever relinquished its position as arch-defender of the principle of free seas.

On July 21, 1915, Mr. Lansing wrote to Germany:

The government of the United States and the Imperial German government are contending for the same great object, have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom, *from whatever quarter violated, without compromise and at any cost.*

Apart from all desirable, idealistic but utopian plans of universal peace, the sure and attainable thing which the United States can contribute to the world is a League—for which other neutrals now long—to Enforce Open Sea Routes. If we cannot change human nature or national ambitions, we can at least see to it that those who choose to fly at each others throats shall be forever debarred from also wrecking a peaceful world.—April 15, 1916.

THE WORLD COURT

The World Court congress, which has been in session in New York, is a well-meaning attempt to accomplish the impossible, and even the undesirable. The central idea of the delegates is ex-President Taft's scheme of a league to enforce peace. Nations which join this league are to apply their joint economic and military forces to put down any nation which goes to war without submitting its cause to an international tribunal for decision or—in the case of questions of national honor—for investigation and report. The kernel of the plan is the maintenance of the status quo in the world.

All this would accomplish in-

ternational stagnation. Boundaries cannot now be arbitrarily fixed and maintained forever. Napoleon thought he had the map of Europe eternally laid out. He was wrong. When Napoleon fell the allies at the Congress of Vienna laid out the lines which nations were to keep. France, Austria, Prussia and Russia bound themselves jointly to resist revolution and change. It could not be. The nineteenth century saw the establishment of an independent Belgium, a united Italy, a new German empire, the Americanization of Spanish colonies. In this century the Japanese giant has awakened and stretched his mighty limbs, the Balkan nations have grown to absorb most of Turkey in Europe, and the Russian colossus, balked in Manchuria, forced his way half through Persia to the Persian gulf.

It is the law of growth. Nations grow weak and fall away, replaced by stronger and younger rivals. It must always be so. Who will dare to say that Japan now has territory commensurate with her national power, her vast birth rate? Who will care to sit on the safety valve of an international attempt forever to confine Germany in her present boundaries?

The United States has no business in the proposed league to enforce the status quo. Participation in such a league would mean the constant menace of being hauled into foreign quarrels in which we can have no possible interest. All our statesmen warn us against this. Are we to go to war whenever any blustering or decadent little state invites aggression?

To-day the interest of the United States is not in a chimerical league to enforce peace, but in an interna-

tional agreement to confine the damage of war to those who fight. This means a league to enforce open sea routes—for trade and travel—in war time. Perhaps in the future we shall be interested in a world court, not to enforce the status quo, but to modify the status quo in the same manner that it would be modified by war. Representation in this court would be on the basis of military strength. Its rule would be progression, not stagnation.

Mr. Taft and the legalistic minds that follow him cannot enforce the status quo for the corporations they serve at home. That is because such stagnation is contrary to the laws of life, growth, progress. No more can these men throttle life, growth, progress, regrouping in the international world.

Mr. Taft's position on this international problem recalls the reply which he gave to a voter who sought his advice on a personal matter in the campaign of 1912. This man had many children, but no land and no employment. Those who possessed the land and the implements for its cultivation had not furnished him, for the time being, with the opportunity for earning a living. To this man's question as to what he should do, Mr. Taft wrote him: "God only knows."

Under the provisions of the World Court idea as enunciated by Mr. Taft, some nation might ask the same question of him. Some nation with a rapidly growing population, little or no room to accommodate its increasing numbers, might point to some other nation of a dwindling population and a great surplus of land, with an abundance of the implements for its cultiva-

tion, and might ask: "What shall I do?"

And Mr. Taft's answer, framed by the policy of his World Court, would be: "God only knows."—*May 5, 1916.*

NO PEACE IN SIGHT

Secretary Lansing's explicit denial of the persistent rumors that a definite move had been made for peace in Europe will not come as a surprise to anybody who is familiar with the trend of events overseas. And the best reason for assuming that negotiations for the termination of hostilities are impossible at present is to be found in the statement made on Sunday by President Poincare:

"France does not want Germany to tender peace, but wants her adversary to ask for peace."

M. Poincare's pointed summary of the attitude of France came three days after the reiteration by Sir Edward Grey of Premier Asquith's previous declaration that the entente allies would not consider peace until Germany had been compelled to do three things:

1. Restore Belgium and make full restitution for all the damages that have been suffered by the Belgian people because of the military operations.
2. Rehabilitate Serbia.
3. Abandon "militarism"—that is to say, disarm.

These three points in the treaty of peace which the entente allies profess themselves as willing to sign are once more indorsed by M. Poincare in his latest declaration of what France and her allies regard as reasonable terms. The merest glance

at the military position which Germany occupies up to date will suffice to dispel any impression that she might be willing to accede to the entente's outline of the "irreducible minimum" of its desires.

The plain fact is that as long as the entente holds to its present uncompromising attitude, just so long will Europe continue to bleed. The terms which the entente is seeking to impose upon Germany differ in no respect from those which an undisputed victor might impose upon an enemy who has been beaten to his knees. That Germany is far from being in any position even approaching defeat at the hands of the entente allies can be easily seen on the map of Europe. That there are even some Britons who recognize that Germany holds the unquestionable advantage of her enemies in every respect save sea-control, and that she is seriously disputing sea-control, is indicated by the following summary of the international situation by Dr. E. J. Dillion, political correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph*:

Since October, 1915, the balance of war is decidedly against us. In fact, the enemy has conquered allied territory greater in extent than the German empire. And he is holding it, too, with a firm grip, while we are wrangling about "bargains, married men and other puerilities." On the water we are happily more fortunate. None the less even there the conditions have changed to our detriment. "Britannia Rules the Waves" has to be sung in a lower key than ever before. * * * Our loss of tonnage is disquieting. A curious inquirer who should count the ships sunk since the opening of the campaign would arrive at noteworthy results. An acquaintance of mine who claims to have done this approximately sets down the loss of commercial shipping since the beginning of the struggle at over 6,000,000.

Until a more objective view of these facts prevails, there can be no peace in Europe.—*May 16, 1916.*

THE PEACE LEAGUE

It is vain to try to stigmatize as lovers of the sword those who do not believe in the League to Enforce Peace. It is opposed by those who love peace but who know history, and who know the wide difference that separates the relations between citizens from the relations between nations themselves.

This league aspires to be an association of powers pledged to use their joint military force to suppress any nation that refuses to submit to the league's court of investigation and arbitration all questions that cannot be otherwise settled with other nations. The league could not operate otherwise than to guarantee the status quo in Europe, and participation in this guarantee would mean for America not peace but a sword.

A nation cannot grow in territory if its demand for growth is to be passed upon by its rivals. A judge of this international court could not vote against the vital interests of his country and those vital interests require that its rival shall not grow in territory and power. To undertake to say that present boundaries shall be permanent is for us to sit on a safety valve of a great engine in which we have no direct interest. It is to participate in European alliances against which our statesmen have all warned us. It is to join in the system that in vain has tried to maintain the balance of power abroad.

It is audacious to say that there

would be no war if we were members of such a league. Every one knows that, when this conflict is over, half the world—so far as fighting force is concerned—will refuse to join such a combination. The present central powers will refuse to join. Having witnessed this war, do we care to bind ourselves to participate in a carnage the next time that Serbian officials assist a plot to murder the heir to the Austrian throne and the next time Austria insists on punishing Serbia for the crime? What is it all to us? It is enough for us to increase by arbitration treaties our own immunity from war and to participate in the processes by which nations are getting to know and understand each other, the processes of commercial, scientific, artistic and social intercourse. This must run its course, and there must be some approach to international homogeneity of feeling before we can talk of any real analogy between citizens of a nation and nations themselves who are citizens of the world. The League to Enforce Peace is well-meaning. But it is simply premature.—*May 20, 1916.*

A LEAGUE FOR TROUBLE

During this week the League to Enforce Peace meets in Washington. The projectors of this league want the United States to join with some other nations in an agreement to use their joint military force to put down any country that refuses to submit its international disputes to the league's court of investigation and arbitration.

For America to join the league means for us to join in guaranteeing

the status quo in Europe, the present European balance of power. Worse than that, it means placing our national destiny for all time in the hands of an alien court. No matter how well-meaning that court might be, it cannot and must not see with American eyes. But we want to retain control of our own destiny. It is easy to show why.

In 1898 Spain had outlived her usefulness as a world power. The abuses of her colonial government in Cuba were such that they could no longer be allowed to persist in this hemisphere. The time had come for the last Spanish colonies to be either freed or differently governed, and ours was the task of liberation. We undertook and fulfilled the task in the face of a hostile world, which now praises us. No world court could have met this need, for, after all, to a court the matter would be Spain's private affair. We drove Spain out in obedience to something higher than human law, something which courts, intent on conserving every one's "rights," cannot—from their very nature—recognize.

When we were ready to build the Panama Canal, Colombia refused to sell us the zone of land which we required. What did we do? Something which could have been accomplished or sanctioned by no court. We recognized and upheld a revolution in Colombia whose purpose was to create a new state willing to sell us the canal zone. There is no legal defense for our act. But its result is the canal. And no legalistic mind can easily suggest another way in which the canal could have been attained.

One instance more. Will the advocates of this league tell us that

any international tribunal would for a moment uphold the United States in its exclusion of the Japanese? The law would not let us exclude them without also excluding all other immigrants. We have no legal "rights" to keep out the frugal Japs. It is not a legal matter at all; it is a mere matter of the preservation of our own civilization. Under the legal principle of international comity, the Japanese have a right to spread their civilization and spread it here, if other nations are allowed to do so.

Our destiny belongs in our own hands. We shall make ourselves strong, not in order to abuse our power, but in order to defend ourselves against wrong and to control our fate. By international treaties we shall limit more and more the field of possible conflicts. Europe was far on this path to peace when the war broke. The Entente and the Triple Alliance, the German-French agreement on Morocco and the Anglo-Russian partition of Persia needed only to be supplemented by Anglo-German and German-Russian agreements to remove the causes of European friction. The Anglo-German agreement was not far from being signed in August, 1914.

When this war is over, we hope that the European belligerents will supply the missing links in the partly forged chain of peace. But until that time we do not choose to sign an agreement to participate in every war in which they become embroiled.—*May 23, 1916.*

PEACE WITH SECURITY

By universal feeling England and Germany are regarded as the two

great protagonists of this war. Both are fighting for the same thing—peace with security. All Germany absolutely believes that Russia planned for this war, and was the immediate cause thereof. Germany wants security against an overwhelming Russia. Germany believes that King Edward VII. maliciously and purposely surrounded her by a group of powerful and aggressively hostile nations. Most of Germany believes that envy was at the bottom of this war.

All England believes absolutely that Russia planned no aggression; that this is Germany's war; that the doctrine that might makes right is fundamental in German national policy; that there is no safety from war in the world until Germany's military power is crushed. In each country there is an absolute body of beliefs that constitute the dominating state of mind that in each case is pervasive, universal and intense. These states of mind constitute the great and most powerful of the imponderables of the war. They can be removed only by years of fighting that will lead to complete exhaustion, or by the injection of some new force or idea that will produce the absolute conviction of *security* in the minds of the peoples of the warring nations. It is possible that the United States might be that new force that will bring that sense of security without which this war may continue for many years.

The President's speech has made vivid the idea of a union of the United States with the nations of Europe for the purpose of assuring peace with justice and security.—*May 29, 1916.*

ANGLO-SAXONS

One striking incident stands forth in the story which S. S. McClure Thursday night told of his experiences on the continent. It was not the marvelous tales of German efficiency in economic reorganization, the pathetic incident of those trainloads of dazed refugees from Galicia, nor the strange picture of fighting fronts where no living thing was visible, where you can scarcely find the artillery of your own side, to say nothing of the enemy's artillery; where men are killed without ever seeing a single foe.

The striking sketch which Mr. McClure drew was of a dinner with the general and staff of the Twelfth army on the Russian front. The American arose and proposed a toast to an alliance of England, Germany and the United States in the work of carrying forward civilization and peace. The German staff answered the toast with cheers.

In 1902, when Cecil Rhodes's will was read, it was found to contain provision for liberal scholarships for Americans and Germans at Oxford. These are the words in which he explained his gift:

The object is that an understanding between the three great powers will render war impossible, and educational relations makes the strongest tie.

It does the heart good to learn that amid all the horrors and hates of war the ideals of an Anglo-Saxon leadership of the world still lives. Its roots are deeper than the alliance and intrigues that fester around the outbreak of this war. That sentiment of a common destiny of co-operation, not civil strife, between these three nations, is in the blood.

Those who work to foment hate between England and Germany work against the Anglo-Saxon idea. The world needs both of them in full undiminished strength and sovereignty. British traditionalism and German rationalism are the two qualities which, if combined with the force and energy of the new American world power, will furnish the elements and set the pace for world progress. Enough of this talk of England destroying Germany or Germany destroying England. Either event would mean the same calamity as for one of them to destroy the United States.

In their hearts what do Germany and England want? Security. What does the United States most want to-day? Security. Can any man name a way so certain to reach this goal as by the realization of an Anglo-Saxon understanding? Or is there any other way so certain, so easy of attainment, for assuring the peace and progress of the world? It is an alliance for which our instincts cry out, an alliance which can be widened to embrace more extensive forms of internationalism.

The alternative? Germany seeks security. She finds it with us or elsewhere. If we shut her out from England and America in the west, she will turn to alien strangers in the east. No one who knows politics doubts that Germany can in the future achieve an alliance with Russia and Japan, if she will pay the price. Nor would the price come out of Germany's pocket. It would be paid from the coffers of civilization; the price would be the occidental abandonment of Asia.

No responsible thinking person wants to face such an eventuality. Germany belongs where she seeks

to be ; with her brothers in the west.
—June 3, 1916.

THE GREAT OBSTACLES TO PEACE

By S. S. McCLURE

I publish to-day, side by side, a translation of a part of Von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech delivered in the Reichstag the 5th of April, and two statements by Sir Edward Grey.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg expresses not only his views but his feeling in regard to Germany's enemies as the universal feeling in Germany.

The state of mind in Germany is that Germany is the innocent victim of a vile and malicious conspiracy of envious nations, who began to form a coalition against her under the leadership of the late King Edward VII. This war must be fought until the safety of Germany is so securely established that the tragedy of 1914 cannot happen again.

Sir Edward Grey's interview given to a correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* is a picture of the minds of all the people of England and France.

In each of the hostile nations there is a vast and constantly increasing mass of printed material, in newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals and books, that nourishes the respective states of mind and continually increases the obstacles to an early peace.

We, in the United States, are familiar with both states of minds, so it is not necessary to illustrate beyond the statements of Sir Edward Grey and Von Bethmann-Hollweg, nor should it be necessary to state that in each country the con-

tending beliefs are held with the most absolute conviction and sincerity.

There is one common desire—namely, *Security*.

It ought not to be beyond the ability of statesmen to give a real meaning to The Hague. And as there seems to be a growing feeling that the United States should join a group of nations that would exalt peaceful methods of settling international differences, we can confidently hope that in some fashion the entente of the nations of Europe, so nearly accomplished in 1914, may be advanced again and be the most lasting benefit of this war. The addition of the United States would insure peace and security for the world.

Yesterday, I received from Prof. Kuno Meyer, the well-known Celtic scholar, a copy of a letter to him from Mr. Roosevelt which I publish here because it is in harmony with what is best for the world.

The letter was written by Col. Roosevelt on the occasion of Dr. Meyer's betrothal to Mrs. Florence Lewis, and is now published with the consent both of the writer and the addressee:

Sagamore Hill,
December 17, 1915.

Dear Mr. Meyer—Wars pass, and international enmities pass also, in time—long or short—and friendships should be interrupted by them as little as may be. One of the very real griefs to me, in connection with the present contest, is that I suppose most of my German former friends will never be friends with me again. I am glad you will not be among them. I congratulate you most heartily; and if you and your betrothed, are ever near Oyster Bay it would be a pleasure to see you at our house.

Sincerely yours,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

—June 10, 1916.

MR. BRYAN'S SPEECH ON PACIFISM BEFORE THE TEACHERS

By S. S. McCLURE

One's first impression of Mr. Bryan's address before the many thousands of teachers from all over the United States is that it is prehistoric. It has a far-away, unreal sound.

That Mr. Bryan should utter such views as he did is not strange. His mind is detached from realities. He lives mostly in the fourth dimension. But it is important and thought-provoking that his ideas were received with the most chasteous applause by this representative body of the teachers of the United States.

Mr. Bryan's pacifism is prehistoric only in the sense that he is living in the unreal atmosphere of two years ago. Mr. Bryan never learns. He is a huge baby. He has the appearance of a man, with the artless mind of the infant.

When he was Secretary of State and a dignitary of the Catholic church begged him to take steps to protect the nuns, many of whom had suffered the ultimate outrage, he replied: "Oh, what was suffered by the Mexican nuns happened to two school teachers from Iowa who were raped by Mexicans."

All the incredible outrages on American men and women in Mexico and in the United States, referred to by Secretary Lansing, meant nothing to Mr. Bryan in the way of using the power of the United States to protect Americans from the foulest outrage and incredible torture.

What shall one say about the

teachers who applauded with such warmth the absurdities and dangerous ideas of Mr. Bryan?

Mr. Bryan's views are not prehistoric. When the United States was a new and feeble power it destroyed the tyranny of the Barbary pirates to protect American citizens in the Mediterranean. Let the teachers study that portion of our history.

Had the United States simply taken a humane stand in regard to atrocities on its citizens in Mexico these atrocities would not have occurred. During that terrible night in Tampico, after the U. S. fleet had been ordered out to the open sea leaving 4,000 Americans and Europeans to be the victims of lust and rapine, one little German gunboat held the Mexicans in check, thus showing what a slight exhibition of firmness could do.

History will charge Mr. Bryan's administration of the State department as largely responsible for the utterly unprecedented situation described so ably by his successor.

Supposing Mr. Bryan had spoken as follows to the teachers of America, whose responsibilities toward the coming generations exceed that of any other class of our people:

"I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defense and of exacting from them the fulfillment of their duties toward us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which

the history of every other nation abounds.

"There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.

"But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we should give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. An efficient preparation for war can alone secure peace.

"The organization of 300,000 able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 26 for offense or defense at any time or at any place where they may be wanted. We must **TRAIN AND CLASSIFY THE WHOLE OF OUR MALE CITIZENS** and make military instruction a part of collegiate education. We can never be safe until this is done.

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite."

If Mr. Bryan had made this little speech he would have been guilty of a noble plagiarism. The first two paragraphs were by George Washington, the third by John Adams, the fourth by Thomas Jefferson and the fifth by Washington.

What would the teachers who applauded Mr. Bryan have said to this?—*July 6, 1916.*

THE NEW PROSPECT OF PEACE

The portent of the new treaty between Russia and Japan is looming large upon the horizon of the British Empire. The Russo-Japanese explanation of the purpose of this agreement is too ingenuous to be true. Alliances are not formed to drive out a country which already has been driven out. Germany no longer possesses a foot of land, a harbor or a warship in China or its adjacent waters. Therefore the Russo-Japanese presentation of the aim of the new pact as being the permanent exclusion of Germany from the Far East sounds far-fetched and fanciful to British ears.

Britons who direct public opinion and public affairs cannot fail to realize that it is England and not Germany that stands in the way of Japanese and Russian ambitions in the Far East. The summaries of the world's trade have shown for years that Britain was the dominant commercial factor in China. England's traders, scattered all over the productive parts of the Chinese republic, are the successful barriers to Japan's passionate desire to achieve the commercial domination of China. This fact is keenly realized in Tokio.

On the other hand, British statesmen and British traders alike are coming to a poignant comprehension of the fact that Japan is bitterly resentful of continued British commercial mastery in the Far East; that Japan is boldly throwing out commercial and political lines which will menace British primacy in China. A year ago, when Japan presented to Peking the series of demands which spelt exclusive privi-

lege for Japan and the Japanese in China, British public opinion was so strongly wrought up against Tokio's aggressions that only the highest political wisdom staved off an open breach between Britain and her ally who was fishing in troubled waters.

But that breach has been only staved off. It has not been definitely averted. Britain sees her commercial empire in the Far East doomed by the activities of two of her allies. That vision cannot fail to exert a powerful influence upon the course of events on the battlefields of Europe. It is an influence for peace, working in the direction of a rapprochement between Great Britain and Germany. While Germany was unqualifiedly victorious by the verdict of the map, peace could not be thought of at London. Now that Germany has been driven back somewhat on two fronts, the prospect of peace is not so unattractive to British eyes. The appalling price which Britain has paid for her inconsiderable gains on the Somme is another argument for an early peace. Britain has tacitly abandoned the plan which she proclaimed at the beginning of the war—the crushing of Germany. There is no more talk in England of putting an end to Germany by dismembering the German nation. Therefore, the inducement for a continuance of a war which is decimating the manhood of Britain as well as that of her great enemy has vanished.

On the other hand, Britain is realizing that the new alignment of military power suggested by the Russo-Japanese treaty—an alignment hostile to the very life of the British Empire—will once more place her in her former position of

isolation among the nations of the world. British statesmen are awakening to the fact that, by continuing their campaign against Germany, they are only throwing their one possible strong ally into the arms of their future enemies, the allied Russians and Japanese, after the war. Such an eventuality would place England completely at the mercy of her great commercial rival in the Far East. The picture of England's future is made still more somber by the fact that Japan already is geographically within striking distance of India, and by the additional fact that Japan's motto is "Asia for the Asiatics."

This combination of forces has brought back the thought of many to the great vision of Cecil Rhodes. England, the United States and Germany in alliance could secure, for several generations, at least, complete dominance of western civilization and of West European ideals.

During the next two generations the fate of Africa, of South America, of Australia and much other territory that is not yet fully settled will be determined. How much of this surface is to be the white man's country? It is for us of this generation largely to determine, not by our words and professions, but by our deeds.

Mr. S. S. McClure's toast at a banquet of the staff officers of the German armies in Poland found hearty response. "To the United States, Germany and England, in alliance as leaders of western civilization!" Even in the midst of the bitterest fighting, the age-old dream of a white man's world lives as an indication of the deepest racial purposes.—*July 18, 1916.*

THE VITALITY OF NATIONS

The official bulletins from Petrograd these days indicate a dubious outlook for Austria-Hungary if they be taken at their face value. They would imply a state of mind in Vienna which is not at all in accord with the gay traditions of the capital of the "eastern empire." In Vienna itself, however, there is no depression observable which corresponds even measurably with the Petrograd bulletins. While they are making plans at Vienna to check the Russian advance, they are going on in buoyant mood with projects for the improvement of their city to fit it for the greater destiny which is in store for it in the event of a victorious outcome of the war for the central powers.

Vienna is so sure of the collapse of the Russian offensive and of the ultimate triumph of Austro-German arms that her chief municipal architect, Heinrich Goldemund, is perfecting a scheme of improvements which shall make the already beautiful city more beautiful than it is.

No great city would profit so much from the restoration of peace as would Vienna in the event of the retention of the "bridge" to the East which has been built by Austrian, German and Bulgarian bayonets. In ancient times the capital of the "eastern empire" was the great entrepot for the trade of the East, creeping by caravan from Asia across the Balkan peninsula and through Hungary on its way to the markets of the west. This trade, greatly augmented by the opening up of Asia Minor and by the improvement of land communications which have been already partly accomplished, will flow from

east to west and from west to east in an ever increasing volume after the war. Vienna is preparing to accommodate it even while the Russian guns are roaring at Kirlibaba.

And the ambitious designs which Vienna is preparing to put through as soon as the international council shall have withdrawn from the green table is a marvelous demonstration of the warm, young blood that flows in the veins of nations even the oldest of them, in a time of crisis.—*Aug. 2, 1916.*

PEACE NOT YET IN SIGHT

A grim determination to continue the struggle with unabated energy is the consensus of European feeling as indicated by the manifestoes of sovereigns, the utterances of statesmen and the forecasts of soldiers at the opening of the third year of war. Stripped of their verbiage, of their political appeal and of their partisan argument, these utterances resolve themselves into one unanimous declaration: "Nobody has yet won a decisive victory. We must fight on until the other side admits defeat."

Germany, despite some recent reverses, is still in a position to point to the map as the measure of its military achievements. And behind the military achievements is the outstanding fact of an improvement in the internal condition of the central powers, by reason of the good harvest, which in some parts is already being gathered.

The allies of the entente, having assumed the offensive on both fronts, are keen in their desire to push to the utmost whatever advantage they may have achieved. Of this group

of powers Russia is especially unwilling to tolerate the sound of the word "peace," in view of the advance of her troops in both regions and especially in Asia Minor, in the direction of the much-desired outlet to open water.

In view of the belligerent voice of Europe on this sinister anniversary, there is every reason to expect a continuance of the terrible slaughter which has decimated the young manhood of the old world, and has sown a crop of rancors and resentments which will be transmitted from generation to generation.

There is only one hopeful feature of the situation. The demands of all the belligerents have been modified by the bitter logic of battlefields. It has become a settled conviction in the minds of peoples and of statesmen that no nation will be sentenced to death in the council chamber of Christendom at the end of the war. Each of the great belligerent groups has acquired a new respect of its antagonists. No nation, after the sacrifices and the heroisms which have marked all nations during two years of appalling conflict, is uttering the words "I will destroy."—*Aug. 2, 1916.*

Nationalism and Internationalism

COURAGE

On the body of a German officer who was killed in Champagne they found a letter. At the end of a description of what he saw in those three days of terrific war—a description in which he mingled expressions of hate and admiration for the French artillery—was this sentence:

“God knows what they have blown up now! From this moment I have lost all sensation of fear.”

It was not that he had ever lacked courage; but the moment had come when his courage no longer was needed to combat with fear.

Philip Gibbs, writing from the British headquarters in the western theatre of war, says:

“Yet in the conclusion of this long dispatch I must say there are no signs of deterioration in the fighting qualities of our enemy. On the contrary, the recent fighting has shown that the majority are very brave men, determined to sell their lives dearly, and in many cases willing to fight to death when surrender would be easy.”

When Irvin S. Cobb returned from Europe he said that everything in war was different from what he had expected to see—except courage. “There are no cowards in the world,” he said.

The thing hideous to consider is that every day, every hour, is lessening the numbers of the brave. Every hour the proportion of weak-

lings in Europe is increasing. Men who have courage prove it—and die.

When the war is over there will be work that will require a different, but equally admirable, courage. Repairing the waste will be a job for strong hearts. But if the courage that has illumined the battlefields can be applied to the duller work of field and factory the task will not be hopeless.—*Oct 11, 1915.*

AN INTERNATIONAL OR INTENSER NATIONALISM?

Halil Bey, talking for the Turkish government, prophesies the creation of a new economic unit that will comprise Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey with a free interchange of goods among themselves and tariff walls against outsiders.

“The most important result of the war,” he asserts, “is that from the North sea to the Indian ocean a mighty group is being created which will forever maintain itself against British selfishness, French revenge, Russian ambition and Italian treachery.”

Out of this speaks an intenser nationalism than has been known in the past. Instead of one power, a group of powers to build tariff walls against all other powers, consolidating their own armed forces and looking from within upon the world as a field for their commercial exploitation backed by military strength.

A few days ago in the English Parliament a member of the government suggested that after the war England would consider a new arrangement of prize courts, providing for a tribunal composed of judges from various nations. To this new court, he said, appeals from the local English courts could be taken.

His remarks came to many as a ray of light pointing the way to an international. They raised hope for an international system that would guarantee equal opportunity to all the nations, just as equal opportunity to the individual has been guaranteed by political achievements in the past within the boundaries of certain nations.

If ocean-borne commerce is free in time of war as in time of peace the struggle of nations becomes a matter of rivalry in which the fittest will succeed and the ablest prosper. The peaceful countries, looking on, will not see their own trade crippled by a conflict for which they are in no way responsible.

But individual opportunity was never won except against the bitterest opposition. So it was with this first hint at international equality. Hardly had the words been spoken in Parliament when a protest arose from the camps of nationalism.

The London *Morning Post*, commenting on the action of the Foreign office, says:

"We do not propose to commit the decisions of a British judge to a mongrel assembly of foreign jurists in which Great Britain can be outvoted by representatives of Ecuador, Bolivia, Switzerland and Germany. The record of the Foreign office is sufficiently dubious. It may be that its series of unparalleled blunders

is due simply to incompetence. If it is not incompetence, what is it?"

Here, then, are two outspoken assertions of nationalism against one modest hint at an international. From Turkey and England comes the same demand for the fencing off of powers and groups of powers. Every time this demand is voiced by either side in the European war the ideal of international equality of opportunity seems less attainable.

Is the tremendous sacrifice of the battlefields to be wasted? Out of all this pain and impoverishment is the world at large to gain nothing? This, it would seem, will be the sad result if nationalists are in the saddle when peace is made. Those who speak with the voice of Halil Bey and the London *Morning Post* will simply lay aside their arms for other implements with which to build even higher walls against the just ambitions of their neighbors. Selfish tariffs and jealous trade policies will still divide the world into isolated groups. The excess energy of nations again will strain at the artificial barriers. Finally some one of them will try to break through—and there will be another war.

What shall it be after the next peace is made—an international or Halil Bey's conception of several federations in deadly economic and military rivalry?

America is the great leader of the peaceful powers, and when the time comes she must give the answer.—*Oct. 13, 1915.*

THE INTERNATIONALISM OF MANHOOD

How many times have we heard that the German was efficient so

long as his employer or the great general staff stood at his elbow, whispering to him what to do. But the German had no individuality, no resourcefulness. When thrown into unexpected situations he was helpless, like an automaton with its wire cut. The German was the machine-like victim of a militaristic state, which shackled the free exercise of thought and crushed out individuality. These could thrive only under the particular form of government developed by Anglo-Saxons. Perhaps we so long accepted this philosophy, made in London, because we were graciously considered to be among the elect.

The war has shattered many illusions, among them this one.

The first difficulty in England was to harmonize the theory with the exploits of Weddigen, pioneer in the art of navigation in a new element. There were no precedents, and none could be given him, for handling the strange, new, fragile craft in the home waters of the greatest naval power in the world.

After Weddigen, Karl Müller, of the *Emden*. Boys no longer read Stevenson for romance of the sea. They read the tale of Müller and the *Emden*. Cut off from home communication—he could use his wireless only to steal the messages of British and Japanese warships that hunted him. He had no naval base to draw from, so he provisioned and coaled himself from captured British merchantmen. He took aboard their crews and with their rich freight carpeted the floor of the Indian ocean. At dawn he sailed into the harbor of Penang and under the guns of the British fortress sank a Russian cruiser and a French destroyer.

Müller and the *Emden* fell before the *Sydney* off Cocos Island. Part of the *Emden* crew, among them Mücke, were marooned on shore when the *Emden* was sunk and the *Sydney* sailed off with her commander. Mücke and his companions seized an old schooner, were later transferred to a German coasting vessel which they found at Padang, and threaded their perilous way through hostile waters to a landing on the Red sea. They fought through the tribes of a thousand miles of Arabian desert and at last were hailed as conquerors at Constantinople. It is like the tale of Odysseus.

And now Berg and his prize of the *Appam*. A German tramp steamer with mounted guns creeps out of Kiel and past the British isles. Off the west coast of Africa she sinks eight British vessels and accumulates their crews and passengers. To assure them comfort she spares the *Appam*, pride of the Elder-Dempster line, puts 429 captives on board in charge of Berg and twenty-two men, and sends them to Norfolk. Faithfully Berg slips through the cordon of British cruisers that hold the Atlantic and interns his steamer, a lawful prize, at Hampton Roads.

Bravery and resourcefulness are not specific attributes of men of English descent. Whatever the efficient German system does, it does not crush out the individuality of the men who live under it.—*Feb. 5, 1916.*

BOASTFUL HISTORIES

Self-delusion is the resort of the stupid. It is so futile an expedient that even the ostrich, contrary to

the old legend about his habitual endeavors to escape the hunter by thrusting his head into the desert sand, does not employ it. Some intelligent nations, however, make up for deficiencies in their performances by setting down apocryphal accounts of such performances in their histories and especially in their text-books on history.

Such a practice is as injurious in its effects upon the national organism as is the use of drugs upon the body and the mind of the individual. The errors and shortcomings of nations, like those of individuals, can be remedied and rectified only when they are recognized, analyzed and traced to their causes.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, assistant secretary of the navy, pointed out in a recent address some of the delusions which have become a matter of common belief through the unwarranted liberties which have been taken with the facts of history in the text-books from which our young glean their ideas of their country's greatness.

He mentioned the fact that America's victory over the Barbary corsairs is magnified in these books, while the fact that for years America paid an annual tribute of \$100,000 to those freebooters of the sea is passed over gently and unobtrusively by deft authors.

He called attention to the meager achievements of our army in the war of 1812, generally characterized as a triumph for American arms, and ascribed our escape from disaster largely to the fact that "a gentleman by the name of Napoleon" was "keeping the British busy about that time."

He might have gone on and mul-

tiplied instances of the self-complacency which has long been a national vice.

It is time we abandoned the drug-taking habit in our school books and devoted ourselves to the task of taking a good look at our faults as a preliminary step to their elimination. Let us, as a nation, be at least as free from self-delusion as the ostrich, who has so long been maligned by nature-fakers. Let us have the truth.—May 25, 1916.

THE JOURNALISM OF HATE

By S. S. McCURE

Letter received by Mr. McClure

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*:

Sir—With thousands of Americans who deplore the special pleading of the subsidized British press of New York City, and who admired the fair and impartial stand taken by *The Evening Mail* in regard to the frightful war that is devastating Europe, I am greatly surprised and shocked by the change of front assumed by your newspaper since Mr. McClure returned from Europe.

Formerly you dared to criticize the violations of American rights practiced by the English government; to-day no such editorials are to be found in your columns. Formerly you gave a just presentation of the German side of the argument in the world war; to-day you prate of Turkish atrocities against the Armenians.

In this evening's *Mail* you have not a single line upon Sir Roger Casement's trial or his great speech upon the rights of Ireland. I will not buy your paper again.

SELDEN B. McLAUGHLIN.

P. J. REILLY.

Fordham, June 30.

Since I returned from Europe I have endeavored to print the exact truth as I saw it. While the circulation of *The Mail* shows no decrease, I am bound to admit that

never before in my editorial career have I received such a mass of disapproving letters, equally from those who are pro-ally and pro-German.

One disgusted reader wrote me that I was neither flesh, fish nor fowl. If my happiness depended on my correspondence I would be a very unhappy man.

Now, I have simply told the truth. I told the truth about the absolutely sincere efforts of von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser to prevent war, and those who are not happy unless they are told that this war was made in Germany visit their wrath on me.

Equally unhappy are the haters of England when I show that England and Germany had almost consummated a treaty that would have insured the peace of the world for a long time. Inasmuch as this treaty proves that England and Germany had settled their differences and that the great cause of war in Europe had been removed, it must follow, especially in view of the documents, that both countries are guiltless of this war. These statements anger equally those who want to blame the country they hate.

Uncontrollable Forces

The people of Europe, one and all, are more the victims of uncontrollable forces than chargeable with the guilt of this war.

People to-day equally admire Lee and Grant and Stonewall Jackson. Yet a little more than half a century ago an inconceivable hatred was felt towards each other by the North and the South. There was one man who said: "Malice towards none and charity for all."

One of the most baneful forces in the world is the journalism of hate. The newspaper as an institution is scarcely a hundred years old. It might be the organ of human fellowship and universal good-will. It ought to be. No one knows better than I how feeble is the power of one editor. Yet such power as I possess will be used in the direction of sympathy and good-will to the suffering peoples of all the warring nations.

Let me give just one illustration of the tremendous consequences that may be traced to the greatest campaign of journalistic hatred the world has ever known.

During the Boer war the newspapers of most countries turned against England. Such was the hatred inspired in France that it was unwise to speak English in a crowd. The German press was also incredibly bitter. In many other countries, especially in Italy, Russia and the United States, a similar hostility permeated the newspapers.

About fifteen years ago, in London, an Englishman whose name is known all over the world said to me after a conference with leading Englishmen:

"This is the darkest day in our history. Within fifteen years the British empire will be fighting for its existence."

England's Position

England stood alone. Self-preservation led English statesmen to prepare for the threatened Armageddon. In 1902 the treaty of alliance with Japan was made. In 1904 an agreement was made with France, removing the causes of dispute and bringing about an entente. In 1907 the long-standing rivalries

with Russia were settled by a treaty.

The great powers of Europe and Asia had aligned themselves in two great and mutually hostile state systems. Mutual distrust was the distinguishing note of Europe. The atmosphere of mutual dread and dislike gave such tone and direction to public opinion in the nations of Europe that when the murder of the crown prince of Austria-Hungary led the dual empire into war with Serbia it was impossible to deal with the resulting situation calmly.

Many causes near and remote led to the great war, but the condition of mind that made these causes effective had its origin largely in the journalism of hate during the Boer war.

Although England and Germany had drawn together, the seed of hatred and disgust sown during the early years of the century matured into the terrible harvest we are now witnessing.

If the press of the world is to be the organ of civilization and international good-will, absolute truth and sympathetic comprehension must take the place of the easier methods of partisanship and vituperation. Otherwise this new institution, scarcely a hundred years old, will be the most malevolent force introduced into civilization.

There are three fundamental forces that influence humanity—religion, nationality, the struggle for existence. All peoples are subject to these forces. The combined struggle for existence of the 20,000,000, or 50,000,000 or 100,000,000 people of a nation intensifies the sense of common interest we call nationality. In many peoples religion is a most potent unifying and militant force.

Elements in Irish Question

All three of these forces, for example, are to be found in their most intense form at the bottom of the Irish question. Sometimes two of these forces, sometimes all three actuate the nations at war. The problem of public opinion and of the press, which is the great organ of public opinion, is to secure the co-operation of these forces internationally and not to aid them in mutual antagonism as between nations.

The undeveloped regions of the world are enormous. Resources, natural stores far in excess of those already in use, lie in reserve. By collective effort among the nations nature can be subjected and untold wealth created. To bring about such friendly division of the "stakes of diplomacy" should be the aim of all who can influence the trend of world opinion.

This does not mean that a newspaper should cease to criticise or disapprove the acts or policies of any nation when justice or the dictates of humanity are ignored. It means that the fundamental aim of the editor should be, in international affairs, to advance co-operation among nations—

"Through the ages one increasing purpose runs,

And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."

—July 3, 1916.

TO PERPETUATE HATRED

A committee of distinguished French artists recently presented to the French public a project for the erection of monuments on the spots where the Germans are alleged to have committed "atrocities."

The *Morning Post*, of London, revives a project which it credits to the mind of the late Lord Kitchener, for the exclusion of all Germans from the United Kingdom for twenty years after the war.

The French proposal is aimed at the perpetuation of the memories of 1914-1916 in France. The *Morning Post's* project is aimed at the safeguarding of Great Britain from German influences in the period of reconstruction that will follow the war.

Both of these extraordinary suggestions will fail to appeal to the reason of Frenchmen and of Britons. Despite the madness through which the world is now blindly struggling, the soul of mankind is essentially sane. France will wish to forget, not to remember, the rancor which is embittering the blood of its children now. England will find, not

many months after the treaty of peace has been signed, that it has learned important lessons from German patriotism, German social preparedness and German public efficiency, which it will wish to adapt to its own needs. To exclude Germans from the United Kingdom for twenty years after the war would be to renounce much that German brains and German energy have contributed to the sum total of the world's achievements. Germany is already trying to forget her "Song of Hate."

The great need of England and France and Germany and of all the world after this sickening slaughter will be to substitute sympathy for misunderstanding, sweetness for bitterness, a sense of brotherhood for the mutual suspicions and intolerance which have brought civilization to its present plight.—*July 29, 1916.*

Mexico

A REAL AMBASSADOR WHO IS NOT IN THE BLUE BOOK

On the third floor of the First National Bank building in El Paso, Tex., there is to be found the real ambassador of northwestern Mexico, so far as the United States is concerned. There Señor Ramos, with telephone connection to Villa's headquarters, accepts payment from Americans for the privilege of carrying on their ordinary business activities and for immunities that already are guaranteed by treaties.

Somebody always governs, and if the government at Washington ceases to function in regard to foreign relations, a real and effective government establishes itself, such as we have under the distinguished and courteous Señor Ramos in El Paso.

But while we give good money to enable Gen. Villa to carry on his operations, is it gentlemanly on his part to flood the Kansas City packers with rotten beef?

We wonder whether the beef is being canned for export or for domestic consumption. Our dispatch from Washington leaves that point uncertain.—*Sept. 30, 1915.*

CARRANZA AND MEXICO

The Mexican problem has not been solved for the United States by the recognition of the faction

headed by Gen. Carranza as the de facto government of Mexico. With Carranza in control of a preponderating number of Mexican states in which more than three-quarters of the nation's inhabitants are domiciled, it was only logical that the choice of the Pan-American diplomats should have fallen upon him instead of Villa, if they were convinced that he possessed the "material and moral capacity necessary to protect the lives of nationals and foreigners."

Nor does Gen. Villa's threat to continue his revolt against the Carranza government present a particularly grave issue for this government. In the first place Villa's army is cooped up in the northwest corner of Mexico, where his power to do serious damage is greatly restricted, and in the second place President Wilson has authority to lay an embargo against the shipment of arms from the United States to any Mexican faction which is in revolt against the established government. It may be assumed that he will exercise that authority in aid of Gen. Carranza whom he has recognized.

But the recognition of a de facto government in Mexico carries with it an obligation on the part of the United States government which presents most serious difficulties, and must be handled with the utmost delicacy. It is a recognized fact that Gen. Carranza cannot suc-

cessfully maintain his government or re-establish peace in Mexico without financial assistance from the outside. He is in immediate need of many millions of dollars. There is no country to which he can turn for that money except the United States.

There are two conditions under which American bankers will furnish money to Carranza. One group of financiers in this country would be only too willing to supply Carranza with all the money he needs for the immediate success of his government, in return for the privilege of exploiting the vast natural resources of Mexico. The value of the mineral, oil and timber concessions, to say nothing of the agricultural lands, which Carranza has it in his power to give to these financiers in return for their money would recoup them a thousandfold—maybe ten thousandfold—for every dollar they gave him, but it would be stealing the money from the Mexican people who fought and bled to overthrow the reign of Huerta and those others of his party who were exploiting them.

The second condition under which American financiers could be induced to furnish money to Carranza would be that the United States government should stand behind their loan with a guarantee of an honest administration of Mexican finances. The administration must give assurances that it will maintain, by force if necessary, the stability of the new Mexican government, and more than that, it must guarantee the purchasers of Mexican bonds against "graft."

This is a very serious difficulty and one to which the President and his advisers must address their at-

tention immediately. Failure to solve this problem can only mean a continuance of the intolerable Mexican situation.—*Oct. 11, 1915.*

OUR OWN BALKANS

For many, many years it would be rumored every spring that war would break out in the Balkans. Southeastern Europe is a legacy of the great Mohammedan invasion. It has long been regarded as the powder magazine of Europe. It has so proved to be.

Between the Rio Grande and the Panama canal are our Balkans. The control and development of this region will be settled within ten years.

If the United States immediately, with force and justice, organizes these helpless peoples, it will be settled in accordance with the interests of justice and to the mutual well-being of the nations of North America.

Failing such a settlement, many years will not pass before other nations—Japan, Germany or England—will undertake such a settlement, and the southern part of this great continent may witness wars arising from rivalries of the great nations.

The wealth of Mexico will be coveted by the impoverished nations of Europe.—*Oct. 12, 1915.*

OUR NEIGHBOR MEXICO

The recognition of Carranza does not allay our anxiety regarding future relations between this country and Mexico. The permanent establishment of the military power of Carranza does not come as the culmination of our policy. It repre-

sents rather the abandonment of the ideals which we sought to further by "watchful waiting." It was the hope of the President that there would arise in Mexico a government representative of all the people founded upon democratic principles, a government that would favor the peasant farmer rather than the land-owning and franchise-seeking classes. The President's appeal was disinterested and was based upon the highest humanitarian grounds. Probably no great nation ever spoke with nobler motives to a neighbor in distress than has the United States to Mexico, through President Wilson. But his words have been unheeded.

Our power and the peculiar circumstances should have made the United States almost a determining factor, yet we have not succeeded in guiding the course of events along the lines of our policy. We have attempted to solve international problems solely on the grounds of moral and ethical appeal, and we have been unwilling to throw the weight of our arms into the scales. Part of the difficulty may be charged against this method. The hard fact, unpleasant for us all to recognize, is that armed force cannot be dispensed with. To establish right, might is still necessary.

Possibly also the problem was further complicated through misconception regarding the scope of democratic organization. Number and majority opinion will not solve all problems. A backward people like Mexico need outside influence. They need the leadership and organizing ability that would have come with foreign capital.

Mexico contains vast natural wealth. Its mountains are filled

with mines. Some of the finest timber in North America is there. There are vast areas that seem to have been created for cattle raising and intensive agriculture. But the methods and tools of the Mexican are those of generations ago.

If these potential riches are to be tapped for the benefit both of Mexicans and foreigners the rights of American capital and American leaders who went in to develop that country need to be protected. Such protection would be in the interests of the Mexican people themselves, for they are still too undeveloped to furnish their own leadership. They are still too poor to avail themselves of the natural treasures of their mountains and their water power and their fertile soil. They are still unable to prevent franchise grabbing and to curb foreign capital.

Mexico lies between us and the Panama canal. Our trade with Panama is developing; our influence in the Pacific is growing. Thus the defense of the Panama canal against hostile aggression is an increasingly serious problem. A friendly Mexican government that would throw its lot with us in case of conflict would enable us to keep an open line of railroads for the defense of the canal, and this one fact would almost double the naval strength of the United States. The Carranza government has manifested a strong antipathy to American influence. Will this tendency crystallize into a definite policy of aloofness from the interests of the United States, will it lead to a government likely to enter into friendly relations or treaties with foreign powers which some day may imperil American defense?

The mutual understanding and trust that exists between this country and Canada is an instance of how much friendly relations with a neighboring power mean to every nation.

Three thousand miles of undefended Canadian boundary line tell the story. Can we look to the south with the same feeling of security? There the scene is in striking contrast. Rangers and soldiers watch for raiding parties and the air is filled with rumors of wild plans to invade our territory.

We have made Canada realize that her interests run parallel to ours. In Mexico only distrust, suspicion or contempt, bred by misunderstanding, has greeted our extended hand.

Perhaps the recognition of Caranza will change all this. Possibly it will plant in Mexico the seed that has taken such deep root along the friendly Canadian border.

But unless recognition of Caranza marks the beginning of a lasting friendship between the United States and Mexico—a new era of co-operation—then the action of this government has merely added another factor to the bewildering problem.—*Oct. 12, 1915.*

A NATION OF PEOPLE, NOT OF STATES

We have found a new use for the army—it is to be shot at, but not to shoot. That, at least, is the pitiable plight of the regiments stationed along the Texas border line. They are presumed to represent the national government at Washington—to typify its sovereignty,

power and purpose. Just the opposite, however, is the fact. They haven't even the protecting power of a policeman pounding the sidewalks of New York. A constable in any of the villages along the border line has a more secure feeling that he will be backed up by his superiors if he pulls a six-shooter on those who seek his life or the lives of others than a United States soldier has should he do the same righteous thing.

In his dispatches to this paper from Brownsville, Mr. McClure has vividly portrayed the humiliating position of our troops there, and the insolent attitude of Mexican border-line ruffians who, knowing the shackles put upon our men by tradition and by red tape at Washington, pay not the slightest heed to them.

Here is an incident related by Mr. McClure that illustrates the situation:

"This train (within six miles of Brownsville) was wrecked by a group of Mexican bandits about 10:30 at night on the American side of the line. They entered the train and found there three young American soldiers in uniform, but unarmed. They at once shot them, killing one. The American soldiers were the first object of attack; and the bandits took little loot."

No other government in the world would tolerate without violent protest the killing of men wearing its uniform, yet no word of objection has gone out from Washington as the result of this incident and many others of like character. We have placed thousands of our soldiers along the border line, in ineffective groups, to be shot at and jeered at, but not to reply by shot or word unless the country is invaded by a hostile army. In that event our men

are permitted to resist—if they are not too humiliated and dispirited by official restrictions to have any resisting force left in them.

The whole situation has a comic opera flavor to it, as Mr. McClure explains, but he also points out its serious phase. Our national government has no right to use federal troops within state borders unless so requested by the governor of the state or to repel foreign invasion. The governor of Texas has made no request to have federal soldiers posted on the border line. Local sentiment is against having them there. The Washington authorities have compromised the matter by sending our soldiers there on "peaceful mission." They are not to shoot, to resist, or to do anything that may annoy. Seeing, they are not to see; hearing, they are not to hear. They are strung along the border like so many helplessly blind and deaf men.

Our government cannot go on enfeebling its authority in this way without ultimately bringing it into contempt. The national sovereignty must assert itself. The old states' rights doctrine has become obsolete in every phase of our national life except in governmental theories and practice. It must be abandoned there, if we are to have the strength and dignity of national unity in the eyes of the world. Indeed, it must be abandoned unless we are to countenance an inherent and fundamental weakness for which we must some time pay dearly.

Grover Cleveland, though brought up in the party of states' rights, had the courage to strike the first blow in protest against the outworn theory that the federal government must stand by idly while a weak

state government fails to protect life and property. As President, in 1892, he did not hesitate to send troops to quell the Debs strike riot in Illinois over the protest of the governor of the state. He was roundly denounced at the time, but no one now questions the wisdom of his act, or its far-reaching consequence. It was an exhibition of real statesmanship—the kind that points a nation's eyes and thoughts on its future.

President Cleveland visioned the need of our government to unify its power from ocean to ocean—to nationalize our states. To use his own phrase, a condition, not a theory, confronted him. He met the condition by abandoning the theory. It was a radical step for the first Democratic President since the Civil War to take, but it stands out to-day as a precedent that will become historic. He might have compromised, as President Wilson did in Colorado last year, and as both Taft and Wilson did in Texas when federal troops were first sent there. Had he done so he would have had our soldiers shot at and jeered at in Chicago as they are now on the Mexican border. As it was, he settled the strike. It was his job to put the United States mails through Illinois, and he did it.

What kind of a job is being done on the Texas border? It seems all muddled now.

Fortunately, no serious consequence has yet followed the sending of our shackled army to the Texas border. The experience there, however, even though it has not been dearly bought, should drive home to us the fact that the states' rights doctrine is of the past. In the evolution of government it has failed

to hold its place. We are not a confederacy of states. We are a nation. If we are to survive as such we must have an assert a nation's power.—
Oct. 30, 1915.

ONLY ANOTHER GRINGO

The torture and murder in Mexico of Joseph W. Tays, an American citizen, possibly will not arouse the interest that such a crime would have aroused years ago. We have been getting used to that sort of thing. The murder of an American, whether in Mexico or near the Mexican border, has come to be accepted merely as the regrettable loss of a human life, not an occurrence to rouse the dignity of this nation.

Mexico has made us get used to it, and she has grinned during the process. When an American is murdered "bandits did it," is the explanation, if any explanation is made.

Nations which offend us have come to yawn over the carefully phrased remonstrances issued by our State department. There have been times when that department was headed by men so cunning that they could make strong words sound as if something was behind them. Now, no matter who may be president or secretary of state, the result is the same. Our weaknesses are known. We are not ready.

Some day, if our preparedness shall have become real, the veriest dummy may sit in the chair of Jefferson and Bayard and Hay and make nations listen respectfully. But until then statesmanship seems to be as useless as the bleat of a lamb.—Nov. 17, 1915.

FOR SQUARE DEAL IN MEXICO

To the Editor of "*The Evening Mail*":

Sir.—It is difficult to estimate the full value to our American public of Editor McClure's articles from the front (Rio Grande). No one had thought this volcanic region was worthy of particular attention in the presence of the European war. Your editor is now exposing the nefarious workings of the extreme anarchistic element in Mexico, combined with the same in the United States, under a programme of violence which already has cost us not only the lives of soldiers and civilians, but also our prestige as a nation that can and will defend itself.

At the same time that we hope Mexico and all the other Latin-American republics will always consider us their best friend, we certainly must make it clear that honesty and fair treatment should be reciprocal, and that when attacked without cause we will always be ready to defend ourselves.

One of the most serious problems now coming up relates to the "guarantees" which peaceful Americans are to have when doing business in Mexico, in the near future.

What is going to convince the ten or fifteen million Mexicans that the American citizen has rights which everybody is bound to respect, abroad as well as at home? A great deal is heard of Belgian, Polish and other refugees, but I do not know of a more pitiful outlook than that of 25,000 to 50,000 American refugees who must now return to Mexico to be surrounded by a relatively hostile people, or starve in the United States. I refer especially to those

Americans who, some three or four years ago, had farms, homes, land or other permanent business in Mexico, and, whose means being exhausted, must return to that country to restore their homes and their broken fortunes, with inadequate protection and with little hope of quick betterment. CHANDLER.

Kansas City, Kan., Nov. 6.

—Nov. 19, 1915.

GIVING CARRANZA A CHANCE

There is hope for Mexico in the decision of Villa to abandon the field and seek asylum in the United States. The collapse of the Villista movement will give Carranza, the recognized head of the de facto government of the country, an opportunity to demonstrate his capacity for the work which lies before him. It is a labor of vast magnitude. Civilization has been destroyed in Mexico by the internecine war of the past three years. It must be built up again from the foundations. Upon Carranza's breadth of mind, his freedom from selfish motives and his devotion to the welfare of a much-harried people will depend the outcome of the reconstruction activities which are now about to begin.

Has Carranza these qualities, without which the successful solution of the difficult problem is impossible? If he has not, the reign of chaos will return without long delay.—Dec. 21, 1915.

CHAOS AGAIN IN MEXICO

Sixteen American citizens have been massacred in Mexico; chaos

has returned to that much-tortured republic. Once more the turmoil across the Rio Grande becomes the issue of the hour, which America must take up with a firm determination to do its duty, not only to itself but to its neighbor.

The latest outbreak of inherent barbarism across the border brings America face to face with the realization that Mexico is another Egypt, which has neither the leadership, the popular education nor the capital to lift itself to the plane of modern civilization. It is another Egypt, and will drag on its helplessness until the United States addresses itself squarely to the task which awaits it there. Without the support of the church, the banished old Spanish aristocracy and foreign capital, Carranza's efforts to build up a stable government must fail. Every other method of restoring order having proved futile, the United States now must consider the only remaining alternative—the dispatch of our troops to Mexico City to take to the Mexican people the boon of a stable and organized government, which it conferred upon the people of Cuba and of the Philippines.

Let us recognize the facts. Our next door neighbor to the south is in a condition of hopeless political and social anarchy. The unrest and disturbance in Mexico across the border affects the United States. A large number of Mexicans have settled as workers in Texas and the adjoining country, and lawlessness in their home republic promotes lawlessness on our side of the border. Many Americans have gone into Mexico to make investments. As owners of ranches they have carried into that country better methods of

cattle raising and have developed the agricultural resources of the country for products needed here.

The mines of Mexico contain minerals and the mountainsides lumber that the United States and the world as a whole need for their commerce and industry. The Mexican people require railroads. All these great industrial enterprises necessitate the use of capital, and the Americans and other foreigners who have gone there as capitalists have carried out a function not only of benefit to the Mexican people but of benefit to us in the United States and to the world at large. They call for our protection. For years they have been calling for the protection of our flag and they have not received it.

Not only our own citizens but foreign countries look to us for the protection of their nationals in Mexico. When Benton, an Englishman, was killed, and yesterday, when another British subject lost his life, the matter was left to the government at Washington because the Monroe Doctrine implies that the maintenance of an orderly government on this continent must be left to the Americans themselves. Holding foreign countries at a distance, we assume a responsibility which we cannot evade by inaction. Let us recognize the facts: the future of Mexico is bound up inextricably with our own foreign relations. Turmoil and disorder there create problems that will become increasingly serious, and which may eventually involve us in disagreement with European countries.

Let us recognize the fact that of the 14,000,000 of Mexican population 12,000,000 are wholly or partly of Indian blood. There are cen-

turies, whole stages of civilization, between their outlook, the simple tools which they are accustomed to use, the views of life to which they are trained, and our modern organization that implies steam engines and railroads and universal education.

They need leadership. They need the direction and the civilizing influence of the white man's institutions. Let us recognize that their organized religion, dating back to the pioneer days when America was discovered, is a factor that should be drawn into the constructive support of their social life. Let us recognize that the Spanish land-owning aristocracy which is now practically banished from the country, had an important function to perform in organizing the agricultural and industrial activities of that primitive people. Let us recognize that foreign capital has a legitimate interest in the development of the resources of that country.

Above all, let us recognize that the Mexican government necessarily must have a close relation with the government of the United States. In case we are ever attacked from without it would prove disastrous for us if a foe from across the Atlantic or the Pacific should land its troops in Mexico, compelling us to fight through such a country. There should be an offensive and defensive alliance that would immediately bring Mexico to our side in case of an international struggle. There should be an open railroad constructed with reference to possible military necessities, extending from Texas to Panama, so that we could defend the canal by both land and sea, with an understanding that should give us the active co-opera-

tion of Mexico in such an undertaking. Let us recognize these facts and act accordingly.

We have made a genuine and high-minded effort to deal with the Mexicans on the basis of placing the ballot in the hands of every Mexican. Unaided, he cannot use it. All our efforts to lead Mexico into the light of civilization by friendly guidance have not worked out, are not working out, and will not work out. If we can grasp these realities the murder of sixteen American citizens will not have been in vain. —*Jan. 13, 1916.*

HUERTA

Huerta is dead. It seems as if Fate, which has not been too kind to him these last months, had relented to the extent of letting him die at a moment when we of the United States could reform our judgment of him. What was the "blood-stained dictatorship" of Huerta as compared with the so-called constitutional government of Mexico to-day?

Let us admit that Huerta was a man of blood. Fortunately for the citizens of the United States who were in Mexico during his regime, he was also a man of iron. Call it war or call it murder, the bloodshed of his day was confined to Mexico and the Mexicans—except when we sailed into Vera Cruz and sailed out again without getting the demanded salute.

Huerta was a relic of the old Mexico, the Mexico of Diaz, of the Spanish civilization, of the ancient respect for the religion that had guided Mexico through the centuries. So far as American rights and

opinion are concerned, is the new "government" of Mexico to be preferred to that old rule? How many Americans are there to-day who do not regret that we muddled into Mexico to enforce certain puritanical theories that had no relation to the real national life of that Latin state?

Huerta was an Indian. He understood the twelve millions of Indians that somehow managed to live under the old rule, while our own Indians died under our own beneficent misrule. He was a soldier, bred in the trade from childhood, and learning from his masters how strong a hand must be kept to keep Mexico alive. He had this strong hand and he used it, perhaps not exactly as it should have been used, but as strong hands are likely to be used when there is ambition in the brain.

It was Huerta's misfortune that he came to the top at a time when some one in the United States suddenly decided that we must be the keeper of Mexico's political conscience. For Madero to overthrow Diaz was right, according to our new notion, but for Huerta to overthrow Madero was wrong, because there was a "constitution." We shook with horror because Madero was killed, for that is not our way, and we decided that it must not be the Mexican way, although it had been the Mexican way for centuries.

And now Huerta is dead. To the very end, we imagine, he saw Mexico as he had seen it from his childhood, a place where internal blood must flow when necessity requires. Undoubtedly he thought of the United States as a country which had mistreated him, because he had never set out to do it a wrong, and

which had kept him to die a prisoner. He died uttering forgiveness of his enemies, another ancient habit of his ancient kind.

"Mexico needs a strong man." That has been our cry since the day of Porfirio Diaz. Well, it had a strong man, if that was all it needed, and he lies in a coffin at El Paso.

Huerta is dead! The constitution of Mexico lives! And under its twentieth century administration the blood of "protected" Yankees soaks into the red hillsides of Chihuahua.—*Jan. 14, 1916.*

BARS OF GOLD AND SOAP

A new government—as governments go in that wretched country—takes the reins in Mexico. The monetary system of the world is sensitive in the matter of fly-by-night governments. The people of Mexico find that their silver and paper, particularly the latter, are not accepted in the outer world at their face value. Business men who ship stuff from the United States and Europe to Mexico want their pay in gold or on a gold basis. Carranza may engrave a piece of paper with the declaration that it is a dollar, and make the peon take it as such, but he cannot treat foreign trade in the same way.

Typhus breaks out in Mexico City—the same terrible disease that has racked the world under the names of ship fever, camp fever and prison fever; a disease which has kept its hold on parts of Mexico for centuries because of unsanitary conditions. The fever is horrible, not only in its fatality, but in its method of contagion, being carried by vermin. An

epidemic of typhus can be stopped only by absolute cleanliness.

Mexico has depended upon other nations for soap and towels. Now she cannot import these without paying gold for them. The peon, who is paid, not in gold but in Mexican money, cannot buy a bar of soap and a yard of cotton or linen cloth for less than a day's pay. So typhus has been carried from Mexico City to the Rio Grande and across into American towns which have a large Mexican population.

The possibility of the spread of the disease to congested American cities is not pleasant, but it is real. Americans like to boast of their personal cleanliness, yet one-half the population of New York, for instance, is not so regularly clean but that typhus might obtain a foothold here. Of course, the doctors of the Rockefeller institute have found a serum for typhus, but the surest way of avoiding the disease lies in soap and water and kerosene.

The actual and rapid progress of typhus from the Mexican capital into the United States tells a story of the smallness of the world and the interdependence of nations. We refuse—perhaps rightly—the paper dollar with which the peon would buy Yankee soap and towels. So he remains dirty and infected, and his disease marches north, invades our own land and kills our own people.

Humanity is bound together by ties which the financiers, the statesmen and the geographers cannot cut.—*Feb. 23, 1916.*

FAILURES OF CARRANZA

The Mexican problem in its present phase is largely the bequest of

the Taft administration to its successor. Mr. Taft relied upon the power of the United States, exerted through the recognition or non-recognition of this or that faction or chief, to hasten the ending of the chronic reign of anarchy in the neighboring republic. Mr. Wilson continued the policy of his predecessor. He picked Carranza as the most likely of the contending chiefs to evolve order out of chaos, and accorded his recognition to him.

It was undoubtedly the idea of the administration that its recognition of Carranza would solidify his party, enable him to establish a reasonably safe government and cause the dismemberment of other factions and their final extermination. The de facto government has received, and is still receiving, many extraordinary favors from the administration, which have exerted but little actual influence on the situation, and all of which have been ignored or ill required by the first chief and his followers, and the expectation that other revolutionary bands and factions would lay down their arms and become peaceful citizens has been wholly abortive.

On the contrary, many more bands exist than formerly, who are lacking in military discipline and control and who are as mobile as a bunch of butterflies and as dangerous as rattlesnakes.

Carranza's officials have not acquitted themselves creditably and have not inspired confidence. They have permitted many needless abuses to occur and have condoned them. His generals have been, and are, rapacious and have enriched themselves at the expense of their soldiers and the people and not infrequently at the sacrifice of their

honor. The people are not in accord with the Carranza government, and never will be.

There is discord among the leaders, both military and civil, and there is no hand among them strong enough to bring order and security throughout the country. Sooner or later this government will have to do it. It is folly to assume that Villa is eliminated. On the contrary the fact remains that he is even now at the head of a considerable body of well armed and equipped cavalry forces, and its numbers are constantly increasing, largely from deserters from the crumbling Carranza forces, disgusted by the inability of Carranza to pay them in acceptable money. It is true that Villa possesses but little statesmanship, and is unsuited to govern a country. Nevertheless, he is abstemious, he is skilled in certain kinds of warfare, in this instance marvelously effective, and he is above all ambitious and vengeful. The opportunity for his effectual elimination is past and he will again loom large in shaping affairs. With Obregon practically a prisoner at Carranza's headquarters, there is no efficient leader to oppose him.

Carranza has not justified the expectations of the administration at Washington. He has proved that he lacks the constructive qualities and the intelligence which would have enabled him to meet the benevolent wishes of the United States.

In order to establish a stable government, Carranza must have money and credit. He has neither. In order to govern satisfactorily the territory under his de facto authority, he must have loyal and competent officials, civil and military. He has no such officials. He must have

the confidence of the people. But he has not won that confidence and is not winning it, as is demonstrated conclusively by his continued refusal to return to the capital and establish himself there. As 95 per cent. of the Mexican people are Catholics, he must not antagonize the church, and must rally the religious and moral forces of the nation on the side of a comprehensive programme of pacification and reconstruction. This harmonizing mission he is not accomplishing—and without such a unification of religious and moral forces the setting up of an effective administration is impossible.

In all these respects Carranza has failed conspicuously, and the United States, with all the good will in the world, cannot supply these foundations for a government in Mexico.—*March 8, 1916.*

EXPOSED

The true connection between the German government and the infamous bandit Villa has been gradually coming to light. It has been the impression that Villa financed himself primarily from levies upon Americans and American property in his section of Mexico. It has been the popular delusion that he carried out his diabolical raid on Columbus for the purpose of stinging the United States into retaliation and relaunching his wretched cause upon the tide of Mexican national resistance.

Nothing can be further from the truth. Germany is back of his finances and his raids. The proof is absolute and convincing.

This proof is in the nature of evidence which at first view looks

innocent, but grows in damning certainty the longer one ponders it.

Villa is the German name for House. This fact is simple in itself. It is the connotation that forges the chain of evidence. Col. House has been in Germany. His connection with German villas may be considered established by the ill-suppressed accounts of his entertainment by prominent German personalities, whose pro-German sympathies are certified by secret documents now in the hands of the authorities at Washington.

The net begins to close. Col. House, after association with German villas, returns to the land to which he should owe allegiance and presents a front of virgin Americanism. In no public interview does House mention the German villas which harbored him. Every one is thrown off the scent.

Shortly after the return of House his secretary is known to have written and mailed certain letters. They were mailed at night. A few weeks later the Mexican Villa (German for House) bursts forth. To disarm suspicion he even shoots up a number of houses in Columbus, N. M.

Villa-House-Villa is the key to the Mexican situation.

The time has come to stop all this German propaganda. The *Mail* is proud to be able to deal it a final and crushing blow.—*March 8, 1916.*

VILLA

Pancho Villa's violation of American soil and his onslaught upon American lives and property left only one course open to our government. That course President Wil-

son has adopted. The pursuit and capture or destruction of this wanton butcher is the imperative duty of the administration at Washington. That duty will be carried out with energy and dispatch by Gen. Funston, who knows his Mexico—and his Pancho Villa.

Mexico, no less than the United States, needs to be rid of Villa. The renegade Indian who has taken sixteen American lives for no other reason than a mad desire to show the Gringos what he could do, has forfeited his right to consideration. He has outlawed himself and his followers. He has written and signed his own death warrant. It only remains to carry it into effect. The President may rest assured that he will have the unqualified sanction of a unanimous public opinion in whatever measures he may undertake to accomplish that result.

But the dispatch of a punitive expedition to eliminate Villa and his fellow cut-throats does not mean, at the outset at least, active American intervention in Mexican affairs and the assumption by the administration at Washington of responsibility for the restoration of peace and order south of the Rio Grande. If such an intervention is thrust upon the American people it will be the result of circumstances over which the American people and their government have had no control. The President has unswervingly maintained toward Mexico an attitude of disinterested sympathy. He has been animated solely by a desire to aid to the limit of his powers in the establishment of a stable government—a government by the Mexican people.—*March 11, 1916.*

THE SOUL OF MEXICO

Mexico has not yet had her Robert Service; but that great, big broad land way down yonder is worthy of the song of some rugged poet who will tell us with electric vividness about the strange spell that the land of Montezuma casts over all who come to make it their home.

There is a deep well-spring under a yellow and blue-tiled chapel near Mexico City. It is called the well of Our Lady of Guadalupe, Mexico's patron saint. The legend has it that whoso shall drink of its waters shall thirst again, and however far he may stray into the world the waters of Guadalupe will call him back, and return he must to drink again.

Ask any man or woman who has lived long in Mexico if they do not feel a strong pull at their hearts sometimes to go back. And when they answer "Yes!" ask them why. They may begin to tell you of the wonderful climate of the central plateau. They may talk of the cool-warm sunshine filtering through the rarefied air of the highlands. They may declare that only Mr. Service could describe "the forests where silence has lease," and "the beauty that thrills one with wonder," and "the stillness that fills one with peace." For down there, too, "the mighty mountains bare their fangs unto the moon," and all the physical grandeur in the world seems packed into some of those marvelous combinations of valley and foothill and mountain and plain. But there is something more than her physical charm, something more subtle than the thirst for the waters of Guadalupe that makes the exile from Mex-

ico feel with the poet of the Yukon that:

"There's a land—oh, it beckons and beckons,
And I want to go back—and I will!"

Most foreigners who have lived in Mexico went there on business, and many of them made fortunes there. Mexico has been a land of opportunity, and the lure of its silver and copper and gold and rubber and government contracts and concessions is strong. But the people who have felt the spell of Mexico will tell you:

I wanted the gold and I got it—
Came out with a fortune last fall,
Yet somehow life's not what I thought it,
And somehow the gold isn't all.
No! There's the land, have you seen it?

And behind the thought of the land there lies the feeling of having found some of the world's richest treasure, the happy human relationships that grow up out of community life laden with common interests and aspirations. The foreign colonies, especially in the larger cities of Mexico, form intimate, close-knit social groups. Every one is known more or less widely within his national group. There is little anonymous isolation. Men do business with each other, golf, tennis or play billards together at their Colony Club, while their wives make rounds of social calls and their children attend the same school. There is leisure for those informal social activities that make for abiding friendships. Time ripens these, and they are kept fresh and green by new and common interests that continually grow up among like-minded people in a foreign land. These are the things one misses hard when he travels away for a season in

strange parts. If he tries to dwell in another section of the world again; these are the things that bring that sense of haunting hollowness and the restless wanderlust that recall the Canadian poet again—"I've bade 'em good-by, but I can't!"

Some there are, too, who have gone through the rare experience of knowing another race. They have made friends with the Mexican Indian, simple, naive, responsive, tractable and genuinely lovable to those who learn the secret of meeting and treating him courteously, squarely and white.

To ride along one of those wonderful canyon trails of the lower Sierra Madre in the moonlight; to listen to the distant, rhythmic tom-tom, tom-tom, tom-tom of a sweetly resonant native drum; to ride a little farther and begin to catch the primitive cadence of the flute-like reed—tu-lu, tu-tu-lu, tu-tu-lu—endlessly repeating on through the night, works something into eye's soul that is not easily forgotten. To stop at the lowly, grass-thatched hut and ask for a drink of water and to be offered tortillas, frijoles, goat's milk and a lodging for the night by a smiling aboriginal who, if asked for his unbleached cotton shirt, would offer you his woolen blanket also—is an experience that makes the deeper stuff within us thirst for more.

To learn another people by heart, a strange primitive race of men and women and children who seem so integral a part of the vast wonderland that is their native home, makes one feel rich in the things that moth and rust do not corrupt, nor thieves break in and steal. To feel oneself a part of it all through

the simple exchange of friendly touch and greeting, and then riding away again into the night—this works into one's finer self an indescribable something that it is hard to travel away from and lose. The soul of Mexico has mixed for a moment with one's own, and—he wants to go back if he can!—*March 16, 1916.*

MEXICAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE ARMY

Every now and then our newspaper headlines blazon forth the revolt of a Mexican regiment, or a garrison, or a whole army corps. We wonder at the instability of that volatile and amorphous organization down there, but forgive its trespasses because of the chronic anarchy into which the country has fallen. But history teaches us that what is now has been and ever shall be so long as the Mexican army is built of unlettered, underpaid, fear-ridden halfbreeds and Indians, schooled only in the traditions of transient hero-worship and professional revolutionism.

In 1810, Miguel Hidalgo, a Catholic priest, and his military friend, Allende, started the revolution for Mexican independence from the rule of Spain. Their Indian army was defeated, and they themselves were executed. Morelos, another priest, continued the rebellion, and met a like fate. Then came Augustin Iturbide, born in Mexico but of Spanish descent, a man of splendid courage and brilliant military talent. He joined Guerrero, the only remaining revolutionary chief, and they warred for Mexican independence under the plan of Iguala. This

platform stood for the establishment of a limited Mexican monarchy, the maintenance of the Roman Catholic Church, and equality of rights for Spaniards and native-born Mexicans. Apodac, the Spanish viceroy, refused to recognize this independent Mexico, and was overthrown. The new viceroy, O'Donoju, who was sent over from Spain, got no farther than Vera Cruz and was compelled to recognize Mexican independence.

A provisional junta issued a formal declaration of independence and nominated a regency of five, with Iturbide as president, to rule the nation. Then Iturbide convened the first Mexican Congress on February 24, 1822. This Congress debated making Mexico a republic, or a monarchy with Iturbide as emperor, or a monarchy to be ruled by a prince of the house of Bourbon. The army worshiped Iturbide as a hero and backed him for emperor, so Congress elected him, and he was crowned on July 21, 1822.

Then Santa Ana, captain-general of Vera Cruz, declared a republic under the plan of Iguala and started a new revolution. He was defeated, but the emperor's army was ready for a change of heroes. Iturbide was deserted by the very soldiers who had shouted at his coronation only a few months before, delivered into the hands of Congress, forced to abdicate, and sent to Italy in exile on a pension for his services in behalf of Mexican independence. Later he returned to Mexico, but was outlawed, captured and shot before he could reach the capital or appeal to Congress.

And so, from the founding of independent Mexico by Iturbide in

1822 to our present day, the Mexican army has been a dangerous and explosive Frankenstein, turning with every shift of the wind and even with the little breezes of revolutionary intrigue. But can we blame it? Built of illiterate, tradition-fed worshippers of the nearest immediate hero, ruled by the tyranny of officers' swords, half starved, and savage at heart (even as you and I), we can easily forgive them—for they know not what they do.—*March 17, 1916.*

CARRANZA'S ARMY

Under Porfirio Diaz the Mexican army became a large, effective police force. Early in his rule the soldiers were active in keeping bandits away from villages and plantations, watching telegraph lines and railway switches and guarding stage coach and passenger train. Later, with the habit of national order fairly well established, the army lived inactive in garrison barracks and degenerated. When Francisco Madero revolted, Gen. Diaz found his once splendid organization was a broken reed, and he departed for Europe.

Madero, five months before his assassination, told his Congress:

If a government like mine, placed in power by the unanimous vote of the people and that has done all in its power for the good of that people, cannot exist in Mexico, then, gentlemen, we must say to the people of Mexico that they are not fit for democracy, and that we need another dictator who will come with his sword drawn to frustrate the ambitions of those who do not understand that liberty can only bear fruit within a system of law and order.

A month later Madero asked Congress to authorize compulsory mili-

tary service. He saw clearly that only backed by the power of a well-organized internal police force could any government endure in Mexico.

Carranza found this true. He doubtless realizes that only while the army is with him can he endure. But this army of his is not a unit. It is an agglomerate of petty chieftains, each with his individual following and each with his personal ambition to be "first chief." So long as these assorted "generals" can live in the houses of expatriated victims of mob rule in Mexico City; so long as they can enjoy ministerial titles and big pay; so long as their followers are given wartime wages or allowed to loot a village or two when the paymaster's roll is small; so long and no longer will Carranza have the support of the Mexican army and remain First Chief of the nation.

It is doubtful if there exists in Mexico to-day the organizing intelligence and military ability necessary for the reconstruction of the army as a working unit. It is possible that this intelligence and ability lies latent in that large body of exiled Mexicans who are watching the slow suicide of their country from apartments in Paris, Madrid and New York. It may be that the Mexican anarchy will, like the French Revolution, sicken of itself and call for the kind of leadership which alone can save an unenlightened and cruelly exploited people from its own madness. If so, it is this element of intelligence, of sympathy with fundamental Mexican problems, and of potential leadership that deserves our moral support, and may need our active co-operation.—*March 21, 1916.*

AND WHAT OF THE POOR PEON?

The Mexican people are quick to see through the thin vaneer of patriotism and high-sounding talk that glosses the shameless ravaging of their country by the various tribes of revolutionaries. Carranza's soldiers, who call themselves "Constitutionalistas," have been quickly and aptly nicknamed "Con-las-unas-listas," which, being interpreted, means "with fingernails sharpened and ready." They are judged by their actions more than by their verbal justifications.

Concrete cases? A page might be filled with such examples as the following, and it would present a fair picture of the agricultural regions of the zone comprising the states of Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosi, a good share of Coahuila, Chihuahua and Tampico. That the same thing has been true in Morelos and parts of Puebla and Vera Cruz, where Zapatismo has flourished is already well known.

A prosperous hacienda gave employment to one hundred and fifty families. These people were as happy and as well fed and as content with their lot as a primitive people, just emerging from centuries of barbarism, can be. Their children went to the little plantation school and were sure of having enough to eat at supper time. The work of the people was directed and controlled by an intelligent owner who did not meddle with politics.

Came a Constitutionalist chieftain en route somewhere to fight somebody. The plantation was made his headquarters. The horses were seized for his men. The cattle were butchered for them or sold in the nearest

market. Corn and provisions were confiscated "for the army of Mexican liberty." The machinery, tools, agricultural implements, in fact, everything of marketable value were sold out in behalf of the revolutionary exchequer. The chief then proceeded to another camping place.

The peons of the hacienda were told that thus the revolution was accomplishing its great purpose, the distribution of the land. The owner had paid the penalty for having robbed and exploited the land of the Indian, who might now return and possess it in peace. And the poor peons stood in open-mouthed wonder, watching the last horseman ride away with the last bag of frijoles slung over his stolen saddle. Multiply this picture by a hundred!

But they had the land! At last the oppressed, the exploited aboriginal race was having its innings, and justice smiled beneath her bandaged eyes. True, but what the peon is asking himself after such revolutionary escapades in the name of freedom and democracy is: "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world of land and be left not even a shovel for the digging of his own grave in that land, and graves for his little children?"—*March 23, 1916.*

A BRIDGE OF UNDER- STANDING

An American planter in Mexico, a man of sterling character who had grown up among the Mexican people and who understood and loved them, tried an experiment not long ago.

He was to leave Mexico for a three years' stay in Europe. Calling his peasant workmen together, he gave

them each three acres of good sugar land. He told them to cultivate it, and said that their cane might be ground in his mill at cost, and that they might have all they could make from their crop. He promised them a big barbecue on his return if they should have made good on the land during his absence.

In three years he returned. He found the land he had given to the peons under full cultivation and his mill grinding the cane. But the Indians did not turn up for the barbecue! They had planted and cultivated somewhat of their land the first year, but the second year they had so neglected it that the administrator had to plow it over to save it from the encroachment of the jungle. The third year, in order to save the land, he had been compelled to place it under cultivation with the rest of the hacienda.

The peons were called together and asked why they had not appreciated the gift and the opportunity to make a small fortune for themselves. Each looked at the other in silence, until an old man finally crystallized the situation in words that characterize the mental attitude of several million natives of his kind:

"We do not like to plant sugar, señor, for what we may gain at the end of a season. We work to get paid every week."

That is the mind of aboriginal Mexico. That is the human stuff with which civilization has to deal. That is the material out of which the Spaniard started to form the beginnings of a new nation. That is the people whom the Spaniard liberated from the rule of Spain and has tried to control and direct.

These Spaniards recognized the

pliable tractability of the Indian, and his willingness to work for a living if work were provided. They recognized the native's value and his need of help. They respected his traditions and in colonial times upheld the integrity of his villages, where he lived a communal life under a paternal system that suited his simple needs. They endeavored to protect him against the very evils that came over in their train, and the fact that those whom they appointed to be "guardians of the Indian" were corrupted and helped exploit their charges, is hardly to be laid against these Spanish leaders. So grateful were the Indians for the fairness with which the Spanish governing class treated them that, in the state of Oaxaca, certain of their free villages still keep up their payment of colonial tribute regularly, punctually and gladly, as part of one of their ingrained traditions.

There have been exploitations and oppressions of the natives in Mexico. Crimes have been committed against individual Indians and against the Indian as a race. The system of government that worked itself out and flowered in the Diaz regime was far from perfect. But the solid body of white men, intelligent Spanish-Mexicans, that forms the only hope for the salvation of our neighbor land if it is to keep its sovereignty, cannot be accused of anything worse than a growing sense of contentment with conditions as they were, and a failure to awaken in time to the seriousness of the problems that had been growing up in their midst.

A few years before the Madero rebellion they had begun to realize what the agrarian problem meant, and had appropriated, through Congress, some \$90,000,000 (pesos) for

the irrigation and reclamation of Mexican land for the benefit of the people. They had discovered that hunger, not so much for education and liberty but for corn and beans, was the vital question of the day, and they realized that corn and beans for a country so agriculturally poor as Mexico meant constructive statesmanship and the wise employment of large capital.

The revolution wrecked the structure they had begun to build, and the following riot of anarchy, resulting in the exile of so many of their number, galvanized them into newer and fresher habits of thought. They had been sleeping too long and awakened too late, but they have suddenly realized keenly:

That old stars fade and alien planets
arise,
That the sere bush fades, and the desert
blooms,
And the ancient well-head dries,

and that there are new compasses
wherewith new men adventure be-
neath new skies.

Some of them have died, broken hearted in their exile over the tragedy of Mexico, like Porfirio Diaz and Joaquin Cassasus. Others have resigned themselves to a stunned pessimism regarding the future of their native land. But most of them who have "seen the things they gave their lives to be broken" stand ready to "stoop and build them up again with worn-out tools." They have, to let Kipling speak for them further, "made one heap of all their winnings, and risked it on a turn of pitch and toss," but, losing, they want to "start again at their beginnings and never breathe a word about their loss."

And it is for us to help them. Our President has told us that "We shall

deem it our duty to help the Mexican people." Here lies our practical chance. We cannot deal directly with the aboriginal Indian. We do not understand him and he does not comprehend us. Our Puritan fathers did not understand the red man. Calling this God's land and themselves the chosen people of God, they drove him harshly westward, leaving a trail of blood. William Penn and his followers did not understand the Indian and pushed him backward, much more gently and with kindly treatment, to be sure, but none the less effectively. Our North American Indian is a vanishing race. We have chosen to exterminate him instead of utilizing his energies, because that was the easiest way to rid ourselves of the Indian problem. But if "our passion is for the 85 per cent. of the people of Mexico who are struggling for liberty," we must recognize that because of their treatment by the Spaniards they have increased and multiplied and must be shouldered as a white's man burden. And we need a bridge of understanding between us and this primitive people. Let us build it of the elements at hand.

Intelligent, chastened Spanish-Mexico, white men, Aryans like ourselves, jolted into a new set of mental habits, a new sense of responsibility toward their sadly wrecked nation, and a new desire to serve in its reconstruction, stands anxiously awaiting the opportunity to co-operate with us in "our duty to help the Mexican people." This is the Mexico that, together with the vast bulk of the population, lies below the surface din and clashing of revolutionary turmoil and wants peace and the planting of corn, the rebuilding of ruined factories and the

opening up of mines, that the people may have productive work to do for the daily hire that they want.—
March 25, 1916.

MEXICAN MOTHERS

The Mexican Indian who owns a little strip of ground devotes about one hundred and twenty days each year to the cultivation and harvesting of his corn. If the uncertain rainfall and frequent frosts permit, he may produce enough to feed himself and his family through the one hundred and eighty-five days during which he does a minimum amount of work. If he is fortunate, he may have a little corn to sell.

But at home sits the woman over her stone "metate" grinding, grinding, grinding. Before corn can be made into those delicious and nourishing disks that the Indian rolls into a cylinder around a core of beans and swallows so amazingly fast, it must be soaked in warm lime water and then ground fine to a doughy paste called "maza." This means hours of unproductive work, time that for centuries has been laid up against the progress of the Indian as a race. The Mexican mother has been little more than a bearer of children and a very inefficient and expensive grinding machine.

In fifteen minutes a small and simple power mill can grind more corn into "maza" than the Indian woman can grind in eight hours of hard, straining work. During the latter days of the Diaz regime the whirr of the power mill was beginning to be heard in the land. The superstition about an evil genius that lived in the wheels and cogs of this mysterious foreign engine was melting away and the village women

stood in long lines in the morning awaiting their turn at the humming machine. They brought their corn to the mill in hard, yellow kernels and came away with a lump of dough. They brought to the mill fifteen minutes and left it with eight hours of time—eight hours potential liberty and independence.

And this freedom was not for the Mexican mother alone. It was part of a real liberation of Mexico. Energy was released for productive work in the garden or in the field and in the humble education of children for other tasks than the grinding of corn. With the productive help of his woman the man found more time to learn the simple but vital principles of irrigation and intensive cultivation. This the Indian was barely beginning to do. Gradually he was learning the value of foreign machinery and foreign tools in terms of net return in corn and beans, but he was learning this under a guidance and leadership that was not a product of his native clime.

The Indian was led to turn on those who were opening up his country to the inflow of that capital and machinery which could alone redeem his land for him and make available the resources of his forests and mountains. His thanks for the lifting of the weight of a stone "metate" from the neck of his women, for the sewing machine which had begun to quadruple the effort of their hands, and the steel plow that replaced his wooden sticks was a cry of "Mueran los Cientificos!" and then, "Mueran los Gringos!" But it was the cry of misguided ignorance and not of inherent malice.

Now he is hungry again. He needs new seed corn and new tools.

Six years of anarchy have almost taught him that the sowing of bullets and the wrecking of mills does not spell the liberty he was led to expect. A swift, thorough American invasion of Mexico with sacks of corn and wheat instead of powder and shell, followed by the placing in power of men with sufficient vision of the needs of their country to see that credit and capital must precede any real reconstruction, might result in the beginnings of a new Mexico. The attitude of a whole people toward the Gringo might be changed from a contemptuous hatred into a grateful respect. For underneath the ferment of chronic revolution there lies a vast and childlike people of fathers and mothers and children who want only to eat, and to rest and forget.

Can we solve the problem of Mexico by imposing upon its undeveloped natives the ballot which has come as the fruit of twenty centuries of culture and service in Europe? Or do they need the leadership of white men, a government organized so that it will command the confidence of American capital, that will bring railroads, engines and mills to grind corn? Is not seven and three-quarter hours of leisure from the heavy work of grinding more significant to the peon Mexican mother than a ballot which her husband cannot understand or use? —*March 29, 1916.*

DOLLARS FOR PENNIES

On lower Broadway, between Wall street and Bowling Green, there stand decrepit old men stretching out handfuls of blue lithographed bills and offering to exchange a dollar in Carranza Constitutionalist cur-

rency for one cent of Uncle Sam's. How many of us who pass by give a thought to the pitiful tragedy that lies back of this phenomenon?

In 1893 the national treasury of Mexico was practically bankrupt. Six per cent. Mexican bonds were quoted in London at 60 per cent. of their nominal value and the reputation of Mexico among the bankers of the world was at low ebb. But in 1893 Porfirio Diaz discovered a man of financial genius, a real leader of men and doer of deeds, and placed him in power as secretary of the treasury. Jose Yves Limantour immediately negotiated a European loan of \$15,000,000. In 1899 this loan was refunded when he obtained a loan of \$100,000,000 in Germany. In 1902 Limantour was able to begin the floating of a series of five issues of 5 per cent. silver bonds of \$10,000,000 each, and in 1904 he borrowed \$80,000,000 from J. P. Morgan & Co. On the first of January, 1910, Mexico's foreign debt, whose interest Limantour had reduced to 5 per cent., was quoted above par. Mexico had won a recognized and creditable financial standing in the world.

And where had all this borrowed money been going after the genius of Limantour had obtained it? Here are a few items: Toward the construction of 20,000 kilometers of railroad, \$85,000,000. To the Tehauntepec railway and its magnificent artificial ports at Puerto Mexico and Salina Cruz, about \$50,000,000. The splendid harbor works at Vera Cruz took \$15,000,000, and the improvements in the ports of Manzanillo and Tampico called for \$5,000,000. Floods had yearly inundated Mexico City, carrying off hundreds of lives and destroying

property until \$7,000,000 drained the valley. Uncleanliness and scarcity of water scourged the city with plagues until another \$13,000,000 tapped the springs of Xochimilco, dug a fine sewerage system, paved the streets and raised the health level of a population of nearly half a million several hundred per cent. Add to these the public buildings, schools, hospitals, monuments, government offices the beautifying of Chapultepec park and large loans for irrigation purposes, if you will, for good measure.

But the revolution came and drove out Limantour. Another revolution drove out Ernesto Madero. Revolution followed revolution until one fragment of the anarchy was recognized as a de facto government and set itself to work to rebuild the nation through the exercise of the most atrocious military tyranny that Mexico has ever seen. Cent by cent the value of the de facto tyranny's currency has decreased in value. Month after month we hear of new floods of paper forced on an unwilling and helpless people. Year by year its home and foreign credit has crumbled. And this very money, issued by the government and paid out to its home creditors, is refused by that same government in payment of taxes! It demands the gold or silver of the days of Limantour! Where is the shred of stability in a government which not only has no credit at home or abroad, but which is compelled in self-defense to refuse its own legal tender when it is brought to the windows of its cashiers?

More than three hundred governments have been overturned in Latin America since the dawn of their independence. All but two of

them have left empty treasuries to their successors, and the majority left their country creditless at home and abroad. President Palma, of Cuba, true patriot that he was, left \$27,000,000 in the treasury when he stepped down and out, and Senor Limantour handed over to Ernesto Madero, an uncle of President Madero, \$36,000,000 on deposit in the national treasury, in the National Bank of Mexico and in the strongest banks of Europe and the United States.

So admirable a working machine did Ernesto Madero find in the treasury department that he not only adopted the methods of Limantour, realizing that only through co-operation with foreign capital could the government expect to endure, but he also kept the personnel of the department intact despite the clamor of the revolutionists for jobs.

Senor Limantour may never return to Mexico, but Mexico needs the kind of leadership with which he was gifted. Limantour had much to account for to the revolutionists, but the Indian crowd cannot do for Mexico and for the peon himself what the organizing genius of intelligent leadership has done. Will Mexico learn this lesson from its fiery and bitter experience with amateur, demagogue government? Can we help it to learn that lesson if it will?—April 5, 1916.

MAXIMILIAN AND CARRANZA

The Emperor Maximilian was one of the most farsighted men who ever tried to rule Mexico. His vision was so distant that it is said he could see, at the end of the vista

of his life, the wall at Queretaro against which he was destined to be stood up to face a firing squad. It was Maximilian who, fifty years ago, summed up Mexico's relations to the United States in the following prophetic words:

I have arrived at the conclusion, from which I will never vary, that no government, of whatsoever form, can exist permanently in Mexico which fails to win the good will of the government and people of the United States.

Maximilian's words, spoken at Mexico City at the close of our war between the states, might be spoken with still greater meaning by Carranza in Vera Cruz to-day. Every phase in the career of the supreme chief of the constitutional party ought to have impressed upon his mind the undeniable fact that without the friendly co-operation of "the government and people of the United States" his administration is bound to end in failure. And the best evidence of his dependence upon the United States is the fact that he has been unable to suppress the bandit Villa and that it has been necessary for the United States to invade Mexican soil to vindicate the inviolability of its own frontiers and the sanctity of the lives of its own citizens.

In what manner is Carranza acknowledging his obligation for past support and his expectations of future favors?

By endangering the lives of our soldiers and imperiling the success of our operations in Mexico—the soldiers who are endeavoring to remove the last obstacle to the restoration of peace and the operations which are designed to make the Carranza government a success.

As our soldiers are advancing

farther into Mexico they are confronted with an increasingly difficult problem of victualing and supplies—because Carranza declines to place the necessary railroad facilities at their disposal.

"If we had had the use of the Mexican railroads we would have captured Villa long before this," is the way Gen. Funston summarizes this phase of an extremely unpleasant situation.

And one result of Carranza's policy of passive obstructiveness is to be seen in the testimony of one of our soldiers on service with a small detachment:

Parched corn is all we have had to live on for the past five days.

And here is a description of how Carranza's policy has affected the American expedition in general, as given in a news dispatch:

Most of our soldiers haven't any shoes, as they were quickly worn out by the rough travel, and it is impossible to get a fresh supply because Carranza does not permit the use of the railroad for supplies. Many of the soldiers have lost their mounts, and it is impossible, for the same reason, to get remounts. Some of the troops have to march barefoot or make shift with sandals of hide.

But this is not all. The drab line of troopers is stretching out to a dangerous thinness—and reinforcements cannot be pushed forward in time because Carranza will not allow our men to be transported on the railroads.

And, as if to add insult to injury, comes Gen. Obregon, Carranza's man Friday, with the plain intimation that the American punitive expedition has done its work and that it is time for it to leave Mexico if friendly relations between the two countries are to be maintained.

Through all this maze of duplicity, evasion and secret hostility our troops are continuing their task with undiminished courage and energy—but amid suffering and privation which Carranza could have spared them by lifting a finger.

What can Carranza be thinking of?—*April 10, 1916.*

TWICE HEROIC VERA CRUZ

Let us not be deceived as to the moral effect of our punitive expedition upon the minds of the Mexicans themselves. It is true that what little there is of a Mexican press has treated our bandit chasing justly and with regard to the facts as we ourselves see them. In this the army-muzzled press has reflected the mood of the first chief, who has, grudgingly enough to be sure, consented to our homeopathic invasion of Mexico. But the people of Mexico have learned, through thirty years of Diaz worship on the part of their native journalists, that they may well wink at the interpretation of events which they find set down in type. And only some 15 or 20 per cent. of them are able to read type intelligently at all. The masses are influenced by word of mouth, and even Diaz did not find a way to prevent the speaking of heresies on lonely hillsides or behind closed doors.

Vera Cruz has twice defended Mexico against American invasion, and our last evacuation was hailed as an ignominious retreat. Our attempt had failed, our soldiers were unable to break through the lines of the Mexican army that surrounded the city, and were compelled to retire to our iron boats and finally to betake ourselves northward, thor-

oughly whipped. Vera Cruz had borne the title H. Vera Cruz, and now it was honored with still another H, and lives as the twice heroic city. Now this bit of fiction about our defeat is not true to fact, but it is true to the background of the Mexican mind, and it works, while the newspaper "truths" about the excellent and altruistic intentions of Uncle Sam in Chihuahua go counter to Mexican belief and fail to stir anything but surface ripples of optimism and good-will.

In the anecdotage of old Don Porfirio Diaz he loved to think of the freedom of the press, and allowed an utterly unscrupulous and corrupt journalism to thoroughly educate the reading public in that anti-Americanism which was the strongest tool in the hands of the revolutionists who prepared the way for Madero. The press enjoyed a carnival of anarchy unequaled in all Latin America, overthrowing Diaz, destroying Madero and celebrating variegated bandits until Carranza placed it under such an inquisition as makes it his tool to-day. The idea that Mexico was being sold piecemeal to Uncle Sam by the científicos became an innate conviction because it squared so happily with the Mexican's idea of patriotism, which has grown to be largely a matter of hate for foreigners. The importation of armed Americans to defend the properties of the Cananea Consolidated Copper Co., the borrowing of Magalena bay, the second capture of Vera Cruz, and now our march through Chihuahua, all make very compact and powerful ammunition for the incorrigible revolutionary element which knows so well how to play on the feelings of the people.

Nor does this element need type and paper to make its dogmas widely absorbed. They go from man to man, and mix with the very street games of schoolless urchins, making the task of changing the Mexican mind more difficult each day. Suppose we do withdraw our troops, with Villa or without. Suppose our purpose is plain on its surface, and our good-will sincere and evident, will the people believe it—the people who know only that American soldiers are in Mexico and that Mexicans have been killed? They may in time, and it is our duty to make this possible, but it will not be a short and easy process, and it will not be hastened by the approval of our actions through a Carranza-rid-den press.

There is a considerable element in Mexico that recognizes clearly the intentions of the United States with regard to Mexican sovereignty, and appreciates the fact that Mexico cannot progress except through co-operation.—*April 12, 1916.*

HAVE WE A PLAN IN MEXICO?

The obstructive tactics which Carranza is developing are not a mere incident. They are a symptom of a situation which it behooves American diplomacy to adjust. Failure to adjust it will involve serious danger to this country in the time of its need. If Carranza, after having tolerated our expedition in search of Villa without co-operating with it, is now demanding that we withdraw from Mexico, we must search for errors of judgment and of action in our own policy.

Have we a plan in Mexico?

A friendly Mexico, bound to us by a community of interests and prepared to work loyally with us in repelling an invasion of the North American continent or an attack upon the canal, is a prime requisite to the successful solution of America's problem. And Mexico needs our help in the development of its vast resources, practically yet untouched, as we need its neighborly sanction of our defensive plans, such as the construction and operation of a railroad to the canal. If Mexico cannot develop its mines, its oil wells, its plantations and its transportation system without American money, American organizing genius and American enterprise, neither can America look to the future with complete confidence without assurances that south of the Rio Grande we have a stanch friend upon whose territory no enemy of our country could find lodgment or a base for operations against us.

The problem that we have to solve in Mexico does not involve merely the pursuit of a bandit, no matter how bloodthirsty he may be. It has not to do only with the restoration of peace in the neighboring republic. It comprises our whole relations with a country of vast potential resources and a great economic future, a country from which only an imaginary line separates us.

Shall we abandon the hunt for Villa, or shall we defy Carranza, seize the railroads which we need for the purposes of our military operations and press on to the accomplishment of our purpose—the capture or destruction of Don Pancho? And, having captured or destroyed the author of the Columbus butchery, shall we remain in Mexico until peace has been restored, or

shall we abandon it to its fate again?

Without a far-seeing and constructive plan we cannot hope to solve the problem.

Have we a plan?—April 14, 1916.

THE MEXICAN MIND

Most of the mischief that is done in this world is the fruit of ignorance. The truth of the old and unsuccessfully assailed adage that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" is brought freshly to mind by the recent utterances of *El Democrata*, a Carranza organ, published in Chihuahua. This newspaper solemnly assures its readers that a revival of the "plan of San Diego" is under way, and that the states of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, California and Utah are only waiting for an opportunity to join a Mexican invader, throw off their allegiance to the United States, and form a separate republic as a preliminary step to the restoration of Mexico as it was before the Mexican war.

Our esteemed Chihuahua neighbor bases its assumption of the forthcoming partition of the Union upon the sage declaration that the "North Americans" are "regarded with great hatred by the populace of those states."

There is a low grade of intelligence to which the printed word hears a message of semi-magic power, not to be questioned or contradicted. That grade of intelligence is the prevalent one in Mexico. Contempt for a neighbor is as dangerous a thing as the proverbial "little knowledge." The utterances of *El Democrata* are fresh evidence

of Mexico's need of a comprehensive public school system that should include Chihuahua.—April 17, 1916.

FEMINISM IN MEXICO

During the later years of the rule of Porfirio Diaz, the Mexican woman of the middle class began to find employment in government offices. Here she came under that constant and demoralizing drizzle of corruption that fell from above on all underlings who had to do with bureaucratic politics. She absorbed the atmosphere of petty thievery and graft that hung over almost all political business transactions, and she became a party to small intrigues and clique-formings that were magnified for her into revolutionary measures in the name of patriotism. The veneer of learning that a smattering of education had given her made easier their acceptance of the undercurrent of second-hand feminism that trickled from an irresponsible press which the hand of Diaz, in his old age, had failed to curb.

Señor Limantour, as minister of finance, had noticed the baneful effects upon women employes of a sudden contact with public employment, and their reflex effect upon the morals of the whole body of government employes; so he closed the doors of his department to women applicants. Now Señor Limantour, through the subtle publicity methods of the Reyist revolutionists, had been created a very arch-type of that fabulous body of horrific public thieves, "the Científicos," who were supposed to be wringing the neck of Mexico that they might sell the body to American millionaires. Therefore, when the revolu-

tion called for the moral support of Mexican feminism against the Científico regime, it met with no half-hearted response.

These women did not want the ballot. They were intelligent enough to see what a farce the ballot was in the hands of the men. But they did think it possible to monopolize government offices, and that men should be drafted off into fields of work better fitted to masculine muscle and nerve. Their patriotism was one of job and pay. They welcomed the *Reyistas* because they promised unlimited positions. They cheered Madero until they found that he had resolved to keep in place all employes who were doing good work at their posts. Their pictures appeared in our papers showering Diaz and Huerta with confetti after the tragic week of the Madero *coup de main*.

The lightning changes of name in the organization of women employes of the government is another index of their patriotism. In the days of Diaz they were "Daughters of Carmelita," named after the dictator's wife. When Madero triumphed their name changed to "Daughters of Mrs. Sara P. de Madero." Next came "Daughters of Huerta's Iron Hand." Daughters of this, that and the other have followed, some enthusiastic circles taking on the names of such heroes as Villa and Zapata. Now, of course, there are "Daughters of Carranza" abroad in the land.

But there is only one way to look at this new force in Mexican politics. It must be trusted and treated constructively by intelligent and sympathetic leadership. Until this is done it will remain unstable and dangerous. The heart of the middle-

class Mexican woman with economic ambitions is sound enough, and it has no inherent love for bloodshed and the breaking up of homes. These women may cheer a Cheche Campos, whose only claim to glory is the fact that he devastated the entire state of Durango and boasted of setting fire to seventy-two plantations with his own hand; but such emotional demonstrations are ephemeral and should not be an index of possibilities in Mexican womanhood. In the restoration of Mexico to come, the potential for good that lies in this green and untried stuff must be used sympathetically and on its own terms—jobs with pay for a day's work done. That means business organization, not military play. The experiment which must be tried (for these women will not return to drawn-work on the veranda) will prove interesting.—*April 20, 1916.*

OUR DANGER IN MEXICO

As our punitive expedition has advanced into Mexico, the political and military problems surrounding it have grown in scope and complexity. The gravest phase of the situation is the increasing hostility of the Carranza administration, or its officers in the field, to our troops. The strategic disposal of Carranza forces along the thin line of American communications is a factor which is disturbing Gen. Scott, the chief of staff, to such an extent that he has gone to San Antonio to confer with Gen. Funston. Gen. Scott's state of mind on the subject is sufficient indication of the serious aspect of the problem which confronts Gen. Pershing, in actual command of the operations.

It is becoming evident that we shall soon be face to face with the choice of withdrawing from Mexico without the achievement of our stated purpose—"the capture or destruction of Villa"—or risking hostilities, not with Villa's shattered bands, but with the Carranza forces, the forces of the de facto government which exists by virtue of our recognition of its status as a government.

Which alternative shall we adopt? Shall we, for the sake of maintaining outwardly harmonious relations with the Mexican people, submit to the humiliation of quitting Mexico without accomplishing our avowed purpose, or shall we stick to the line of policy which we proclaimed at the beginning of the expedition?

The adoption of the first alternative is repugnant to our dignity as well as to our good sense. By quitting Mexico at this stage of events we would run the inevitable risk of producing in the Mexican mind an impression of weakness which it will take us generations to overcome. And the Mexican mind is peculiarly susceptible to contemptuous impressions of North America.

If we adopt the second alternative we would plunge into a military undertaking of vast proportions—and we have neither the men nor the equipment for any such enterprise. War with the Carranza forces, in addition to those of Villa, would mean a war with the Mexican people. And the crushing of the Mexican people would present a task of the first magnitude, not so much on account of their military prowess as because of the large extent of territory we would have to cover in any such military enterprise.—*April 21, 1916.*

LICKING THE CREAM

It may be a part of universal justice that the underlings of Obregon and Carranza should have their innings and that servants and ranchmen should wallow in the confiscated luxuries of Mexico's wealthy exiles. It may be that it is no worse to rob at the point of a gun than to rob by monopolizing meat markets. But the spectacle of destruction that Mexico presents, and the childish waste of time and money and property that is indulged in in the name of liberty and justice, is disheartening because it is symptomatic of rottenness at the very core of what we have tried to believe is a revolutionary change for the benefit of the Mexican people.

If property were confiscated and the proceeds placed in the vacuous national treasury, or used to relieve the famine conditions that prevail in many parts of Mexico, or in any way were devoted to the purposes for which the revolutions stand, we might be patient. But to wantonly destroy factories, to break into the houses of the wealthy, tear up their libraries and furniture and, in short, to indulge in periodic riots of vandalism, does not remind us very strongly of Washington or Bolivar or even of Miguel Hidalgo.

Carranza's power has been built on such foundations. So long as his closed military system controls the possible sources of income through taxation, levies, confiscation and lootings, he may survive. But just as surely as he shall attempt to replace the military by a civil order, the whole Carranza faction will granulate. The situation is impossible and presents no tangible elements that can be built into a con-

structive plan from within. The problem has ceased to be one merely of political transactions, military tactics and a redistribution of governors. It presents the knotty aspect of a problem of individual and group psychology that is at once sinister and baffling.

Thousands of men have dropped their plows, pens, hammers and picks and lived for six years the thrilly and adventurous life of revolutionary brigands. Hundreds of common soldiers and ranchmen have tasted the glories of a pathetic, but to them very real, generalship. The military has been fed and clothed at the expense of the people, and has come to regard itself as ordained to lick the cream, while it lasts, whatever befall the nation. A new set of mental and physical habits have been set up. Only a rigid, martial control can work the change back to civil order and productive work again, and from whence this control? These armed men will not easily be disarmed and set back to their plowing and their ledgers by their own fellows of another faction, and the flight of Villa has shown us that they will not easily be reformed from within. There seem to be three major possibilities in the sorry case.

Either the bandit factions will consume all the cream of the land in their own wastefulness and exhaust themselves and their people in a long continuation of the present nightmare, or the Carranza faction will succeed in fastening itself upon Mexico as a solid military parasite; or, through the intervention of another power or powers, civil order may be restored and a reconstruction begun. There is always the possibility of a miracle, however,

and Mexico may produce that organizing and reconciling genius who may use the best in the Carranza regime and draw upon the more enlightened elements in Mexico for the working out of a civil-military plan. One can hardly think rationally of the Mexican situation, one can only hope.—*April 28, 1916.*

AND WHO IS OBREGON?

After Victoriano Huerta sailed for Forest Hills, L. I., and the Broadway cafés, Obregon marched the constitutionalist army into Mexico City. Carranza was nominally "first chief," but Obregon ran things. He permitted his troops such a jamboree of pillage and rapine as the city had never witnessed before, and when a little later he wantonly abandoned the metropolis to the mercy of the Zapatistas from the south, the people rejoiced and were glad! They welcomed the change from Obregon to Zapata.

Zapata's "hordes" proved to be a strange and pitiful lot of simple Indians from Morelos and Puebla, who straggled into the city bewildered and humble, begging for something to eat! Little brown peons they were, eyes big with wonder, belts heavy with a miscellaneous assortment of cartridges, huge rifles over their shoulders and a gnawing hunger in their stomachs. They were a nuisance; they filled the parks and arcades, they brought dirt and filth and a considerable reinforcement to the armies of the typhus louse; but at least they respected private property and did their blundering best to keep order or to fall in with what there was of it in town. They fled back into the mountains at Obregon's second approach, and the peo-

ple, remembering constitutionalist outrages, were sorry to see them go, and prepared for another savage dose of the new liberalism.

Obregon returned. There was not so much looting this time, because there was not so much to loot. He and his generals fastened themselves upon the city and have been sucking its impoverished blood ever since.

Carranza may not have liked all this. He may have even opposed it. But the fact remains that he could not, and did not, prevent it, nor has he been able to curb subsequent constitutional "levies" in behalf of liberty and justice. However, that is past and gone. The only point to all this is the fact that in the attitude of the people of Mexico City toward Zapata and Obregon we have a flashlight index of the character of the man with whom we are now treating international questions.—*May 4, 1916.*

FIFTY YEARS AGO—AND NOW

It will be fifty years ago to-day since the United States solved a problem in Mexico which involved not only the relations between the two neighboring republics but the vitality of the Monroe Doctrine. Maximilian was emperor of Mexico at that time—Ferdinand Joseph Maximilian, Archduke of Austria and brother of Francis Joseph, the Austrian emperor who is still reigning at Vienna. Maximilian had been placed upon the throne by French arms under the command of Bazaine, the marshal of France who was destined a few years later to bear, with Napoleon III., the bulk of the burden of dishonor which the

disaster of 1870 laid upon the incompetent French government.

In 1866 France was preparing to back out of the unprofitable adventure into which Napoleon's diplomacy had involved her in Mexico. It had become apparent that Maximilian's throne must be supported permanently by bayonets, and the French empire was getting ready to abandon the trans-Atlantic adventure. So Austria was sending troops to Vera Cruz to maintain the Hapsburg archduke. On May 6 of that year the historian Motley, who was our envoy to Austria, informed the government at Vienna that the United States could not tolerate the dispatch of any more Austrian troops to Mexico. Motley's protest proved completely effective. On the following year the French withdrew from Mexico, Maximilian was stood up against a wall at Queretaro, the firing squad did its work and Mexico became a republic.

The part which the United States played in Mexican affairs in 1866 was aimed purely at the termination of foreign trade and at the triumph of self-government south of the Rio Grande. America's purposes in the present crisis have been, from the day when Porfirio Diaz renounced the presidency, to restore peace and establish the orderly workings of popular government in Mexico. These purposes are as unselfish and as benevolent as those that directed our policy in 1866.

It is a fortunate thing for Mexico, as well as for America, that the Carranza administration, by its more pliant attitude in the pending negotiations, is indicating some appreciation of this central fact of American policy south of the Rio Grande.—*May 6, 1916.*

MORE OF THE SAME

The raid by Carranza soldiers across the Texas border and the killing of three American soldiers is a fresh indication of the seriousness of the problem that confronts the United States in Mexico. At a time when the State department is negotiating with the "first chief" for the right of way to pursue Villa and his bandits and to punish them for the raid into American territory at Columbus, that affair is practically duplicated at Glen Springs, Boquillas and Deemers. Instead of having one Columbus incident on our hands, we now have two. And this time the violators of American sovereignty are not Villistas but Carranzistas, whom the dispatches describe as cheering for both Carranza and Villa.

It does not take a profound knowledge of human nature, and especially of Mexican nature, to see in the affair of Glen Springs a logical result of the events which have taken place since the incident of Columbus. The power of this great country was pledged to give the disorderly elements in Mexico a lesson which they would not forget. The purpose of our punitive expedition was summarized in the grim epigram: "Villa, dead or alive." After two months of military operations, not only is Villa not captured, but he is not even menaced. Moreover, the American forces in Mexico, under diplomatic pressure from Carranza, are preparing to carry out an operation which can be defined only as a partial retirement.

The lesson of the expedition has not been lost upon Mexicans, Villistas and Carranzistas alike. The impression that the United States is

not handling the situation with a firm hand has given ground for the conviction that it is unable to guard the sanctity of its soil along the Mexican border. The Glen Springs raid is an expression of this conviction.—May 8, 1916.

THE PEON'S PULQUE

Some of our boys on the "punitive expedition" have probably sampled pulque, the fermented juice of the maguey cactus. Perhaps a few of them have had a taste of *aguardiente* (burning water). These are the Mexican national drinks.

One of the reasons for the boys having this opportunity is that in Mexico there is a "land question." This question is far from simple, but is built roughly of the following facts: The stealing from the Indians of considerable lands that belonged to them; the exploitation of Mexican land by native and foreign capitalists unjustly; the idleness of much arable land through the whim of large landowners; lack of irrigation for semi-arable land; exhaustion of soil due to ignorance on the part of the Indian and *mestizo*; incompetence on the part of a large body of the population with regard to utilizing the soil. Now this last reason, incompetence, deserves a moment's attention.

It is true that the Mexican Indian is a primitive just beginning to react to the incidence of European civilization, and very slow to respond to its stimulus in any constructive direction. It is true that the Mexican half-breed seems to lack all initiative and to be poorly endowed with imitative faculties. It is true that he responds admirably to kindly and just paternalistic

treatment and turns out a fair amount of work. But in the role of alcohol in his proverbial incompetence, and in the degeneration of the Indian stock, is still an unknown quantity, though its results are plainly marked in many wholesale instances.

Vast tracts of richly fertile Mexican land, especially in the state of Mexico, are devoted to growing the maguay cactus. The return from this land is not food, it is practically a slow poison, that befuddles the minds of tens, hundreds of thousands of men who ought to be tilling that land for the corn that their children are starving for.

Again, while Mexico has been importing corn from the United States and Argentina for the past twenty-five years, thousands of bushels of her own production has gone into fermenting vats and distilling retorts for the manufacture of a swifter and more spirited poison, which has in its turn rendered Mexico less competent to deal with its own agrarian problems. For the principal land problem is how to utilize what arable land there is to the best advantage.

Victoriano Huerta did not indulge heavily in either pulque or aguardiente. His piracies enabled him to pay for very old and very expensive cognac. But his alcoholism is typical of a great deal of that temporary insanity which lies below the periodic outbursts of butchery that we hear about in Mexico now and then. Just as the "disappearance" or "suicide" of congressmen, governors, lawyers, army officers and mere citizens were due to Huerta's inordinate love of cognac, so a goodly percentage of those outrages that are attributed to the na-

tive savagery of the Mexican can be traced to the misuse of Mexican land in the production of alcohol.

Mexico is a problem. It will not be solved by our "punitive expedition" or by border conferences. When we, or we plus other nations, or some European power or powers are compelled to step in to save Mexico from completing her attempt at suicide, the pulque-aguardiente question will have to be faced as a real issue, just as vodka had to be faced in Russia. This is no temperance lesson, it is merely another fact of the multiple problem of Mexico.—*May 11, 1916.*

A TAX MAP OF MEXICO

There is little doubt but what the majority of the American people are opposed to intervention in Mexico. We would much rather see Mexico settle her own internal affairs without even so much as a punitive expedition on our part. But we are in Mexico, and we know that the Mexican people need corn, beans and milk primarily and a decent Mexican government as a secondary proposition. There may be time to get the decent government first and let it furnish the eatables, but this is doubtful in the face of the facts.

Corn, beans and milk are a matter of agriculture. Land connotes taxes. Taxes in Mexico heretofore have been dictated by the owners of land with regard to their own welfare. The Madero government and the Carranza government have verbally committed themselves to tax reform, and have done nothing—because they could do nothing. The talk about land distribution is almost wholly nonsense, because under

an adequate system of taxation the land would distribute itself. The few *hidalgos* who have held good land idle and prevented the natives from acquiring and cultivating it have done so because they didn't have to make the land pay for itself. There is no crime in possessing a million acres of barren mountain or alkali plain. Nobody wants these geographical sections. Yet land has been taxed by areas instead of by worth, or else it has been taxed on the say-so of a wealthy *hacienda* over champagne and *pate-de-foie-gras*.

As part of any constructive programme for the rebuilding of Mexico, the making of an agricultural map of Mexico with reference to a just system of taxation on the basis of arability and proximity to means of transportation, would be a capital point. We could render hardly any greater service to Mexico than to show her people how to do this thing. It would not solve all her problems, by any means, but it would go far toward giving her the "tortillas and frijoles" that she so painfully needs.—*May 13, 1916.*

VENGAN LOS AMERICANOS

All over Mexico the better element of the people is beginning to say, "Vengan los Americanos"—let the Americans come. They say it unwillingly, to be sure. They hate the thought of American intervention with all the force of their traditional patriotism, but they are so utterly sick of the brigandage of Villa, Zapata and Obregon that they would co-operate heartily with an American intervention if that were of the right kind.

They have little sympathy with a mere punitive expedition, a military spanking of naughty children who have displeased Uncle Sam. But with a serious and forceful attempt to restore order in Mexico in behalf of the people themselves they would actively accord.

If we should intervene in Mexico under the white flag of truce and the emblem of the Red Cross, using our rifles only when necessary against armed despots of whatever brand; if we placed a strict and effective embargo on arms and ammunition for Mexicans; if we put the railways under such control that food could be distributed to a semi-starving population; if we put an end to the exportation of cattle and food products from the nearly stripped republic, the way would be cleared for a definite reconstruction.

Then the thousands of exiles could return to their homes. An election, superintended by an American army police, would determine justly the immediate political need of the people. The will of the Mexican people has never been heard, because there has never been a fair election in that republic. Now is the golden opportunity for us and for Mexico.

After such an election, the intelligence of Mexico could proceed to its tax reform, the land reforms that the true liberals have in mind. This would in no wise be a return to Porfirism, it would be a new Mexico, with a fresh start toward whatever form of democracy may best fit its needs, to be worked out by Mexicans themselves. Then, indeed, we might "withdraw" completely, and with the lasting gratitude of all Mexicans save those who have lived for

the past six years by holding up a people at the muzzle of a gun.—*May 20, 1916.*

WELCOME THE JUNGLE!

The Mexican revolutions are certainly succeeding in the accomplishment of at least one of their avowed purposes. They are vigorously restoring the land to its original possessors.

It takes but two years for the marvelously fertile sugar-cane land of the state of Morelos to return to the reign of the jungle. Land that has taken twenty years to become civilized and yield food for the Mexican people (for they, too, eat sugar!) is overrun with giant thorn and weedy underbrush almost the moment it is left untended. Zapata has succeeded in reducing the productivity of the lands in his zone from the first rank to practically nothing. Villa and his bands have destroyed and prevented the sowing of crops in the north. The Carranzistas have been equally guilty wherever they have operated, although white-washed by our recognition as a "de facto government."

The slogan "Mexico for the Mexicans!" is fast giving way to a sterner decree of Nature herself—"Mexico for the Jungle!" and the people starve.—*May 25, 1916.*

THE MEXICAN ISSUE

The Wilson plea that the Taft administration blundered in Mexico and that, therefore, Wilson could not avoid blundering, too, is not likely to impress the country as a justifying reason for a national policy that has tolerated, and in a sense con-

doned, the unspeakable crimes committed in Mexico on American men and women, and particularly on those men and women who devoted themselves to the spread of religion and education. Nothing that has happened through all the savagery that has been going on in Europe for two years past is comparable in infamy or inhumanity with the offenses repeatedly committed against our citizens and our flag in Mexico without protest from us.

The reply of the country to the Democratic platform's declaration that President Wilson's mistakes have been incidental to a broad policy will be that the mistakes have been too serious to be classed as "incidental" to any policy. The President's record does not constitute a policy. It is merely a series of mistakes—mistakes that have been tragic in their consequences and that stain our government's attitude with the blood of our own citizens.

Mr. Wilson must shoulder this responsibility. It is solely his.—*June 15, 1916.*

IF INTERVENTION

It cannot be too often stated that, in case of American intervention in Mexico, there will be found a very solid body of influential and intelligent Mexican opinion and power in favor of our effort to restore order. Not that this element will welcome us, not that it will be less bitter against the destructive role that it considers our administration has played in Mexican affairs, but only that it sees no other possible solution for Mexico's tragic puzzle.

In case of intervention the vast bulk of Mexico's native population

of twelve millions or more will remain practically quiescent. It has neither the facilities nor the will to move. It wants only a chance to plant corn again, to be paid its regular bi-monthly wage for work done and to be relieved of the heel of the "patriotic" banditti.

Intervention would send a wave of uniting patriotism through a large part of the population of Mexico. There would be furious talk and startling demonstrations. But as for solid unity, effective organization, formidable resistance except of the desultory guerilla type—these things cannot be manufactured out of patriotic indignation over night. Intervention would be a hard, unpalatable task, but of nothing like the dimensions we are wont to picture it, and not nearly so unwelcome to Mexico as we have been led to believe, IF we will but enter into immediate co-operation with that body of Mexican opinion that is ready, though reluctantly, to assist in saving the remnants of Mexico's social fabric and good name.—*June 16, 1916.*

WAR WITH MEXICO

The border between Mexico and the United States, counting the sinuosities of the Rio Grande, is more than 1,500 miles in length, or as far as from New York City to Omaha.

From one-half to two-thirds of the inhabitants of the border towns and counties on the American side are Mexicans.

Many of these are hostile to Americans. On both sides of the border are criminals who are refugees from across the line, Mexican renegades in the United States, American renegades in Mexico.

A war with Mexico would have many of the characteristics of ordinary war, but more of the characteristics of Indian and guerilla warfare, modified by the existence of trained armies and experienced officers, equipped with modern arms.

Brownsville, on the narrow and shallow Rio Grande, is sometimes shot up from the Mexican side. Brownsville has 13,000 inhabitants, 10,000 of them being Mexicans. El Paso is in somewhat the same situation as Brownsville, also Eagle Pass. There are many towns on the frontier where the main street is the dividing line between Mexico and the United States. The greater part of the Mexican soldiers are Indians, and the ablest are the Yaqui Indians, who resemble the Apaches.

Any town or village or ranch along the 1,500 miles may be attacked in force.

Atrocities that have characterized our previous Indian wars are possible, and that, too, on a large scale. War with Mexico must be waged with all the ability and energy of the whole nation.

It would be well if the able man were put in charge of military operations at the beginning, instead of waiting until untold horrors force action.

The right man to put in charge of the Mexican situation is Leonard Wood. His experience qualifies him, and the work he has done proves his fitness for this task.—*June 19, 1916.*

AFTER INTERVENTION, WHAT?

Carranza's hordes of petty chieftains, each largely controlled by

pettier chieftains below him, will be fused into the semblance of an organized army by the incidents of a foreign war. This army will be defeated, broken into small bands that will continue to harass our operations and prove an ugly menace in guerilla style until we starve them out of ammunition. Then the men will be hunted down and disarmed. If they choose, they can get down to constructive work.

The railways must be rebuilt. The jungle must be fought back again to its boundaries around the once-cultivated land. Corn must be planted for the hungry population. Cattle must be rounded up and protected from slaughter and exportation. There is plenty for the Mexican to do.

Typhoid fever must be wiped out of the large cities, where it has already become a menace to us through the migrations of the body louse.

Sixty thousand Mexicans must return to their native land and be allowed to occupy or rebuild what is left of their one-time homes.

A tax-map of Mexico should be made, putting land taxation on an equal basis and thus doing away with the greatest of land abuses at the hands of the great landlords.

Seed corn must flood into Mexico. The work of irrigation must be recommenced and pushed forward, for no distribution of land will solve the agrarian question of a simple and childlike people as the Mexican Indian is. His land must be made to yield more than an alkali crust patched with wiry grass.

The press must be liberated from the military heel, and, in control of men who are tired of red ruin and the breaking up of laws, tell the

truth about American intentions in Mexico and assure the people that as soon as these capital changes are brought about the American army will be withdrawn.

These things may be done much more quickly than pessimists would have us believe, once some of that vast energy that has turned on itself in destruction is liberated for up-building. There is enough of the intelligence, constructive element in Mexico to work wonders once it is given a chance and it recognizes that the one chance lies in our carrying through of a friendly, though military, intervention in behalf of decency and order.—*June 20, 1916.*

HOW WAR MAY POSSIBLY BE AVOIDED WITH MEXICO

BY S. S. McCLURE.

From the 23rd of July to the 4th of August, 1914, the governments of England, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium and Italy were engaged each in urging the others to compose their differences and not risk a war which would be the most terrible and destructive in history.

No one can read these notes and talk to the authors of the notes without realizing that all the governments of Europe eagerly and honestly worked for peace. The futility of notes was never before shown so clearly. There are four men, Sir Edward Grey, Sazonov, Count Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg, who, had they been face to face, could likely have prevented this war.

The most dangerous occupation in the world is the waging of a word-war. We are now engaged in a futile

and dangerous word-war with Mexico. The atmosphere and controlling forces of the word-fighters are so hostile each to the other that every possible hindrance exists to prevent their minds from meeting. Their objects are identical. There is no natural obstacle to a peaceful and beneficent solution of the Mexican situation; but there are serious artificial and factitious obstacles to a proper solution. A war with Mexico would be another monument to the ineptitudes of negotiation by correspondence or by incompetent agents. Yesterday I referred to Gen. Wood as a man to handle the Mexican situation. I've met Gen. Wood only twice in my life. The total of my intercourse with him does not exceed ten minutes. I judge him entirely by his achievements.

Gen. Wood is a man in the prime of physical and mental vigor. He is the ranking general in the American army. His statesmanlike work in Cuba and the Philippines has given him a reputation all over the world as the foremost living diplomat in dealing with countries identical in many respects with Mexico. He is just, far-seeing and sympathetic. He is, for want of a better term, the greatest colonial administrator now living, and he ranks with the greatest in history. Such is his position in the judgment of leading statesmen in all civilized countries. There is no man so qualified to inspire affectionate trust and confidence in the minds of the rank and file of such a nation as Mexico. He is the fittest instrument to conduct our negotiations with Mexico, not by notes, but face to face.

Gen. Wood is the most competent military man in the United States.

He is also in the matter of this sort the most competent negotiator.

Leonard Wood has had a career which thrills Americans to read. It is full of a spirit of high adventure and great achievement, of force and gentleness combined, of a readiness to serve his country in emergency, and then step down from a pinnacle when the emergency was over.

In 1886 Leonard Wood, a young man of twenty-six, entered the army as an assistant surgeon. He was attached to the forces of Gen. Miles, which were engaged in cleaning out the Apaches and in rounding up old Chief Geronimo. In his first two years Wood had won the medal of honor for distinguished service; one night he rode seventy miles through a country infested with hostile Indians and the next day covered thirty miles on foot, carrying dispatches.

He became known as the only man who could tire an Apache on the trail. He was the best boxer, the best all-round athlete in the army. Every one in the West knew him. That is why Roosevelt, who had met and known him in the West, joined him in forming a regiment of Rough Riders for the Spanish-American war. But Wood's great achievement in Cuba came not on the field of battle. His greatest work was not done at San Juan Hill, but in the office of administrator and pacifier of an oppressed and war-torn country.

There may have been colonial administrators of greater ability than Leonard Wood, but, if so, history has neglected to record them. When the war was over he found himself governor of the city of Santiago. Five minutes after he sat at his

desk some one asked him how he would begin. "Clean up two hundred years of dirt," was the answer. And he did it, did it so well that he was made governor of the province of Santiago.

Santiago was the hotbed of Cuban revolutionary activities, and the mainspring of it all lay in a few red editors who lived on the propaganda of revolution. They violently attacked Wood, and his advisers demanded their suppression. But the young general called them before him and said:

"You may say anything against me personally, but the moment you attack the government I shall put you in Morro Castle and keep you there."

From the province of Santiago he was called to be governor-general of Cuba. At the age of thirty-nine he sat in the chair of Weyler in the palace at Havana. Placed in the most difficult of positions, with perpetual opportunity to make errors, he made none. He won the friendship of the church, of Spanish and Cuban elements, even the approval of that small class of West Pointers who saw with envy a civilian soldier rising to the position of head of the United States army.

Gov.-Gen. Wood won universal approval because he made good. Some one said, "Flaws have been found in the administration of other generals, but only a steady stream of praise for Wood." By modern water supply, sewers, roads, sanitation, he made the Cuban pestholes habitable. He averted a yellow fever plague and stamped out the danger for all time. He gave Cuban cities a lower death rate than Washington itself. He established police courts and a system of justice in

the island. When he began at Santiago he said:

"The most important thing is to get the children off the streets and into the schools." He did it for all Cuba.

He taught the Cubans how to govern themselves, taught them so well that, when we withdrew from the island, the system which Wood instituted began to work and has worked since. As agent of the United States he showed the world how America can take up the white man's burden, teach a half-civilized people to rule themselves and then withdraw when the service is done. He devised the railroad laws for Cuba, laying thereby the foundations of prosperity with fairness to the nation and railway men alike.

In 1903 Leonard Wood was made a major-general of the regular army. He served in the Philippines and returned to be chief of the Eastern department, with headquarters on Governor's Island. From 1910 to 1914 he was chief of staff at Washington; then, with the passage of a law requiring rotation of the position of chief of staff, he returned to Governor's Island.

It was Wood who originated the Plattsburg training camp idea. It was he who has from the start insisted upon some form of universal military service as the basis of our defense. There is no other solution.

On February 21, 1916, he said:

"We cannot maintain our democracy and rely with any degree of certainty on a hireling army."

Four days later he set forth the terrible danger of a volunteer army—which means a policy of preparing for war after war has begun:

"A voluntary army is like a volunteer fire department which the mayor calls out after the fire has started. The vol-

unteers of England have all made a noble sacrifice, but they have been killed off."

Hemmed in by all the limitations of public utterance that surround a man in his career, Gen. Wood has made a deep impression on his countrymen. He is a great soldier, but still more, a great organizer, a great leader of men.

At this moment there is one of two things to be done. Settle the Mexican trouble peacefully or by war. For either solution the fittest man is Gen. Wood. If the settlement is to be by war, the lives of thousands of American youth depend on good generalship.

England has had to face problems similar to what we had to face in Cuba and the Philippines and now in Mexico. Lord Cromer, one of her greatest administrators, told me that in his work in Cuba and the Philippines Gen. Wood in this field ranked with the greatest administrators in history. He said that his work in Cuba and the Philippines could not be surpassed.

There is no country where the sense of nationality and national dignity is stronger than in Mexico. This must be taken into consideration in dealing with a people whose ideas about the United States are utterly fantastic. Our ideas about Mexico are sufficiently removed from actuality. Negotiations by notes must lead Mexico either to war or to humiliation as Mexico feels it. Now is the time, if ever, for a qualified plenipotentiary.—
June 21, 1916.

NOT TOO LIGHT HEARTED

We hear that the war in Mexico, if war comes, will be only a

skirmish. No one will see any real service there, only a trip to the border, a few weeks in San Antonio, or a joy ride into Chihuahua.

This is the century-old error of facing war too light-heartedly. Why should we, after all, be able to conceive of this business of war? It is no part of our experience, so we visualize it as a variation of what we know—the works of peace.

Yet it is well to steel ourselves for other things. It is well to recall that Washington society drove out to Bull Run in carriages to see the game. In 1898 the Boers were to be eaten alive at one gulp. We still remember reading of the British posters at the beginning of this war, advertising a free shooting trip up the Rhine, for volunteers. The Germans promised to be in Paris in six weeks. The Cossacks were to eat Christmas dinner in Berlin. Churchill was going to dig the rats gaily out of their holes.

If we fight in Mexico, we fight a hostile country of 13,000,000. Their lack of arms will be compensated by their advantage in defending a most difficult country against a force mostly untrained for this intimate sort of fighting. If we come to blows we face no easy task, no light sacrifices, no mimic warfare.

Let us now recognize that Mexico is our Balkan peninsula. It is the touchstone by which our foreign policy is tested. Unless we succeed there, we cannot succeed in the larger world relations to which we are called.

Let us bring the highest intelligence in the land to bear upon the problems involved. Let us utilize all the information that exists.

We can take counsel with Americans who have gone to Mexico

pioneering the introduction of modern industrial and economic development without making ourselves subservient to corporate interests.

We must place the ablest men that our public service and army life has developed in charge of operations, so that whatever undertaking circumstances force upon us may be carried through in a thoroughly systematic manner and with adequate preparation. Such a tragedy as that of Mexico only the foolhardy can face light-heartedly.—
June 22, 1916.

THE BLOOD-SPILLING AT CARRIZAL

The word Carrizal—the name of an obscure station on the Mexican Central Railway—is looming lurid in the destinies of two neighboring nations. At that point, according to the Mexican version of events, an American force declined to obey Gen. Trevino's "order" to desist from any forward movement, was attacked, lost twelve men, including its commander, and retreated before overwhelming numbers.

It is not necessary to go far into the background of this lamentable incident in order to appreciate it at its full value as a menace to the nominally peaceful relations between the United States and Mexico. It is not necessary to remember that the troops which were attacked had advanced into Mexican territory with the express consent of Venustiano Carranza, the Mexican "first chief." It is not necessary to recall even that the purpose for which that force had entered Mexico was to aid in the tranquilization of the disturbed republic.

It is only necessary to consider that, while President Wilson was straining the resources of diplomacy in his endeavor to prevent an open breach with Mexico, a Mexican force, while the negotiations were pending, treated an American detachment as if war had already been declared and the slaughter of the enemy had become a patriotic virtue.

President Wilson, by the bloody incident of Carrizal, has been brought face to face with a situation that brings the grim fact of war much nearer to America than anything that had gone before. Congress, aroused by the latest and most sinister page of our unhappy relations with Mexico for three years past, is awaiting the signal to utter the word that will mark the opening of a second war with Mexico. The word has not yet been spoken. The gates of the Temple of Janus are still closed, but they are beginning to swing on their hinges.

Shall the fateful words be uttered? Shall the gates open wide?

The event of Carrizal has placed the decision in the hands of our southern neighbor. Will Mexico realize the solemnity of its obligation and act promptly in the interests of peace, or will the rifles of Trevino's men be suffered to open the new war between two nations whose destinies should run side by side for the greater happiness and prosperity of both?—*June 23, 1916.*

TYPICAL OUTRAGES IN MEXICO

A few months ago a raiding band of Mexicans in Texas was met by a

small force of United States cavalry. During the ensuing fight a soldier disappeared. Two weeks afterward a laborer in Texas was found to be wearing the boots of the missing soldier.

This is what happened: The soldier was captured, taken across the river into Mexico. He was hitched to a horse; when the horse galloped the soldier must either be dragged on the ground or run as fast as the horse. Then his ears were cut off, and after other tortures his head was cut off and stuck on a pole. This was an American boy twenty-three years old, who was helping protect life and property in Texas.

Near Tampico there was an old man living with his daughter and a niece on a little farm. Four Mexicans came and, after getting his money, tied him to a tree, and in succession, within fifteen feet of him, outraged the niece.

There is a large collection of reports, fully authenticated, of outrages, tortures, murders and rapine in the United States and in Mexico, upon American men and women and boys and girls. Incredibly horrible outrages occur frequently in the United States along the 1,800-mile Mexican frontier.—*June 23, 1916.*

OPPORTUNITY AND PERFORMANCE IN MEXICO

The present administration is justly proud of the marvelous growth of foreign trade since 1912. Part of that growth is temporary and when the war ends such trade will revert to its former owners like Great Britain or Germany, now

either too busy or too blockaded to uphold the full volume of their foreign commerce.

The part of our growing foreign trade which will endure is the part which is anchored by American investments abroad. The old saying that trade follows the flag is being replaced by a new maxim that trade follows investment. If an American investment company like the American International Corporation builds a street railway in South America, it means the purchase of rails and cars from American manufacturers and the installation of a power plant by American engineers and electric companies. All these American concerns employ labor; half the proceeds of the foreign sales will be turned over to American workmen.

In undeveloped countries trade follows the investment, but what does investment follow? It will not go far or long without the companionship of the flag of its protecting government. We are children in this matter. England has taught the world the lesson of foreign investment and foreign trade. English investors lend more than a billion dollars a year to the backward countries of the world because they know that the navy follows that investment and, if the government which invited and allowed that loan cannot protect the development that arises from it, then the British military forces will compel order and exact reparation for damage done. On the protection of these investments depends the willingness of employers to hire laborers to produce machinery and railroad material for sale abroad.

There is no sense in shirking the problem in Mexico. American, British, German capital need protection

there and the establishment of a firm government. This is no less for the advantage of foreign capital in Mexico than for the benefit of its unhappy population, harried by contending bands of revolutionaries. No one wants permanent military occupation of Mexico. We want done there what was done in Cuba. Contrast the plight of Mexico and the prosperity of Cuba—neither one of which we own or want to own—and the contrast measures the distance between opportunity and performance.—*June 24, 1916.*

TO THE NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARD GOOD-BY AND GOOD LUCK!

Our national guard is going to the Mexican border and probably into Mexico. It is no trip to visit friends and no summer vacation country. These men are going into Mexico, not to get anything for themselves, nor even for the United States, except for security on our southern border. Before they are through they will cast out the alternating sets of bandits who prey on the unhappy Mexican people, and give the people order and peace to harvest and enjoy the fruits of their industry. The same military crowd that robs the Mexicans, robs and murders across our own border; the two evils will be abolished together. Yet the very ones we are going to serve will be duped or bullied into opposing us. That is the irony of it.

Is New York really as insensible to the meaning of this departure as it seems? Women and men who complacently stay at home look casually upon New York soldiers marching through the streets to en-

train. Some of us do not know what is happening. Some of us do not know how to express ourselves; some of us think it is bad form; some of us are simply too busy with our own affairs.

Ahead of these New York men who are going to do our part in this work are the rigors of campaigns in the dust-choked, burning desert, in mountains that swarm with guerrillas that know every inch of them, in towns full of civilian snipers. They face the more serious problems of commissary supply and medical attendance.

When our men are gone we shall read every paragraph in the reports sent back by the correspondents that go with them. When they come back, we will line the streets from the Battery to the park and give them a hero's welcome. Some of those who are leaving will never see that welcome. Just to be sure that they all know we appreciate them, show them now. Hats off to the flag, give the men a cheer, and individually wish them Godspeed.

To the guard, good-by, good luck and God bless you.—*June 26, 1916.*

RECONSTRUCTION IN MEXICO

A wonderful task awaits the doing in Mexico. That task is the modernization of a medieval people, the putting of machinery in the hands of rude artisans, the setting free of the imprisoned resources of man and soil, the guidance of Mexico into its own. This is in its essence work not of a military but of an economic nature, whatever military flourish or prelude there may be before the workers begin.

Destiny has decreed that we should take up the work which Spain as a colonial power could not finish. Magnificent as was Spain's accomplishment, it was the achievement of a medieval power that is only to-day learning to fit itself into the modern capitalistic world.

Over a hundred years before the English came to this hemisphere the Spaniards came to Mexico. We hear too much of Spanish exploitation of Mexico. The Spanish settled and lived there, and civilized the people. The great land owners and the church taught them to be industrious, sober, religious. A patriarchal, agricultural land arose, and as it was 300 years ago, so it remains to-day.

To be sure, the Spanish developed other than agricultural resources; they mined for silver. But it was pickaxe mining, with the labor of men. The Spanish genius has not even at home learned the wonder of capital, which means investments, machinery for oil wells, copper mines, railroads, factories. This modern development came into Mexico from other sources, from England, America, Germany.

No agricultural country has laws or governmental machinery to foster or even protect the new forms of property that thus arise. Government and laws were weak and local in character; industry requires both to be strong and centralized. Investment and industry developed in Mexico faster than the new framework of laws and government. Mountain bands, the wild tribes of the south, and even political parties, found it profitable to plunder and blackmail the half-protected foreign industries. Hence the revolutions of the last five years, and, to-day, anarchy.

Now industry, capital, progress, cannot get out of Mexico. Mexico must get into them. That means a new sort of laws, a new kind of government, a new attitude toward employers and investors. The creation of such laws, such a government, such an attitude, is what we call the work of colonial administration. It means taking up the white man's burden, it means helping backward people to find themselves in the modern world. England has done this work in South Africa, in Egypt, in India. France has done it in Algiers. We have done it in the Philippines, in Porto Rico.

This great work can be done without remaining in occupation of the country thus reformed. That was our magnificent achievement in Cuba. The world expected to see us hold Cuba. We taught it to walk, and set it free.

Sooner or later that is precisely what we shall do in Mexico.—*June 26, 1916.*

THE PACIFISTS AND MEXICO

There is a great deal of loose thinking about the possible war with Mexico. This is largely because of the almost universal lack of knowledge of the conditions on our southern frontier.

It is not generally known that there is no safety for American lives in the parts of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona that border on Mexico, and that since the overthrow of Huerta there is no man or group of men able to prevent the Mexican bandits in northern Mexico from murdering United States citizens on the farms and in the vil-

lages in the United States near the Mexican border.

It is a condition—a serious and terrible condition—that confronts the government of the United States.

The actual facts of the terrible tragedies behind the general statement in Secretary Lansing's note of June 20 are not known to the American people.

Secretary Lansing said:

"It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and extent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed.

"During the past nine months in particular the frontier of the United States along the lower Rio Grande has been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory and depredations and murders on American soil by Mexican bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens, sometimes carrying American citizens across the international boundary with the booty seized.

"American garrisons have been attacked at night, American soldiers killed and their equipment and horses stolen, American ranches have been raided, property stolen and destroyed and American trains wrecked and plundered. The attacks on Brownsville, Red House Ferry, Progreso postoffice and Las Pedradas, all occurring during September last, are typical.

"In these attacks on American territory Carranzista adherents and even Carranzista soldiers took part in the looting, burning and killing. Not only were these murders characterized by ruthless brutality, but uncivilized acts of mutilation were perpetrated. Representations were made to General Carranza, and he was emphatically requested to stop these reprehensible acts in a section which he has long claimed to be under the complete domination of his authority."

A reign of terror exists to-day in the territory of the United States

contiguous to Mexico. The danger is greatly increased by the fact that in most of this territory in the United States the majority of the inhabitants are Mexican and these Mexicans are largely sympathetic with their own people.

Our government should publish a detailed history of the outrages on American soil. These outrages have steadily grown worse, the invading bandits have grown bolder, as witness, for example, the tragedy of Columbus, New Mexico.

The rights of American citizens in Mexico are unquestioned. But forgetting entirely the horrible story of the last three years of outrages in Mexico itself, our government has no choice in the matter in protecting its citizens in its own territory.—*June 27, 1916.*

MEDIATION IMPOSSIBLE

There are disputes between nations which can be mediated. There are other disputes which so closely involve the honor and the vital interests of nations that they are beyond the scope of mediation, no matter how well intentioned.

Something of the distinction between the two sorts of international controversies seems to have been sensed by the diplomats of those South and Central American states which have shown a desire to offer their friendly offices for the settlement of the present ominous crisis in our relations with Mexico.

All Latin America and the rest of the world must realize that the affair of Carrizal, coming as the climax of a series of outrages committed by Mexicans against the dignity of the United States and of its citizens, presents an issue which

must be settled directly between the United States and Mexico.

No country is more anxious than the United States to cultivate friendly relations with Mexico. And yet, such are the present circumstances that the United States would jeopardize the future and make such friendly relations impossible if it did not at this grave juncture insist upon a clear and equitable settlement not only of the ghastly Carrizal issue, but also of all the cumulative issues that lie behind it. A failure to reach a complete adjustment of all outstanding problems at this time would constitute a menace to the future peace of the two continents.—*June 28, 1916.*

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA

In the year-book of Trinity Parish, just out, Rev. Dr. William T. Manning, rector of Trinity Church, makes a significant contribution to the controversy which has arisen out of the convening of the Panama church conference. That gathering, held in the city of Panama, has been characterized as a movement to extend Protestantism in Latin America. Mr. Manning, with other members of the church mission board, exerted himself in a vain effort to prevent the sending of delegates to the conference. In summarizing the attitude of Trinity Church toward the cause represented by the Protestant rally in the heart of Catholic America, Dr. Manning says in the year-book of his parish:

It is plain that this church could not officially identify itself with such a

movement without departure from her historic position and compromise of her principles. We have our deep and real difference with Rome, which cannot be minimized or disregarded. Those teachings of the Roman Catholic Church which are modern and un-Catholic this church has always firmly opposed. But this church stands, and has always stood, for that which is ancient and Apostolic and truly Catholic.

The Catholic church has been the great colonizing and constructive force, not only in all the Latin American republics, but in California and the southern tier of states which once formed part of Mexico. The United States government recognized the continuation of the powerful influences of the Catholic church in the Philippines when it sent William H. Taft to Rome in a successful effort to bring about an adjustment of the friars' lands question. As in the Philippines, so in all the Latin American states, the Catholic church is still a mighty force in the lives of the people. This is a fact which Americans in official life are sometimes prone to forget. It is a fact which should be remembered in our present dealings with Mexico. The eyes of Catholic America are upon Mexico. And the impressions which Catholic America shall gather from our conduct in Mexico cannot fail to exert a powerful influence upon our future relations with the rest of the American republics in which the church is an effective social force.—*June 28, 1916.*

NOW OR LATER IN MEXICO

Either now or later we have a task before us in Mexico which cannot be obscured by all the clouds of

incense arising from the altars of rhetoric.

We are going to have to aid the distracted citizens of that country in forming and upholding a government—of Mexicans, not Americans—to maintain peace and order in their unhappy land. Perhaps the incessant outrages on our border, perhaps the slaughter of half our band of troopers at Carrizal and the imprisonment of the rest, perhaps the view of the jobless and starving masses of the native population and the abandoned or ruined mines, oil fields and plantations of Mexico—perhaps all these do not suffice to impel us to aid in the establishment down there of a power that can give security to our border and to the Mexicans themselves. We can postpone but we cannot avoid this work.

Let us make clear to ourselves just what this inescapable duty means for us. It certainly means nothing like the present thin column of American soldiers extending south into Mexico from Columbus, a thorn in the Mexican side. This expedition is an exact counterpart of the Vera Cruz expedition. Then we sailed down to force Huerta to salute the flag; we killed many Mexicans, a few American soldiers, and came away with the flag unsaluted. To-day our column is in Mexico to get Villa alive or dead. It stays there inactive, not having gotten him, and not knowing whether he is alive or dead. We never get anywhere. It is because we have no plan, because we will not face the inevitable fact of intervention.

The way to pacify Mexico is first to take Mexico City. That means an expeditionary force in from Vera Cruz. When Mexico City is taken

the job belongs to Gen. Leonard Wood. Let him assemble representatives of the interests that stand for order in Mexico: The men who want to labor, the men who want to employ labor, the 60,000 land owners who are in exile in the United States and Spain, and the church, which is such a force in Latin-American countries.

Then, pending the establishment of order, when elections can be held, let there be established a provisional government backed by the United States. Our army officers should aid this government in forming and equipping an adequate military force. Our support would enable such a government to raise money—first to pacify the country, then to build railroads, harbors, irrigation works, roads, and establish schools. When such a government is in swing and elections are held, we can withdraw as we did in Cuba and let the Mexicans rule themselves.

One thing we should need, and Mexico would need: An offensive and defensive alliance. It would eternally protect Mexico from aggression and forever safeguard our vulnerable southern border. Through Mexico we should soon have a protected all-rail connection with Central America and the Panama canal. This, together with security for our investments in Mexico and a boundless field for new enterprises there, is what we should gain for ourselves, apart from the service rendered our neighbor.

We are floundering on a heavy sea. It is time to take our bearings, set the sails of this Mexican issue, and steer direct into port instead of waiting to be shipwrecked somewhere on the shore.—*July 5, 1916.*

AMERICAN DOLLARS, TOO, FOR CARRANZA?

Having denounced in 1913 the American bankers interested in the six-power loan to China, and having given notice that the new administration was sternly against government co-operation in such matters, we are now informed from Washington that Secretary of State Lansing is discussing with Carranza's envoy the conditions upon which this government would aid in securing from American bankers the money necessary to establish Carranza firmly in power.

Are we to understand from these semi-official reports that it is seriously contemplated at Washington to encourage American bankers to loan Carranza money which in one way or another may be used to buy arms and ammunition with which to shoot the American troops now being mobilized on the Texas border?

Is it possible that while our War department at Washington is working night and day on train schedules hurrying thousands of our young men into camp for possible war duty against Mexico, our State department is engaged in conferences whose purpose is to secure loans for Carranza that are far more likely to be permanent than the peace that is so cautiously promised?

Nearly all the ammunition now held by Carranza "for emergencies" was shipped into Mexico by consent of this government. Is American money now to be stored in Carranza's vaults by permission of this government for the same "emergencies"?

Can Carranza build a government? We have selected him, contrary to the views of the best-informed Mexi-

can people. He does not represent the organizing force of that country.
—July 7, 1916.

IPSWICH, SOUTH DAKOTA

Ipswich is a place of about 1,000 inhabitants. It is a prosperous farmers' town, so prosperous that, when Thanksgiving and Christmas come, it is hard to find a family to help.

All of the boys ride and shoot. Twenty-five of them belong to a cavalry troop and to-day they are on the Mexican border. With these boys gone the town is desolate, and it will be desolate until they return.

What were they sent to the Mexican border for? What are they supposed to do down there? What is the tangible work of service to their country which they can perform and, by so doing, earn the right to return? This is what the people in the northwest are asking themselves. Neither in the record nor the promise of our relations with Mexico do they find the answer.

It is not our intention to capture Villa. We are withdrawing our troops to the American border. We do not intend to re-enter Mexico to help establish there a man and a government who can extirpate anarchy in Mexico itself and along our southern border. We would not let Huerta do this. We supplied first Villa, then Carranza, with arms and ammunition. In spite of our arms and ammunition they were not able to bring peace and order in Mexico. They only turned the arms against us. To-day we repudiate Villa, and we trust Carranza so little that we will no longer send him arms. If with our open support and our guns and cartridges he was not able to

rule Mexico, how can he rule it handicapped by our deserved distrust and shut off from getting arms from us?

We will patrol our own border and, if Carranza will let us, follow into Mexico Mexican murderers and plunderers who cross our border to ply their trade. Through the summer heat in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona that is what the Ipswich boys will do, and the boys from a thousand hamlets all through the country. They are like children condemned to defend themselves against individual wasps and forbidden to destroy the wasps' nest. In all recorded history of great nations there was never before one that so perfectly and consistently insisted upon disregarding facts and the inescapable necessity of the case, sooner or later. There never was a piece of national policy so fabulously fatuous and futile.—*July 10, 1916.*

THE TRAGEDY OF MEXICO

Twenty-five years ago an American, whose father had made a name for himself as a pioneer in the opening of our western country, turned his attention to Mexico. He took with him his own capital and interested friends in America and bankers in Canada in Mexican development. With him went scores of millions of dollars that were used in Mexico for damming rivers, for building railroads, for irrigating arid stretches and starting great plantations.

When President Taft visited the Mexican frontier thousands of American Beauty roses that had bloomed under this man's hand in that arid country decorated his tables. Many thousands of Mexicans received em-

ployment and the opportunity to wrest, with the improved tools of the white man, from an arid land their sustenance in an orderly way through the work of this pioneer American.

Just as James J. Hill subjected through his leadership and enterprise and through the capital that backed him the prairies of the northwest to the culture of the civilized man, so this man had pioneered in Mexico. Three years ago disaster began to overtake him. The tragedy of the individual and the tragedy of the nation are epitomized in the following letter and in the article on the conditions of Mexico which we publish on another page of to-day's paper.

Comment is superfluous.

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*.

Sir—I am sorry to tell you that since I saw you last I have suffered great losses in Mexico. All my plants have been destroyed, the machinery being broken up wantonly, my orange orchard, one of the best in Mexico, cut down and all improvements burned, my houses in * * * are all vacant and being looted of doors, sash, windows, roofs and flooring. Not a single property of mine has escaped, and I am really ruined. I owe it all to the Democratic administration, which I earnestly hope will be defeated in the next election.

I have received not a cent from these properties. On the contrary, I have exhausted myself in trying to keep my people alive and exercise some semblance of control and protection of my property. I tell you frankly that the small check which you sent me for some editorial work was a God's blessing when it came. Just think of it, from affluence to penury, through no fault of mine—and with the present administration I see no hope of relief.

I am enclosing an article which I have written. It only tells the truth. You must take notice of the condition of starvation which now exists in Mexico and is rapidly growing worse and will continue to do so. A ghastly tragedy is being enacted in that country and if you

begin to set it forth in your paper you will not make a mistake. You must bear in mind that Mexicans as a race are heartless and pay no heed to the sufferings of any one. Starving women and children would not deter them from taking their last morsel of food, or induce them to concern themselves about their future. No effort, and but little means, to plant exists, and therefore there is practically nothing raised. What was planted was destroyed wantonly or killed by the drought, which has been unprecedented. I have come into possession of many important particulars about the inside workings of the Carranza government, both in Mexico City and elsewhere. Carranza is personally powerless. He lives in a Pullman car at the railroad station and earnestly wishes to go to Yucatan, but Obregon and Cabrera, who are the real rulers, will not permit him to leave.

You may rely that the de facto government is purely a shell, unable by any means to maintain itself, should the furor of military intervention subside. I have recent specific information from their side of the situation.

Whether Wilson wants war or not—intervention is bound to come.

AN AMERICAN.

Texas border, July 2.

—July 11, 1916.

STARVING MEXICO

Dispatches from Washington tell us that if we were to blockade Mexico, the country would starve in a short time—not the soldiers, but the civilian men, women and children.

It is a melancholy indictment of our Mexican policy that a farming country rich enough to support its population should be on the verge of starvation. A country that should feed tens of millions of people outside its borders does not raise enough to keep itself alive. Who will plant what he cannot eat? Who will till the soil when the fruits of his labors merely serve to make him and his

family desirable for plunder? It is better to turn plunderer oneself. When more rob and fewer produce, the food supply runs short. When there is little left to pillage at home, there is always plenty across the American border.

The United States cannot shirk part of the responsibility for this situation. We protest so loudly our love for the Mexican people, yet we refuse to free them from the successive bandit leaders who prey upon them. Nay, we help the bandits one by one. The call to us to do our duty toward Cuba was a whisper compared with the voice of misery and helplessness that arises from Mexico.—
July 12, 1916.

IDEALISM VS. REALITY

President Wilson phrased a fine bit of sentiment in his notification speech last Saturday when he declared: "I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men and pitiful women and children than in any property rights whatever." He was speaking of Mexico at the time, defending his persistent refusal to give protection to the interests of Americans in that country or to heed their warning that the course he was pursuing could not lead to peace.

It is a lofty ideal to place the well-being of men, women and children above mere material matters—to have regard for their lives and their comforts before one begins to count dollars or consider business interests. If the two purposes could be separated, this would indeed be a world of idealism. The difficulty is that they cannot be separated. All human experience shows us that men, women and children are happiest and most contented in lands where—

in prosperity abides and property rights have a stability founded on alert government protection. We have no doubt that Mr. Wilson, while an interpreter of history before he entered politics, realized fully out of his abundant reading that no nation that failed to protect property rights was ever able to protect human rights. In government you cannot separate the two with any hope of being able to afford protection and encouragement to either.

Mr. Wilson concedes that he arbitrarily rejected every word of advice and every appeal from American business interests in Mexico, and addressed himself solely to sympathetic co-operation with 15,000,000 oppressed men and burdened women and pitiful children—all with a "passion for the fundamental right to life and happiness." Inasmuch as he frankly avows it, we are bound to assume that this high purpose has been in the President's mind from the time when "three weeks after he entered the White House," to use his own words, he decreed that Huerta should go and that Villa and Carranza should be the emancipators of a down-trodden people. Even had he resolutely followed such a policy Mr. Wilson would have failed—you cannot bring happiness out of desolation, or life out of the solitude of death.

But Mr. Wilson has not followed the ideal he has so finely phrased. As a matter of fact, he has not followed any policy long enough to call it a policy. The result is that Mr. Wilson has failed, by deliberate refusal, to protect human rights. After nearly four years of "watchful waiting" by President Wilson, the oppressed people of Mexico for whom his heart beats so warmly, are

much worse off than they were when he encouraged Carranza and Villa to press their ruthless and lustful warfare upon defenseless men, women and children. The net result of Mr. Wilson's attitude, fixed "three weeks after I entered the White House," is that life as well as property in Mexico has been sacrificed in a manner as brutal and as horrifying as the world has ever recorded. Mr. Wilson cannot blind his country to his base betrayal of American interests in Mexico by a false assumption that he has aided the "fundamental rights" of the Mexican people. He has not lifted the oppressors' yoke from their necks nor stopped a single bandit's bullet on its murderous way to their hearts. No Mexican woman has found herself safe from the ravager because of any act or word from Washington, nor has any child lifted its eyes to future manhood with greater hope.

In short, the whole story of Wilson politics in Mexico is one of encouragement to the destruction of property and the sacrifice of human life to the passion of bandits.—*Sept. 6, 1916.*

ANOTHER HOLD-UP

Is there another bandit effort to hold up the national administration at Washington?

Does Carranza insist upon a \$200,000,000 loan as a condition precedent to a real conference at New London?

Is the Wilson peace-at-any-price policy to undergo another change and become a policy of peace at a fixed price—fixed by Villa's former ally, Carranza?

Such are the rumors that come from Wall street. They are to the effect that Carranza must have millions or there can be no peace in Mexico, which means for us no peace with Mexico.

It looks very much like another case of hold-up.

Not long ago Carranza stipulated that our army must leave Mexican soil before he would treat with us. Instantly the administration's policy of "Villa, dead or alive," was abandoned. Our troops turned their faces homeward. To-day for all practical purposes they are out of Mexico, and Villa again roams and pillages at his own sweet will. Carranza's condition has been met.

Now we face a new condition—\$200,000,000 loan or no peace. The administration seeks the aid of Wall street. Can it be done? it asks of the men Mr. Wilson denounced as "exploiters" only last Saturday. Will Wall street kindly find \$200,000,000 to save the nation's face at New London?

Evidently Mr. Wilson has a passion for the hold-up game, whether it is played by railroad brotherhoods or by the bandit chief of Mexico.—*Sept. 7, 1916.*

OUR DUTY TOWARD A REAL MEXICO

The hold-up demand of Carranza for a \$200,000,000 loan from American bankers is not the kind of a loan to Mexico which this government must ultimately encourage and indorse in some way. It is our duty and to our interest to give substantial aid to a stable government in that country, when such a government emerges. It is neither our duty

nor to our interest to aid Carranza. He does not represent a government; he represents only himself. For the time being he is the superior military force in his country. It is equally true, however, that no one can tell how long his power will last. No one realizes better than Carranza himself that he is likely to be displaced at any moment by a rehabilitated Villa or another "chief" of the Villa type. His government is but a shell. Its power is exercised cautiously where it is challenged, and ruthlessly, murderously, where it feels secure. Zapata reigns supreme in Xochomilcha, only ten miles from Mexico City. Felix Diaz occupies Oaxaca, Calles dominates Sonora. These men pay not the slightest heed to the so-called "First Chief." The Carranza lieutenants—Obregon, Cabrera and others—are constantly under suspicion of revolt, and are held together only by the ties of spoils. They have no more regard for what President Wilson calls the "fundamental right" of the Mexican people to life and happiness than has the hunted Villa, and as little conception for its real meaning.

It is preposterous to talk of the "passion" of such men for the well-being of their countrymen, or of their murdering of men and ravaging of women as mere mistakes in a valiant struggle for noble achievements. They are in fact the real oppressors of the men, women and children for whose pitiful plight President Wilson has such great sympathy. They have made a waste of a land of plenty. In all their activities the only passion that moves them is a passion for power, for plunder and for lust. There is nothing in the career of Carranza, or of any of

his known lieutenants, that suggests anything else.

It would be a crime against humanity for this country to countenance a loan to such a group of men. No stable government can be built around Carranza, because no government can long endure against the organizing influences of a country. Those influences supply the leadership, the intelligence and the opportunity for enlarging usefulness and for real advancement. They are the constructive forces on which progress depends, and which unlock the treasures of mine, forest and field. When those forces come into play in Mexico, and begin to put into the background the whole caboodle of Carranzas and Villas and Obregons, there will be a real service in behalf of a rehabilitated Mexico. We should not be slow to perform it. We must not then merely indulge in pretty phrases about the passion of bandits for fundamental rights. We must act. We must openly enter into alliance with such a Mexico—loan it money, help it open up the country, build railroads, particularly from Texas to Panama, and aid it to do all things that will develop the resources of the country and bring them into closer touch with the markets of the world.

Mr. Wilson calls this exploitation; we call it civilization. It is what crossed the Mississippi half a century ago and created an empire of people, wealth and influence out of a wilderness.

Nor should we aid Mexico on any pretext of "serving humanity" in any idealistic sense. Humanity is best served when it is aided to opportunity to do for itself, when the path is blazed for it toward labor and its reward, toward education and

its ennobling influences. Mexico needs the United States to do this for her; but the United States, in another and equally significant way, needs Mexico. It is only twenty-five years since Lord Salisbury, with an idealism as blind as Wilson's, had England cede Heligoland to Germany. What would England have given in midsummer of 1914 if its fighting ships had the protection of that strategic piece of land?

We do not want Mexico, but when a foreign war comes to us, as some day it must, we do not want Mexico as a weak nation on our border line. It might prove disastrous. Mexico is to the American continent what the Balkans are to Europe. An unstable government in Mexico might easily precipitate war on this hemisphere as the unstable government of the Balkans precipitated war in Europe. Control of Constantinople and Asia Minor had as much to do with the present war as any other one thing. The strategic value of Mexico is no less than that of Constantinople. Who holds Mexico dominates the Panama zone and much of South America. In any foreign complication we might have in time to come, Mexico playing the role that Greece, for instance, has played the past two years, would be a real menace to the United States. As the willing or unwilling ally of a foreign power Mexico would be a danger to us.

Now, what is the course of wisdom for us—from our own point of view as well as from Mexico?

We must be friends, allies. Neither of us can afford to be enemies. We must heed the lesson taught by the tragic consequences of all Europe's plotting with conspirators and plunderers in the unstable Balkans, however, and not endeavor to create gov-

ernments by force, only to have them fall as their hollowness is revealed. Mr. Wilson has failed utterly to realize that a bandit government of Mexico cannot be given a character there by fine words on his part, and cannot be made to endure so long as it typifies and glorifies vindictive antagonism to the only influences that can make a country other than the habitat of roaming multitudes.

Mexico, with 15,000,000 inhabitants, has fully 13,000,000 of Indian or partly Indian blood. It should not be necessary to say to any sensible person that those 13,000,000 Indians cannot create a government, or that they are not particularly interested in doing so. Our American forefathers had that problem on their hands, and after two centuries of effort abandoned the Indian as hopeless. He had to be displaced, and he was.

In Mexico there have been three dominating forces, and they have had a wonderful influence in bringing her to the forefront of prosperous nations. These influences were, first, the Spanish conquerors of years ago; second, the Roman Catholic Church; third, invested foreign capital. No doubt all three had their abuses. Inevitably it had to be so. Yet the good they accomplished, the progress, material and spiritual, they stood for, far outweighed the wrongs; and in the larger sense made Mexico what she was in the best days of Diaz. They developed Mexican civilization, such as it was at that time; and the contrast between conditions in that land while those three influences dominated and conditions throughout the Carranza-Villa period marks the difference in the ultimate results of the two kinds of government.

Ultimately the United States must identify itself with one or the other kind. Mexico cannot be permitted to bleed to death with this country standing indifferently aside. Mr. Wilson has chosen the side that has meant murder, destruction, idleness. He must not be permitted, however, to establish such a regime firmly in power by the use of American dollars. We must not send our wealth on such an errand into any land. For a Carranzista Mexico not a dollar! For a real Mexico, millions!—*Sept. 8, 1916.*

THE FIERCE PASSION FOR RECONSTRUCTION

They (the Carranzistas) represent the fierce passion for reconstruction.—President Wilson in Shadow Lawn speech.

Rafael Torres, general in the army of the illustrious First Chief, Don Venustiano Carranza, was in Mexico City. He, if not the public, was celebrating the occasion. Gen. Torres had risen rapidly. A few years back he had been valet, butler, coachman, handyman about the house of gentlemen. The wars had claimed Torres and Torres had won favor in the eyes of the noble Venustiano.

And now Gen. Torres was in Mexico City and celebrating the fact. It offended him that more attention was not shown to a man so distinguished. He was in a high-class restaurant. Waiters now and then opened a door to what looked like another hall. Why should there be another room, or why should it be shut off from Gen. Torres?

The soldier of the First Chief determined to ascertain. He arose, went to the door and flung it open.

A party of friends was dining privately.

The general looked at the gentlemen, stammered a bit and then proposed to the gentleman at the head of the table that he have a drink with the general.

The gentleman did not care to drink.

"You will not drink with me, Gen. Torres? Why will you not drink with me?" the valet, butler, coachman-soldier demanded.

"I have a headache and do not wish to drink," the gentleman replied.

"This will cure your headache," Gen. Torres said as he drew a revolver fired and the gentleman dropped dead in his chair.

Gen. Torres's passion for reconstruction is fierce.—*Sept. 15, 1916.*

A MEXICAN EXILE'S VIEW OF THE MEXICAN PROBLEMS

[NOTE—The writer of this letter is a Mexican exile, owner of a moderate-sized plantation, who has had European training and possesses a broad, cultured outlook. Like other Mexicans, his properties have been despoiled, his animals driven away, his buildings burned down and he himself has been driven out of the country to live in exile until the return of settled conditions. His identity is concealed out of fears for the safety of his relatives in Mexico.—Ed.]

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*:

Sir—It is particularly comforting to have you state the facts regarding Mr. Wilson's preposterous and persistent assertion that the anarchy reigning in Mexico for the last five and a half years is the noble struggle of a people for its liberties. The struggle has been that of a cowardly minority of bandits and jailbirds in a race to loot and murder and out-

rage women. Quite as ridiculous is the declaration that Carranza has established any sort of a government—"de hecho" or "de derecho."

Carranza is nothing but the master bandit, who, having robbed more methodically and successfully than his rivals, has gained some ascendancy over them, and his recognition as a *de facto* government is nothing but a premium on successful banditry. The magnitude of Carranza's and Obregon's looting operations in Mexico City, after they entered it on the strength of a treaty to respect the lives and properties of the inhabitants, can best be estimated by the fact that they took out of the city 1,300 railway carloads of furniture, antiquities, works of art, libraries, etc., and this explains in part how the imports from Mexico into the United States actually increased from \$77,612,691 in 1914-15 to \$97,676,544 in 1915-16 (June 30).

I say "in part," because the organized and systematic pillage was not by any means confined to the capitol and its suburbs. All the country where the Carranzistas held their temporary sway was subjected to a similar treatment. At the present day there is nothing left to rob, and so the first chief bandit sends his robber commissioners to try and saddle unfortunate Mexico with a debt of \$250,000,000; not to reconstruct the country but simply to feather their own nests.

That such a thing should even be discussed here is outrageous, for the men pretending to arrange it represent nothing but the chiefs of a faction that is not only a small minority in their country but is the most hated faction of all those in the field. They therefore represent

nothing but their own greed for the chattels of the people whose resources they are trying to barter in exchange for a loan intended to benefit none but themselves.

Only a thoroughly representative government could assume such a debt, and when such a government is established in Mexico it could not in justice be held responsible for it. It is grotesque, in the face of facts any one can ascertain, to assert that these men, or indeed any Mexican revolutionists, "represent at least the fierce passion of reconstruction"; they represent exactly the opposite, a fierce passion (the term is perfect) for destruction, and they have never pretended anything else. Obregon in one of his bombastic manifestos last year said he preferred to see Mexico "turned into a huge cemetery than see it in the hands of the 'reaction.'" He has lived up to this principle.

It is the same with all of them—Villa, Zapata, etc. I know what I am talking about, for friends and myself have just spent the last year in Morelos, and we have ridden through what was once the garden of Mexico, through our one time model plantations, and we have seen nothing but ruin and desolation—not a corn plot in the great fields, not a head of cattle on the ranges, not a soul in the deserted and burned villages.

I wish the poor people of Mexico could be made to vote as to what they would sooner have—the "oppression" of the old days or the "liberty" of to-day. "Maldita revolucion!" the Zapatista women would often cry in the streets of Cuantala.

It is not true there existed an unquenchable yearning for land among the "peons." That is one of the

fables with which the American public (and the Mexican townfolk to some extent) has been "fed up" against all facts. I doubt if there is any country in America where in proportion to its population there are so many small agricultural holdings as there are in Mexico.

If any proof is needed that the working man in Mexico does not pine for the land there are our haciendas in Morelos, where the storm center of the agrarian unrest is supposed to have started, with their matchless irrigated lands unclaimed and untilled, though commission after commission has tried to divide them up among country folk who will have nothing to do with them.

"Who told you we wanted land?" I once heard some women ask a Zapatista. "We want food and work, and to be as we were before." fore."

The agrarian commissions when offering the land to the people invariably met with the same reply, "We don't want land. We want the haciendas to start working again, so that we may earn our living as we used to."

What you say about Carranza not daring to show his face without a guard of soldiers is exactly true. No faction is so thoroughly hated as Carranza's. Villa and Zapata possibly have still a few misguided sympathizers—Carranza has none except his immediate followers. He made himself hated by every class, by every institution, from the outset; he disarmed and disbanded the old federal army, heaping contumely on its officers; he put into the street all government employes, including those of the national lines, some 30,000 of them; he dismissed all the

school teachers; he drove the commerce, big and small, to despair; he bullied the bankers; he persecuted the foreign colonies, deporting hundreds of their members, among whom were some diplomats; in the churches his hordes committed untold indecencies and sacrileges; he drove out, tortured and murdered priests, while nuns were indescribably outraged by his men—let nobody come to tell us the last statement is anything but a solemn, hideous truth.

Let us piously believe you are right when you say that perhaps if Mr. Wilson could see Mexico as it is to-day as a result of his mistaken policy he would be moved to act. But what is beyond doubt is that it is not war that Mexico needs, nor could there be such a thing with the Mexican people unarmed and starving. What is wanted is a work of rescue from and protection against the prowling wolves that now de facto oppress the helpless population. You cannot conceive to what an extent all classes are longing for this rescue and say so openly.

"*Quen vengan los Americanos*" is the universal prayer—it is secretly offered up in the churches.

Nor is the talk of rescue going to be the sanguinary fight some people here think and the blustering revolutionist make believe; on the contrary, if it is properly organized, it is going to be an easy, pleasant task—I might almost say a triumphal march.

The bandit chiefs won't be long in seeing the unfortunates who have been obliged by threats and by hunger to follow desert them by hundreds. Not shells and bullets but food and kind treatment will win the day. Already the behavior of

your troops in Vera Cruz is known in all the country, for the Veracruzanos proclaim it from the housetops that they never had a better time than during the months of the American occupation.

There is one point upon which I must join issue. It is not fair to put Felix Diaz in the same boat as Villa, Zapata and Carranza. Neither my friends nor myself have ever taken any part in politics, nor are we Felicistas, but we must recognize that there is an abyss between Felix Diaz and the three others.

He is neither a robber or a murderer. He certainly failed in the two attempts he has made in overcoming the robbers' "revolution," but if you Americans have definitely determined to allow the Mexican people to fight out its destinies—an awful prospect—Diaz is the only "white hope" in sight and we will have to support him. He has the right ideas and his stay in the United States has done him no end of good as indeed, is the case with the hundred thousand Mexicans who have been obliged to seek refuge in this country.

If the revolution had no other advantage (it is difficult to see any other) its taking so many Mexicans out of their narrow existence will have been an untold blessing—it will have made "traveled men" of them. When they return to their devastated homes they will be different beings, their horizons widened, their aspirations extended. I think we must watch Felix Diaz; he is doing exceedingly well, we know. The population, amazed at armed forces respecting lives and property, are receiving him with enthusiasm.—*Sept. 15, 1916.*

THE FIERCE PASSION FOR RECONSTRUCTION

They (the Carranzistas) represent the fierce passion for reconstruction.—President Wilson in Shadow Lawn speech.

Mexico gives credit to Gen. Venustiano Carranza for superlative ability. He has set a mark it will be difficult for other reformers to reach. In time of revolution he has made the nation's exports increase. He has swelled his war chest. He has done remarkable things.

Don Venustiano began his great work of reconstruction by dismissing the school teachers of Mexico. To cut down expenses he stripped all the federal departments of typewriters, furniture, tapestries, etc. These were shipped to Vera Cruz, exported and sold. Of the School of Mines and the Department of Agriculture he left the walls. For some reason he did not take the paintings out of the national gallery.

Such cattle as remained were driven from the fields to Vera Cruz, sold or exported. Furniture of wealthy Mexicans was taken because it would do more good in the cause of reconstruction than in the households of the owners. There was one shipment of fifty-seven carloads of such furniture to Vera Cruz.

The exports of the republic showed a gratifying increase.

Mexico is being reconstructed most thoroughly. There formerly were three classes, the rich, the middle, and the poor. Now there are but two, the robbers and the robbed.

There is no sign of Don Venustiano's fierce reconstruction passion abating.—Sept. 18, 1916.

THE FIERCE PASSION FOR RECONSTRUCTION

They (the Carranzistas) represent the fierce passion for reconstruction.—President Wilson in Shadow Lawn speech.

Figuratively the right hand of His Excellency Don Venustiano Carranza is Gen. Obregon, and the left hand is Gen. Pablo Gonzales.

Obregon we know about. Gonzales has not been in the international limelight so much, but he has been governor of Mexico City, and lately of the state Morelos, which is the richest part of Mexico.

The power, the influence of Gonzales is great.

Gen. Gonzales has a nephew, who is much like the general in character. The nephew was a hostler, roustabout, drinking resort hanger-on before civil war gave opportunity for his high talent.

One form in which the fierce passion for reconstruction manifested itself with the nephew of the general was in desire to possess Señora Feleciana Gutierrez, one of the most respected and charming young women of Mexico City. Señora Gutierrez's father-in-law, Señor Zetna, is a manufacturer of high rank and is known as the "Ford" of Mexico.

That a good, pure woman should be horror stricken at his advances incensed the nephew of Carranza's left hand. To teach a lesson to others of her kind he rode out to the Bosque de Chapultepec, and, waiting there until Señora Gutierrez, as was her daily custom, took her automobile drive along the famous avenue through the woods of Chapultepec, he shot her to death.

The nephew of the brave Gen. Gonzales is still at large and still has a fierce passion for reconstruction.—Sept. 19, 1916.

Japan

JAPAN'S WORDS AND HER DEEDS

The archives of the State department at Washington contain a letter written to Elihu Root, when he was Secretary of State, by Baron Kogoro Takahira, Japanese ambassador to the United States in 1908.

That letter was written at a psychological moment.

At that time Japanese-American relations were undergoing a strain. The anti-Japanese agitation in California was approaching an eruptive stage. There was a feeling in America that Japanese policy in China was not in harmony with America's desire that China should have an opportunity to achieve her own destiny without interference from foreign sources. America feared that the "open door," enunciated by John Hay, might be closed by Japan. Rumors of aggressive purposes by Japan in the great country across the Yellow sea were finding wide circulation in the American press.

To restore confidence in its purposes the Japanese government, through Baron Takahira, submitted a draft of its understanding of the spirit and aims of existing agreements between the United States and Japan. The Japanese ambassador wrote as follows, among other things:

They (the two governments) are determined to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting

by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that empire.

Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take.

Has Japan kept these pledges?

Did Japan respect the independence and integrity of China when, under stress of armed force, Tokio compelled Pekin in 1915 to accept a series of fourteen demands which included:

The appointment of Japanese political, financial and military advisers for China?

The granting of special rights to Japan in Inner Mongolia?

The granting of a monopoly to the Hanyeh-Ping Steel Company after it had been handed over to Japanese control?

Were these events such as would threaten the "status quo" as defined in Japan's pledge? And did Japan, in accordance with the plain language of the Takahira letter to Mr. Root, communicate with this government for the friendly action suggested in that communication?

Since the above acts by Japan, plainly aimed at the destruction, not only of the open door principle but also of the status quo in China, Japan, with Russia's consent, has taken further aggressive steps in

China. The new demands presented at Pekin by Tokio include:

The appointment of Japanese military advisers for the Chinese army in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.

The recognition of "special interests" for Japan in Inner Mongolia and Southern Manchuria, comprising powers of police and administration, preference in loans and in the selection of all foreign advisers.

The appointment of Japanese military instructors in all Chinese schools and colleges.

These further demands can mean only one thing, if they mean anything at all. They mean the firm establishment of Japanese military, financial and police power in Inner Mongolia and Southern Manchuria, and an extension of Japanese influence in all the schools in China.

Did Japan regard these new measures of domination in China as inimical to the status quo as well as the open door in that country? And did the Japanese government notify Washington in advance of its intended proceedings, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Takahira pledge?

Or did the United States find it necessary, after the publication of the news of Japan's latest aggression, to inquire at Tokio as to the meaning of the new move, only to receive in response the usual Japanese denial of sinister motives in its dealings with China?

The situation in its latest aspects concerns us closely. The administration at Washington is creating a problem of increasing seriousness for its successors. Thomas F. Millard, in his notable book, "Our Eastern Question," points out the fact that a Japan intrenched in China would be more difficult to deal with ten years from now than she is now.

In this vast game with destiny Time is Japan's ally. Will America suffer the game to go on to its logical conclusion?—*Sept. 19, 1916.*

JAPAN AND THE BALKANS

One of the impressive developments of the world war is the effect it has had of bringing into direct contact nations and races separated by oceans and by hemispheres. Two years ago, or even a year ago, a clash between Japan and Bulgaria would have been regarded as an impossible event. To-day Japan is seriously considering the advisability of dispatching an army to the Balkans to resist Bulgaria's attack upon Serbia, whose fate was of no possible concern to Tokio a year ago.

The discussion in Tokio is symptomatic of Japan's anxiety to take a direct part in European affairs in their present state of confusion. If Japan lands an army in the Balkans, she will place the powers of the quadruple entente under a heavier obligation than they have yet incurred. That obligation must be discharged in some substantial fashion—and what quid pro quo could be more substantial and more welcome to the Japanese than a pledge of "hands off" in the event of a further development of Japan's ambitions?

Such a triumph of Japanese diplomacy in the present crisis might prove a matter of concern to the American people in the event of any vital difference of opinion that might arise between Washington and Tokio in the future—and Tokio is not nearly as far from Washington, as facilities of communication go, as it is from Sofia. Thus a disturbance in the Balkans echoes around

the world and makes itself felt in America.—*Oct. 14, 1915.*

THE JAPANESE IN CHINA

Before Japan agrees to the establishment of a monarchy in China she will require from the Chinese government a substantial guarantee. This guarantee will be summarized in the following form:

1. China must guarantee to Japan that the new monarchy shall be under Japanese protection, and that Japan shall enjoy the right of the most favored nation.
2. Japan must have a voice in Chinese military matters, and also must get the orders for the supply of munitions of war.
3. Japan must have better treatment in the distribution of official positions in the customs and salt monopoly services.
4. Group five of the China-Japanese agreement, the clauses of which were left over in abeyance, must be taken up.
5. Preference must be given Japanese when China is appointing advisers. Japan will certainly not tolerate any monarchical movement to come to a head unless her claims and her future advantages have been fully guaranteed.—From a periodical published at Tientsin, in China.

The foregoing is additional evidence, if additional evidence were needed, of Japan's determination to obtain a preferential position in Chinese markets and in Chinese public affairs. Such a position inevitably would involve the closing of the open door and the defeat of the policy established by John Hay—a policy which the present administration at Washington has abandoned.

How is the principle of equal opportunity for American trade in China to be safeguarded? Will the future of our trade in that great market be left to the good will of Japan and her ally, Great Britain,

or will the United States, by the adoption of a more vigorous foreign policy and by adequate military and naval preparations, put itself in a position to make its legitimate interests respected, not only by Japan but by all the world? These are vital questions.—*Dec. 20, 1915.*

THE NEW MENACE OF JAPAN

Japan is evidently determined to destroy the last remaining vestige of Chinese sovereignty and to absorb China in fact if not avowedly. The inexorable character of the extortions which Japan is practicing upon its neighbor is indicated by the renewal of the seven demands upon Peking which were deferred a year ago when China, finding herself bereft of friends, accepted the remainder of the conditions exacted from her by the Japanese.

These seven demands, now pressed afresh by the Foreign office at Tokio, are designed to complete the work of subjugation which was begun last January. The employment by China of Japanese "advisers" in all departments of the government; the pledge that China shall purchase most of her war munitions from Japan; the employment of Japanese as directors of police in all large centers, and the construction of Japanese railroads in China, can mean only one thing—the slamming tight of the "open door" which John Hay established as the dominating principle in the relations of China with the rest of the world.

The diplomacy which accomplished this result was based upon a realization of America's future on the Pacific. The eyes of John Hay

looked far. He realized clearly that the teeming millions of the yellow race, united under the rigid rule of Japan, would form a mighty javelin of destruction, with Nippon as its sharp point, directed against the United States. He saw that the day would come, unless the all-devouring ambition of Japan were curbed, when the yellow race would press for the domination of the Pacific. The westward trend of American civilization and development, he foresaw, would inevitably bring about a conflict with the eastward movement of Japan—if a free hand were given to that aggressive empire.

John Hay's open door dictum, accepted by all the nations at the time, constituted the "thus far shalt thou go and no further" to Japanese encroachment. It aimed to secure the United States against a back-door attack by a far more numerous power. If it had been made a fixed feature of a continuing American policy, backed by a sufficient show of force to command respect, it would have solved peaceably one of the most ominous problems that confront the American people.

But all that John Hay builded for the security of his country now faces final destruction by a stroke of the Japanese pen. If the seven demands now advanced by Japan at Peking are exacted from China, a portentous chapter in American history will be begun.—*Jan. 27, 1916.*

THE BREAK

Associated Press correspondence tells of a denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the part of a considerable section of the Japanese press. It is represented that the in-

terests of the two countries are already diverging and that it is time to untie. The Japanese want preponderance in Chinese markets, and eventually want India, these denouncers say. England stands in the way. She also blocks the way to expansion on the islands of the Pacific, in especial Australia. Australia and Canada exclude the citizens of England's ally, and this cuts the Japanese pride. The alliance with England was made in the early days of this century, when the Russian colossus threatened alike India, Manchuria and Korea. The alliance served its purpose in the Russo-Japanese war. Russia is no longer a military colossus. The peril is gone which bound the white and yellow man together and obscured their fundamental economic rivalry.

So say these Japanese.

What they say is to be taken with a grain of salt. It sounds like the voice of professors and military men educated in Germany. It is not the voice of official Tokio. But official Tokio may be allowing or even encouraging the utterances as an exhibition to divert our attention from consideration of the American peril so clearly outlined in the President's Kansas City speech last Wednesday:

Look at the great sweep of our coasts. Mind you, this war has engaged all the rest of the world outside of South America and the portion of North America occupied by the United States, and if this flame begins to creep in on us, it may, my fellow citizens, creep in toward both coasts, and there are thousands upon thousands of miles of coast.

No, the Anglo-Japanese alliance will not break now. It is too valuable to the English in their pending negotiations with us. It is too valuable to Japan in her ambitions on the Pacific.—*Feb. 9, 1916.*

OUR DUTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

An abandonment of the Philippines to their fate by the arbitrary setting up of a theoretical Filipino independence would constitute an international crime. William Howard Taft is performing a public service in calling attention to the fact that there is enough latent explosive power among the heterogeneous peoples of the archipelago to precipitate a disastrous upheaval at the present moment, were it not for the strong hand of the American administration. The islands once evacuated by the Americans, such an upheaval may be regarded as a certainty.

If the boon of independence is to be granted to the Filipinos, they should be trained for self-government by a steady policy of political tuition, independent of the changes in party control at Washington, implying reversal of purposes toward the islands.

In one respect the Japanese problem is akin to the Philippine problem. If we are to deny to the Japanese that freedom of intercourse with America to which they emphatically regard themselves entitled by reason of their civilization and achievements, then we must prepare—and prepare earnestly—for the clash which such a policy will inevitably provoke. If we are not prepared to face the hazards inseparable from the continuance of an attitude toward Japanese immigration which the Japanese, even of the lower classes, regard as insulting, then we should back down gracefully while there is yet time and accord to the Japanese people the freedom of entry into this coun-

try which all the Caucasian nations enjoy.

Whether in our contact with the Japanese or the Filipinos, the future is fraught with danger unless we adopt a definite, clean-cut policy and continue that policy, no matter what party is in power at Washington or what individual is in control in the State department.

A nation without a policy is like a ship without a rudder.—*Feb. 10, 1916.*

OUR OPPORTUNITY IN CHINA

When the Chinese have reached the point where they will consume as many American products per capita as Canada, the United States could export to China products worth \$4,000,000,000 a year. These possibilities are not mere creatures of the imagination, but are capable of actual realization. And your financier, as well as your manufacturer, enjoys the good will of the Chinese people, just as they enjoy yours; and good will is a sure guarantee for successful business.—Wellington Koo, Chinese minister to the United States.

China's resources have only been scratched on the surface. It is not difficult to realize that, with the development of those resources by organized industry on a modern basis, that vast population of more than 300,000,000—the greatest population inhabiting any geographically continuous country—will attain a purchasing power approaching that of our northern neighbor.

China is a growing market—and America, as Wellington Koo points out, has been relegated during this period of growth from second place to a poor third among the powers which have trade relations with that country. This is the psychological moment for American trade

to recover the ground it has lost. The productive machinery of Europe is largely absorbed in the domestic needs of war and peace. China, through her official spokesman in America, appeals to American capitalists and producers to avail themselves of the opportunity to aid in the development of China's resources and to take their proportionate share in the supplying of its needs.

Will the State department see to it that this opportunity is safeguarded under existing international agreements, or will it tolerate the Japanese policy of exclusive commercial, investment and political advantages for Japan, which can have only one outcome—the shutting tight of the door which John Hay, with eyes that saw far into the future, sought to open wide to all the world, including his own country.—*Feb. 11, 1916.*

A PICTURE NOT TAKEN

Here is a word-picture of a picture which those who saw refused to take with a camera. It shows, more plainly than a thick book could describe, the barrier of skin-color that has held the world apart. Gerald Morgan wrote this little description in the *New Republic*:

Ten years ago I was present at some fighting near 203-Meter Hill outside of Port Arthur. We were a party of some ten war correspondents. At dawn we were awakened with the news that a Russian captain had been taken prisoner, and were asked whether we would like to photograph him. The correspondents were men of no achievements, the majority dependent on small salaries. No one had had the chance to photograph a Russian prisoner before. It was in most cases a matter of bread-and-butter. The

men were of all nationalities. I remember how excitedly they fished out their cameras from underneath their cots. We all ran out, and there, sitting very gravely in the sun, was an old bearded quarter - master - captain, transferred through shortage of officers to the line. A dozen grinning Japanese soldiers surrounded him. They were not grinning to be disagreeable, but to be polite. But they were yellow, and he was white and a prisoner in their hands. Every single correspondent—Norwegian, Canadian, American, even the German Jew—stopped, slung his camera, and turned away, as though the action had been rehearsed. Not one man took that picture.

There you have one side of the yellow race question in a nutshell. "All men are created equal," says the Declaration of Independence, and America has added the mental reservation: "if their skins are white." Call it prejudice or call it caste, the result is the same—we put our cameras back in the case.

We are not the only nation that has refused to accept the yellow races as equal, but that is no reason why we should not look the matter squarely in the face and act as if there were no other white nations. It is important to look at it, because it looms up larger every year. Even now there is another immigration bill before Congress, with the usual puzzle as to the best way to bar Japanese and Chinese without violating the rights which they have under our treaties with the oriental nations.

Let us assume that Congress will wriggle through. What about the future? We must look at the picture from the point of view of the grinning Japanese soldiers who were not photographed. We need not interview a soldier, but a man who represents modern Japan—Prof. Kambe, of the Kyoto Imperial University. He understands the feeling

of caste that separates the races and the injured pride of his own country, and he is blunt about the remedy:

It is clear that our only hope among the white races is power; if we are only strong enough, and then only can we move freely from country to country as convenience serves. Japan must be determined to uphold and promote justice, come what may! Even a child can understand whom we are addressing. The people of America may consider the Japanese-American question as ended some few years ago, but we Japanese do not think so. The people of America do not seem to understand the height and the depth of our national and racial pride.

Japan is under terrific pressure from within. With a population more than half that of the United States, she has a territory only the size of Montana. Her progress in the last fifty years has been marvelous. Her national pride is intense. She wants a place in the world, but the white nations have held her back. When she seemed to go too far in China, white nations have stepped alongside, ostensibly to "help" her, but really to see that she did not go too far. She has not been permitted to enter the great war except as a munitions-maker for Russia. Her white allies do not wish to be under too great obligations. She is not having her picture taken "in white company."

The problem of Japan's future is as delicate for the white world as it is important to Japan. It is a big problem and it is the miserable fact that America has been side-stepping it. Japan, for instance, wants the Philippines. There would be two open courses for us to take. We could give or sell the Philippines to Japan, or we could—if we were prepared to fight—hold them against her. If we were to go to war to-

morrow, it is likely that Japan would get the islands and keep them. It would be a bitter lesson to us, but it would silence the imbeciles who are yelling against preparation.

But we are taking neither of these courses. We are preparing to crown the Filipino with the silk hat of independence before he has learned to wear trousers. We are going to drop a burden which even Spain did not lay down until she could do it gracefully.

Japan perhaps does not hope soon to break down the racial barriers between her and the white world. But she does hope to rule—and quickly—the far East. If she cannot be a part of the great world, she will try to have a great world of her own.

Our course, not Japan's, is the important thing for us to contemplate. Tinkering with immigration bills and treaties will not serve us long. We must lay on the table either a deed of gift—or a sword.—*Feb. 14, 1916.*

HOLLAND AND THE PHILIPPINES

The prospect of the abandonment of the Philippines by the United States is causing apprehension in the Netherlands. Hendrick Colijn, who is regarded as one of the leading European authorities on Malay colonial administration, predicts that the establishment of an independent government at Manila would certainly bring about "most serious consequences—not only in the Philippines but all over the orient—in the possessions of European powers."

Holland is anxious for the con-

tinuance of American power in the archipelago. There is a conviction at The Hague that the undisputed preponderance of Japan, allied with Great Britain, in Asiatic waters would carry menace to the Dutch overseas empire, with its area of 736,400 square miles and its population of almost 40,000,000. Since the opening of the world struggle which evoked the specter of Japanese control in the far East—a control which presumably would be unhampered by interference, from British quarters—Holland has been reaching out for a co-partner for the defense of mutual interests in Asia.

The naval programme sponsored by the conservative party provides for the creation of a new fleet of six dreadnoughts for the defense of Java and Maderio, the islands of Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes and the minor archipelagos which constitute Dutch possessions in Malaysia. This naval force is designed to co-operate with the only possible power possessing a community of defenses interest in Asiatic water, to repel the first attacks while the main strength of that power—the United States—could reach the scene of the struggle.

The retention of her dominion in Asia means much to Holland. A large share of her prosperity has its source in the possessions which the Dutch have been developing since the close of the fifteenth century, and of a large part of which they have been gradually stripped by European rivals, notably England. Now that the remnant of these possessions has reached the height of industrial organization and productiveness, Holland sees the fruits of her labors and sacrifices endangered by Japan's acquisitive in-

stincts. And she is seeking to protect herself against the hazards of the future.

Holland's view of the proposed setting up of an independent state in the Philippines, and the possible effects of such a step on the destinies of European dominions in Asia, is worthy of consideration from the standpoint of American interests. The breakdown of public order in the Philippines under a native administration, and the consequent occupation of the archipelago by a European power, or by Japan, under the time-honored pretext of re-establishing tranquility, would constitute events which the United States could not ignore. Such eventualities would involve far-reaching commercial and political results, destructive to legitimate American trade interests.—*Feb. 15, 1916.*

JAPAN MASTERING THE PACIFIC

The enterprising Japanese, ever on the sharp lookout for the door of opportunity, are fast becoming masters of the carrying trade of the Pacific. The flag of the rising sun, which is to be seen with increasing frequency even in New York harbor, now floats from the taffrails of most of the ships plying the ocean highways between America and Asia.

An American shipper who has a cargo of manufactured goods which he wishes to send to Asia must send it in a Japanese vessel. There is hardly a choice. Germany is out of the game. Great Britain is engrossed in transportation problems nearer home. America is sound asleep. So the Manila merchant who

is looking for a vessel to send a shipload of tobacco or hemp or sugar to the seat of empire in America must send it in a Japanese carrier. Transportation between America and the Philippines is falling exclusively into the hands of the Japanese.

We talk of a Philippine policy. What colonial policy binding America with the Philippines can there be when the very means of communication between us and our trans-Pacific possession are owned and controlled by a foreign power whose interests are directly opposed to ours?—*March 1, 1916.*

JAPAN'S NEW POSITION

The fall of Tsing-Tau made Japan a world power. By defeating Russia on Manchurian battlefields and in the waters of Tsushima, Japan became the dominant force in the Orient. By aligning herself with the Entente and ousting Germany from her Asiatic possession, Japan issued from the pent-up Utica of her oriental position and took her place in the councils of the western powers in all matters that might affect not only Asia but Europe and Africa as well.

Count Okuma, the premier of the island empire, gives striking expression to Japan's new aspirations under the changed world conditions. This statesman, frank as he is far-seeing, may be pardoned for the note of exultation which he betrays in the course of an article entitled "Japan's New Position in World Diplomacy," in the Nipponese magazine, *New Japan*. He says:

Japan, which half a century ago was an insignificant and mere island empire, isolated in a corner of the extreme east,

has now become one of the world's powers and come to sway a great influence. Japan finds herself with Great Britain, the United States, Germany, France and Russia, and every move made by Japan affects in some way or other the interests of those great nations and reflects on the situation of the world.

And Japan's new importance, the result of her co-operation with the Entente, will entitle her after the war not only to a voice—the decisive voice, it must be pointed out—in Asiatic matters, but also to participation in the settlement of frontiers and the determination of colonial and commercial rights that will follow the war. Japan, Premier Okuma insists, will exert her share of influence even in such purely European affairs as the solution of the Balkan problem.

Count Okuma's article brings into sharp emphasis the spirit of aggressive self-assertion which dominates the collective mind of Japan in the present period of international anarchy. The revelation is of especial interest to the people of the United States. Japan, on the theory that oceans are roadways and not dividing walls, is our next-door neighbor. The trend of Japanese sentiment toward us, our civilization and our interests, is a matter of immediate concern to us. Upon the direction which that sentiment will take may depend our future to an extent that may affect the lives of unborn generations of Americans.

Does Japan hate America? Does Japan covet American territory under the stress of her own manifest need of elbow room?

These and similar questions are answered with convincing frankness by Mr. Thomas F Millard in a remarkable article in the *Century*. Mr. Millard has lived in the Orient

for many years. He has studied Japanese psychology in the only place where it can be studied successfully and profitably—in Japan. As to the feelings of the Japanese toward America Mr. Millard has this to say:

Just now the Japanese feel a very lively antipathy and contempt for this country, its institutions and its citizens, and by a calculated process have been educated to regard our nation as Japan's next antagonist in the series of wars required to establish the hegemony of the far East and the mastery of the Pacific in Japan's keeping.

As to Japan's probable colonial aspirations in the future—the direction of the pressure which her increasing millions are exerting upon her foreign policy—the same authority writes:

The outcome of Japan's efforts to colonize in Corea and Manchuria and in other parts of China is that, notwithstanding their government has maintained many unjust preferential conditions for them in comparison with Coreans and Chinese, Japanese emigration to the continent of Asia is a failure. * * * In going to Corea and China, Japanese find that they have transplanted themselves to an even lower standard of living than obtains in Japan; that is, to a more cramped economic field and not a wider one* * * To the millions of Japan's peasantry China offers no lure and little opportunity of betterment.

Mr. Millard's first-hand observations, which are borne out by the entire trend of Japanese thought and feeling at home, as revealed by by numerous utterances in the Japanese press and by Japanese public men, emphasizes the fact that elements which work for war exist in the relations between the United States and Japan. These elements are a deliberately promoted anti-American sentiment and the pos-

session by America of vast quantities of land, with high standards of living, toward which the Japanese people are pressed by their necessities.

No Japanese can forget that he is not on an equal footing in America with individuals of European races whom he has defeated in battle. No Japanese can forget on this side of the Pacific is a rich country of practically unlimited resources, while he is doomed to scramble pitifully for a scanty livelihood at home.

We will fail to realize only at our peril the passions of pride and of necessity that are working in the souls of fifty million Japanese within a steaming distance of ten days from the Golden Gate.—*March 2, 1916.*

TWO WAYS WITH JAPAN

In his speech at St. Louis Mayor Mitchel said very bluntly what a great many Americans have been thinking about the Japanese:

"Our interests and theirs are ever drawing closer to conflict in the Pacific."

Whether it is politic for a public official, enthusiastic though he be for preparedness, to say this in a public speech, is another matter. The fact remains that the day of a showdown with Japan comes nearer and nearer.

There are two ways to meet that day. The first way, the big way, involves the assumption by the United States of her place as a world influence. If she were prepared, defensively and industrially, the question of the Philippines—which is the heart of the Japanese question—would be simple to answer. She could say: "I am going to give to

the Philippines the finest government that any colony has ever enjoyed. I am going to make it an example of the white man's benevolent domination. I shall not exercise a tyrannical or selfish attitude toward the islands or any other part of the orient. Japan shall have the trade opportunities in the Philippines to which she is entitled by her progressive civilization, but she shall have it not because we fear her but because we admire her and appreciate her needs."

The second way, the smaller way, is the way which it seems we must adopt if we do not care to rouse ourselves to world influence. This way will involve saying to Japan that she may have the Philippines for a price. What the price would be is speculative. Besides cash, it might include a treaty which would secure our commercial rights in the Orient. Unless we welcomed dishonor, it would include a pledge of the proper treatment of the Filipinos. And there is a rub. For the first time in history a Christian nation would be turning over a Christian people to the mercy of a non-Christian nation.

Which step we shall take must be decided soon. Japan's growth will not wait upon our lethargy.

The choice is pressing upon our nation. In the ringing lines of Kipling:

Take up the White Man's burden—
Ye dare not stoop to less—
Nor call too loud on Freedom
To cloak your weariness.

March 6, 1916.

ADRIFT

The Philippines are to be given up, set adrift like the infant Moses on the waters, until Pharaoh's

daughter, Nippon, adopts the helpless child.

The United States has brought to the islands an orderly development of industry and transportation. Personal thrift and education have been inculcated. A small beginning has been made in teaching the natives that mutual respect and self-restraint which go with liberty and independence.

Great economic values to the United States have been fostered and brought to fruition. Now, what we have sown, the reapers from the Land of the Rising Sun shall harvest.

We disavow a union that is of advantage to both the Philippines and ourselves. In this country, for example, we raise no coarse fibers, such as hemp, jute and sisal. Sisal we get from Yucatan. Its sale to us is in the hands of a monopoly, financed by American capital. Yucatan is prepared to squeeze the American sisal buyers. At the same time we prepare to throw away a dependency where all coarse fibers can be grown and from which a large part of the world's hemp now comes. At the moment when we feel the pinch of a foreign trust, we relinquish our surest chance of controlling or supplanting the trust.

It all illustrates the chaos in the present conception of national aims in Washington.—*April 3, 1916.*

JAPAN DRAWING NEARER

Dr. Frederick Starr, of the University of Chicago, who is just back from Japan, throws an interesting sidelight upon Japanese policy in connection with the world war. Interviewed upon his arrival at San

Francisco, Dr. Starr is quoted as saying:

Japan has no intention of withdrawing from the Ladrone or Marshall Islands, which she has taken from Germany and which lie about midway between the Philippines and Hawaii. She has already undertaken expensive schemes with reference to the postal service, telegraphs and cables of these possessions. She is sending settlers in quantity to them.

By the seizure of the Ladrones, the Japanese established themselves just north of Guam, our way station to the Philippines. By occupying the Marshall archipelago, Japan executed a march of 1,500 miles in the general direction of the western hemisphere. Dr. Starr's statement shows that Japan's intention is to keep both these groups of islands, to develop and colonize them.

In the event of complications with America, Japan through her new acquisitions would have a base of supplies a good 1,500 miles nearer the Hawaiian Islands than Yokohama. By the same acquisitions, her task of interrupting communications between San Francisco and the Philippines and Honolulu and the Philippines would be greatly simplified.

These achievements by an ambitious people of extremely limited elbow room and a fast-growing population are worth keeping in mind.—*April 6, 1916.*

STICKING TO THE PHILIPPINES

Evidently no policy of scuttling from the Philippines can be adopted by this country with the consent of the House of Representatives. The lower branch of Congress is closer

to the people than the Senate. In many instances in our national history, aside from the Philippine matter, it has proven more responsive to the real sentiments of the country.

Our people are not willing to set the Philippines adrift, and the House so records itself. It would be an unworthy course to follow at this time. The best thought among the Filipinos themselves is emphatically against so-called "independence" for their islands. They realize that independence would mean chaos—until some other government stepped in and took the place the United States had abandoned.

The House vote of 213 to 165 yesterday is practically a defeat of the measure—for this Congress at least. It is an administration bill, and the large adverse vote is, therefore, significant, particularly in view of the fact that the Senate, yielding to White House pressure, had passed the bill.

The time will come when the Filipinos should have absolute independence. No lover of liberty would delay that day a single moment, and this government, last of all in the world, should resist it. It would be a shame and disgrace to us, however, if we should now establish a Mexico on the Asiatic shore.—*May 2, 1916.*

GIVING JAPAN A FREE HAND

Ambassador Chinda, of Japan, has won a significant victory for his country at Washington. Under pressure from the administration, the Senate committee on immigration has thrown up its hands on the

issue between the United States and Japan, which was recently made the subject of representations at the White House by the accomplished oriental diplomat. The committee has eliminated from the immigration bill the clause which was designed to exclude Japanese subjects. In its place it has adopted a provision, drafted by Baron Chinda, which exempts Japanese from the operations of existing exclusion laws, even when those Japanese happen to be natives of such territories as Manchuria, eastern Siberia and Korea, whose natives are barred out by legislation now in force.

The committee's surrender was complete. Baron Chinda, it appears, made ample provision for the future expansion of Japan, on the mainland of China as well as on island territory, by shifting back the line of exclusion to the 110th meridian. That exemption would insure free entry to Japanese who may be born in north-eastern China, the object of Japanese aspirations of the future.

It is announced that the administration at Washington is prepared to exert pressure upon both houses of Congress, in a determined effort to embody these notable concessions to Japan in the bill on its final passage.

Baron Chinda's diplomatic success is only one of the successive steps which Japan has been taking in its campaign to dominate eastern Asia. The last previous triumph of the Japanese Foreign office in its dealings with America was marked by the abandonment by Washington of the policy of the "open door," which John Hay had made the law of nations. Taking advantage of the moment when Christendom was plunged in war and when Japan's

assistance was badly needed by her ally, England, Japanese statesmanship imposed upon China conditions which made the closing of Mr. Hay's "open door" an inexorable certainty. To China's energetic appeal against Japanese aggression, Washington replied with a communication to Peking and Tokio, which amounted to a declaration of America's refusal to interfere in a situation fraught with menace to our commercial interests in the greatest unexploited market of the world. This market, under the stimulus of industrial development, would possess a purchasing power of \$4,000,000,000 a year.

As a part of this vast expansive movement, Japan has sought to obtain from America a recognition of the equality of the Japanese race with the white nations, by the admission of Japanese into America on the same basis as white immigrants. This recognition, keenly desired by a proud and ambitious people, Japan has obtained by the terms of the amendment made in the immigration bill at the behest of the Washington administration.

And this concession, as Japan has doubtless calculated, will exert a powerful moral effect upon the Chinese, whose protests against their own exclusion have been unavailing. It will aid the Japanese in their ambitious design to place themselves in the leadership of the yellow races. Chinese industry, persistence, thrift and ingenuity furnish excellent material for Japan's molding hand. The Japanese for a generation have been at work developing the economic and military potentialities of 400,000,000 Chinese. The recognition of Japan as a dominant nation will help the forging of a vast arrow of offensive purpose. The tail of

this arrow will rest in China, and its head in Japan. And the point of this portentous weapon is directed toward America.

Such is the sinister course of events which American policy has made possible under pressure from Japan. And America's acquiescence in Japanese aspirations has been the outcome of our unpreparedness to deal vigorously with a situation which has involved a surrender of important American rights.

How long will America continue to mortgage the future because it lacks the only force which makes diplomacy effective—the iron hand within the velvet glove?—*May 18, 1916.*

JAPAN'S AMBITIOUS PLANS OF DEVELOPMENT

A wise old owl lived in an oak,
The more he saw the less he spoke;
The less he spoke the more he heard.
Why can't we be like that old bird?

Japan is the wise old owl of the world to-day. Quietly, systematically and adroitly the clever men who rule the chrysanthemum empire are planning the most ambitious trade conquest the world has ever known. They see in the dislocation of the affairs of Europe such opportunity as a century of peace would not have furnished and they are taking advantage of it to the full.

They believe, and they have basis for the belief, that they will command the commerce of the Pacific absolutely. They are building ships at a rate undreamed of by persons who do not appreciate their enterprise. On the authority of George H. Scidmore, United States consul at Yokohama, it is stated that in the Mitsubishi yards at Yokohama

10,000 men are employed; in the Mitsubishi yards at Kobe 2,400 are working; in the Kawasaki yards at Kobe 9,500 are employed; in the yards at Osaka, Uruga, Harada and Fujinagata from 300 to 3,000 are engaged. The total is given as 27,900. That is about as many as are employed in the shipbuilding plants of the United States along the Atlantic coast. The American yards are busy on miscellaneous work and are building not a few ships for British, Norwegian and other foreign concerns. Of the American vessels they are constructing the bulk is made up of tankers for oil companies. Comparatively few general cargo boats for American registry are coming from American yards.

The Japanese are not content with what they can build for themselves. They are buying ships—good, big ships—wherever they can be obtained. The other day they purchased from the International Mercantile Marine two of the fine craft that formerly were the pride of the Pacific Mail fleet.

The significance of the purchase of these vessels can be appreciated only if one knows the cheapness of ship construction in Japan. The International Mercantile Marine bought these ships from the Pacific Mail for about \$1,500,000 each. They sold them for about \$2,000,000 each. The vessels more than paid for themselves in the short time the International Mercantile Marine owned them. The Japanese could build two ships of the same size and character for about \$1,000,000 apiece. But the Japanese wanted boats for immediate service. The International Mercantile Marine, an American corporation, considered profit in hand better than profit in

prospect, and, besides, the International Mercantile Marine is American in name only and has no particular interest in the promotion of the American merchant marine.

In American shipyards wages are very high, averaging perhaps \$5 a day. In Japanese shipyards wages average from 39 to 45 cents per day. In America there is danger of strikes. In Japan there is none.

More than all else, the Japanese can operate their ships for perhaps 20 per cent. less than can owners whose vessels are under the American flag.

Behind the shipbuilding looms the great purpose of Japan. China, huge, lumbering China, is to be exploited politically, industrially and financially. Europe is too busy destroying itself to interfere. When war ends Europe will be too busy dressing its wounds to be concerned with China. When Europe is well again China will be a vassal of Japan. Mines, mills, railways of China are being Japanned. The consular report gives the operations of one month in China as follows:

The Sino-Japanese Industrial Company has acquired rights for the Lao-Chung mine in Anhui and is projecting the establishment of a large iron foundry company, with capital of 20,000,000 yen (\$9,970,000).

The South Manchuria Railway Company has secured rights for the An-shanchan and seven other mines.

The Maigai Cotton Company, of Osaka, contemplates extending the equipment of its cotton mill in Shanghai by 20,000 spindles at an expenditure of 2,000,000 yen (\$997,000), and a similar scheme is contemplated by Mitsui & Co.

Suzuki & Co. intend to start a large spinning company somewhere in South China.

But China, big as it is, does not satisfy the ambition of Japan.

Japan is reaching out everywhere. In association with Russian capitalists, Japanese merchants of Yokohama have under consideration the establishing of a monster cotton mill at Moscow. This project will entail an expenditure of 10,000,000 yen (\$4,985,000).

In the South Sea Islands the Japanese have control of and are developing practically all the mineral resources in those lands and, in addition, Tokio and Osaka business men are planning to promote a rubber company in the federated Malay States.

The Japanese government has organized a trade commission whose function it is to investigate the condition of foreign markets as affected by the war. Members of the commission will be dispatched to India, the South Sea Islands, Austria, Europe and North and South America to carry on investigations.

So far as South America is concerned, the Japanese are not confining their attentions to Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile and Colombia, but see prospects of good business in the Argentine, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay as well. Japanese bankers are broadening their activities. The Sumitomo Bank, of Osaka, is to open branches in Honolulu and San Francisco. The Mitsubishi Company is opening a branch in New York as well as in London.

In the near future the Nippon Yusen Kaisha will have its steamers plying between New York and Japan, via the Panama canal, and, as it will not be bound by the established tariffs, a reduction in freight rates between the Atlantic ports of America and Asia may be expected.

In 1915 the merchant marine of

Japan was put at 1,886,319 tons. Within the next twelve months this will be increased probably one-half.

A few years ago Japan was staggering under the weight of debt entailed by the Russo-Japanese war.

To-day it is the giant of the East.

Its financial strength is negligible in comparison with the United States, but the spirit of nationalism is strong with its people. While the United States has talked, Japan has acted.

The cardinal weakness of America is in its lack of unity of purpose. It is losing the chance to gain one of the greatest prizes of the world—the commerce of the seas—because of this weakness.

And what a commentary it is that a people to whom western civilization was unknown seventy-five years ago should show more enterprise to-day than a people who boasted of their enterprise; that the Yankee of the far East should show the way to the Yankee of the West!—*June 14, 1916.*

CHINA SEEKS A LOAN HERE

The Chinese government is in the American market for a loan of \$25,000,000. The restored republic of China needs the money urgently for the purposes of reconstruction after the internal anarchy amid which the Yuan Shi-kai regime ended in the death of the emperor-president. New York bankers are evidently inclined to raise the money but they want to know first whether the government at Washington, following in some remote degree the established policies of European governments in similar cases, is willing—not to impose political terms on the borrower, as other governments invariably do, but to make some sort

of declaration that the funds will be safeguarded in the turmoil which is China's current history.

In other words, the bankers wish the government to revert to the far-seeing policy in the Far East which John Hay established, and which was designed to secure to America a legitimate share in the development of the vast resources of China.

The wishes of the bankers are worth the serious attention of the administration. A substantial loan to China at this particular time would be of the greatest commercial value to the United States. A loan to a country like China can be easily made to take the form of a credit for the purchase of American goods. When France, or Britain, or Germany lends money to an impecunious country, the conditions of the loan always include a provision for the expenditure of at least a part of the proceeds of the transaction in the creditor country.

Japan, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the world elsewhere, and preparing to take advantage of America's prospective preoccupation on the Rio Grande, is fastening her grip upon the Chinese market. The application of China for an American loan, therefore, is a strategic event which should not be neglected.

The administration at Washington can do much, by a single word, to protect our menaced commercial interests in the Far East. That word should not be left unspoken.—*July 1, 1916.*

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY

The aims and scope of the Russo-Japanese treaty, just signed, cannot

fail to be of lively interest to the country which enunciated the policy of the "open door" in China and made it a recognized international principle.

With apparent frankness Japan has explained that the new agreement provides for a friendly co-operation between that country and Russia in the event that the interests of either are menaced in the Far East. Such a provision may mean little or it may mean much. During the years that have intervened since the treaty of Portsmouth was signed by Witte and Komura, Russia has been hand-in-glove with Japan in all matters affecting China. Japan has not opposed the extension of Russian railroads and Russian influence in northern China. In return, Russia has been remarkably complaisant to the activities of her former enemy in its dealings with China. In the course of the latest encroachments of Japan upon China, the foreign office at Petrograd and the inspired Russian press maintained a decorous silence which distinctly implied acquiescence.

In a supplementary explanation of the purposes of the agreement with Russia, Japanese statesmen volunteer the assurance that the treaty will in no way affect American interests in the Far East, and that it is designed to prevent the embroilment of China in fresh international complications through the ambitions of Germany.

It will be remembered that the same respect for American rights and the same solicitude for the integrity of China were affirmed by Japan during the diplomatic struggle in Peking which had the definite result of closing the "open door" by a good bit and of fastening upon

China a degree of Japanese control that is a menace to Chinese sovereignty.

The new treaty, it is frankly admitted at Tokio, is an amplification and extension to Russia of the treaty already existing between Japan and Great Britain. It forms a sort of triumvirate for the protection of "mutual interests." Will it also prove a triumvirate for the exclusion and hampering of the interests of other nations besides Russia in the markets of the undeveloped portion of the Far East?

It behooves the State department to look closely into the provisions of the new agreement. America cannot afford to continue an indifferent spectator while the commercial and political future of 400,000,000 prospective purchasers is being determined behind closed doors amid an international confusion which furnishes a favorable atmosphere for devious diplomacy.—*July 8, 1916.*

A CHILL WIND FROM TOKIO

When statesmen are about to start upon a new national policy one of their first steps is to clear away any facts of history or of sentiment that might obstruct the progress of the changed order of things. Somebody has said that history is made of putty, so readily does it yield to the manipulations of statesmen or sovereigns. And the more widely accepted and firmly held the record of history the greater the necessity for its destruction to make way for a new dispensation.

Count Okuma, premier of Japan, lays violent hands upon the great formula of Japanese-American friendship—the belief on both sides

that Commodore Perry was the man who awoke Japan and made it possible for her to enter the family of modern nations. That service to Japan, the premier points out in a newspaper article, was not performed by Commodore Perry. It was the work, he argues, of Nikolai Lezanoff, who headed an imperial mission to Japan at the command of Czar Alexander I. fifty years before Perry was heard from. The purpose of this mission, relates Count Okuma, was to open up Japan to the rest of the world, and the task was successfully accomplished.

Count Okuma does not explain how it happened that, fifty years after the opening of Japan by Lezanoff, Perry found it tightly closed. He does, however, indicate with unmistakable candor the new direction in which the wind from Tokio has set in. His little essay on history is entitled to the serious attention of Congress and of the American people.

Perry's services to Japan, and Japan's warm sense of gratitude to America for dispatching his naval expedition to awaken the Japanese from their sleep of centuries, have been regarded hitherto as the basis of an undying friendship between the United States and Japan. That friendship was the magic formula which was expected to solve in an amicable way any trouble that might arise between the two countries. In the gravest phases of the California controversy, and the controversy arising out of the exclusion of Japanese coolies, we were assured from Tokio that Japan could never raise a hand against the nation that let the current of modern life into the veins of Nippon. Now that formula is swept

away by a denial of the achievement upon which it was based. And this denial is not made by some irresponsible professor, but by the premier of Japan, who presumably is too busy and too high-placed a personage to dabble in merely academic matters.

Japan is in contact with the white man's world at only two points—Russia and America. Russia, in the light of the treaty of alliance recently signed with Japan, is excluded from the scope of possible Japanese aggression by a community of interests. But the white man's world, flinging itself across the Atlantic, has crossed the Pacific and has come in touch with Japan in a sphere which by Japan's declaration is exclusively Asiatic—that is to say, Japanese. And this white man's country is the only remaining Caucasian-inhabited land in which there is plenty of elbow room and untold wealth still awaiting development. Japan is swarming with one of the most densely congested populations in the world and a high birth rate is constantly adding to the congestion. The eastern side of the Asiatic continent, already overcrowded, is not attracting Japanese immigration. America remains the land of heart's desire for the Japanese.

In conjunction with these facts it is interesting to note that Japan's latest naval programme provides for the construction of eight super-dreadnoughts and six battle cruisers. The National Security League, in a communication to the House naval committee, calls attention to this ambitious programme of naval expansion as a matter of vital concern to Congress.

Will Congress take into considera-

tion the manifest signs of the time, or shall we drift with closed eyes into a situation which may bring a national disaster?

Against whom is Japan undertaking these gigantic naval preparations? That is a question which Congress and the American people should keep clearly in mind.—*Aug. 10, 1916.*

KUMAGAE

The victory of the Japanese, Kumagae, over our national champion, Johnston, of California, in the Newport invitation tournament, was an event that should start us thinking.

It may be that in the national championship at Newport some one may be found to defeat the Jap. Otherwise the championship of this country, and so of the world, will go to Japan. If Kumagae can win, all honor and success to him.

A few superficial people may still think that in Japan we do not have to deal with a really first-class people. The Japanese are interesting but backward, they say, and the individual American can lick three Japs.

Some of the superficial superior ones can understand tennis when they know nothing of world politics. Let them ponder on Kumagae. He has played a western game a few years in Japan with no players of class to practice with. He comes to America and blooms into the first candidate for the national championship.

Let these superior Americans consider how well we should do against the Japanese at *their* game, war. They are keen recipients of what

the West has to teach. Kumagae learned, *in absentia*, the tennis lessons of the western world. He is passing a good examination. He and his friends have also learned what England knew of naval warfare, what Germany knew of land fighting. Then they add something Japanese to what the West taught them. So with Kumagae. He has an uncanny twist and drop in his drives which can hardly be volleyed.

So in trade. Somehow the British and American trade development in the far East ceased, replaced by Japan, who now progresses also in Russia and South America. They took our machines. They added something else of their own.

It is quite an able little nation, worthy of our thoughtful, thoughtful consideration.—*Aug. 23, 1916.*

SWORDMAKER TO THE ALLIES

According to a communication received from Tokio, 5,000 Japanese swords have been ordered for the use of officers in the allied army.—*Washington Star*

What folly it is for America, by denying equality to the Japanese, to run the risk of war with the swordmaker to the officers of the allies!—*Aug. 29, 1916.*

A NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITY

To meet her urgent financial needs China is to borrow \$30,000,000 or more from Japan. It was the hope and expectation of China to get this money from the United States, in whom she has confidence, but, unable to do so, she must in her extremity, borrow from the Japs whom she fears.

It is to the commercial good and the political benefit of the United States that the door of China be kept open. It will not be kept open to the rest of the world by Japan.

Commerce follows money. Japan is shrewd in buttressing her political and her military steps toward China with her financial power.

It is not to our credit that we, the richest people of the earth, should at the time of our greatest prosperity, neglect this great field for our product by refusing to lend to a nation in temporary monetary distress a paltry \$30,000,000.

Japan, more far sighted, but immeasurably poorer, will pour out

many times \$30,000,000 if necessary to gain China's trade.

When will our financiers realize that they are but the trustees of our funds? When will they appreciate the duty they owe to all the people; to open new and broader markets for the output of the factories of the middle West, for the goods that come from the cotton mills of New England and the Carolinas; to give cargo to American ships, put money in the pay envelope of the American workman and strengthen and better not only America but the nations that America serves? When will they put a bit of patriotism into financial leadership?—*Sept. 4, 1916.*

Our Foreign Trade

OUR TEXTILE EXPORTS

It is not to the credit of the American cotton manufacturer that in a time of the greatest demand in the history of the textile industry our exports amount only to a trifle more than 5 per cent. of production.

The export business of the steel industry, direct and indirect, is estimated by Judge Gary at 25 per cent. The export business of the automobile industry is immense. So it is with almost every other important department of production. Only the textile industry lags.

Some American cotton mills have declined foreign orders. They are doing so well with domestic business that they are perfectly content.

That is the trouble with the American cotton manufacturer. He considers the export business as a crutch—something to be used when home business is bad, but to cast aside when home trade is good. Home trade is excellent now. So he cares little about foreign orders.

South America is ready to buy American cotton goods. So is Central America. Italy has tried to place orders. There is a large trade to be had in Africa and elsewhere. Many of the mills of Belgium, Germany and Austria are idle. So are tens of thousands of the spindles of France and Russia.

Opportunity such as America never had before presents itself, but is neglected.

The cotton goods of the United

States never will be marketed throughout the world until the American textile industry is managed with enterprise, vision and real appreciation of the value of an export trade.—*Jan. 15, 1916.*

PAN-AMERICAN UNDER- STANDING NEARER

Harvard University has done a service of great importance to the cause of pan-American unity by the establishment of a chair of Latin-American history and economics. The success of this step toward a better understanding of the prosperous and growing peoples south of the Rio Grande is assured by the selection of one of the most distinguished scholars and public men of South America for the newly created professorship. He is Dr. Ernesto Quesada, Attorney-General of the Argentine Republic, Professor of Sociology at the University of Buenos Ayres and Professor of Political Economy at the University of La Plata.

Dr. Quesada is a thorough believer in the doctrine that the essential interests of the Latin-American republics are identical with those of the United States. As chief of the Argentinian delegation to the Pan-American Scientific Congress recently held in Washington, he gave powerful advocacy to the movement for united action by all the states

of the two Americas for the promotion of their common interests, commercial, industrial, political and intellectual.

A thinker of large vision and a singular clarity of analysis, Dr. Quesada will be able, perhaps better than anybody else on the two continents, to impress upon the minds of American students the fallacy of the attitude which we have heretofore maintained in our relations with the Latin-American states. This fallacy is best illustrated by the general assumption held by the man in the street that the other Americas are a lot of turbulent oligarchies, masquerading under the name of republics, whose only hope of salvation lies in the adoption of our customs, our social organization and our point of view.

A man of impressive dignity and great charm of manner, he is qualified, perhaps better than any other man on the two continents, to substitute for this arrogant delusion the truth that at least some of the Latin republics have attained to as high a grade of civilization as our own, that their background of achievement is in no way less worthy than our own, that if we desire to cultivate enduring relations with our neighbors to the south we must set about doing it on a basis of equality instead of the present ground of tolerant superiority—the sort of superiority an adult adopts in dealing with a child.

Finally, this eminent Latin-American will be able to convey to the North American mind the fact that, because of this unwarranted assumption of superiority, the United States has largely alienated the sympathies of young and energetic peoples who would gladly have regarded this republic as an elder sis-

ter and a model. And he will be able to show us that by our lack of comprehension we have missed a great opportunity, perhaps never again to be presented in the same degree, to build up profitable business relations with countries of unlimited possibilities of development.

If Dr. Quesada succeeds in performing these services to the cause of pan-Americanism, he will earn the gratitude of the two Americas.—
Nov. 7, 1915.

WANTED, A STATESMAN IN FINANCE

Through lack of a man of great financial and commercial vision, America is in danger of losing the greatest opportunity ever presented to a nation. In 1910, the latest year for which statistics are obtainable, the wealth of the United States was \$187,000,000,000; Great Britain, \$85,000,000,000; Germany, \$80,000,000,000; France, \$50,000,000,000; Russia, \$40,000,000,000; Austria-Hungary, \$25,000,000,000; Italy, \$20,000,000,000; India, \$15,000,000,000, and that of all other countries combined less than \$100,000,000,000. In material strength, therefore, the United States had approximately one-third of the total of the world.

The position of America was peculiar. With all its wealth and power its part in international commerce was small. A large proportion of its raw products, like cotton and copper, went out of the country, carried in foreign ships to foreign lands to be manufactured into finished goods and then sold the world over and, in not a few instances, sold to America itself. Fa-

vored with a greater variety and a greater abundance of mineral resources and nature's products than any other section of the earth, it lacked the organization or the spirit to utilize them to the fullest degree for its own benefit.

Absorbed for many years with its domestic development, it has neglected or ignored world trade. Its growth had been wonderful but haphazard. Agriculture held its exclusive attention for generations. Not until it began to see a limit to its agricultural spread was serious attention given to industrial development. For a nation to make the most of its industrial possibilities in all the markets of the world there must be a co-ordination of effort by the manufacturer, the merchant, the financier and the statesman. Industry and commerce are the bases of a nation's wealth and greatness. America plunged into industrial development but neglected its foreign commerce.

With all its wealth it was the chief debtor nation. To build its railroads and develop many of its industries, it borrowed from England, France, Germany, Austria, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and other European countries.

With the thicker settlement of our country and the gradual disappearance of our agricultural surplus for export, it became apparent that our favorable balance in the foreign trade must be maintained by a corresponding growth of manufactured exports. Moreover, for a decade or two before the great war, it was realized that unless America built up a foreign trade for its manufactures it was certain to suffer through overproduction. Spasmodic efforts were made to develop for-

eign markets, but, without a merchant marine, proper banking support and a national purpose back of them, they failed in all but a few instances.

Overgrowth, overproduction and misdirection of effort brought periodic panics, followed by long years of industrial depression and fruitless introspection instead of reform. This introspection ended so soon as prosperity returned.

The war came in one of the periods of depression. With the war came a collapse of the financial machinery of the world and paralysis of the ocean-carrying system. It required no particular vision to see what tremendous possibilities were open to America. Great Britain, which controlled more than half the ships of the sea, was in a life or death struggle. Germany, which had made wonderful strides commercially and had opened markets for her goods in every quarter of the globe, was bottled up and threatened with possible destruction. Asia, Africa, South America and a large part of Europe had to look to America for what previously had been supplied by Great Britain, France and Germany. Before the war ended, America might establish herself in world commerce and hold a position compatible with her wealth, her industrial power and her strength.

The situation had its perplexities and difficulties, for the courses of commerce are not to be changed in a day or a year out of the channels through which they have been flowing for decades or centuries, but the time was one of revolution, convulsion, pregnant with tremendous possibilities. Opportunity usually develops the man. Unfortunately

the man has not appeared to shape the way for America. Neither personal nor national pride has awakened him.

Meanwhile America has floundered like a gaint without sense of direction. The way her energies have been misapplied and her blindness taken advantage of is maddening.

At a time when we were made to realize our helpless dependence for foreign trade upon the alien-owned carriers of that trade, no constructive plan has been evolved and put into practice for a revival of our merchant marine. The golden opportunity has been thrown away to realize our power and our duty to take advantage of these times and get us a merchant marine worthy of our place in the world.

Early in the war England, France and Russia had agents scouring the United States for machinery. Lathes, vises and boring machines were purchased by the hundreds and the thousands until the nation was stripped of all that could be obtained for love or money. Since then the scarcity of lathes and other machinery sold so freely and blithely has hampered many manufacturing establishments.

Steel mills, railroad car and equipment concerns and various other establishments were flooded with orders for munitions. To-day the railroads of America are suffering through scarcity of cars and are begging car and equipment houses to fill orders which cannot be executed promptly because all or nearly all the car and equipment plants are busy on war material.

Some of the steel mills are un-

able to turn out shapes and plates for the building of American ships because their war orders have priority.

Excuse may be made in these instances because the foreign orders came to the steel and equipment makers at a time of almost stagnation. But for some other branches of industry there appears to be no apology.

America is the land of cotton. It grows more than two-thirds of all the cotton of the earth. The bulk of its crop is sent to Europe to be made into cloth by European spinners. There is no reason why our mills should not turn out any and every kind of cotton goods equal in quality, fineness and finish to any in the world. There are five things to which a manufacturer gives consideration in figuring his chances as against a competitor. They are: 1, cost of raw material; 2, plant and machinery; 3, power; 4, labor, and 5, cost of marketing.

America, by nearness to the field of production, has great advantages over European cotton manufacturers. America has plants and machinery to turn out any grade of cotton goods. Power, either from coal or hydro-electric, is abundant and cheap. Labor costs more in America, or, rather, did before the war. As to cost of marketing, that varies.

Belgium, France, Germany and Austria are shut off from their usual exports of cotton manufactures. English spinners are embarrassed by labor shortage. If our cotton crop is to be used and cotton prices kept up, American manufacturers must use this disappearing European quota. But American manufacturers, at the present

rate, will not use over 7,000,000 bales in the present year, only 400,000 bales more than their best annual takings before the war. A statesman in finance would have shouldered this industry with fresh capital to open new markets. Why should American cotton go to Liverpool to be spun for Chinese markets?

American mills are known to have refused orders for South America and from Europe. Prosperous and contented with local business, they are not concerned about forming trade connections in foreign lands. They never are when American trade is good. They never think seriously of a foreign market until American business is bad.

What is true of the American textile man is true of various other American manufacturers. No industry is solid and safe unless it is assured of foreign markets. To neglect the full field of commerce is to imperil the industry.

To illustrate how lacking the American textile men have been, it is necessary only to declare that, despite all the tremendous handicaps of war, the British cotton manufacturers are doing almost as large a foreign trade as before the war, and are more prosperous than at any time in more than a quarter of a century.

But the American textile men have plenty of company in the group of neglected opportunity. American shipbuilders, who were slow to see what the war meant for American shipping, now are booked full with orders that will keep them busy for two years or more. They have raised their prices until a ship owner considers himself fortunate if he can get a vessel built for twice the sum

it would have cost him before the war. Most of the shipyards are short of skilled men. Material is hard to obtain. There is little of standardization and not much of the economy that has made England and Germany great in shipbuilding.

To a nation with so much sea coast and with such an interest in developing foreign trade, there should be a bond of union and effort between the government and the shipping people. There is none here. Instead there is antagonism, bitterness and distrust.

But, neglectful as the industrial leaders have been of their opportunity, the financiers have been worse. With billions of dollars of American securities held in England and France, the bankers of New York engineered an unsecured loan of \$500,000,000 to England and France. This probably is the first time in the history of the world where a debtor nation lent money to its creditors.

The normal thing would have been for us to take up our securities abroad, the certificates of our indebtedness.

To lend money is the bankers' privilege, but how many persons appreciate what this loan cost Americans? Practically it has been employed to aid the foreign holders of American securities to retain them and hold them over the American market instead of being forced to dispose of them at what would have been bargain prices to American purchasers. Some day that \$500,000,000 loan will be considered a joke—a joke on Americans.

If the American has lacked vision and forethought, the Britisher has not. He has been shrewd, forceful and clever. He has used much of

that \$500,000,000 to buy American goods. He has manipulated the grain markets when he wanted grain so he could buy at rock bottom prices. He has withdrawn from the American field and bought in the Argentine until he has made the American wheat growers believe their grain was not needed. Then, when he had the leaderless farmers fearful if not disgusted and they had thrown their holdings overboard, he has stepped in and bought and the American farmer has been the loser by hundreds of millions!

It is still fresh in our minds how England, after depressing our cotton prices to 6-7c. per pound in the fall of 1914, stacked herself for a year at those prices and left the South prostrate.

Apart from the individual extravagance and vulgar ostentation of those who are enriched by war orders and "war brides," we have experienced an unexampled spirit of industrial wastefulness. The business has been too easy. Manufacturers have thrown efficiency to the winds. Producers and individuals have been forgetting how to save and running their scale of expenditures into a burden too heavy to carry when they meet the post-bellum competition of a chastened, unified, disciplined Europe.

There may be need of America's best energies when this war ends. If the people are wasteful, extravagant and care less, they will be in poor fettle to meet the strain. Europe will be in the guise of a New World and America in the garb of an Old.

The workers of Europe, driven by necessity, will be more efficient, careful and enterprising than ever before. It will be a regenerated Europe.

France, Russia, England, Germany, spurred by need, will become mighty competitors of America in any field America enters.

How different it might have been had a man of financial power, commercial wisdom and broad statesmanship risen to direct the nation.

Is it too late for one to show the way?

Possibly not.

But whether with proper leadership or without, it is the duty of the man who loves America to do his part to strengthen, broaden and give spur to everything for American commerce, American finance and American industry.

Play the American game! Play the game for America!—Nov. 14, 1916.

GERMANY STILL OUR CUSTOMER

The news that German merchants and German manufacturers are making heavy purchases in this country for delivery "after the war," and that goods to the amount of \$200,000,000 in value are already accumulated at points near Atlantic ports for shipment as soon as possible after the last gun has been fired, is characteristic of German methods.

It is explained, on the authority of inquiries made by the Chicago "Herald," that the products purchased by Germany in keen anticipation of the rebuilding of German commerce after the close of the hostilities include copper, cotton, wool, lard, wheat and various other supplies needed for the rehabilitation of Germany.

A significant feature of the com-

mercial activities of Germany on this continent at a time when Germany is cut off from the ocean pathways of the world, and from the sources of money on this side of the Atlantic, is the fact that this business is being transacted on credit. "Germany's credit in the United States is not exhausted," a banker is quoted as saying to a Chicago "Herald" financial writer in explanation of the financial phase of this activity.

This continuance of active planning for the future is characteristic not only of German commercial foresight but also of the strength of the social and political structure upon which German commerce is based. Any state organization which can maintain its vitality and its active enterprise for the morrow under the unprecedented conditions under which Germany is maintaining them, is well worth the study of the American people at a time when they are beginning to realize the importance of organizing their own powers and resources against the hazards of the future.—*Dec. 9, 1915.*

COAL AT \$40 A TON

The tragedy of a nation lies behind the news dispatch announcing that in Italy coal is selling at \$40 a ton. The statement suggests some reflections upon the effects of the war, with its blockades, ship seizures and increases in sea-freight rates, upon one of the partners in the quadruple entente.

At \$40 a ton, coal is half as expensive as sugar; more than half as expensive as flour; more expensive than potatoes. Coal at \$40 a

ton means paralyzed industries, widespread unemployment, general distress.

A large part of the people of Italy even in normal times are too near to poverty for comfort. Under the present stress it may be safely assumed that the spectre of want is knocking at many a door, from the southernmost tip of Sicily to the northernmost border of the kingdom.

Before the war, England, in addition to America, was the source of the bulk of Italy's coal supply. In the present crisis English coal has been cut off, because England is conserving her resources even at the expense of her ally, and one reason why coal is selling at \$40 a ton in Italy is the enormous increase in ocean freight rates.—*Jan. 20, 1916.*

AMERICA SADLY LAGGING

"The Review of the River Plate," for March 3, furnishes a stirring reminder of the opportunities which we are losing, not only in Argentina but in every other Latin-American country at a time in the world's history when the obstacle of war has closed old markets and is turning international trade into new channels. In this issue of the "Review," which is published in English at Buenos Ayres and is the representative business publication of the Argentine Republic, most of the foreign firms and enterprises doing business in that great country are represented by advertisements, of which there are thirty-five and a half pages all told. The magazine bears an unmistakable look of prosperity. Its appearance is a reflection of the purchasing power of a prosperous people who

are looking for foreign manufactured goods which they cannot produce themselves—as yet.

Of the aggregate advertising, 56 per cent. is taken by British firms of which the nationality cannot be mistaken. An additional 10 per cent. is taken by firms of individuals whose affiliations or ownership is largely or predominantly British. The Britons' appreciation of the value of the Argentine market is thus indicated by the fact that they have taken up 60 per cent. of the advertising space of a recognized Argentine business medium.

The advertising of American goods is limited to two and one-half per cent.

The people of Argentina have a quarrel with Great Britain because of the seizure of ships, which has caused commercial distress in the republic and was recently the subject of heated debates in the Argentine Congress. Nevertheless, British trade with Argentina, as reflected by the advertising in the "Review," is in a flourishing condition.

With the people of the United States the Argentinians have no quarrel. On the contrary, much has been said recently about closer relations, especially commercial relations, between the United States and the Latin republics, including Argentina. And yet the American manufacturer and exporter is taking next to no pains to tell the Argentinians that we have things which we would like to sell them.—*April 21, 1916.*

SELLING TO SOUTH AMERICA

A recent foreign trade bulletin of the American Express Company

makes one reason clear why Argentine buyers want ninety days' credit on their purchases. The reason appears when one reviews the local advertisements of banks doing business in Argentine. Their bank rates for "overdrafts in current accounts" or "debit balances in accounts current" range at 8 or 9 per cent. The Argentine buyer, by getting credit from the American seller at 6 per cent., makes a profit on all he borrows.

And the Argentine buyer expects to pay 6 per cent. for the credit loaned him. He has been taught that by European sellers who, if he does not pay cash, charge him for the time that his bill runs. The European seller also makes money on the transaction, for he can borrow money at less than the 6 per cent. he charges the South American. The same profit lies open to the United States seller, under the new credit conditions initiated by the federal reserve law.

Every new country, like Argentina, lacks capital. One of the means of lending capital to it is for American and European exporters to lend credit to buyers down there. One of the necessary weapons of our commercial warfare is the readiness to lend to South America commercial capital at the same time that we sell them goods.

We have labored under the handicap of faulty credit information regarding buyers to the south of us. This is being remedied, especially through American branch banks being established there. Our exports have been handicapped by the difficulty of getting from our banks credit to loan to South American buyers. That difficulty is being remedied by the addition of the for-

sign trade element to the scheme of our bank loans.—*June 28, 1916.*

THE KEY TO SOUTH AMERICAN COMMERCE

Opportunity such as a nation never had before was presented to us by the European war. Cut off in a day by the disorganization of the financial system by which she had been bound to England, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Portugal and Spain and by the disruption of her trade lines South America turned to the United States. Her commerce, her friendship, the financing of her manifold enterprises were ours if we strove for them.

What have we done to win the prize?

We have established a few branch banks, lent some money to one of the governments, sold goods in far larger volume than hitherto and with that we have been content. The bulk of the effort made thus far has been a side issue merely to the operations of one New York bank.

By geographical lines the countries to the south are welded to us. By the Monroe Doctrine they are wedded to us. To the maintenance of that doctrine we would shed our blood and spend our treasure, but unless we realize our shortcomings and plan intelligently to do now what we should have done long ago the trade of Latin America will revert to Europe when the war ends. It is drifting back now. Great Britain is doing almost as much trade with South America as before the war.

Commerce follows the channels of money. The development of South America has been financed by the

bankers of Europe. France, Germany, Portugal have invested millions of dollars to build the railroads of Brazil to open the door for its wealth of resources and, incidentally, to sell to Brazil the products of their mills, their factories and their multitudinous industries.

Great Britain has done likewise in other sections of South America. Italy, Belgium, Holland and Spain have done their part. On the bourses of Paris and Berlin and in the stock exchange of London "South Americans" have been dealt in as freely almost as home securities. Railroad bonds and shares, rubber shares, hydro-electric shares, traction shares, copper shares found a ready market. Some of the greatest works of development in Brazil were the conception of two brilliant Americans one an engineer from Massachusetts, the other a New Yorker, but not a dollar of American money went into their undertakings. To finance their projects they had to get the support of French and British bankers.

The average American is as distant in language, financial knowledge and general understanding of Latin America as of India. There has been little study of Spanish.

Our business men know little and make small effort to learn the customs, the needs, the desires of the people to the south of us. They never have appreciated the value of Latin America's trade. If they knew the truth they would see that it holds more of promise, more of possibility, more of profit than does the trade of Europe.

To command the commerce of Latin America the United States must do as Europe does—furnish a market for Latin America's securi-

ties. That is a function the stock exchange can perform. The value of a stock exchange in the promotion of business is incalculable. Without the stock exchange New York would lose much of its power and prestige. The exchange is a great machine for the marketing of money or what represents money.

When New York is a market place for Latin American securities American money will flow into Latin American properties, and not till then.

Europe would not have looked with favor on South African and South American investments if they were not of profit. England never would have controlled so much of the world's trade but for the floating of her oversea's developments on the London stock exchange. The growth of Germany's foreign commerce was coincident with German investment in foreign properties and the marketing of these securities on the Berlin bourse.

And what has South America to list in our market place? Brazil, in railroads, has more mileage than Italy, and the Argentine nearly as much as Great Britain. Peru has oil fields, gold fields and silver fields. Bolivia has tin deposits greater perhaps than anywhere else on earth. The Amazon and Orinoco valleys have wealth in rubber beyond estimation. The hardwood forests of northern South America have been touched and little more. There are iron deposits in plenty and copper beds that it will take centuries to exhaust.

South America is a treasure house in natural resources.

And the commerce of this land, which naturally we should control, will be Europe's again if the United

States does not use the key that opens wide the door.

The key is the market place of money, the stock exchange—*July 18, 1916.*

THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN TRADE

If the administration has one hobby preferred before all others, it is the fostering of our foreign trade. They will go to the country in November with the claim that the present enormous totals of our exports are the final proof that we need four more years of Democratic rule.

Whoever has seen an analysis of the present export situation knows that it is due to the war. What are our main items? Wheat, because the Dardanelles and Baltic are closed and the Russian supplies locked up. Meat products, because of the vast consumption of fighting armies. Powder and cartridges, shells and guns. Horses and mules to pull the guns. Steel, brass and copper to be made into more ammunition in Europe. Barbed wire, leather for harness, saddles and shoes. Surgical instruments. Military clothing and blankets. Motor trucks for army transport; oil to run the motor trucks, aeroplanes, war vessels.

Those are the present elements of our export trade. They developed with the war and will vanish with it, no matter who rules at Washington. The test of fitness to rule is the record of peace. In the year, before the war, when the Democratic Underwood tariff was in operation, we saw imports flooding into

the country and American working men walking the streets for want of work which the violent Underwood tariff reductions had transferred to foreign producers.

That is what the administration does for the American working man. The war came and saved him from

his friends. The Democratic policy is one of developing our imports, not our exports; a policy of furnishing employment to foreigners, not Americans. We judge a party by its peace record, for we are before long to face peace and its problems.—*Sept. 5, 1916.*

Trade War After the War

THE WORLD IN A TRADE WAR

Peace between the armies of Europe may come at any time (the sooner the better!), but its coming will mark the beginning of the fiercest war for trade ever indulged in by the nations of the world. There is to be no peace in that struggle for a great many years to come. Nor will it be confined to Europe. The United States is to be in it—perhaps the center of it. Here is the richest market of the world for the manufacturers and merchants of other nations. It may well be assumed as a certainty that they are eagerly awaiting the day when they can bombard our shores with their products. That is more in their minds than any possibility or desire to bombard us with guns. Our government at Washington, therefore, will face the task not only of defending our manufacturers from this intense foreign competition bound to come at home, but also to clear the way for us, as much as governments can do so, in the markets of the world. We, too, have goods to sell to other nations besides our own; we, too, must realize that our enduring prosperity no longer rests upon our home markets. We have outgrown them and must hereafter regard the world as our trading post.

England already senses the menace to her over-seas trade as a sure consequence of the war. The

Morning Post, of London, recently asked its readers: "How are we going to meet this menace?" It added: "Military victory is still far away; but even military victory will not save this nation if it is won by others and not by ourselves and is accompanied by commercial defeat."

The *Post*, like other English newspapers, insists that Germany is even now ready to launch a fierce campaign for international trade conquests, and calls upon England to resort to a protective tariff as the only sure way to meet the coming invasion of German manufactures.

The whole trend of the foreign press is in the direction of heavy tariffs to protect the industries of each nation, and of aggressive governmental effort to develop sea traffic. England undoubtedly will build a wall around herself and her colonies; Germany will do the same. It is beyond question that wherever her military control is asserted, whether in Belgium, Poland or in the direction of Constantinople and in Asia, Germany will follow it with tariff regulations that will place the trade of that section within the power of German manufacturers.

Apparently, therefore, we are to see huge tariff walls around England and the territory she will control after the war; around Germany and the territory she will control; around France and Russia. Japan will follow the example.

It is not pleasant to contemplate

the nations of the world ringed with heavy tariff duties against each other like trenches in the present war, each signifying a fierce determination to let no intruder get by.—*Oct. 28, 1915.*

OUR TRADE AFTER THE WAR

The task of the new international trade corporation is by no means an easy one. It has its pitfalls, it has its obstacles made almost insurmountable by tradition, alliance and nationality opposed to us. For the moment war has minimized these difficulties, but war must have an end, and its ending will mean the resumption of the sundered ties of Europe with the rest of the world, so far as that may be possible.

It is true that Europe will have its own industrial and financial problems at that time, and they will be of no trivial character; but for ages Europe has realized, as this country has only faintly begun to realize, that enduring national prosperity rests on a nation's ability to sell to others—not on its ability to sell to itself. That well-demonstrated fact is not going to be forgotten abroad.

England, Germany and France have a ripe experience back of their national policy of encouraging individual enterprise in foreign trade and clearing the way for expansion. This experience and the fixed investments they have made in South America and elsewhere as part of their trade exploitation will continue to give them a telling advantage over new competitors for business. In addition, their war-impooverished condition at home will

accentuate their zest for trade abroad. In this country our manufacturers will feel the sharp results of Europe's upbuilding efforts after the war, and unless our tariff is adjusted to the new conditions we will have an unprecedented influx of foreign goods, produced on a working scale in wages and hours incomparably harsher than the American scale.

Our own home market is not to be the only object of attack, however. The foreign trade corporation just launched will find its efforts challenged in every worth-while market it seeks. Every trading house and bank in England, Germany and France, every shipping line controlled by those countries, and every national foreign policy shaped by decades of experience and unchanging governmental purpose will be engaged in a unified determination to hold their old supremacy against the competition of Americans.

No doubt the shrewd men back of this foreign expansion enterprise fully realize all this and have made their plans to meet permanent conditions rather than temporary, war-duration ones. No doubt they are prepared to make extensive foreign investments—not in trade itself but to develop and command trade. In brief, they have got to put American capital into railways, street cars, mines and other forms of industrial activities in these foreign countries in order to establish American trade relations of a substantial character.

Mr. Vanderlip and his associates are the kind of men who know what they are about, and who plan far beyond the horizon of the ordinary business man's vision. Nevertheless they cannot know, for no one knows, to what extent our government at

Washington will prove a helpful factor and ally in the consummation of their hopes. As a nation we have no consistent record as a seeker for foreign trade outside of that which comes to us because it cannot go elsewhere. Our war munitions trade is an example. It is ours through no effort of our own, but because we alone can supply the needs of others. That is characteristic of substantially all our export trade.

How could it be otherwise when we find a Bryan destroying by one stroke of his pen as Secretary of State our long-sought opportunity in China, for instance? On March 3, 1913, this government was committed to participation by American bankers in the memorable six-power loan to China. On March 4, 1913, this government formally disavowed all connection with or interest in the matter. Our "open-door" to China closed with a bang! Is it surprising that it should close?

Domestic trade cares for itself, but foreign trade only follows a nation's flag. It has to be backed up by a consistent and encouraging national policy, and, above all, it must have the protection which a nation's flag is presumed to assure it under all conditions. Bryanizing our national attitude toward American property interests or American trade in foreign countries means making both extinct. A John Hay, an Elihu Root, a Philander Knox might develop a helpful policy for years, but if, through the accident of politics, a Bryan is so placed officially that he can reverse their intelligent labors, the effort is in vain.

The result in China, bad as it was, was trivial in its cost to American trade compared with the millions upon millions of American in-

vestments in Mexico hopelessly wrecked by the refusal of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan to protect them. No American citizen with a dollar legitimately invested in Mexico has had his government's protection, or even its interest in his fate. On the contrary, he has been regarded at Washington as though he were a gambler who must take his chances with the cards as they fall, rather than as a business man of enterprise in whose secured rights the government had a direct and unchanging interest.

Let us hope that the Vanderlip corporation signifies not merely a new enterprise engaged in foreign trade, but a new attitude by the nation toward a foreign trade for our expanding country—an attitude that means a fixed government policy of helpful co-operation and of stern assertion of our citizens' rights in every land.

Such a national policy has given England a foreign trade, Germany a foreign trade, France a foreign trade.—*Nov. 26, 1915.*

AFTER BATTLES A TRADE WAR

While the German guns are thundering at Verdun, the powers of the Entente are perfecting a comprehensive project for a continuance of the war against Germany with commercial weapons after the sword shall have done its work.

The continental system devised by Napoleon is child's play in comparison with the scheme of commercial exclusion or discrimination which Great Britain, as the financial leader of the allied powers, is relying upon to cripple Germany for

many years to come after the signature of the coming treaty of peace. If this project is put in effect, German trade will be circumscribed by a commercial anti-German alliance, to comprise all the allied nations and their colonies. The basis of this alliance, as outlined by the *London Times*, will be the exclusion of German commerce for a term of years to begin with. After that will come a long period during which German products will be so hampered by tariff duties and other burdensome restrictions that it will have a hard time to penetrate the barriers.

All this elaborate structure of trade warfare is based upon the assumption that the present alignment of powers will continue after the close of the present hostilities. There is no guarantee of permanence in this grouping of forces, the result of the military necessities of the hour rather than of traditional tendencies or a logical community of interests.

Nobody who looks under the surface of things would be astonished to see, in the decade immediately following the present war, an entirely new association of nations. The spectacle of Great Britain allied with Germany to resist Russian aggression is not so startling as to be unbelievable. Neither is the possibility of united action between Russia and Germany in a new struggle against Great Britain.

Finally, it must be remembered that commerce is not, in the long run, governed by sentiment or by political expediency. The producer must sell at the most remunerative market; the purchaser must buy at the least expensive source of production.

In any event, the attempt to divide Europe into two camps, separated by an arbitrary wall decreed by statesmen, does not promise the success which its promoters expect.—*March 4, 1916.*

THE ENTENTE AGREEMENT

The text of the agreement reached by the eight powers of the entente in the course of the great war council held in Paris is the most formidable international compact that ever has been drawn up.

It comprises "unity of military action, assured by an agreement concluded between the general staffs; unity of economic action, whereof this conference has regulated the reorganization and unity of diplomatic action which guarantees their (the allies') unshakable will to pursue the struggle until the victory of the common cause is obtained."

The potential result of such an agreement, taken at its face value, would be the domination of Europe for at least a century by the powers which have signed it, with the assumption of the crushing of Germany as an incident in an unprecedented triumph of arms, economic resources and diplomacy.

But underneath the apparent unity of purpose if an undercurrent of discord, the result of conflicting interests touching the very lives of some of the nations involved.

Russia, despite her formal adherence to the agreement, is determined to obtain unrestricted possession of the Dardanelles. Great Britain, for reasons which cannot be altered by any state paper, is equally determined that Russia shall not attain that goal. Any

great power established at Constantinople and controlling the Dardanelles would menace England's road to India. That fact cannot be altered by any declaration, no matter how solemn or high-sounding.

For this reason there can be no "unity of military action" between Russia and Great Britain.

Any Russian army that marched to the Persian Gulf would never withdraw from there voluntarily. And Great Britain, for reasons inherent in the heart of her Indian policy, would be bound to make every effort to prevent the arrival of a Russian army at the mouth of the Tigris. This circumstance suggests another wide gap of disagreement between Great Britain and Russia.

Then there is Italy, whose policy already has interfered seriously with the success of the entente in the Balkans and elsewhere. It was the entrance of Italy into the war, with the assumed pledge of territorial profits in Asia Minor, of which the Italian press made no secret, that forced Greece into maintaining her neutrality at a time when the alignment of forces in the Balkans was in complete doubt because of Bulgaria's delay in announcing her choice. In order to placate Greece, the powers of the original triple entente dispensed with Italian aid in the Balkan campaign, and the campaign ended disastrously for Serbia and Montenegro. And then, for reasons of her own, Italy refused to participate in the campaign in Asia Minor.

France, too, has her grievances—and they are material. There is a strong feeling in Paris and in the French trenches that Great Britain has by no means done all she could have done to offer up her part of

the sacrifices on the west front. There is a suspicion that she has been reserving her resources in men and material for her own purposes at a later stage in the operations. Such a feeling of resentment cannot contribute to a complete "unity of action" as between France and Great Britain—whatever the French diplomats who signed the agreement may say about it.

In war, as in peace, the force and effectiveness of international agreement do not derive from the acts of statesmen. They proceed from the interests and feelings of peoples. With so many cross-currents of national sentiment and national interests deflecting the course of the united and mighty river which the entente desires to direct to the destruction of the central powers and their allies, the agreement of Paris is not so formidable a fact as it is designed to be and as it looks on the surface.—*March 30, 1916.*

TO-DAY OR TO-MORROW?

Many American business men are beginning to ask themselves whether Great Britain is really making a supreme effort to manufacture all the war material she uses. There is no diminution in the volume of war orders, for both munitions and supplies, placed in this country. England seems content to keep a large part of her industry employed in making the products of peace, to export to neutral countries—a business that will last long after the war is over.

England seems quite content to let us put a larger and larger portion of our industry at work producing for her those things whose pro-

duction ceases with the war of which they are a part. It is particularly simple for her because we do not require her to pay for what she buys. Our manufacturers are paid by our bankers, who take Anglo-French bonds, or future promises to pay.

From London we hear that the British exports of textiles are approaching normal. The textile workers could be turned into munition workers and the making of textiles for South America and India could be handed over to the United States. But somehow this does not seem to occur.

One would think that all British iron and steel workers would be making war materials. But they are not. Some of them are making cast iron pipe. A few days ago Mr. Sweet, assistant secretary of commerce at Washington, told us in New York that Americans had lost the sale of \$1,000,000 of cast iron pipe for the Argentine. We lost it because the rate from New York to Buenos Ayres, on the British steamers which do our carrying for us, was suddenly found to be 100 per cent. over the rate from Liverpool to Buenos Ayres. A fundamental of the ocean rate structure has always been identical rates to South American ports from New York, Liverpool and Hamburg, so that manufacturers of all three countries would be kept on a parity.

Evidently there are workmen in England making cast iron pipe who are to be protected by the recent British rate differential against us. Our cast iron pipe manufacturers can of course get a sub-contract to make shells for England. But is that a real substitute for what they are deprived of?

Britain is looking further ahead than we are. Some day peace will come. When that day comes our bankers must give us a reckoning. They have had entrusted to them the employment of our funds and so the determination of the channels in which industry and labor find themselves employed. Will our industrial forces emerge from the war strong and confident, masters of the opportunities which this war has brought? Or will our financial leaders have to reproach themselves for having sold the birthright of our future on the markets of the world for a mess of wartime prosperity?—
April 11, 1916.

A BOYCOTT AFTER THE WAR

It is natural that, under the stress of aroused passions, one of the groups of warring nations should consider the possibility of boycotting the trade of the opposing group after the close of the war. If the plans imputed to the conference of Paris could be carried out, Germany and her allies undoubtedly would be put to it to re-establish their shattered foreign commerce.

But even in the British empire there are men who have serious doubts of the feasibility of such a project. Mr. William Morris Hughes, the Australian delegate to the conference, said in a published interview the other day that the interdependence of nations in the modern world will make such a boycott impracticable.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that the attempt to shut Germany out of the markets of that part of the world which is now closed to her would result in the exclusion of Germany

as a purchaser as well as a seller, and that such an event would constitute a heavy blow to British trade in the period of commercial and economic reconstruction when Britain will stand in the greatest need of purchasers.

The entente plan of a Chinese wall of commerce is based upon the conviction that, whatever the outcome of the pending clash of arms, the struggle between the nations now at war will be continued for many years to come. And this distressing point of view is as strongly held in Germany as in England and France. Friedrich Naumann, the eminent German thinker and publicist, presents his views of the future of Europe in the following lurid colors:

After the war fortifications along the frontiers will be erected wherever the possibilities of war may exist. New Roman walls will spring into existence; new Chinese walls, made of earth and steel and barbed wire. Europe will have two long walls from north to south—one from somewhere on the lower Rhine to the Alps and the other from Courland to either right or left of Roumania.

Side by side with this alignment of irreconcilable military forces, Mr. Naumann discusses the possibility of an Austro-German economic alliance, designed to give the Germanic race a dominant position in a hostile world. Both of his propositions assume a continuance, by arms or by commercial and industrial weapons, of the conflict which is now devastating Christendom.

Naumann's conception of the future of Europe is as appalling as that indicated by the activities of the Paris conference. For the sake of civilization it is to be hoped that the policy of neither alliance will

be governed by such a spirit of mutual hate and suspicion.—*June 17, 1916.*

ETERNAL WAR

Those who hope that this war will be the last war gaze with dismay at plans which lay the basis of certain wars in the future. The allies have declared economic war upon Germany, to be continued after the military conflict is ended. These plans contemplate the carrying into effect of the threat of Walter Runciman, president of the British Board of Trade, to so fix Germany that she will never lift her head again commercially.

Our country has just received a report of the economic programme adopted by the conference of the allies June 17. The allies agree, after the war, to give each other preferential trade favors and to prohibit or restrict trade with Germany. The plan generally talked of, and no doubt to be adopted as a specific measure putting into effect the general programme of the allies adopted June 17, is for each of them to have a tariff with three scales of customs duties. Each of the present allied countries will charge the lowest scale of duty on goods imported from one of the others. The next highest duty will be levied on goods imported from a country that has been a neutral in this war. The highest scale of duties, in some cases prohibitive, will be laid on imports from the central powers.

This means that Germany is now challenged to fight against a proposed starvation and destruction of half her people, after the war is over. These people lived on the

proceeds of Germany's exports. They must starve or leave Germany, for the markets where they earned their bread are to be denied them. It is a dark and desperate future, and Germany must fight till the last man falls, rather than accept it.

For belligerents who take these measures to say that they do not desire the destruction of Germany but only the destruction of "Prussian militarism" is to play with words. This programme proposes the complete destruction of Germany's economic life. It proposes a dismemberment of the German empire in a sense more complete than any military success could hope to attain. Germany now knows she must win the war or face a permanent crippling of her national life.

What of England's proud rejection of the imputation that she entered this war to destroy the commercial competition of Germany? How does this plan of economic destruction fit into Great Britain's defence of the German charge?

If the allies are able to put this programme into effect, the central powers will retaliate with a great customs union of their own. The world will be divided into two hostile armies, facing each other in their economic trenches.

The present neutrals of the world will be stranded in No Man's Land between the trenches, exposed to the cross fire of both sides and offered the protection of neither.

In dim outline we see arising a situation of international hate, war, revenge. The wisest statesmanship will be none too wise for Washington. Let us look to our defenses, military and industrial.—*June 20, 1916.*

TRADE KNOWS NO WAR PASSIONS

Never before in the history of the world has it been so futile to attempt to prophesy the developments of to-morrow. The relations of nations, their control over their own destiny as well as the destiny of other countries, are changing like a kaleidoscope and are affected by conditions which no one can foresee. The war has thrust the whole world into a fiery crucible, out of which almost anything may come in most surprising form.

Take our own future as a nation, for instance. It ought to be reasonably safe to forecast the course we are to follow the next six months, the conditions we are likely to face and the results to us as a nation. Yet no sane man would attempt to do so. Our relations with other nations are inextricably bound up in the decision now being fought out in Europe, and, in a lesser sense, in our difficulties with Mexico.

Nevertheless, conditions and prospects with us are more nearly normal than with any other nation. We have only to keep that fact in mind to realize how far out of balance the whole world is and how much like trying to measure eternity it is to attempt to define to-day the attitude of nations toward each other when peace shall once more reign.

Hence it seems to us that the gentlemen from many countries who have been conferring in Paris for the purpose of controlling the trade of the world in the interest of the allies, after war ceases, have a very flimsy basis on which to predicate their planning. It would be equally

absurd for Germany and her allies to attempt such a thing.

Trade knows no war animosities. It has a short memory for everything except a fixed purpose to do business. After war ends the pound sterling of an Englishman will look as good to a German tradesman, and vice versa, as the dollar of a Yankee. Both may have been glaring savagely at each other at rifle's length the past two years; but when the drum beat ceases English, German, French, Russian and Austrian will work out their industrial salvation on the old basis of skill, energy, organizing ability and salesmanship.

That is the history of all after-war periods. It is conspicuously illustrated in the intimate relations of Russia and Japan to-day. It will be so, despite the conferences in Paris, after Europe settles down again to business.—*June 22, 1916.*

A LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS

There are only four possible ways in which the war can end: by an allied victory, by a Teutonic victory, by a partial victory of either the allies or the central powers, or by an absolute deadlock. Any one of these events would bring to the United States peace problems infinitely more serious than those which have confronted us during the war. The same problems will confront other neutral countries. It is high time for us to bind them to us in a league to protect our interests after the conflict.

Consider the possibilities of an allied victory, and the effect upon our commercial future. The economic alliance agreed upon by the allies assures that our exports will

be discriminated against in England, France, Russia, Italy, Roumania, Serbia, the colonies and dominions of these countries, Japan, China (a dependency of Japan) and the territory which, in the case of victory, the allies would take away from the central powers as the result of the war. Whatever would be left of the central powers would probably be compelled to grant to the allies preferential treatment for goods coming from the allied countries. The very excellent prospect is that the only open markets left for this country would be European neutrals and the American continent, between the Rio Grande and the Cape Horn.

If the central powers should win an outright victory, the result would be in no way different. In that case it would be the enlarged territory of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey which would be shutting us off from their trade and forcing the allied countries to grant them preferential treatment. In the case of a partial allied or Teutonic victory, we should have two great independent groups of countries engaged in discriminating against each other and against us in favor of the members of the group.

If the allies win, our wheat to England and France would have to pay a higher duty than wheat from Canada and Russia. Other neutral countries would be similarly affected. Brazilian and Dutch coffee would be discriminated against in favor of products from the allied countries. Argentine fodder would lose its British and European markets to fodder from allied sources, such as Japanese Manchuria. Mexican petroleum would be discriminated against in favor of the Rus-

sian product, and Swedish lumber lose its markets in the allied countries to the Russian and Canadian product. Spanish would be discriminated against in favor of French wines.

The losses to all of these countries, at present neutral in this war, would be very great. The easiest way to protect themselves against such a policy is to unite. Neither of the groups of belligerents can, after this war, disregard us if we all act together. It is not at all impossible that by united effort we could force our way into the preferential treatment granted by each group to its own members. Thus we should become more favorably situated than the participants in either group. Not even the strongest of them could afford to disregard the markets of South and Central America, the United States, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia, if these countries jointly threaten both groups with retaliation for any discriminatory charge imposed against us.

Even if the united strength of this neutral group was insufficient to wholly thwart the proposed exclusive tariff groups, the United States would have every advantage from forming and leading such a neutral customs union. Because we should be the strongest industrial member of it, we should have the sole ascendancy in a group of markets not at all incomparable with the present warring groups.

It is time for the administration at Washington to cease its aloofness from the neutral countries of the world, and unite with them for the protection of our joint interests during the war and after it. The time to do this is now, before more

of us are driven, at the point of the bayonet, into the conflict, or else compelled to join one of the economic groups proposed by the belligerents.—*Sept. 12, 1916.*

THE END OF THE WAR

Whether the war is soon to end or not, men are actively speculating as to its outcome. There is a limited number of ways in which it can end, and, as all the present conditions are passed in review, the events which in each case could bring about the end stand out sharply defined.

First, the central powers may be beaten. This would be brought to pass by a crushing defeat in the Balkans and the Carpathians, with the resulting military collapse of Austria. Or the same result might come about through the economic starvation of the central powers with respect to some essential of industrial or military life. Such an outcome is by no means in immediate view, but there is no doubt that the majority of persons in this country think it more likely than any other result.

Second, the allies may be beaten. This would be brought to pass by the desertion of Russia from the allied ranks, by the financial collapse of England, or by the economic starvation of England through a successful submarine campaign. While at this moment these events seem less probable than similar disasters to the central powers, they are by no means beyond the realm of reason. If Russia were convinced that the allies could not win against the Germans, Petrograd would have everything to gain by throwing in its lot

with those whom its assistance could help to gain victory. In any case, Russia would probably have more to gain by participating in a Teutonic than in a British victory, for the Germans have no interests that would prevent the Russians from realizing their aims. The British have such interests in the Suez Canal, India and China.

As for finances, Great Britain is now bearing nearly the entire burden for the allied countries, and the continuance of financial support, both in British and foreign markets, is dependent upon continued military success. Finally, the submarine campaign. It must be kept in mind that a German submarine campaign, which torpedoed indiscriminately everything going in and out of England, would take a totally different toll of British food carriers than is taken by the present submarine operations, restrained by the exercise of the law of visit and search.

The other possible outcomes are a partial victory for one side or a deadlock. A partial victory for the allies could be won by driving Germany out of France and Belgium. Its fruit would probably be the annexation by France of German territory as far as the Rhine, the loss of the German colonies, an indemnity for Belgium, probably the loss of East Prussia to Russia, and large territorial concessions by Austria to Italy, Servia, Roumania and Russia. A partial victory for the central powers would be won if they could maintain the status quo and persuade their enemies that it could not be altered. By trading upon their present advantageous situation the central powers could probably include in their peace terms the re-

covery of their colonies, an independent Poland, an open route to Constantinople, and the abolition of the intended economic trade war of the allies. A deadlock would mean a return to the status quo before the war.

Each one of these possible results presents to the United States severe problems after the conflict. It is time to get down to the facts of the case and consider our situation in each one of these events.—*Sept. 13, 1916.*

COMMERCIAL BOYCOTT OF THE UNITED STATES

It is difficult to diagnose the strange hypnosis that overcomes a part of our press when reading the diplomatic documents that grow out of our relations with Great Britain. Every new blow at our present and our future is construed into an act of almost royal benevolence.

If there is anything that we should be alarmed about, it is the proposed discrimination against our goods by the allies, in favor of each other's goods, after the war. If the same action is taken by the central powers—which is by no means impossible—we shall be crippled in the leading markets of the world.

Great Britain has not waited for the war to end to institute this policy. She has started it now. She has begun to modify her prohibition of the importation of certain goods into England, a prohibition laid for the double purpose of enforcing economy upon the people and for making ship room free to carry war freight. The modification is to allow certain of the prohibited goods to come in, not from us, but from

France alone. The news is contained in the following cablegram from the American consul-general in London:

The French government has opened a special office in London for the granting of licenses for the importation into France and Algeria of British goods under import prohibition in those countries. Arrangements have been made whereby French exporters of goods on the British prohibited list may apply to the French ministry of commerce for approval of applications which will then be transmitted to British Board of Trade import restrictions department in Paris, thus enabling French exporters to overcome existing British restrictions.

The State department is deeply alarmed over this action, which not only contravenes the "most favored nation" clause of our commercial agreements with Great Britain, but also establishes the precedent of not only discriminating against our trade, but even boycotting it altogether.

The Washington correspondent of the *Detroit Free Press*, however, sees in this measure a balm to the feelings of Americans already outraged by Great Britain. This is the way he figures it out, in a dispatch to his paper:

It may be a great surprise to some to learn that there are even now in existence British restrictions upon trade between the allies. It will be soothing to the offended Americans to learn that Great Britain has not confined her edicts to neutral commerce, but has felt the compulsion of war so heavily as to lay an embargo on British exports, not even excepting her sister ally, France.

No one but this Washington correspondent was ignorant of the fact that British import prohibitions were prohibitive, and affected all countries, including France. To all the rest of us the new London measure means that Great Britain has begun to open for her allies the gate she keeps barred to us.—*Sept. 23, 1916.*

Merchant Marine

"PICKING UP" A MERCHANT MARINE

Bernard N. Baker, former president of the Atlantic Transport Company, and more recently an intimate counselor of President Wilson on the government-owned shipping proposal, laments the fact that the failure to pass the administration's bill last winter prevented at that time the purchase of control of the International Mercantile Marine Company. He points enthusiastically to the current quotations for International securities, and estimates that on the rise the government would have cleaned up \$70,000,000.

Of course, there is no way of ascertaining whether the government could have "picked up" control of this shipping corporation last spring in the stock market in the manner that so many "war brides" were taken over by speculative optimists. Shrewd manipulation of the tape, backed by ample government funds, might have landed a majority of the stock in the Treasury department at Washington before the operating owners of the ship company were aware of what was going on; hundreds of stockholders might have sold during the distressing times of the early war period, and the government might have made a handsome stock market profit besides getting possession of a shipping corporation at bankrupt prices.

Is such the purpose of the administration's ship purchase bill? Is

Mr. Baker's lament over the lost opportunity shared by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo? Is the government to seek profits—even of \$70,000,000—out of a bull market in war stocks as well as control and direct the development of a mercantile marine?

On the other hand, suppose peace had come last spring—after the government had purchased the International Mercantile Marine—and the shipping of the world had resumed its competition for American trade, at what price would the securities of this company be selling in Wall Street to-day? Would there be a \$70,000,000 advance or a \$70,000,000 decline? How would the \$70,000,000 depreciation be carried on the treasury books?

These questions, prompted by Mr. Baker's statement, reveal the peril of establishing a shipping corporation, with 51 per cent. of its stock in the United States treasury and 49 per cent. scattered in private ownership. Of course, the government's stock would not be affected by Wall Street quotations, but Wall Street quotations would be seriously affected by the government's policy from time to time in directing the ship corporation's business affairs.

In the days before the federal reserve act it was always worth a point or two on the "granger" stocks to know how much money the government would release for crop-moving requirements. Happily, un-

der the present law, the Treasury's action is no longer a factor. Money moves freely in response to legitimate demand. How much more seriously, however, would the government's course (or rumors of its course) affect the quotation of a corporation, the stock of which was in part government owned and in part privately owned? Having taken the government out of Wall Street in one instance, why put it back in another?

The demand of the country is for a merchant marine. There are only two ways of establishing it. One way is that urged by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo. It means government-owned ships, operated by the government in some instances, leased to private corporations in other instances. The Democratic Congress refused last winter to indorse the McAdoo plan, but the administration is determined to force it through the approaching session if it is possible to do so. It does not now seem possible.

The alternative way is to encourage private capital to build, own and operate ships. This is the plan followed by every other nation. For years it has been urged upon Congress by practically every commercial organization in the country. It has back of it also a world-wide experience. Its opponents yell "subsidy," however, and the politicians in Congress fear to indorse it. They lack the courage to go back to their constituents and frankly state that they have voted sensibly and according to sound business judgment on a business proposition.

Between Secretary McAdoo's theories on one side and the demagogic cry of "subsidy" on the other

side, the nation's real interests are sacrificed.

We have no ships to carry our products to the markets of the world; we have no ships to attend our battlefleet as auxiliaries in the event of war. In brief, our present condition means that we have no ships for American trade in times of peace and no ships for American defense in times of war.—*Nov. 24, 1915.*

SCARCITY OF AMERICAN MARINE INSURANCE

American capital can probably find no safer nor more lucrative employment to-day in the United States than in the establishment of a sufficient number of marine insurance companies to cover all of the risks arising from maritime pursuits in the United States. The larger part of the marine insurance underwritten in New York is placed through agents here with foreign, chiefly British, marine insurance companies. One of the serious drawbacks to the establishment of an American merchant marine in foreign trade is the lack of sufficient American marine insurance companies to transact the business daily offering in this country, chiefly in this port.

To secure insurance of ships and their cargoes the vessels must possess "a class" and "a rating" that satisfies marine underwriters that the risk is acceptable. To secure such classification and rating ships must be built according to specified rules. Lloyds' Register of Shipping is the institution, privately owned in Great Britain, under whose rules most of the vessels are built in England, and

when so built that institution classes and rates them in a book consulted by marine underwriters for all of the essential information regarding vessels, and upon which insurance of vessels and their cargoes is based.

When marine insurance is sought in England marine underwriters refer to Lloyds' Register for needed particulars regarding the vessels. There is difficulty in placing insurance in England if the vessels are not classed and rated in Lloyds' Register. This forces owners of ships, even if built in the United States, to build them according to Lloyds' rules.

It is remarkable that the usual acumen of American business men has been unequal hitherto to the complete insurance of American ships and their cargoes. Ships worth at least \$600,000,000 are annually engaged in carrying the imports and exports of the United States, valued at approximately \$4,500,000,000 in normal times, all of which are insured, chiefly in Great Britain.

Marine insurance is an old-established business. It could not have lasted so long if it were not profitable. If it is profitable, why are there not enough American marine insurance companies to cover every American maritime risk? Why are Americans forced to have their ships built to conform to British rules in order to secure in England the insurance they ought to be able to obtain in the United States? "There is a reason" why American marine underwriting falls so far short of wholly covering American marine risks, and we should like to learn just what that reason is.—*Dec. 3, 1915.*

AMERICAN PREPAREDNESS

Germany's Lessons for the United States

By THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

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The first and most vital need of this country is the military preparedness necessary in order that this nation shall be safe internationally, that we shall be able to protect our own coasts, to protect the isthmian canal, Alaska and the islands where the American flag floats. In the end there is just one way for a democratic country to meet its obligations in this matter, and that is by universal military training.

This is the only democratic method. The citizen who does not fit himself to fight for the country is not entitled to a vote in deciding that country's policy. A man should no more be permitted to "volunteer" to stay at home in time of war than to "volunteer" not to pay his taxes in time of peace.

But one of the main reasons why I advocate the Swiss system of universal military training is because such service and training would help us to national solidarity and cohesion, and would enable us to do our duty in time of peace infinitely better than at present. The men who have had military training would be more self-respecting, more loyal to the nation, more law-abiding and with a greater sense of responsibility to themselves and to others. In especial, they would understand that our haphazard system of social and commercial development to-day cannot continue if we are to hold our place as a great nation.

Preparedness in Peace

There can be no real preparedness to perform our duty in time of war unless there is preparedness to do our duty in time of peace. Of course, the most important of all types of preparedness is that of the spirit and the soul. This comes first, if we are to get the proper social and business preparedness; and in the same way it is proper social and business preparedness that lies at the bottom of military preparedness. Germany's history shows this. It is her social and industrial efficiency that has given her military efficiency.

There are two or three essentials for this nation to understand as regards such preparedness in and for the work of peace. It is, in the first place, necessary that we shall do justice to each individual and in return exact justice from him. Business must be encouraged and controlled; the rights of labor must be secured; and in return labor must be required to acknowledge and live up to its obligations toward the commonwealth as a whole.

There is much that labor can get only by the co-operation of many different influences and factors—schools, doctors, hospitals, experts of all kinds; it is only through the government that such co-operation can be organized. Such co-operation should be given by the government, acting for the people as a whole, and in return the fullest performance of duty and loyalty should be required.

German Social Advantage

Germany has been far in advance of us in securing industrial assurance, old-age pensions and homes,

a reasonably fair division of profits between employer and employed, and the like. But she has also been far ahead of us in requiring from the man who toils with his hands, just as much as from the man who employs him, loyalty to the nation.

Capitalist and wage worker alike must be required—not merely asked, but required as a matter of right—in the fullest and most ungrudging manner to acknowledge the prime duty of loyalty to this great democratic commonwealth, of loyalty to our flag, which symbolizes so much of the hope of the modern world.

The effects of the recent shipping legislation upon our Pacific coast shipping trade illustrate just exactly what ought not to be done in all such legislation. The farmers of the law were well-meaning men outside of political life. They had not thought deeply enough of the effects of the law. The politicians who enacted the law were interested in votes and not in national well-being.

In consequence, the effect of the law has been to impose such requirements upon the American owners that the American flag has practically disappeared from the Pacific. The law provided elaborately for the welfare of the American sailor—and did it in such fashion as absolutely to eliminate the American sailor from the Pacific Ocean.

Now, this ought to show our people that when we control business in the public interest we are also bound to encourage it in the public interest, or it will be a bad thing for everybody and worst of all for those on whose behalf the control is nominally exercised. We ought,

as a matter of course, to insist upon securing the welfare of the American seaman, but at the same time we must make it worth while, as a business proposition, to run the American ship on which the American seaman works. If there is no American ship, there will be no American seaman.

Laws That do Harm

It is eminently right to pass laws in the interest of American seamen, of American workingmen, of American farmers and shippers. But if these laws make it impossible for the shipping interests, for the railroads, for the great business concerns, to do business at a reasonable profit, they create a situation far more intolerable than that which they endeavor to remedy.

Big business must be controlled, but it must be encouraged also. We must shape our policy so that no man is allowed with ruthless brutality (and as Lloyd George has recently said, unlimited and ruthless competition puts the greatest possible premium upon ruthless brutality) to oppress the general public or his competitors or the men in his employ.

But it must be our aim also not merely to tolerate his activity, but to encourage it, to encourage and aid him in making a profit, so long as that profit is secured by serving the general public and so long as there is a reasonable division of the prosperity among all contributing to the prosperity. We must get over our absurd fear of recognizing leadership as a necessary factor in business, entitled to full reward for the responsibilities it assumes.

Need Unity of Action

This object cannot be accomplished by a chaos of forty-eight states working at cross purposes in the development of our interstate and international industrial fabric. We cannot have industrial justice so long as we have forty-eight different codes of laws governing accidents in factories, sanitary conditions in factories, old-age pensions and the like. Neither can we have efficiency in our international trading so long as our industrial companies operate with licenses from any one of forty-eight states.

There is absolute need of a larger nationalism if we are to make this country as efficient as Germany is efficient, and if at the same time we are to secure justice for our people. Germany has outdistanced us in her industrial efficiency; and now it is for us to show that a democratic government which guarantees personal liberty is not inconsistent with such industrial efficiency.

It is our opportunity, and our highest duty, to show that such efficiency is compatible with democracy. Germany has taken care of her working classes at the same time that she has taken care of her business interests. Her programme has been constructive and not destructive.

Destructive, Not Constructive

Over here, on the contrary, the programmes that have been put into effect have mainly been purely destructive programmes; and our effort has been to take care of the working classes by hitting at business interests, instead of encourag-

ing business interests at the same time that we insist that they themselves take care of the wage workers and do them full justice—justice in wages, justice in housing, justice in sanitary conditions, justice in every shape and way.

We must as a nation understand the evolution that has gone on in the world, and our country must begin immediately a big, broad, constructive course of action on the lines indicated, if we are to hold our place in the industrial world of the future.

So much of the regulation attempted in our country in the past has been done by demagogues or by heedless politicians interested only in their own momentary political success that the very name regulation has become an offense and an abomination to many honest business men.

The men who believe that big business should be controlled in the general welfare ought to be the first to insist that the welfare of the business itself should be our first consideration, and that the regulation should be done by experts with not only business experience, but business vision, who recognize that the corporation—including the big corporation—is not an artificial and wicked creation for sinister purposes, but an inevitable outgrowth of modern industrial conditions, and an indispensable instrument in assembling capital, labor and leadership in the shape necessary for the efficient performance of the tasks of the modern business world.

A Syracuse Instance

Let me illustrate. Recently I was in the office of a big concern in

Syracuse which owns a line of trading steamers on the upper great lakes. This concern is incorporated in Maine; but none of its business is done within a thousand miles of Maine. Its business office is in Syracuse.

Under the law it is required to name the nearest port as its home port; and so it has named Oswego. But none of its vessels have ever gone to Oswego, and they never can go, except by sliding over Niagara Falls. The vessels run from a city in Ohio to a city in Minnesota, and touch several cities in different states between them.

Now, can there be imagined a more absurd system than that which leaves such a corporation under state control, the state in question being one which has not the slightest connection with it? Of course there should be national control and encouragement of such a corporation.

Recently a great company has been started in New York to aid in the commercial development of this nation in the international field. The probabilities are that this company will perform work of the very highest usefulness for the United States. But it had to go to Albany for a charter! It cannot go to Washington and obtain a federal charter.

What Germany Would Do

If that company was in Germany, it would be organized under imperial German laws, and it would be aided in every way by the national help and prestige; and, on the other hand, it would be supervised so that no injustice could possibly be done by it to German citizens. It is on

its face an absurdity to hope that the average corporation, with only the backing of an individual state, can do as well in the future international competition as a corporation intelligently backed by the nation. There are exceptional corporations of great power which can struggle along under such conditions, but they are the exceptions, and, as a rule, the German corporation will beat the American corporation under such conditions.

Moreover, the American corporation may very possibly act in such way as to need neither supervision nor regulation—doubtless the great corporation of which I speak comes in this class. But it is not safe to treat this as a rule. It is not safe to continue to permit a corporation to be chartered in one state and then be allowed to run wild through the forty-eight states without the slightest thought or care by any governmental authority as to its future operations and as to whether or not they are fair, open and honorable in regard to stockholders, consumers, competitors and employes.

Nor on the other hand is it right to permit the well-behaved corporation to be continually harassed for alleged violation of technical and conflicting and often impractical state laws.

Preparedness in the Air

One of the leading aviators of the country has just written an article in which he says that he has little doubt that within a very few years airships will be practical for carrying mails and valuable commodities of small bulk.

If this prophecy be even approxi-

mately correct, how is it possible that there can be anything resembling state control of these operations in the air? Surely we should now be studying the possibility of this condition and be ready to meet it when it does come, and not wait until we bump into it and then wonder what we are going to do about it.

Preparedness for this kind of new condition in our industrial life is an absolute necessity if we are to have a proper type of preparedness to protect the nation.

Men who do not understand how Germany's industrial system is worked speak as if it were all done only by supervision and interference on the part of the government, and, in consequence, by the destruction of all individual initiative. This is not the fact.

Unlimited private competition in business may result in the elimination of private initiative, just exactly as under a system of unlimited private competition in politics, unregulated by law, the usual result is a despot with all the power and nobody else with any power. Countries that are free politically are countries in which the political activity of the individual is regulated. The same is true industrially.

Holds Business Responsible

In Germany the government does not interfere in the private affairs of a business except where it absolutely must; but it makes the men responsible for managing that business take hold in conjunction with their employes and in conjunction with the government authorities to see that justice is done. The employers and the representatives of

the employes sit around a table and reach a decision on such matters as, for example, the employment and payment of doctors who are to pass in expert fashion on industrial accidents. I have in mind exactly such a case, a case where the employes belonged to the Socialist and Centre parties and the employers did not, and where they were politically opposed, but where they met as a matter of common sense and business around a table to discuss something that was of common interest to all of them and to those they represented.

One of the prime reasons why I advocate universal service on the Swiss or Australian model is because through such service we shall achieve that national cohesion, that national solidarity, which will enable us to deal efficiently with our industrial problems.

We should at once begin governmental encouragement and control of our munition plants. To make war on them is to make war on the United States; and those doing so should be treated accordingly and all who encourage them should be treated accordingly. The plants should so far as possible and as rapidly as possible be shifted west of the Alleghanies, Pittsburg being as far east as they ought by rights to be.

There should be a great plant in the southern iron fields—the iron fields whose development was rendered possible by the wise action of the United States government in permitting the United States Steel Corporation to secure the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, action which has since been passed on and approved by the federal courts.

These great corporations should

be encouraged in everything that makes them efficient, but they should be controlled also, so as to see that their employes get their fair share of the profits and that their housing and living and working conditions are such as to enable them to rear their children as self-respecting American citizens of the great American democracy.

First Duty of Government

Military preparedness of the kind I advocate will help us toward social and industrial preparedness in time of peace. But let it be remembered that no preparedness in time of peace avails unless there is the military preparedness also.

Belgium and China have tried the experiment, and the results have been lamentable. It is of no concern now to the poor Belgians what they wish to do in time of peace, because they have been unable to protect themselves in time of war.

Self-preservation is the first duty of a government, and therefore the first duty of this government is to protect itself by potential armed power. This preparedness should be based upon industrial and social efficiency in time of peace, and cannot reach a high point unless there is such industrial and social efficiency. But it is itself the only means of securing the peace that permits of social and industrial justice.—*Dec. 4, 1915.*

OUR FLAG ON THE PACIFIC

The purchase by the American International Corporation of the seven old and small ships of the Pacific Mail line, that have long

been operated between San Francisco and Panama and intermediate ports of Mexico and Central America, brings into prominence the fact that the American flag has by no means disappeared from international trade on the Pacific, a fact which is even more emphasized by the circumstance that only recently the American Spreckles line, which operates ships between San Francisco and Australia, has added a new vessel to its fleet, a fleet that employs American crews.

It is unlikely that the American flag will disappear from the Pacific. It is likely that under it, afloat, Americans will have a better chance in the forecastles of the ships than hitherto they have had, and that will be a decided advantage to the United States. Already American lines are being planned to operate to the Orient under the American flag, and in time the American flag doubtless will be seen more than ever before upon the Pacific upon merchant ships, commanded, officered and manned by American citizens.

The ships just purchased by the American International Corporation are old and small, as the following table will show:

	Net Tons	When Built
Asrec	2,298	1894
City of Para.....	2,504	1878
Newport	1,806	1880
Pennsylvania ...	2,567	1872
Peru	2,540	1892
San Jose	1,538	1882
San Juan	1,496	1882

The American International Corporation has secured the firm of William R. Grace & Co. to operate these ships. Grace & Co. now operate a fine line of new American-built ships between New York and

the American ports of the Pacific, and it has for a great many years operated a line of ships under the British flag between New York and the west coast of South America.

The strategic value of the route which has come into its possession, and the organization perfected by the Pacific Mail line along the coast of the Pacific, will be of the greatest value to the Grace Company, and should result in profitable business for the corporation that owns the ships.—*Dec. 16. 1915.*

WHAT WILL THE UNITED STATES DO?

Secretary of Commerce Redfield hinted, in a speech he recently made in Brooklyn, that the United States by law might prevent the foreign registry of vessels now under the American flag. This would be in accord with steps recently taken by the governments of the great maritime nations to forbid the foreign registry of ships under their flags.

This is no new departure. An agreement was entered into on August 1, 1903, "between the Admiralty and Board of Trade (of Great Britain) and the International Mercantile Marine Company" and British steamships acquired by the latter, as a condition precedent to their ships remaining under British registry, sections 3 and 4 of which read as follows:

3. No British ship in the association, nor any ship which may hereafter be built or otherwise acquired by any British company included in the association, shall be transferred to a foreign registry (without the written consent of the president of the Board of Trade, which shall not be unreasonably withheld) nor be nor remain upon a foreign registry.

Nothing shall otherwise be done whereby any such ship would lose its British registry or its right to fly the British flag.

4. British ships in the association and ships that may hereafter be built or otherwise acquired for any British company included in the association, shall be officered by British subjects, and as regards their crews shall carry the same proportional number of British sailors of all classes as his majesty's government may prescribe or arrange for in the case of any other British line engaged in the same trades.

The word "association" used in the section applies, according to the terms of the agreement, to "the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Ltd., Frederick Leyland & Co. (1900), Ltd., the British and North Atlantic Steam Navigation Company, Ltd., the Mississippi and Dominion Steamship Company, Ltd., the Atlantic Transport Company, Ltd., and the International Navigation Company, Ltd." And the agreement extends the same conditions to other ships and lines of ships under the British flag that may subsequently be acquired by the International Mercantile Marine Company.

More latterly the British government has required ships under the British flag to obtain licenses from the government defining the routes and areas within which the ships may operate. This establishes a policy that gives the British government complete control of not only the sea-carrying but the oversea trade of every foreign country dependent or partially dependent upon British ships for its conduct.

There is a whole world of suggestion in these precautions so foresightedly and astutely taken by the greatest of maritime nations to retain safely under its own control the

merchant ships under its flag, and to limit, as seems best to British interests, even the commercial use of such ships. There are those, having eyes, who sees not, having ears, who hear not. So far, in our international relations, we seem to be of that class. Shall we remain so until the end?—*Dec. 27, 1915.*

WHAT HOLDS THE UNITED STATES BACK?

Common sense consideration of our merchant shipping problem should make plain the impossibility of its solution by methods that would accentuate rather than relieve the intensity of foreign competition. Our people have gradually drawn out of foreign carrying during a period of over half a century, a period during which our foreign rivals have increased their ocean-going tonnage enormously, largely to accommodate our foreign commerce. This gives them the vantage ground of knowledge of and experience in the intricacies of international trade, which present-day Americans are unfamiliar with. Our foreign rivals also have the advantage of cheaper construction and operation of ships than our own people in the beginning, could hope for. Add to this the various aids, financial and otherwise, that foreign governments that realize the value of a merchant marine of their own are disposed to extend in every way possible to those of their nationals who are engaged in maritime pursuits, and it becomes more and more apparent that, lacking governmental encouragement, those of our people who might be disposed to invest in American-built ships for

foreign trade will not make the venture.

Cheapness is not, nor should it be, the sole objective of a nation in establishing and maintaining a merchant marine of its own. That policy has never been applied to our navy, the personnel of which is three times more expensive than that of our nearest rival. Efficiency is of far more moment to the nation than cheapness. Depending, for example, on foreign shipbuilders for our ships, in the very moment of our greatest need may they not fail us? Depending likewise upon aliens for the officering and manning of our merchant ships, of what avail will they be to the nation in the event of war? Manifestly our national necessities in respect to a merchant marine of our own include home-built ships navigated by dependable citizens of our own. As private capital will not supply such a marine without ungrudging governmental support and encouragement, not at all for the benefit of either shipbuilders, shipowners or seafarers, but for the welfare and safety of the nation, liberally encouraging laws must precede the establishment of an American merchant marine in foreign trade.

When in 1883 the United States entered upon the construction of its new navy, American shipyards were unprepared for and their men were unfamiliar with such construction. The construction was entered upon from a condition that may be described as "in the raw." The demand for warships was constant, and the supply was confined to the United States. What followed? Existing shipyards supplied themselves with the men and the facilities that supplied the national demand; new

shipyards were established, and the work progressed rapidly and successfully. Most of the warships were built at or below cost, the competition between builders was so keen. Thirteen years later in his last annual message to Congress, speaking of our warships, President Cleveland said:

It is gratifying to state that our ships and their outfits are believed to be equal to the best that can be manufactured elsewhere, and that such notable reductions have been made in their cost as to justify the statement that quite a number of vessels are now being constructed at rates as low as those that prevail in European shipyards.

Having succeeded in so brief a period in constructing warships—the most intricate, difficult and expensive of ships—as well and as cheaply as they could be built abroad, if, by law, a demand is created for merchant ships equal to the needs of our foreign carrying, why should not our people build them as well and as cheaply as they are built abroad if the supply of merchant ships were confined to American shipyards?

Had the building of our new navy, in 1883, been thrown open to foreign competition, is there reason to believe that American shipyards in thirteen years would have built warships as well and as cheaply as they were built abroad? If the building of our merchant ships is thrown open to foreign competition, what reason is there to believe that American shipbuilders will attempt to meet the competition? We believe, however, that the policy pursued in building our new navy, that it shall be wholly home-built, in ten or fifteen years would bring our cost of merchant ships down to the level of foreign cost, or below it,

merely by increasing the skill and efficiency, but without reducing the pay of American workmen, which constancy of employment would no doubt accomplish.

The United States will decide to build a navy equal to the strongest possessed by any other nation. At the same time it must decide to build a merchant marine equal to all of the needs of American foreign commerce. In a score of years our navy and our merchant marine would be unmatched in all the world, and, by re-establishing our maritime independence, we would achieve, and thereafter retain, our destined position upon the seas.—
Jan. 3, 1916.

HAVE BRITONS GONE MAD?

Nothing but sheer desperation could cause the British government to issue two most remarkable orders in council, affecting British shipping. These are the order creating the ship licensing committee, which issues licenses defining how and where British ships may be used in foreign trade, and the order forbidding the use of British ships by German-Americans, as well as German subjects residents of the United States, "or any Americans unfavorably disposed to the cause of the allies." Nothing could be more calculated to arouse the maritime spirit of non-maritime nations, and to force them to create and maintain, at whatever expense may be necessary, merchant ships of their own, for the preservation of their foreign commerce. Sovereign peoples now dependent upon British ships for their overseas transportation, in whole or in part, must submit to British regulation as well as conduct of their

foreign trade, or free themselves from further dependence upon British shipping.

Germans declare they are fighting for the freedom of the seas, but the licensing (and thus the limitation of the uses) of British shipping in foreign trade is calculated to accelerate what the Germans profess to aim to accomplish. Correspondence from London suggests that the purpose of this licensing is insidiously to safeguard British shipping against the growth of alien shipping, lest, in time, freedom from such dependence is secured. In order to rivet British maritime dominance upon the world at large it is suggested that the licensing plan will be followed by the compulsory execution by aliens dependent upon British shipping of contracts by which nothing but British shipping will be used for long periods of years. "In support of this theory," says the correspondence, it is pointed out "that in certain trades between the United States and South America the withdrawal of British bottoms would bring ruin upon the shippers, for at the present moment it would be impossible to secure ships flying other flags to take their places." Was that what inspired the order forbidding the foreign registry of British ships without the consent of the British government? The correspondence concludes:

If this theory is correct, it can be readily appreciated that the licensing plan places a powerful trade weapon in the hands of the British government, which will not only enable it to control its own exports and imports, but will give it a tremendous influence over the sea-borne trade of other nations.

Are these orders aimed directly at the United States? Confessedly

the second one, outlined above, must be, because it singles out German-Americans, German subjects in the United States, and "any Americans unfavorably disposed toward the allies," as those who will be denied the use of British ships. What sort of internal espionage are our citizens of German birth, aliens resident in our country, and "any Americans (doubtless meaning native Americans) unfavorably disposed toward the allies," to be subjected to? And what proof will be sufficient to Britons to bar our citizens from the use of their merchant ships?

These developments are so unheard of, so remarkable, and of such deep import, as well to justify doubt in their correctness. They bear all of the earmarks of authenticity, however, but further conclusive confirmation of the scope of these orders in council is awaited.

It has long been apparent that it would take some startling upheaval to arouse our people to the menace of longer dependence upon alien merchant ships for the conduct of our foreign carrying, and the imperative necessity, not alone for purposes of national defense, but for the promotion unhindered of our foreign commerce and the unimpeded development of foreign markets for our rapidly growing surplus products, of dependence alone upon American-built vessels for all of the needs of our foreign commerce. These desperate expedients of Great Britain's to maintain her control of the world's carrying, and, through such carrying, control of the world's trade, should be sufficient even to arouse a maritime Rip Van Winkle from a seemingly endless sleep. Will

it arouse the United States, and, in sheer self-defense, compel it to establish and maintain a merchant marine of its own equal to all of the needs of its foreign commerce? If it does not, what will the final reckoning be?—*Jan. 6, 1916.*

SINISTER TENDENCY OF SHIPPING LAWS

Since 1817 we have denied foreign ships access to our domestic carrying. Before that our laws discouraged but did not prohibit foreign vessels from engaging in our domestic carrying. Our domestic carrying includes our trade between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and between the United States and Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico. Our Philippine is the only trade between the United States proper and its possessions not classified as domestic. It will be manifest that much of our so-called domestic, but to an extent oversea, carrying requires ocean-going ships. This has long been true of the trade between our Atlantic and Gulf ports, more recently of the trade between Pacific ports, and of the trade between ports of the United States on the Great Lakes. But the ocean expansion of our domestic carrying, so to speak, since the development of Alaska and the acquisition of Hawaii and Porto Rico, has brought under our flag a very respectable and rapidly growing fleet of ocean-going American-built steamships. If a census were taken to-day of our documented and undocumented shipping in domestic carrying, it would probably be shown to exceed 15,000,000 gross tons.

For almost a century this coun-

try bore the expense of native-built ships for all its domestic carrying practically unnoticed, certainly without criticism or complaint. Not until the question of free tolls for vessels using the Panama canal in domestic carrying was the expression ever heard that our colossal domestic shipping, all native built, was "a monopoly," or "a trust," phrases that were intended to discredit the law that reserves our domestic carrying for native-built ships. Thus discredited it will be easier to repeal the law, bills to accomplish which are now before Congress. There is no American demand for admitting foreign vessels to our coast carrying. Whence comes such a demand? Naturally from the interests that would be most benefited, to wit: foreign ship-owners and foreign shipbuilders. The welfare of the United States is left out of consideration in the advocacy of "free ships" in domestic carrying. Such advocacy constitutes a menace, and the admission of foreign vessels to our domestic carrying would constitute a national calamity. We have lost our maritime independence in foreign carrying, and the admission of foreign vessels to domestic carrying would in short order destroy our national independence. We must prevent it.

Until 1912 our laws denied American registry to foreign-built vessels. That is to say, until 1914, in fact, with the rarest exceptions, vessels carrying the American flag at their sterns proclaimed both their nationality and their nativity. Now all of that is changed. Not only are foreign-built vessels welcomed under American registry and the American flag—as yet only for foreign trade—but exceptional advan-

tages, so called, are offered to Americans who will bring them under, such as exemption from our inspection and safety laws, and exemption from American masters and officers, none of which exemptions, however, extend to American-built ships.

American shipping will be wholly American or wholly foreign. At the moment the trend is toward what may be called a foreign American merchant marine, which means American in name but foreign in fact, confined, for the time being, as stated, to foreign carrying, but with bills pending and a strong following developing both in and out of Congress in favor of the admission of foreign vessels to domestic carrying as well.

A wise and a vigorous national policy would arrest this tendency at once. It would demand the repeal of all laws that admit foreign vessels to American registry, it would make it worth while for American capital to invest in American-built ships for foreign trade, and such ships would be wholly owned, commanded and officered by American citizens. By requiring, as our laws should require, an increasing proportion of American seamen on American ships, in a remarkably short time our merchant vessels would be as completely manned by American citizens as the ships of our navy are to-day, and without subjecting owners to an additional dollar of expense. There is no justification for, and no consideration should be given to, bills providing for the admission of foreign vessels to domestic carrying. National safety and national welfare alike demand a real American merchant marine, equal in foreign trade to

all the requirements of our foreign commerce, and in domestic carrying wholly reserved for native-built vessels.—*Jan. 7, 1916.*

AMERICAN MARINE INSURANCE

So long as American shipping is subject to foreign dictation or domination, it will not be an independent American merchant marine. Not for a single instant would Great Britain allow her marine, or any of the essential accessories to the creation and maintenance of her marine, to be subject to foreign influences or dictation. British laws, British rules, British practices and British customs must be all sufficient for British shipping, and properly so. It is equally true that the merchant shipping of other nations must be free of foreign dictation if it is to be independent.

To-day plans are under way in the United States, if they are not already consummated, the purpose of which is to subject merchant ships built in the United States to the rules of construction of a British classification and rating association, although we have an American classification and rating association whose rules have the approval of different departments of our government, including the United States Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels, boards of marine underwriters, and American marine insurance companies. Various reasons are assigned for the preferences for Lloyd's rules of construction, and for Lloyd's classification and rating, the chief being that necessary marine insurance on American-built vessels and their cargoes cannot be placed in

London unless the vessels seeking such insurance are classed and rated by Lloyd's or some other British classification and rating association.

At times it is impossible, for the moment, to secure enough insurance on large and costly American-built vessels from American marine insurance companies to cover all of the risk, which necessitates placing at least a part of the insurance in London. As the number and resources of American marine insurance companies increase the insurance of American vessels and their cargoes will be placed with such American companies, which will remove the chief reason for the building of vessels in the United States under British rules of construction, so that they may thus secure British classification and rating, and thus such insurance of hulls and cargoes as is necessary.

It is expected that many vessels to be built in the United States will be used as auxiliaries to our navy in time of war. It is neither wise nor desirable that all of the details of their construction should be in the possession of aliens, and it is desirable that so far as possible they should be known only in the United States. Again, Great Britain is our chief competitor upon the seas, and in seeking foreign markets for our growing surplus products our people will be in competition with British producers, reasons quite sufficient for our self-dependence upon all of the accessories essential to the building, classification, rating, insurance and operation of American vessels in foreign trade.

If the United States government will say, as it should say, that vessels built in the United States according to the rules of our Ameri-

can bureau of classification and rating (which is not conducted to earn a profit) will be acceptable to and certificated by United States inspectors of vessels, necessary strength and force will be given to our American association. If, however, the rules of foreign classification and rating associations are equally satisfactory to our government, then we may as well expect to remain subservient, as a shipbuilding and, necessarily, as a shipowning nation, to British domination and influences.

And, finally, if any alterations are necessary, now or hereafter, in the rules of our American institution, in order to make them the sole reliance of our government as to the seaworthiness of vessels constructed in the United States, such changes should be imposed upon the American association and accepted by it, to the end that all the essentials preliminary to bringing merchant ships into existence in the United States shall be as free of foreign dictation or influence and as wholly American as are the designs and construction of American warships.—*Jan. 11, 1916.*

PLAIN WARNING BY PRESIDENT WILSON

No longer is the shipping question confused and obscured with silly suggestions that, because foreign ships are built and run more cheaply than ours are, it would be economically wise to depend upon them for the conduct of our foreign carrying, and we hear less and less the equally fatuous suggestion that we should have our ships built abroad and manned and officered by aliens, so as to achieve the minimum of "cheap-

ness." Clearly and plainly we are learning that efficiency is superior to mere cheapness. It is a long step forward in the right direction.

Too little attention has been paid by the press of the country to the illuminating words and the clear warnings uttered by President Wilson in discussing, in his message to Congress last month, the situation respecting our merchant marine, in which he in part said:

For it is a question of independence. If other nations go to war or seek to hamper each other's commerce, our merchants, it seems, are at their mercy, to do with as they please. We must use their ships, and use them as they determine. We have not ships enough of our own. We cannot handle our commerce on the seas. Our independence is provincial, and is only on land and within our own borders. We are not likely to be permitted to use even the ships of other nations in rivalry in their own trade, and are without means to extend our commerce even where the doors are wide open and our goods desired.

No wonder the President added that "such a situation is not to be endured." As foreign countries now refuse to allow the foreign registry of merchant ships under their flags, and as it is coming to be the vogue to issue licenses to their merchant ships describing where, and only where, they may operate, even refusing to allow certain peoples, or people with certain sympathies, to use their merchant ships, soon we shall find ourselves completely barred from foreign markets that would welcome us, unless we are prepared to establish in our trade with them American-built ships, commanded, officered and manned by our own people. The President is equally clear in this:

It is of capital importance not only that the United States should be its own

carrier on the seas and enjoy the economic independence which only an adequate merchant marine would give it, but also the American hemisphere as a whole should enjoy a like independence and self-sufficiency, if it is not to be drawn into the tangle of European affairs.

The Latin-American republics ask nothing better than the establishment of lines of American ships in the direct trade between themselves and the United States; they are most eager for such lines; they would welcome them and see to it that they were successful. They will support any move along such lines we may initiate, and frankly they make clear to us that there will be no rivalry in the carrying of our commerce—it is all ours for the taking. No longer is dependence upon foreign ships favored, when a President of Mr. Wilson's economic leanings talks like this:

Moreover, we can develop no true or effective American policy without ships of our own—not ships of war, but ships of peace carrying goods and carrying much more; creating friendships and rendering indispensable service to all interests on this side the water.

We cannot employ alien ships, commanded, officered and manned by aliens, to develop the trade of this hemisphere along the lines suggested by the President. We must have ships built in the United States, owned, commanded, officered and manned by our own people, successfully to accomplish all that is necessary in opening up and holding and developing trade between the United States and the peoples of the Latin-American republics. We can only come to know each other in that way.

Quite regardless of whether or not a substantial section of our new American merchant marine shall be

owned and operated by the federal government until private American capital finds a way profitably to supersede the government lines, or whether the possibilities of profitable business are made sufficiently attractive to induce American capital to supply the necessary American ships in the beginning, the government and the people gradually are learning the great truth, that must no longer be obscured, that to increase our foreign trade as the rapid growth of our surplus products relentlessly compels us to increase it, then to hold and develop it in line with our own needs and the needs of our foreign customers, American-built ships, commanded, officered and manned by Americans, are the instruments essential to success in such an undertaking.—*Jan. 13, 1916.*

AMERICAN MARINE INSURANCE

Some weeks ago, and again this week, *The Evening Mail* discussed the subject of marine underwriting as conducted in the United States, and American dependence upon foreign (chiefly British) marine insurance companies to do the larger part of American marine underwriting. We asked for information as to why so lucrative a business as marine underwriting was not extensive enough in the United States to enable American marine insurance companies to cover American marine risks. In the issue of the *Syren and Shipping Illustrated*, of London, of December 29, 1915, our question is partially answered in the following comment upon our article.

The *Syren and Shipping Illustrated* was the British publication

that first offered a prize of £500 sterling to the first British merchant ship that would ram and sink a German submarine, and subsequently it paid that sum to a British merchant ship.

A section of the *New York Press* and more especially *The Evening Mail* is considerably exercised over the complaint that United States capital is not sufficiently represented in marine insurance business. It is stated that the larger part of marine insurance underwriting in New York is placed through agents, who are chiefly British, of marine insurance companies, and it is argued that this is the result of the failure of American capitalists to recognize the possibilities of the business, and American business men are blamed for not showing sufficient acumen to engage in what is said to be a lucrative field of operation. Marine insurance, the critics state, is an old-established business, which could not have lasted so long if it were not profitable, and they ask why, if it is profitable, are there not enough American marine insurance companies to cover every American maritime risk. They further inquire as to why Americans are forced to have their ships built to conform to British rules in order to secure in England an insurance they ought to be able to obtain in the United States. Ships, they say, valued at \$600,000,000, are annually engaged in carrying exports and imports of the United States, which are valued at \$4,500,000,000 in normal times, the bulk of which risks are insured in Great Britain. Of course, there is one obvious answer to these queries, and that is that marine insurance business is part and parcel of shipowning, and to the country that possesses the best mercantile marine it is a natural result that it will also have the biggest share of the world's marine insurance business. There is another factor, too, which makes for the success of the British underwriter, and that is he is never afraid to insure anything, because it is one of the principles of his profession that any and every risk has its price.

We are obliged to *The Syren and Shipping Illustrated* for its fair

summary of our article and its frank explanation of the reasons that we needed information about. Since our article was written, early in December, we have been advised that the business of American marine insurance is growing rapidly, and that soon it will be possible for American marine companies to take so large a part of the maritime risks originating in the United States that foreign insurance companies will be glad to share in them without insistence that the vessels upon which the risks are taken shall be built according to the rules of the British Lloyd's Register of Shipping.

Steps are also being taken in the United States greatly to strengthen the American institution under whose rules vessels are built in the United States, and which institution issues certificates of classification and rating, the hope being that with the extension of American shipping in foreign trade, coincident to the growth of the foreign commerce of the United States, classification and rating of ships by our American organization will be accepted as readily in London as Lloyd's is here.—
Jan. 15, 1916.

THE ACUTE SHIP FAMINE

The whole nation realizes the need of an American merchant marine. The people have not yet reached the stage when they are demanding that Congress shall enact measures to encourage, promote and maintain American ships in foreign trade, but soon they will. Lacking ships to carry them to their foreign destinations, our experts fill hundreds of miles of railroad sidings in cars needed for other service, and our ex-

ports fill warehouses, piers, lighters and other available harbor craft, while awaiting merchant ships to carry them to the peoples in other lands who are in frantic need of them, ready to pay almost any price for them, and to pay freight rates ten times higher than in normal times, in order to get them.

Millions and scores of millions of dollars' worth of our national products destined for export are thus held up awaiting ships for their deliverance. Meanwhile foreign governments are restricting more and more our use of their merchant ships; our people no longer are permitted even to buy foreign merchant ships without the consent of the foreign governments under whose flags they now are; nor are British ships available for our uses lacking licenses issued by the British government defining the routes over which the ships may travel and the goods they are permitted to carry. Every conceivable restriction is applied to ships, and there is a real famine in ships the world over to-day.

What a mockery to think that several million tons of belligerent merchant ships are laid up in the different parts of the world to avoid seizure.

At last our grain producers, flour millers, meat and produce men of the Middle West, cotton planters and factors of the South and manufacturers of the East, realize that their exports are completely dependent upon ships that are absolutely beyond the control of our people or our government, and that are unavailable for their uses unless what they happen to have to export is the thing the nation possessing the ships most needs.

No longer are we told that, as

foreigners are willing to do our foreign carrying more cheaply than American ships can do, it is better to let the foreigners do it; no longer are our people advised to avoid investment in American ships because they are so unprofitable and that so many other more profitable avenues are open for investment. "Free ships," that great panacea that did such wonderful service for half a century as the one stock argument of free traders as the sole solvent for the problem of an American merchant marine, has been tried under the most favorable conditions possible to test its effectiveness and it has proven a failure.

Either some protective measure, or government ownership and operation of ships, regardless of the emergency, regardless of our great and pressing need, Democrats invoke their platform utterances to show how impossible it is for them to subsidize ships, although when it suits their needs, or seeming needs, to go absolutely contrary to their platform declarations, they do not hesitate a moment to do so.

Every ship that is able to navigate the seas is in use—all but the merchant ships of Germany and Austria, millions of tons of which swing idly at their anchors or chafe at their moorings in safe harbors in order to avoid seizure. Everything else that can carry a cargo is being pressed into use. Ships easily earn their cost and a profit as well on a single voyage, such is the demand for them. The shipyards of all the world available for merchant ship-building are filled to overflowing, with orders for still additional ships that will require several years for their construction. The more enterprising shipbuilders are increasing their

facilities for building in every way possible. If Congress should give our government a credit of a billion of dollars for immediate investment in merchant ships the government would not know where to turn to obtain them. It is even suggested that our navy-yards, as yet unfitted for ship construction, should be made ready, and even then there is doubt of skilled mechanics being available, sufficient to supply the additional demand.

This is the situation that confronts our government on the eve of a discussion of ways and means for the rehabilitation of American ships in foreign trade. And, instead of Congress rising to the need of the situation, and availing itself of the unprecedented opportunity to establish an effective and enduring policy for the building and profitable maintenance of an American merchant marine in foreign trade, evidently it is going to give us a measure confessedly of but a temporary character, intended for use only so long as private capital hesitates to supersede it in the running of American merchant ships over untried and new trade routes.

A presidential campaign is about to begin, and although the country needs merchant ships more than anything else, it looks as though on the one hand it will be given "issues" and on the other hand "arguments"—anything in the world but ships.—*Jan. 17, 1916.*

STIFLING AN INFANT INDUSTRY

Intoxicated by sudden prosperity, some of the principal American shipbuilders are demanding prices

beyond reason for such vessels as they are willing to construct. They have compelled men to come to their terms, but they are making no friends by their conduct. "All the traffic will bear" is not a good or safe policy in any industry. The railroads followed that system for years and had cause to regret it.

One of the large shipbuilding corporations prepared plans before the war for two fine craft for a prospective customer and was so anxious to get the contract that it offered to take part payment in bonds. The price was \$1,600,000—\$800,000 for each ship. After the war it raised its price to \$3,000,000—\$1,500,000 per vessel. It did not get the contract.

At a recent meeting in London of the shareholders of the Anglo-Perisian Oil Company, Mr. C. Greenway, the chairman, reported he had negotiated with American shipyards for vessels, but the price demanded was \$400,000 more per ship than that quoted by foreign builders, so the contract was not awarded to the Americans.

In the strained situation on the seas and the urgent need for vessels, American shipbuilders are able to get sufficient orders to satisfy them now. They have booked contracts that will keep their yards busy for two or three years. To the future they give little thought.

Commenting on the situation, *Shipbuilding Illustrated*, a marine publication, says: "This unbusinesslike attitude has defeated its own object, for new inquiries are exceedingly scarce and all appearances point to a very lean period succeeding the present boom * * * unless something quite unexpected takes place."

It would be well for the American merchant marine if the "something

quite unexpected" was the entrance into the American shipbuilding industry of some men with vision and sound business sense.

America may never have such an opportunity again to develop shipbuilding for herself and the world at large. If this country neglects the opportunity it will be grasped elsewhere. The Yankee prides himself on his enterprise, but if he does not stir himself even the Chinese may pass him.

The British are giving contracts to the Mongolians. Hong Kong is having a shipbuilding boom of fine proportions. In the Taikoo yard six oceans vessels are being constructed. Three of these are for Alfred Holt & Co. of the Blue Funnel line, and three for the China Navigation Company. The Blue Funnel boats will be of the same style, but not so big, as the huge vessels that ply between Liverpool and the Far East. The Taikoo yard has been enlarged and so equipped that it is able to turn out all classes of vessels up to 10,000 tons. The labor is Chinese, including the foremen. The technical staff is white.

Hitherto Norway has built nothing but small or medium size vessels. Now Norway is preparing to turn out ships of the largest dimensions. The Rosenberg Engineering Works at Stavenger is fitting its plant to construct steamers of 12,000 tons. A big shipyard is being developed at Tonsberg, on the Jariso Island. The Friedrikstad Engineering Company is arranging to build ships of all sizes up to 12,000 tons, and various other corporations are enlarging their plants and increasing their capital to go into shipbuilding on a scale never attempted in Norway before.—*Jan. 19, 1916.*

FOUR MAURETANIAS FOR U. S.

Vice-President Franklin, of the International Mercantile Marine Company, an American corporation which runs four steamships under the American flag, has made a public statement that is of general interest. He says that if our government will deal as liberally with the American line as Great Britain dealt with the British Cunard line in the arrangement which led to the construction of the steamships *Lusitania* and *Mauretania*, the American line would build four steamships in size and speed at least equal to the *Mauretania*, these cruisers to be run under the American flag in transatlantic trade—ships of the highest type and speed known to commerce and ready always to serve in time of need as invaluable naval auxiliaries.

Four such ships, the most modern afloat, would stimulate the just pride of the American people in the ability of its shipbuilders to construct and its citizens to operate such ships over the route traversed by the finest ships that sail the seas.

In the contract executed between the British government and the British Cunard line on July 30, 1903, the company agreed to build "in the United Kingdom" two steamships of a speed "of from 24 to 25 knots an hour in moderate weather," to run between Great Britain and the United States. In consideration of this, Great Britain agreed to loan the company enough money to build the ships, not to exceed £2,600,000, for twenty years, at 2¾ per cent. interest, and to pay the company an admiralty subvention of £150,000 a year for twenty years,

and further, as stated in a "treasury minute" of July 31, 1903, for the carriage of the mails "the subsidy has been fixed at £68,000 a year," also for twenty years. This led to the construction of the steamships *Lusitania* and *Mauretania*, the first of which was most useful to the British government during the period of the war up to the time of her destruction in carrying war munitions from the United States to Great Britain, and the *Mauretania* has been equally useful "in his majesty's service" during the period of the war.

Since our government is so insistent for a naval auxiliary merchant marine, as it so eloquently and urgently explains the pressing need of precisely such ships, and as a thoroughly responsible American steamship company offers to build them if our government will merely be as liberal to our American line as Great Britain has been to the British Cunard line, what prevents the prompt enactment by Congress of a bill that will enable our government to avail itself of this patriotic and generous offer of the American International Mercantile Marine Company?—*Jan. 20, 1916.*

THE GOVERNMENT SHIP PURCHASE BILL

Great mystery always has shrouded the real purpose of the government of the United States in attempting to persuade Congress to pass a bill that would enable it to build or buy merchant ships and run them in foreign trade. In a fascinating work only recently issued under the title of "Economic Aspects of the War," respecting

"Neutral Rights, Belligerent Claims and American Commerce in the Years 1914-1915," Prof. Edwin J. Clapp, of New York University, sets forth "the real reason" why the government of the United States desired to acquire and operate merchant ships in foreign trade.

Explaining in illuminating detail the methods by which, by hook and by crook, Great Britain has managed to prevent the proper exercise of the rights of citizens of the United States in the shipment of non-contraband goods to Germany, so long as Great Britain has failed to establish a real blockade of German ports, in which the lack of American merchant ships greatly aided Great Britain, Prof. Clapp states that it was the desire of our government to operate in the trade between the United States and Germany ships regarding whose American ownership no question could be raised, that would carry goods that the United States would guarantee were non-contraband.

If the United States had been able to do that, explains Prof. Clapp, it would have effectually brushed aside all the subterfuges and expedients to which Great Britain has resorted to prevent the shipment of non-contraband American goods to Germany, and that has enabled Great Britain so to coerce the Scandinavian and Dutch governments that they were constrained to enact laws first refusing to re-export to Germany imports from foreign countries, and finally refusing to export to Germany the products of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, in furtherance of the determination of the British government to starve Germany into surrender.

Prof. Clapp states that our government did not have the courage to declare its real purpose in seeking to acquire and operate merchant ships in foreign trade. It is his belief that if the United States government had frankly taken the people into its confidence, explaining the situation, and how our government proposed to assert and maintain the just rights of its citizens in international trade, the people would have loyally supported the government and forced Congress to pass the government ship purchase bill. Whether that was or was not our government's purpose last year, is that its purpose this year in renewing its efforts to pass the government ship purchase bill?

If it is, will the government, even now, take the people into its confidence?—*Jan. 22, 1916.*

THE UNITED STATES AS A MENACE?

"In the world's new era which will dawn after the blackness of the present war, Great Britain will no longer be referred to as a 'nation of shopkeepers,' but as the nation of engineers. In days to come, when the history of the war is written, one of the most amazing chapters is that which will tell of the giant of engineering genius and industrial power which the conflict has called forth from the womb of the nation. Night and day our vast shipyards are unceasingly at work putting forth fighting ships of types heard of and unheard of, and this with bewildering swiftness."

This is a paragraph from the "Review of Britain's Shipbuilding. Engineering and Shipping Triumphs,"

just published by the *Journal of Commerce*, of Liverpool. When we consider that the naval force already possessed by Great Britain has enabled her to bottle up Germany's navy and her mercantile shipping, the inquiry is natural, "Whom does England fear?" Surely not Germany, upon the sea. If that be true, why are her "vast shipyards unceasingly at work, putting forth fighting ships of types heard of and unheard of, and this with bewildering swiftness"? "Night and day" this work goes on. The need, whatever it is, for additional naval preparedness must be most urgent.

"Even now, although growing almost daily, British sea power is so stupendous, so versatile, that if the peoples of the earth could gauge it they would be awed and dazzled by its might, and every Britisher would thrill with pride."

So continues the opening chapter of the Liverpool *Journal of Commerce's* "Review." "The mighty engine of war" which is being perfected "will slowly but surely grind our enemies until its task is completed." Of course, a disclosure of details is forbidden, "but it is due to the whole empire to realize that these undreamed-of and unmatched feats are due to the men who control and manage our shipbuilding yards and engineering works."

The "free ship" policy with which, sixty-five years ago, Great Britain beguiled the rest of the world into allowing her shipbuilders to build the merchant ships for all the world is bearing fruit. For almost two-thirds of a century the world has been contributing to the perfection of the "shipbuilding yards and engineering works" of Great Britain, and, of recent years, no single nation

has contributed more in this direction than the Germans themselves. And now this perfected machine, useful alike for war as well as mercantile shipbuilding, over night, as it were, becomes "the mighty engine of war, which will surely but slowly grind our enemies until its task is completed." Because mercantile shipbuilding, for the time being, has all but ceased in Great Britain, all of her shipbuilding resources and all of her skilled "engineers" are devoted to the single purpose of perfecting England's "mighty engine of war" that is to enable her to triumph over her enemies.

"The scientific power, the engineering skill, the vast capacity of enterprise, the inexhaustible resourcefulness exerted by these great captains of industry, form a force that all the world powers could not match."

Proof of this assertion lies in the fact that, devoted as Great Britain has been during the year 1915 to perfecting in every way possible her naval resources, it is her proud boast that, in mercantile shipbuilding, the product of British shipyards was double that of all the rest of the world.

But, besides this, they are giving their mental and physical energies not shorter in hours or less keen in zest than the efforts of the captains of war. They do not figure before the nation officially, nor does the lurid flare of actual battle silhouette them before the public eye; neither do they figure in the limelight of the parliamentary arena. But they are the untiring creative and motive powers which will enable the empire to win the world's greatest war—and a war which is essentially an engineering war.

Tenaciously, and with a conscious and a subconscious purpose that has never relaxed, Great Britain has held fast to the world's shipbuilding, the real source of true sea power. Denying Britons the right to register foreign-built ships as British as long as it cost more to build merchant ships in Great Britain, and yielding the right to Britons to register foreign-built ships as British only when British-built ships were cheaper than foreign, the "free ship" policy of Great Britain, never intended to put foreign-built vessels under British registry, has been successful in putting British-built ships in preponderating numbers and preponderating tonnage upon the registries of all other nations.

The resources, latent but existent, possessed by the United States suffice to enable this nation to duplicate and quadruple all of the "shipbuilding yards and engineering works" possessed by Great Britain, and to achieve a supremacy in the building of warships and merchant ships outmatching British war and merchant ships in thoroughness and in cheapness of construction. We possess the means, but seemingly lack the incentive, to be not only sufficient unto ourselves in shipbuilding for war and for commerce, but for a larger part of the rest of the world than Great Britain has ever yet served.

A hundred and twenty-five years ago, speaking of our marine, Thomas Jefferson truly said that "as a branch of industry it is valuable, but as a resource of defense it is essential," a great truth he had completely grasped, but of which his countrymen are still strangely ignorant, a truth, however expressed, that has been the mainspring and

the unswerving guide of British objective and British energies. And to-day England reaps the reward of her foresight and acumen, while the rest of the world is completely subservient to her sea dominion. "The trident of Neptune is the scepter of the world," and Great Britain is Neptune.—*Jan. 25, 1916.*

OUR DOMINATION OF OVERSEA TRADE

They say that after the war we shall be the great exporting nation of the world. It will be a decade before the German and English factories and exporting organizations recover their stride, and by that time we shall have a firm grasp upon the trade of South America, Africa, Asia and Australia.

Perhaps.

But who will do our carrying to those oversea markets? English and German ships carried over three-fourths of it before the war began. English ships carry nearly all of it now. After peace will England and Germany continue to carry our products to a market for which they are starving?

The matter is worth considering.

To-day no British ship operates from America to anywhere but England except under special license. All of our shipping to Australia and most of it to South America is operating under special licenses of the British Admiralty. What if England should withdraw those licenses after the war is over? What if Germany should then institute the same system?

Such withdrawal would rapidly break our war-won monopoly of the competitive markets of the world.

Such withdrawal would aid in the very rapid recovery of the British and German foreign trade.

After all, why should the German and British ships help us in keeping their own nations prostrate?

We could not claim ill will if England and Germany took this action. They may need the ships for their own trade. During the war they have built few merchant ships and lost many. They will be short of tonnage. Should they stint themselves to serve us?

It is every man for himself.

It is the United States for a merchant marine as soon as we can get one.—*Jan. 27, 1916.*

THE "CHEAP" MARINE FALLACY

No nation has been so educated as has ours to believe that only through the possession of a merchant marine in every essential as "cheap" as that possessed by other nations can the United States expect to acquire and operate it profitably in foreign carrying. How often we hear people, discussing this subject, say that there must be "equality of conditions" of competition between American and foreign shipping, that the United States "must find some way" by which its merchant ships can be operated as cheaply as foreign ships are operated. Many people believe that our commercial and maritime success is dependent upon as "cheap" an American merchant marine as any foreign merchant marine.

A moment's straight thinking will dissipate this fallacy. It costs more to operate British merchant ships than it costs to operate the merchant ships of any other nation save alone

the United States. The over-mastering success of British merchant shipping completely demonstrates the fallacy of the proposition that a nation's merchant ships must be operated "as cheaply" as those of other nations. There are many ways by which Great Britain, and those Britons engaged in the different branches of shipping are able to overcome the single item against them of cheaper cost of operation. There is the closest and most friendly co-operation between the British government and British shipowners and British shipbuilders. Both shipbuilders and shipowners are regarded, in Great Britain, as among the strongest pillars of the empire. They possess, to a degree that we would regard as quite amazing, the confidence of the government and the respect and esteem of the people, and justly so, since the businesses in which these are engaged have made and now maintain Great Britain as the dominant nation of the earth.

So conscious are the British people of the inestimable benefits their shipbuilders and shipowners confer upon the nation that there is never objection to the government doing whatever its leaders regard as necessary to foster, maintain and promote both British shipbuilding and British shipowning. Where subsidies are necessary they are paid, not in a niggardly and suspicious manner, as though the shipowners sought to rob the government, but with a consciousness on the part of the government that the purpose of the shipowners is to serve the empire. The very atmosphere in which British shipbuilders and British shipowners live is conducive to that self-confidence that is essential to their suc-

cess. A hostile atmosphere surrounds American shipbuilders and shipowners, and still we wonder that they are not successful. Forever they are accused of being, or eager to become, "thieves," "robbers," "grabbers" and "treasury looters." A large part of the nation so regard them, and forever the press is instilling such thoughts in the people's minds.

There is a widespread belief that American capital, especially Americans with capital to invest in shipping, should establish an American merchant marine in foreign trade and successfully and profitably keep it there. Really, individual Americans are quite unconcerned regarding the nationality of ships they invest in; all they care about is "a profit," and reasonable hope of their capital returning to them, hence their investment in and control of 2,500,000 gross tons of ships under foreign flags. It is the United States, as a nation, that needs an American merchant marine in foreign trade—not at all the shipowners—and until the United States finds a way for American capital to find as safe and as profitable an investment in ships under the American flag as they now find in ships under foreign flags American capital will continue to invest in ships built in other countries and operating under foreign flags, enriching the builders of ships in other nations, and thus strengthening and fortifying upon the sea the nations under whose flags they operate their ships, while the United States remains weak upon the sea. Manifestly, the fault is not with the American investor in ships. It is in his government, his countrymen and their newspapers. The fault is

with the United States as a nation.
—Jan. 28, 1916.

AND WE?

Weld & Co., of Liverpool, one of the largest cotton houses of the world, writing under date of January 12, have this to say:

Later on, perhaps, when the bulk of the world's crops have been transported, and especially if Lancashire mills are threatened with the necessity of closing down owing to shortage of cotton—in our opinion, a very remote possibility—it may be possible for the government to bring pressure to bear or devise means for the bringing over of cotton in greater volume; but at present how is this to be done, when war supplies, munitions, grain and foodstuffs are all fighting for freight room? Wheat, in spite of the government's proviso that a large percentage of the freight room available must be reserved for foodstuffs, shows a bigger percentage of increase in the rate of freight than cotton. It may be that pressure will become so great that the government may release some of the vessels now commandeered for war purposes, and this may relieve the situation a little, only we are inclined to think that quite insufficient tonnage can be released to bring any real and definite relief. In the meantime, rates of freight are still advancing.

Beautiful prospect.

And where are the ships to come from to transport the many American products other than cotton, grain, foodstuffs and war material?

What are we coming to?—Feb. 4, 1916.

THE GOVERNMENT SHIP BILL

Chairman Alexander, of the House merchant marine and fisheries committee, has explained the main features of the government ship bill he introduced on Monday,

which is favored by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo and President Wilson, as providing for: the initial sale of Panama canal bonds to the amount of \$50,000,000 for the purchase or lease of merchant ships; the appointment by the President of a federal shipping board of three men of large practical experience in the conduct of foreign commerce, who, with the secretary of the navy and the secretary of commerce as ex-officio members, will constitute the board.

The federal shipping board is practically everything. It is empowered to organize a corporation to lease, buy, charter or build merchant ships. So far as possible the ships are to be American built; the foreign-built ships acquired to be limited only to foreign trade. The stock of the corporation is to be offered for sale to American citizens. If private capital fails to purchase the stock the board will operate the vessels, but not in routes where American ships now operate. In conjunction with the Interstate Commerce Commission, the shipping board may allow railroads to make special rates on freight carried in these government-owned ships both to and from the country in foreign trade.

All vessels in domestic and foreign trade are required to obtain revocable licenses, without which they cannot engage in our trade. The shipping board is to possess power to regulate water-borne freight rates, a power only to be used in extremis. The shipping board is also to examine into our navigation laws and recommend such changes as it believes will foster the growth of American shipping.

The vessels are to be subject to the command of the government, whenever required for auxiliary naval purposes. The statement is made that, whenever private capital feels able to relieve the government from the operation of merchant vessels in foreign trade, the government will withdraw. Another feature is a naval reserve, open to officers and men for voluntary enlistment, who will be paid sums fixed in accordance with their rank.

It is known to shippers and shipping men, but perhaps not to the general public, that rail rates on goods for export from, and on goods imported into, the United States are substantially less than the rates charged on domestic freight. If it be the purpose of the government to limit such reduced rail rates in future only to exports and imports in American vessels, the discrimination would alone suffice, in respect to exports from or imports for interior points far enough removed from the seaboard to constitute a substantial difference in the cost of such goods, thus to create a demand for American vessels. German state-owned railroads long have thus favored goods carried in German merchant ships.

It is improbable that the licenses would discriminate in favor of American vessels, but one of their chief purposes will be to discriminate against vessels participating in pools, rings, combines or "conferences," the purposes of which are to apportion the number of vessels engaging therein, amounts of freight they may carry, rates they shall charge, rebates they may allow.

The powers vested in such a board should enable it greatly to promote the upbuilding of a real

American merchant marine in foreign trade, whether owned by the government or not. Indeed, there is a possibility that private American capital might, at the start, see its way to relieving the government of any participation in the operation of government-owned ships in foreign trade, especially if the advantages were such as to benefit shippers as to cause them to prefer to use American instead of foreign ships.

Much will depend upon the sources at the command of the government to bring tonnage into use for foreign trade not obtainable by private capital, as to whether or not the bill will command public favor. Disclosures on that head will be eagerly awaited. There are suggestions of reserve powers in the possession of the government, now to be availed of for the promotion of American shipping in foreign trade, if wisely exercised by the federal board it is proposed to create, that will render entirely unnecessary any government participation therein beyond supervision and regulation that shall promote instead of abridge the growth of American shipping in foreign trade. The government will have to establish, very clearly indeed, the need of government operation of merchant ships.

To be sure, present prices of ships are tremendously high, but so are freight rates. It ought to be possible for private capital to purchase any ships purchasable by the government, and, freight rates considered, there should be no difficulty whatever in inducing private American capital to invest in all of the ships that are available—all that the government may be able to purchase. If that be so, the government will

have to put up a convincing case of the need of government operation of merchant ships in foreign trade before its scheme will command the public's favor.—*Feb. 4, 1916.*

materials and men able to design and build modern ships. In 1894 J. Henniker Heaton, an eminent member of the British Parliament, notable for his postal reforms, was moved to exclaim

"WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN"

If the United States had never abandoned its protection of its shipping in foreign trade, as it never has abandoned its protection of shipping in domestic trade, and as it never has abandoned its protection of other American industries subject to foreign competition, it would undoubtedly now be the leading maritime nation. Not only was that protection gradually suspended, but when Great Britain three-quarters of a century ago began subsidizing her steamship lines the United States followed suit, under Polk's administration, and for thirteen years matched subsidy with subsidy in the transatlantic trade, finally withdrawing it in 1858, to the ruination of American lines and to the salvation of British shipping.

But had the early successful, protective American maritime policy been maintained unimpaired our shipping in foreign trade would have grown greater with the years, we would long ago have been building ships for all the world, and ships under the American flag would have continued, as Webster expressed it, "to leave no seas unexplored," no ports unvisited, no foreign trade unshared. The destruction of protection led to the almost utter effacement of shipbuilding, especially for foreign trade, although this country always possessed and still possesses in the most prodigal abundance everything essential to shipbuilding,

As a consequence of refusing five millions a year in subsidies during thirty years to native ship owners, or \$150,000,000, the United States had to pay in the same period no less than \$3,000,000,000 for freights, while their mercantile marine dwindled into insignificance.

Since then that loss of three billions has been augmented to eight or ten billions and our merchant marine in foreign trade has all but vanished. Those billions have strengthened our strongest rival in foreign trade and upon the sea, while we have grown weak and insignificant. If, at the outbreak of this European war, we had had an American merchant marine equal to the needs of our foreign carrying, we would then have been at least eight billions of dollars richer than we are, and during the period of this war our ship owners would have earned enough to pay for their ships several times over.

If the freight rates had been exorbitant, they would have been paid to our own people, and the money would have remained in the United States, and our marine would have been tremendously strengthened and augmented, foreign markets would have been open for our exports, our foreign trade would not be imperiled, and, most of all, our maritime independence would have saved us from the ever-increasing danger of its serious dislocation or utter destruction, because we lack ships of our own with which to conduct our trade.—*Feb. 16, 1916.*

WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO

A complete reversal of national policy in respect to merchant shipping should be made forthwith. The most liberal laws should at once be enacted that will cause the erection of a goodly number of additional modern American shipyards. Every variety of merchant ship useful in foreign trade should be built; ships of the scout and auxiliary cruiser type, of the *Mauretania* class, to be operated in trans-Atlantic trade; also ships of combined passenger and freight-carrying capacity, useful for troop ships, munitions ships, also useful in trans-Atlantic trade and trans-Pacific trade; ships of inferior types, of the kind most useful in the trade with South America, Central America, the West Indies, Africa, Australia and the Orient, adaptable for coal and oil fuel ships, for supply ships, hospital ships, and every kind of use that the government in time of need would have for them.

The United States needs such ships as these for the uninterrupted continuance of its foreign trade, and for the further development of that trade where opportunities are most favorable; and the nation needs such ships for the different auxiliary naval purposes already alluded to.

The United States has been too niggardly, too parsimonious, too cheeseparing, too suspicious of everybody concerned, in all matters related to the development of an American merchant marine. All of that must be changed. It cannot be changed too quickly, nor too completely. Even prodigal liberality would, probably, be most economical

in the end. The dependence of the United States on foreign merchant ships for its foreign carrying is fraught with too many dangers to be continued a moment longer than is necessary. At once the encouragement of American-built ships should be provided for. Americans should be induced to officer and man them. This country must be independent of all of the world in the sources of its supply of merchant ships and in citizens of its own with which to man them.

At any moment we are threatened with the disruption of our foreign trade, now the largest in the world, because we do not possess ships of our own for its transportation. It is possible for our foreign rivals, for reasons that they could make seem extremely plausible, to withdraw their merchant ships from our trade, and compel our foreign customers to turn to them for the imports they must have.

Our danger is acute. It is no time to haggle over details. The United States must have a merchant marine of its own fully equal to all of the needs of its foreign carrying, just as rapidly as American capital, using American shipyards, American officers and seamen, can furnish them. The more profitable such ships are to their American builders, owners, officers and crews, the more rapidly they will increase, and the sooner the nation will be secure.
—Feb. 17, 1916.

CONGESTION

Parts of the congestion at our seaports, and by contagion through our whole railroad system, is due to the lack of ships. We cannot deliver what we have sold. Trains

block the terminal yards at the ports, and the side tracks from Chicago to the seaboard. Lighterage sheds and lighters in New York harbor are held full. No more cars can be unloaded, so the equipment must be kept under load in the Jersey yards while farmers in Nebraska and millers in Minneapolis cannot get cars in which to ship their grain and flour.

We own only half the equipment necessary to carry on our foreign trade. That trade does not move from Chicago to New York, but from Chicago to Liverpool, Buenos Ayres, Naples. We own our rolling stock; but we have depended upon the floating stock of others, now withdrawn and put to their own special uses. Therefore our trade piles up on the wharves. The wharves should be a mere transfer platform between carriers. They have become an impasse.

Part of the ships on which we relied swing slowly at their anchors in a hundred roadsteads, their German crews idle on shore. Part of the carriers that once served us strew the floor of the English Channel. Part are coaling the huge allied squadrons in the Mediterranean. Part are carrying supplies to Salonica or troops from Bombay. More and more we are being restricted to just those ships which England can spare, away from her own military and naval needs.

What a spectacle for us to regard! What should we say of a private industry that neglected to prepare itself against an absolutely certain contingency? Our Congress, by shutting its eyes to the facts and refusing to agree on the details of a plan to restore our merchant marine, has left our foreign commerce

unprepared against a contingency that was certain to befall it, namely, a great war in which foreign nations found their ships locked up, or called them home.

We may before long find that our dream of conquering foreign markets during this war has vanished. We may have to stop selling to extra-European buyers because we shall have no ships with which to deliver to them. To-day coal is \$40 per ton in Italy and less than \$5 on board at Norfolk. But we cannot sell it. There are no ships to carry it.

Perhaps this war, if it lasts long enough, will teach us that the equipment for foreign trade consists of carriers that will take that trade all the way, not half the way. We shall learn that a neutral nation cannot depend upon ships subject to the military call of nations that choose to go to war.

When that lesson is learned, we shall have an American merchant marine.—*March 9, 1916.*

TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG

We all recall that during the last months of 1915 Great Britain swept from the seas most of the vessels of the American Transatlantic Company, owned entirely by American citizens. The British excuse was that some of these vessels at some period in the past were under the German registry.

Over 50,000 tons of shipping, most of which the American Transatlantic had transferred from the Danish to the American flag, were thus frightened off the ocean or seized by British cruisers and nominally sent to the prize court to have their "innocence" passed upon.

None of these American ships has yet come up before the court. It will be many a long day before they do. Britain has requisitioned them. The *Genesee* and *Hocking*, not suitable to carry our goods, are engaged in carrying for England.

The elimination of these ships from our use served another purpose. They were about to extend our coal trade to Buenos Ayres. England cannot spare ships nor coal to continue to supply South America with fuel. But South America can starve before we shall be allowed to supplant the British coal trade. The British know too well the economic significance of their vast coal exports to all the world. These coal ships, rather than return light, offer unexampled low freight rates on raw materials to England, and so form a pillar of that country's industrial supremacy. America shall not now disturb that pillar.

It is not we who say this hateful thing. It is South America who says it. In the Argentine Congress Dr. Zeballos, in a recent speech, spread out the situation clear for all who can read:

Great Britain is so severe in her new conduct that at the present moment the Argentine government has not sufficient coal for her navy, and, having bought some in the United States, cannot get freight, as the American vessels available were formerly German vessels. The sellers of the coal have telegraphed to the Argentine government informing them that they cannot fulfill the contract unless they obtain from the British government permission to transport the coal. The English government has answered that they cannot renounce their right of seizure. They offer to send the coal to Buenos Ayres with sailors of the English navy, but they will take away the steamer afterward. Thus the new policy comes to isolate us and deprive us of provisions that are badly wanting, just as if we were in full war blockade.

Trade follows the flag. Trade is swept from the seas when the flag is swept from the seas. So much of our trade remains as Great Britain chooses to let continue—mainly a temporary trade in war supplies for her and her allies.

But we are not to be allowed, in these golden hours of opportunity, to lay the basis for a larger share of the peaceful trade which will endure when this war is a memory. That trade is held in abeyance for the subjects of his majesty's government.

Do our men in Washington know these things?—*March 27, 1916.*

THE FRUITS OF DEPENDENCE

One of the fixed policies in ocean rates was that the same rates applied from New York, Liverpool and Hamburg to every South American port. This made it possible for the American manufacturer to compete on equal terms with the manufacturer in Great Britain and Germany. Believing in the permanence of this equality of rates, we were content to let the English and German lines do our carrying to South America. To-day the German lines are chased off the seas and the British ships, in order to prevent us from stealing Britain's trade when she is embarrassed, have jumped the rates to Buenos Ayres from New York to a point 100 per cent. above the corresponding rates from Liverpool.

Our informant is the assistant secretary of commerce at Washington, E. H. Sweet. A few days ago, at a dinner of the new Norwegian-Amer-

ican Chamber of Commerce at New York, he said:

Only a few days ago a contract for the sale of more than a million dollars' worth of cast iron pipe could have been made with responsible parties in the Argentine if the British interests which control the shipping situation had not insisted upon a freight rate from New York to Buenos Ayres about one hundred per cent. higher than the rate from Liverpool to Buenos Ayres.

Perhaps now we shall have less talk about trusting the noble foreign ship owners. Perhaps our friends in the Middle West will stop telling us that it is foolish to pay subsidies to support our own fleet of international delivery wagons, because English and German ships will deliver for us as cheaply as for English and German producers. Theory is interesting, but it is facts which convince. —*March 30, 1916.*

SHIPS

The losses which are piling up for every class of American producers are such as to unite them, all, even those of the Middle West, in a demand for positive action looking toward the rapid fostering of an American merchant marine.

Because we have no overseas merchant marine of our own, we have seen great numbers of the carriers upon whom we depended swept from the ocean, as an incident to a war in whose making we had no part. Of the ships that can still sail the seas, half are requisitioned for naval auxiliary service with the allies and so are not available to carry our goods. The few ships that can still carry for us are engaged in charging us ten times the ocean rates of pre-war days.

These vast rate increases lessen the profits for the farmer and the miller. The price paid them is a Liverpool price minus the cost of transportation. If ocean rates were normal or only mildly abnormal, what fabulous wealth would now be accruing to the farmer in Kansas and the miller in Minneapolis! Their losses are precisely measured by the huge earnings of the foreign shipping companies which carry for them.

It is the Middle West, or rather some of its representatives in Congress, who have thwarted every plan to give protection and assistance to an American merchant marine. These men seemed to think that ships were something solely for the benefit of the seaboard which was of necessity their terminus.

The producer in the West knows better to-day. He sees his profits appropriated by an alien carrier. He sees freight congestion and car shortage on the railroads because ships are not available to carry his products away from the seaboard. These products are held for weeks stored in cars that should be available for transportation. It is not that there are not enough ships in the world. It is that those ships which we chose to rely upon have been largely withdrawn from our service. If we had made the small sacrifices necessary to encourage the building and operation of American ships, they would to-day be serving us. The middle westerner is seeing this truth and is telling his Congressman that American ships for the foreign trade are to be provided even at the cost of less elaborate postoffices in the Congressman's home town.

Our provincial days are passing.

Americans will learn at least one thing from this war. The whole country will learn that our foreign trade does not move from St. Louis to New York. It moves from St. Louis to Rio and the River Plate. To safeguard its carrying we need not only railroads to the seaboard, but also ships from the seaboard to destination.—*April 1, 1916.*

YOUNG-MAN-AFRAID-OF-HIS-HORSE

An Indian name was Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horse. The title is not a bad one for Uncle Sam, who seems afraid of the great corporations which the natural course of economic development has given us. Instead of accepting great concentration of capital and large scale operation as a logical result of machine production, and instead of appropriating the good and repressing the bad of these modern agencies of efficiency—instead of this, we attempt to break up the huge units into their component parts. If we ever do succeed in tearing the three asunder, the trunk and all the branches will be dead.

To-day, as we look at the situation on the Pacific Ocean, swept clear of American ships, we can see the fruits of our foolish policy of persecuting corporations, instead of accepting the principle that they and their large power are here to stay, but that that power must be used for national ends.

When the Panama Canal was to be opened, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, controlled by the Southern Pacific Railroad, and the only American line in the transpacific trade, saw its earnings

threatened. Most of its Pacific traffic was Asiatic freight to or from the eastern part of the United States, interchanged at San Francisco with the transcontinental railroads. The Pacific Mail saw that, when the canal was opened, direct lines from New York would take cargo from the eastern states so cheaply that the combined rail and water rates via San Francisco would no longer be competitive.

Therefore the Pacific Mail determined to start its line for the Orient at New York, running through the Panama Canal and calling at San Francisco. The service was to be a semi-weekly one, operated by the 18,000-ton *Korea* and *Siberia*, the 27,000-ton *Manchuria* and *Mongolia* and four new 37,000-ton steamers to cost \$3,000,000 each. This line would have meant permanent protection against the subsidized Japanese lines, which to-day monopolize our transpacific trade.

The American-built and operated steamers of the Pacific Mail asked no subsidy, though their Japanese rivals receive \$100,000 per round trip from the Japanese government. The Pacific Mail ships merely proposed, as American vessels, to carry coastwise freight between New York and San Francisco, incidental to their oversea service. This coastwise trade, reserved for American ships by law, was a source of earnings, of course, closed to the competing Japanese lines.

Congress would not have it. As a "rider" to the 1912 Panama Canal bill, providing for the administration and operation of the Panama Canal, a provision was inserted to prevent railroad-owned ships from passing through the canal and carrying coast to coast

freight. The provision was directed against the Pacific Mail. San Francisco interests which did not want their Asiatic line extended to New York persuaded Congress that the Southern Pacific wanted to run through the canal and carry incidental coastwise freight for the sole purpose of killing off independent water carriers and preventing water rates between the coasts so low as to be embarrassing to the transcontinental roads. There was much talk of alleged collusion between the Pacific Mail's Panama route and the trans-continentals before the interstate commerce act was passed in 1887.

It was vain for the Pacific Mail to offer to file their coastwise rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission and submit to any desired regulation, while the "independent" water lines would remain free to cut under them. Congress in a panic passed the Panama canal act with the "rider." The Pacific Mail was in effect forbidden to build the four new American ships, each as large as the *Mauretania*. These American ships were refused that right to carry coastwise freight which would have made them able to operate in the face of the Japanese subsidy. The Pacific Mail was in effect refused the right to extend its service to New York. The line's disappearance was then merely a matter of time; the immediate occasion was the passage of the seamen's act. In the last few months the Pacific Mail has sold its ships and the American flag has disappeared from the ports of China, Japan and the Philippines.

What desirable result has come from this denial of the right to live to an American steamship line,

merely because it had the traffic and financial support of its natural feeder, an American railroad? First, Japanese lines now monopolize the transpacific trade. There is no competition there. The Japanese government, in subsidizing its lines, controls their rate policy, which is frankly to push the export of Japanese manufactures to this country and slow up our manufactured exports to Japan. The freight rates we pay support great liners that will be auxiliary cruisers for the Japanese navy, not ours. Is Congress pleased with the result?

Nor is there any competition in water rates from coast to coast through the Panama canal. Over nine-tenths of this traffic is carried by the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company or W. R. Grace & Co. These companies have identical rates, a slight differential below the transcontinental all-rail rates. The American-Hawaiian has a representative at the transcontinental rate conferences and revises each rate along with the railroads. W. R. Grace follows.

It was not that Congress was malicious. It simply had not grasped the idea that competition had gone. No one wants it. Both in water and land carriage we want stable rates, no rebates, the cards all on the table. Our protection against extortion is regulation. It is wicked folly to dismember that organic growth which we call the large corporation, seeking for a form of competition which we cannot get, and should not want if we had it.

Incidental to the act of folly represented by this "rider" to the Panama canal act, the American ships which built up our Asiatic trade are gone for all time. It is a heavy

price to pay for the education of our legislators, but if the lesson is being learned it is worth all it costs.
—April 3, 1916.

GRAIN AND FLOUR

Japan cares enough for a merchant marine to subsidize the lines that ply to our western ports to the extent of \$100,000 per voyage. Since the Pacific Mail, under the influence of the Panama canal act and the seamen's law, was driven off the ocean and most of the Robert Dollar Line steamers were transferred from American to British flag, the Japanese steamers have dominated the Pacific trade. We ship by them to Japan and China, or not at all.

The Japanese government in granting its subsidy retains control over the ocean rates of the aided line. It uses that control for its own national advantage. For example, rates on grain are kept low, rates on flour high. Japan has to buy breadstuffs from us, but so arranges the ocean rates that it buys grain which is ground into flour in Japan and not in America. Similarly, the American miller cannot get a flour rate to Manchuria to compete with the grain rate to Japan plus the low flour rate from the Japanese mills to destination.

Japan knows how to create and use a merchant marine. She has national purposes and takes the means to realize them. Will our friends still go on telling us that there is no use in having an American merchant marine and that we should let others do our carrying for us?—May 5, 1916.

THE DESERTERS

In the Panama canal act of 1912 we forbade railroads from running ships through the Panama canal. That prevented the Southern Pacific, the Santa Fé, the Hill roads and the New Haven from putting lines through the canal in competition with each other. The interstate commerce act makes both rail-and-water and all-water rates of a railroad-owned boat line subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission. So we should to-day be getting from such lines, voluntarily or under compulsion, the low rates justified by the full boat loads which the railroad owner would be pouring through the Pacific ports.

But no; Congress would not have it. Congress thought these "tainted" boat lines would in some mysterious way throttle the canal. Congress had its way. It barred railroad-owned boats and left the water open to free competition between independent carriers. But—as all traffic men predicted—there was no competition. Rates from coast to coast by water were a slight differential under the all-rail rates, just enough to attract business. Two lines, the American Hawaiian and the W. R. Grace & Co., dominated the traffic and charged identical rates. Their representatives attended railroad meetings and they followed the railroad rates up or down.

Last fall the Panama canal was closed by slides. It has reopened, but the American Hawaiian and W. R. Grace are not putting their boats back on the coast-to-coast route. They can make more money chartering the vessels elsewhere. The rail rates across the continent fix a maximum water rate which

can be charged, an amount lower than the current ocean rates to-day. The rail rate on canned salmon from the Pacific coast to New York is \$14 per ton. To-day you can earn \$40 per ton carrying flour to Naples. The railroads bring asphalt across the continent for \$10 per ton. You can earn \$30 per ton taking coal to Genoa.

These independent boats are as free as the ocean air. They have no obligations to serve America, so their owners charter them out to their own advantage. The railroad-owned boats would to-day be operating between Atlantic and Pacific coasts, rendering service and charging rates regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Some day we are going to learn to trust and use for our own national purposes these great transportation agencies of ours, instead of fighting them. Water carriage to-day, in purely American traffic, is a matter for co-operation, not competition, between boats and railroads.—*May 6, 1916.*

THE LESSONS OF WAR

Step by step the American people are learning the elementary lessons of foreign trade. This war is doing a great deal to teach them. First and foremost we are learning what it means not to have a merchant marine. We are learning how false were those who assured us that we could entrust to foreign shipping the carrying of our exports. Now that one single class of foreign shipping, the British, has us in its power, it is exercising that power to levy discriminating rates upon American exports to South America.

It used to be considered an axiom of the ocean rate structure that the rates to South American ports should be the same from New York, Hamburg and Liverpool, so that the manufacturers of all three countries would be upon a parity. This parity of ocean rates was repeatedly insisted upon by the American managers of British steamship lines during a House committee's investigation of the Shipping Trust in 1913.

For example, Mr. Daniels, the New York manager of Lamport & Holt, speaking of the rates to Brazil, said:

There are similar tariffs to that published from England, published from Germany, and our tariff is made up on the same cost equivalent, whether it is in pounds and shillings or whether it is in marks and pfennigs, brought to dollars and cents, so that a man shipping any manufactured goods *where an English or a German merchant is shipping the same class of goods, the American merchant has the same rate as the English merchant, has the same rate as the German merchant, for the transportation, and it is up to them to see who can produce it the cheapest.* As far as transportation goes, we give them the same rates for the same service.

Nay, the New York manager of this British steamship line waxed indignant when one of the congressmen again questioned him on the subject:

Yes, sir; and I do not want you—I tell you right now, the American rates are on the same parity with the English rates.

Methinks the lady doth protest too much.

When Mr. Daniels gave that testimony his line had a competitor operating to Brazil from New York—the joint service of the Hamburg-American line and the Hamburg-South American line. After the war broke out this competitive German

service was removed and English ship owners were alone in the field. They then proceeded to jack up the rates from New York to Brazil to a point far above the corresponding rate from Liverpool, with the purpose of preventing the United States from taking advantage of the war conditions and getting a firm foothold in the South American field. As the British government has direct charge of the rates and services of British ships in war time its hand can be clearly seen in the proceeding.

This whole process is very clearly described in a report of the American members of the high commission that recently visited South America to study financial and commercial conditions. The members were Mr. McAdoo, Senator Fletcher, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury A. J. Peters, Archibald Kains, Paul Warburg, of the Federal Reserve Board, Samuel Untermyer and John H. Fahey, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce. They say:

We are advised that bottoms are available in very much larger proportions from Great Britain than from other countries, and *British merchants are enjoying rates 50 to 75 per cent. less than American manufacturers.* A number of notable cases were brought to the attention of the members of the commission where important contracts have recently gone to Europe which would have been given to the United States except for the wide difference in freight rates which made it impossible for our manufacturers to compete.

It was also pointed out by the representatives of American shippers in these countries that very much higher rates to the United States, as against Europe, seriously militate against our manufacturers in the purchase of raw materials, which become available to European manufacturers at lower cost because of the cheaper transportation.

We shall now be interested to hear again that ancient fable that the British control of the seas has been used to protect America. It would be nearer the truth to say that America in this case was protected only so long as Germany shared with England that control. But the whole truth is that America will never know real and reliable protection for its oversea interests until it obtains a share in the control of the seas and a share in the carrying trade of the world proportional to its vast interest in the world's trade.—*May 15, 1916.*

BOSTON RUM

Last night a dispatch from Boston told of the chartering of a schooner to carry a cargo of rum to the west coast of Africa, the charter rate for the voyage being \$80,000, somewhat more than the vessel cost to build. The incident recalls the good old days when Boston made its first big money trading in rum and "niggers."

The hardy Boston traders brought sugar from Jamaica to Boston. They made this sugar into rum, and carried the rum to the west coast of Africa. They exchanged the rum for droves of slaves, brought to the coast from the interior. They put the slaves below and carried them to Jamaica, to be traded for more sugar, to be made into more rum, to be exchanged for more slaves. Many an early Boston fortune was made out of the profits of this triangular trade, money which, when the slave trade was no more, went into the New Bedford whaling industry, and, when petroleum replaced whale oil, found its way into

the copper mines and railroads of the West.

The slave trade is long since dead, but the West African taste for Boston rum remains. It is perhaps the only reminder that Boston retains of the vanished glories of the days of her maritime supremacy.—*May 16, 1916.*

EXTENDING THE RAILROAD

In the last issue of the *Outlook*, P. H. W. Ross, president of the National Marine League, asks:

Is there any reason why part of the capital for our merchant marine should not be supplied by the railways that would feed that merchant marine with freight?

No, there is no reason in the world. Our railroads in earlier days played a large part in building over-sea lines for this country. The Pennsylvania participated in establishing the American Line to Liverpool. The present Johnston Line from Baltimore to Liverpool was originally owned by the Baltimore and Ohio. The Southern Pacific's Pacific Mail Steamship Company, along with the steamers *Dakota* and *Minnesota* of the Great Northern Railway, built up our trade with the Far East. The Canadian Pacific now maintains fleets on both Atlantic and Pacific oceans, as well as a complete line of hotels and pleasure resorts across the continent. An Englishman books from Liverpool to Hong Kong and every cent of his money goes to the Canadian Pacific.

Of recent years this government has done little to encourage railroads to extend their transportation services on the water. The Pacific Mail asked for permission

to build four 37,000-ton American liners to run from New York to the orient through the Panama Canal, calling at San Francisco. These boats, in addition to the large steamers which the Pacific Mail already had, would have given us an unexampled fortnightly service to the Far East. Congress refused to let the boats carry freight from New York to San Francisco, which alone would have made the service profitable. This permission was refused because the Pacific Mail was owned by the Southern Pacific Railroad. Some of the old salts who represented middle western states in Congress said that the whole scheme was a Southern Pacific plot to stifle competition through the Panama Canal.

Not content with this, Congress passed a seamen's act whose effect was to prescribe for the Pacific Mail American crews, forbidding them to further employ Chinese crews, which alone made it possible to compete with the subsidized Japanese lines. But Congress provided no subsidy to make it financially possible to employ the higher-paid American labor. So the Pacific Mail ships were taken off the trans-Pacific trade.

Nor has the end come. Following an act of Congress, the Interstate Commerce Commission is now deciding whether the Central Vermont Railroad shall be allowed to retain its boat line from New London to New York, and whether the Southern Pacific may still own the boats which it has run from New York to Galveston and New Orleans, though these services are purely extensions of the railroads owning them.

Mr. Ross is perfectly right. Railroad and steamship services are

naturally complementary. Other countries realize this. Canada encourages and subsidizes the water lines of the Canadian Pacific on both oceans. The United States legislates to discourage and penalize the same development here.—May 24, 1916.

THE INTERNATIONAL MERCANTILE MARINE COMPANY

A game is being played whose stakes are possession of the great fleet of the International Mercantile Marine Company, J. P. Morgan's steamship merger. One of the players is represented by the American interests who control the common stock of the company, now undergoing reorganization. The other party to the game is the British government, which had with Mr. Morgan a secret agreement assuring the admiralty absolute control of the vessels which Morgan seemed to own. The present question is whether the admiralty will be able to retain that control in the reorganized company or whether it shall become really an American concern.

In 1901 shipping over the entire world was in financial straits. During the Boer war the British admiralty had withdrawn a great tonnage of merchant ships from commercial work for admiralty service, to aid in carrying on the South African operations. So during that war there were high freight rates, which induced an abnormal amount of shipbuilding. These new ships, in addition to the admiralty tonnage released at the end of the war, created such a plethora of shipping in 1901 that rates reached very low levels.

So in 1901 Mr. Morgan, who had been prime mover in this country in the consolidations and agreements that had eliminated rate cutting among railroads and price cutting among producers—Mr. Morgan decided to form a similar consolidation among North Atlantic steamship lines and attain a similar elimination of ruinous competition. He bought up the leading lines from here to England, except the Cunard, and formed of them the International Mercantile Marine Company, with over 1,000,000 tons of ships. He owned the Red Star line to Antwerp. He made a rate agreement and a division of territory with the German lines, and jointly with them acquired 51 per cent. of the stock of the Holland-American line. The circle of common ownership or interest included the North Atlantic lines of 1901, with the exception of the French line, which was unimportant, and the Cunard line, which turned out to be a very important omission.

Mr. Morgan had hopes to get the Cunard line into his combination. Shipping men all know why the Cunard stayed out. It was because the British government gave to the Cunard the *Mauretania* and the *Lusitania* as a reward for remaining independent of the American combine. The British government loaned the Cunard the money for these boats at 2½ per cent. interest and a small amortization quota. It then turned about and gave the Cunard a subvention which was exactly equal to the annual interest and amortization. The independence of the Cunard has been a thorn in the side of the I. M. M. C. in its attempt to maintain rates, especially passenger rates.

But the British government did

more than this to thwart Mr. Morgan's plans. As a condition to permission for British lines to enter the combine, the admiralty made Mr. Morgan agree not to Americanize those lines. No existing British vessel could be transferred to the American flag and half of all vessels to be built must fly the British flag. Above all else, the admiralty retained power to terminate the agreement and break the combine, if it pursued a policy hostile to the British merchant marine; for example, if it made any attempt at Americanization.

The I. M. M. C. failed and is being reorganized. After acquiring large interests in the fleets of the United Fruit and Pacific Mail companies, the American International Corporation, the foreign arm of the National City Bank and its associates, set out to pick up the common stock of the I. M. M. C. They have a good percentage of it. And now appears Mr. Harold Sanderson from London bearing with him the British government's demand that the ships of this company shall remain British and that it shall not be used with an eye single to develop the foreign trade of the United States.

We shall see an interesting conflict. The American International Corporation is for America first, last and all the time. At present it is the hope of the American merchant marine. Has this corporation bought a control merely in the name and not in the substance of the International Mercantile Marine? Will it be satisfied with the name and not the substance? On the other hand, we may be sure that Great Britain will fight hard to retain her

absolute hold on the ships of the I. M. M. C.

Our first coup in the struggle for an American merchant marine was thwarted when the State department refused to back up Breitung's purchase of the Hamburg-American liner *Dacia*. If we had supported that purchase, probably 200,000 tons of German deep-sea ships would have followed the *Dacia* to our flag.

The second coup is this of the American International Corporation, and the decision is still pending.—May 25, 1916.

THE AMERICAN LINE'S RUIN

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*:

Sir—Your editorial, "The International Mercantile Marine Company," showing the British attitude when this company was formed, brings to mind a phase of the situation with which the writer is familiar. In this phase we see that no one was much concerned with the safeguarding of our future on the Atlantic, Mr. Morgan apparently least of all.

In 1898 the writer returned from a deep water sailing ship voyage and was appointed cadet, and shortly advanced to the billet of quartermaster on the U. S. M. S. *St. Louis*, of the American line. This was before the days of wireless and was at the time when the American liners had been returned to the transatlantic service after service as auxiliary cruisers in the navy.

The ships were then first class in every respect. They were among the speediest on the ocean run, and were largely manned by Americans. The officers were all Americans.

My service in the *St. Louis* cov-

ered a period of a year and a half, and during that time I came into contact with the best type of the American merchant marine officer. We had such men as Randall, Jamieson, Mills and Passow in command, and Beckwith, Seagraves, Rogers, Power, Porter, W. A. F. Smith and Talbot Rogers as executives and bridge officers.

Those of the port of New York who know these names and who know our merchant marine will remember the high order of service that then prevailed in the American line. We were proud of the ships and we were proud of the men who manned them, and it seemed that the Stars and Stripes had again come back to the ocean lanes for good. The passenger lists of those days were a record of the best and most discriminating travelers across the western ocean.

In 1901 the inclusion of these fine ships in the great International Mercantile Marine Company was the funeral toll of the Stars and Stripes in the front rank of trans-Atlantic travel.

The ships were systematically neglected. With the death of Captain Shackford, the marine superintendent, the backbone of the high-class personnel was gone, and one by one the officers of that day left the American line to seek service in more promising fields. The ships were allowed to run down, while the British ships of the great combination were kept up.

New ships were constantly being put down and added to the foreign part of the great steamship combination, but no new American ships were built. Finally the American Line dropped into the third class and no first cabin passengers were

carried. It was then—before the great war—a dilapidated, worn-out example of steamship mismanagement.

Those of us who knew the line in its prime cannot help but feel that the condition of the American Line is due entirely to foreign influences detrimental to the best interests of our flag upon the seas.

FELIX RIESENBERG.

New York, May 25.

THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE

The *Korea* and the *Siberia*, two large American ships of 18,000 tons each, have been sold to the Japanese. These two great passenger ships were the pride of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, the pioneer of our trade in the Far East. When the Pacific Mail was driven off the ocean, partly by the operation of the Panama Canal act and partly by other conditions, these boats were sold to one of the subsidiaries of the International Mercantile Marine Company, an American corporation owning, under the British register, the bulk of high-class shipping plying between here and England. The *Korea* and *Siberia*, however, remained under the American flag. Now the president of the International Mercantile Marine announces that the *Korea* and the *Siberia* have gone to Japan.

Something is wrong with this country. At the very time that commerce and navy are crying for ships as merchant carriers and as naval auxiliaries, at the moment when ships are scarce and cannot be duplicated, at this moment the largest American shipping concern sells two

great steamships away from our register to the flag of Nippon.

It is vain to say that the seaman's law, designed to force the use of Americans in the crew, is responsible for this sale. When the war is over and freight rates sink it may become unprofitable to operate American ships under that law, and it may have to be modified. But with the rates of to-day you could operate profitably and pay a crew of bank presidents.

If a war comes upon us we shall find ourselves hereby deprived of the means of transporting 5,000 men. As the number of men that can be used away from our own shores is limited by the transport facilities, that sale means that our effective force is permanently diminished by 5,000 men. Should we ever have to meet Japan in the Philippines or Hawaii that sale would mean the loss to us of 10,000 men, 5,000 taken from us and 5,000 added to them. Two large steamers can no longer be counted on to carry freight for us in these days when our merchants are refusing orders because there are no bottoms to carry their goods.

These are the days when a merchant marine is so priceless that all European nations have forbidden the transferring of ships away from the home flag. If the *Siberia* and *Korea* were sold out of America without the knowledge of our government it indicates a terrible lack of co-ordination between government and shipping interests. If the government knew of this transfer and approved of it, it would be nothing less than a betrayal of the nation.

What is San Francisco, what is the Pacific coast, saying? The *Ko-*

rea and the *Siberia* go to Japan.—
June 1, 1916.

WHAT ARE OUR SHIPYARDS BUILDING?

We are hearing a great deal about the marvelous activity of our shipyards. Enthusiasts tell us that there is no need of government aid for a merchant marine because we are already building so many ships that we are on the point of becoming perhaps the dominant factor in the world's carrying trade. The facts and figures are now before us. Examined, not from the viewpoint of Fourth of July orations but from the viewpoint of cold truth, they show that we are not building up a merchant marine at all. Our shipyards are full of oil tankers, coast-wise steamers, car floats and ferry vessels.

What is a merchant marine? It is a large tonnage of long-distance ocean carriers which, in time of peace, will assure our merchants rates and services to oversea markets equal to what our competitors enjoy. In time of war such a merchant marine assures the navy transport service for coal, provisions, munitions troops. No cargo or passenger vessel of less than 5,000 gross tons is suitable for oversea commercial or naval use. A smaller vessel has not the steaming radius for long voyages and, if it had, it could not compete against the larger, more economical carriers. Now let us see how many cargo or passenger vessels of over 5,000 gross tons are building in our shipyards.

The commissioner of navigation has just published the figures. On May 1 there were 1,129,014 gross

tons of ships building in the country. It is an unprecedented situation. Yards are booked full until the end of 1917. The class of tonnage now building is indicative of what will be laid down in the coming months.

Of these 1,129,014 tons, 174,000 are building for the great lakes or other inland waters and are not available for foreign trade. Four hundred and fifty-nine thousand tons are oil tankers, mostly Standard Oil boats, and are not common carriers at all. There are 510,000 tons of cargo vessels or cargo-and-passenger vessels, but most of these are smaller craft for the coastwise or West Indies trade. There are only twenty-five ships, with a total gross tonnage of 162,000, which are over 5,000 tons each and so capable of overseas use. Of this total, 94,000 tons are building on the Pacific coast, only 68,000 tons on the Atlantic. Of this small tonnage there is only one single ship with a speed of over 12 knots, which is the speed of a tramp steamer. That single exception is a steamer building at the Union Iron Works in San Francisco for the Matson Navigation Company. It has 16 knots speed and a tonnage of 9,728, being the largest vessel in the total of 162,000 tons. We are building twelve steamers of 10,000 tons or over, but every one is on oil tanker. The largest owners of the new ships are Luckenbach, building 32,000 tons, and W. R. Grace & Co., building 24,200 tons. Last week we sold away from our flag to Japan the *Korea* and *Siberia*, together 36,000 tons, more than the tonnage building for either of these firms.

It is very well to be proud of our shipyards' activity and profits, of the

labor they employ, the materials they use, their potential capacity to serve us. But it is false to say that they are building a merchant marine. They are doing nothing of the sort.—*June 3, 1916.*

BRITAIN OUR BEST CARRIER, SAYS THEODORE H. PRICE

In discussing the business to be derived from the war, Theodore H. Price said that the expediency of developing a large merchant fleet under the American flag depends entirely upon our naval policy. In his opinion the war has proved conclusively that a merchant marine without a navy to protect it is utterly useless. The survival of England's merchant fleet, he pointed out, is entirely dependent upon the ability of her navy to protect it. Germany has one of the finest deep-sea merchant fleets in the world, but it is utterly useless to-day because of England's superior sea power.

"The United States," Mr. Price went on, "has a coast line of about 10,000 miles to protect, to say nothing of our oversea possessions. In time of war this would occupy the energies of a very much larger navy than we now possess; but unless we could patrol the foreign seas as well, the commerce under our flag would be subject to attack by any nation with whom we happened to be at war.

"To create a navy sufficiently large to protect an American mercantile marine against sea raiders throughout the world would involve an expenditure that would probably be largely in excess of any profit that

we might derive from the possession of such a merchant fleet."

Mr. Price said that it seemed to him largely a question of dollars and cents as to whether it was desirable for us to undertake the creation of a great merchant marine. A huge navy would be an inevitable corollary, and our past experience indicates that the cost of such a navy would be enormous.

He admitted that it would gratify American pride to see our flag upon the seven seas, but he doubted whether it would be of real advantage to us from either an economic or a patriotic standpoint.

"I believe," he added, "in an America for the Americans, but our prosperity and development would be best subserved by getting our freight carried as cheaply as possible. The English have shown themselves specialists in marine transportation. They are already provided with the fleet that is necessary for the protection of their vessels. I am rather inclined to believe that it would be wisest to let them carry our freight as long as they could do it more cheaply than any one else."—*June 21, 1916.*

FOREIGN CARRIERS

Most Americans will not agree with Mr. Theodore Price in his statement that we can rely upon other nations to do our overseas carrying for us because, under normal conditions, they can do it cheaper. A power plant is built to carry the "peak load." A sound national policy provides national equipment not only for every-day life but for emergencies.

War is an emergency that has not

grown less frequent in the last twenty years. If we have our ocean transportation done by others, war dislocates our ocean transportation—not war in which we are involved, but war in which our carrying friends are involved, war which we by the most exemplary behavior cannot prevent.

When this conflict broke out 90 per cent. of our foreign trade was moved in foreign ships, mostly British and German. The German ships were chased off the sea. Half the British merchant marine was chartered by the admiralty. Such ships as serve us in any trade but that between here and England do so only under special license from the admiralty, daily revocable. Cancellation of these licenses would kill our foreign trade at a blow. We have our commercial head in the British lion's mouth and have little enthusiasm about pulling his tail.

The assistant secretary of commerce tells us that the British, having eliminated German ships from participating in the New York-South American trade, now charge our merchants 100 per cent. higher freight rates than their own merchants. No use blaming the British. They want to keep hold of that South American trade and they add freight rates to handicap the American competitor. It is a logical thing to do.

To-day the limits of our export trade are set by lack of tonnage. The limits on the profits we make on what can be carried are set by the enormous freight rates charged by the reduced ship tonnage available for mercantile use.

The point of the whole matter is that we want our fate in our own hands. A national transportation

system for our producers is one that runs to their overseas markets, not merely to the seaboard.—*June 21, 1916.*

AMERICAN SHIPOWNER CALLS BRITISH POL- ICY "PIRACY"

Transatlantic Company's Presi- dent Tells Story of Seizures and Failure of U. S. to Act

To the Editor of *The Evening Mail*:

Sir.—Apropos of your article in the *Evening Mail* of July 11 headed "The Collapse of Sea Law and the End of the Declaration of London," it may be interesting for the American people to know of a specific case in relation to which the British government ignored the Declaration of London by seizing steamships owned by American citizens and flying the American flag and also the attitude of the administration in Washington relative thereto.

This case relates to the steamships owned by the American Transatlantic Company, an American corporation, the capital stock of which is now and always was owned by American citizens. This company purchased eleven ocean-going steamers all from neutral countries, neutral flags and neutral owners, during April, May and June of 1915, and owns the ships free and clear of any encumbrance or any foreign alliance.

The company applied in May, 1915, to the Commissioner of Navigation, Mr. E. T. Chamberlain, at Washington, for American registry under the act of August 18, 1914.

After Mr. Chamberlain had considered the matter for about a month he refused registry and an appeal to Secretary Redfield, his superior, was without avail.

Secretary Redfield's denial of American registry was based on "confidential diplomatic information," which, he stated at the time, could not be disclosed. Finally, on appeal to Secretary Lansing, of the state department, it was held that the ships were entitled to American registry and the commerce department was so informed. American registry was then finally granted about three months after the first application was made.

Loss of \$1,000,000 While Waiting

The withholding of registration for such a long time meant that the ships were idle during this time and suffered the loss of earnings approximating \$1,000,000. No valid reason was ever given by the officials of the commerce department for their action. Copies of the so-called "confidential diplomatic information" were afterwards obtained from the files of the commerce department, and it was found that it consists of letters from the American consuls at London, Copenhagen and Rotterdam, all based only on rumor and newspaper reports that German citizens had an interest in the ownership of the vessels.

The files also contained a letter from a prominent local steamship man, a competitor of this company, misrepresenting the status of our ships and evidently written for the purpose of preventing competition.

Worst of all, after American registry was issued to our ships, we received a letter from the commerce department stating that registry was

only granted under the technicalities of the law, but that our ships were subject to seizure by foreign governments and prize court adjudication, and the officials of the commerce department took special pains to publish this gratuitous opinion to the public press, so that it was a direct invitation by the officials of the commerce department to foreign governments to seize these ships.

Blacklisted by Britain

Great Britain, in August, 1914, ratified the provision of the Declaration of London, Article 57, which provided that the character of a ship shall be determined by the flag it rightfully flies and not by the nationality of its owners. All of the ships of this company were purchased after this date, and before October 20, 1915, when Great Britain, by another order in council, abrogated this provision of the Declaration of London.

Soon thereafter the eleven ships of this company were placed on the British blacklist and three of the ships seized, the first one, the *Hocking*, on October 28, while going in ballast from New York to Norfolk, Va., under charter to load coal for Buenos Ayres.

The next one, the *Genesee*, while off the coast of Brazil with a cargo of coal under charter to C. G. Blake & Co., of New York, and the third one, the steamship *Kankakee*, off the mouth of the river Plate, while under charter with a cargo of coal to W. R. Grace & Co., of New York.

It should be noted that the only charge Great Britain makes against these ships is a probable German interest in the ownership. As stated above, there is no such interest in these ships, and there never was.

The suspicion of such an interest was aroused by the acts of the officials of the commerce department, and the writer believes that some of these officials, by direct communication with representatives of the British government, invited the seizure of the ships.

It should also be noted that under the Declaration of London, adopted by Great Britain and in force at the time these ships were purchased, ships were not subject to seizure or molestation because citizens of belligerent countries were interested in the ownership.

Called an Act of Piracy

The seizure was therefore nothing more or less than an act of piracy, backed by the might of the British navy. This high-handed procedure of the British government was further emphasized by the fact that immediately after the seizure the ships were confiscated and placed under British government service and have been held there ever since without any compensation to this company.

After many appeals and much delay a protest was finally sent to Great Britain by the state department stating that the seizure of these ships was illegal and that they ought to be set free. The grounds given for this request were that the ships were not of belligerent nationality at the time of their acquisition by the American Transatlantic Company and that the position of the department was corroborated by Article 57 of the Declaration of London, which was then in force as the applicable British law.

The British foreign office replied that the ships were now before the British prize court and therefore the

question of release could not be taken up diplomatically. That is as far as our government interfered in the matter, and no further action has been taken.

In view of the present administration's declared programme for a greater American merchant marine, it is difficult to understand its action in the case of the American Transatlantic Company.

Here 62,000 tons of ocean-going cargo steamers were added in good faith by private capital to the American merchant marine. By direct charges of the high officials of the present administration, which have proved to be unwarranted, the ships were seized by foreign governments and are still held, and because of the indifference of the Washington officials their services are lost to the commerce of the United States.

R. G. WAGNER,
President American Transatlantic
Co., New York, *July 13, 1916.*

WAR RISK INSURANCE

In the days when Dr. Norvin Green bossed the Western Union Telegraph some clever person suggested that the company might evade responsibility for error, delay and any or every other possible act of omission or commission by printing on the back of the sending blank a contract by which the sender of a message became bound merely by paying money to the company and writing on the paper.

That contract was a delight and a joy to the Western Union until some testy individual took the matter into court. Then the jurists declared it a manifest fraud, and not worth the paper it was printed on.

Something of the same finding may be expected if the "war risk insurance" policy which the British marine companies are selling to American shippers is subjected to the scrutiny of the courts. Some artful gentlemen have inserted joker or jokers until the companies are liable for nothing except by vessel striking a mine.

For this perverted policy a rate of from 1 to 5 per cent. of the value of a cargo is charged.

The person who buys war risk insurance does not get it. What he gets is deception, fraud.

This comes, too, in a time of the greatest prosperity the marine insurance companies ever have known.

Such of this insurance as is written in New York comes under the laws of the state of New York, being a contract entered into and on which the premium is paid in New York. It is therefore possible for the legislature of New York to compel these companies to issue jokerless policies so far as New Yorkers are concerned.

And if, as is reported, the United States government, in its ignorance, has followed the British companies in this "war risk" swindle in the policies it issues, it should take steps at once to return to the old and honest form.—*July 27, 1916.*

COMMON CARRIERS BY WATER

The central concept of the common carrier concerns its obligation to carry for all alike without discrimination in rates or service. Indeed within this country we have our Interstate Commerce act which prescribes upon railroads such non-

discriminatory treatment of ship-
pers.

The extension of this principle to ocean transportation will help solve our difficulty in regard to trading with neutral countries of Europe. The main hindrance to such trading is the refusal of Dutch or Scandinavian steamship lines to accept any shipment not vised by British authorities in this country. Experience has shown the steamship lines that to accept at American ports shipments not passed by the British consul means long detention in an English port, with consequent loss of steamship earnings.

By three measures this system can be abolished. First, we can close our ports to any ocean carrier discriminating against any American shipper, unless he offers contraband destined to Germany.

Second, we can enforce upon England the canon of international law which Secretary Lansing recalled to her in his note of Oct. 21, 1915; the principle that British cruisers have no right to drag into a British port any ship plying between here and neutral countries, unless on board the ship are found evidences that it carries contraband for Germany.

Third, we can scale down the British contraband list, now including all the main articles of export, and restrict the list to those articles previously recognized as contraband in warfare. A list internationally framed is contained in the Declaration of London.

Of course this means action on our part; no longer mere words. It means actually asserting the rights which diplomatically we insist that we have. It means asserting these rights as we asserted our rights

against German aggression.—*July 29, 1916.*

GOVERNMENT SHIPS; TOO LATE

The reports now are that the government's shipping bill will be brought up in Congress and promptly passed. The proposal is for the government to build or buy ships and operate them itself unless suitable parties will charter them and run them on the routes desired. There was a time for such a bill—in the fall of 1914. The time was missed, the opportunity lost. It is no time for such a bill now.

In September, 1914, the southern states were prostrate. They had harvested a large cotton crop and it lay on their hands until the producer was selling for 6c. or 6½c. per pound on the farm. The cause for the depression was that the quota which usually moves to the central powers—over 3,000,000 bales—was not moving. German ships were off the seas. England, of course, would not carry for the central powers, and England frightened neutral ships from carrying by threats that cotton might be declared contraband, which would make cargo and ship seizable. We had no ocean carriers of our own. It was a time for action.

The government proposed action. The ship purchase bill of 1914 was really framed to meet this condition: to buy German ships interned in our ports, put cotton in them and ship it to the central powers. The bill, if promptly passed, would have relieved the cotton situation and would have meant millions of dollars to the American producer.

But the government did not tell the truth. It spoke of buying ships from every one but the Germans, or even of building them. Every one knew that only the German ships were available, and that to build ships would throw the relief so far into the future as to be no relief at all. The government talked of running ships everywhere but to Germany—it talked preferably of South America. At that time we all knew that there was a surfeit of empty tonnage running from here to South America. The Democrats had a good case. They did not dare to state it, and the bill was filibustered to death in Congress.

If those government ships had been put into the service from here to Germany they would still be carrying our cotton and foodstuffs and bringing back dyes and potash. Against these ships the mock "blockade" would never have been declared.

To-day the German ships are no longer for sale. Nor are the ships of any neutral nation. All have passed laws forbidding the sale of ships away from the home flag. All we can do with government money is to build ships. We need them; we need an American merchant marine, and it is perfectly true that the vast tonnage of oil tankers, colliers, coastwise traders and ferryboats now building in our shipyards do not promise us an oversea merchant marine of common carriers. But there is now no especial emergency to be met. Cotton is now prosperous; the administration has abandoned our right to trade with the central powers. The need is the perennial need of a merchant marine, a need demonstrated by this war as never before. And for the

long future we want private-owned, not state-owned, ships.—*Aug. 10, 1916.*

"FOSTERING" THE MERCHANT MARINE

The Democratic administration is about to pass a bill providing \$50,000,000 of the nation's money to buy or build ships. Nobody knows where the ships are to be got, but the crying need for a merchant marine these last two years demands some sort of political action with which to go before the voters in November. The Democratic party, being in its platform a confirmed opponent of direct subsidy to private ship lines, will now subsidize them indirectly in the form of low leases on government ships.

This administration has a record in the matter of "fostering" our merchant marine which the voters will bear in mind. We have had during this war such an opportunity as will never again exist to revive our ancient shipping prestige. On three separate occasions the administration allowed itself to be frightened by England away from seizing the opportunity.

First—When the war broke out a whole fleet of German freighters were interned, useless, in our ports. They were for sale. A government ship purchase bill was framed to buy them. The bill did not state, nor would the administration officials openly admit, that they proposed to buy the German steamers. They were all that there were for sale. When Great Britain saw what the Democrats' purpose was, and that they were afraid to admit it, vague threats of terrible conse-

quences came from London if we should buy the German steamers. The threats frightened the administration leaders. They had not told the country the truth about the bill. They did not now tell the country the truth that the sea law under which the allies were operating—the “modified” Declaration of London—specifically permitted the bona-fide purchase by a neutral of the merchant vessels of a belligerent.

England had got her maritime supremacy by purchasing our vessels when British-built Confederate privateers in 1861-2 chased them off the seas. England did not propose that we should recover in 1914-15. The British clamor, unopposed, frightened enough senators to defeat the bill in February, 1915.

Second—A private American tried to buy one of those interned German liners, *E. N. Breitung*. He bought the *Dacia*, a Hamburg-American liner, put an American crew aboard, loaded her with cotton at Galveston and sailed for Rotterdam. The State department declared itself satisfied with his proof of the validity of the transfer of ownership. Yet the State department gave him no real support. A French cruiser seized the *Dacia*, towed her into Brest and handed her over to a prize court. That was the end of the attempt to buy German ships.

Third—The administration then demonstrated that it would not support an American who bought even neutral ships. R. C. Wagner put his own and other American capital into 62,000 tons of neutral steamers (mostly Danish) form neutral owners, and transferred them to the American flag. There

were eleven steamers in all. They were placed on a British blacklist, Great Britain choosing to assume that there was German capital in the American company. Three of these steamers were seized by British cruisers; the others deterred from again sailing except under restrictions to South America that made profit impossible. The three seized steamers, while not good enough to serve America, have been since carrying freight for the British admiralty. No finger has been raised by the State department on behalf of this 62,000 tons of shipping wiped off the ocean.

The administration's Americanism in the matter of shipping is a negligible quantity.

When the Democrats recount their achievements, let them tell of their failure to tell the truth and to stand up square and pass the ship purchase bill at the time when it would have done some good. Let them explain why they made no faint effort to aid American citizens to purchase either German or neutral steamers. Let them explain this and then descant on the glories of the present bill, which promises government competition to what remains of a privately owned merchant marine to which this administration refuses the slightest support.

The American people do not want four more years of this “fostering” of their interests.—*Aug. 18, 1916.*

THE SHIPPING BILL

The Senate has passed the ship purchase bill, already passed by the House. The government is

to contribute \$50,000,000 to a corporation which will purchase or lease ships, built in America or abroad, to be run under the American flag and relieve the present lack of tonnage. The ships are not to be operated by the government if private lessees can be found.

It is necessary to keep in mind the situation which this Democratic measure is designed to meet. We have had few ships under the American flag engaged in the foreign trade, except in the short trade to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. The reason is that it has cost more to build ships in America than abroad, and it has cost more to operate them, because of the high wages of American officers. We required ships flying our flag to be American built and American officered.

Yet we needed ocean-going merchant ships to explore and develop new markets for us, to train men fit for the naval service and to act as naval auxiliaries in war time. The Republicans in the last fifteen years have repeatedly brought in subsidy bills, providing that the government recompense American ship owners for the higher costs of operating American ships. It was the protection policy applied to shipping, an industry necessary for the life of all other industries as our foreign trade developed. The Democrats, aided by some western Republicans, defeated every subsidy bill. In the meantime "pork barrel" appropriations for buildings in unheard-of western burghs and for "improving" unnavigable rivers where no traffic existed went merrily on.

The Democrats entered. In August, 1914, they passed a bill admitting all foreign-built ships to

American registry and so to the right to fly our flag. That seemed to equalize Americans with foreigners in point of vessel cost. The law of August, 1914, empowered the President to suspend the requirement that American ships carry American officers. Foreign ships brought in were allowed to retain their foreign officers. This was supposed to reduce to the foreign level the cost of operating these American ships. It did not have that result, for the foreign ship officers brought in demanded, and got, American wages.

The Democratic shipping bill will some day provide 300,000 to 500,000 tons of shipping, one-tenth of our needs. Favorite persons will lease these ships on low terms and put them into competition with the now American lines which, since the war, are operating to all continents.

It is a scheme to discourage private enterprise. It was ably characterized by the London *Spectator* last February, when it was framed:

From the point of view of the British shipping industry, we certainly hope that President Wilson will persist in this bill, which may be briefly described as a scheme for handicapping American commercial enterprise by state competition.

We want our merchant marine a national industry. The ships should be built here, to develop our shipyards. The ships should be officered and at least partly manned by Americans. No other sort of merchant marine is of any use to the navy. The country is willing to make the sacrifice necessary to have a merchant marine of this sort. The government's \$50,000,000 spent in judicious ship subsidies would give us not 500,000 but 5,000,000 tons of shipping.—*Aug. 22, 1916.*

AMERICAN SHIPBUILDING

American shipbuilders say it either is a feast or a famine with them. That is what Carnegie said years ago about the steel industry. That is what is likely to be said about any industry that is managed loosely, inefficiently and in defiance of sound economic principles. They do not talk that way now about the steel industry because that business, thanks to the wisdom of Gary, Schwab, Topping and others, is becoming stabilized.

American shipbuilders are feasting now, gorging themselves, in anticipation of lean days and hard times that are to come they know not how soon. Meanwhile they are getting "all the traffic will bear" out of such craft as they construct. The prices they charge are not based on a fair measure of profit, but on the needs or the frenzied desire of the purchaser. For example, a shipowner who required vessels had plans drawn late in 1914 for more boats. One of the largest shipbuilding concerns quoted \$1,600,000 for the craft and agreed to take part payment in bonds. The shipowner needed some financial assistance. By the time he arranged for it the shipbuilding concern jumped the price to \$3,000,000 and withdrew the bond agreement. To-day the price would be nearly \$4,000,000.

The ships were not built. The shipyard is crowded with work at high rates. The shipbuilders consider it was good business on their part to escape that contract. Most business men may agree with them in such a view. Therein is the essence of American business instability. That is the sort of thing

that causes wild, unreasonable advances in prices and correspondingly unwarranted declines.

It is axiomatic that no trade is a good trade that is not of benefit to both parties. Shipbuilders, however, are garnering immense profit, charging prices never charged before and never likely to be paid again, and are doing this with the expectation that, with the end of the war, the men who pay such extravagant prices will "be stuck." Any one who questions the wisdom of their course is considered a fool.

Yet the truth is that the American shipbuilders are the fools. They are fatuously proceeding on lines certain to result disastrously to them.

A railroad that is overcapitalized is unable to do justice to its owners or the public. A house on the construction of which the owner spends \$100,000 will be profitable to its proprietor, while a similar house on which in a period of business madness a builder spends \$200,000 or \$300,000 probably will bankrupt its owner, be permitted to run down and become a real estate Jonah. A ship that costs far beyond its value cannot earn its keep when freights become normal.

It is a feast or a famine in American shipbuilding because the shipbuilders make it so. They need nothing so much as common sense. They need a Henry Ford to teach them there is more of gain and more of safety in volume of business at modest profit than in excessive profit out of a spasmodic business. There was a time when the American shipbuilder possessed common sense. That was in the day of the square rigger. The men of Maine, by study and experience,

evolved a ship of great speed and high ability. It was the clipper. They clung to that style and carried the trade of America to every port of the seven seas. It was the best built, fastest and, all things considered, the cheapest vessel of its class in any merchant marine. It was a standardized product.

The cargo boat of to-day is a plain ordinary box compared with the gracefully patterned clipper, yet the American shipbuilder is as far from standardization as Mars is from the moon, and he scoffs at it as something ridiculous in connection with shipping. Every branch of American shipbuilding is on a false basis. The industry cannot be sound until this is recognized and rectified. It is wrong in its finance, in its construction costs and in its administration. It is hopeless to expect stabilization or standardization from the heads of the shipbuilding companies of their own initiative. They are wedded to the idea that what the industry needs is protection; that the government by subsidies or tariff restrictions or some other method should aid them. No merchant marine of the world over was developed on such lines. The principle is wrong. It is destructive of enterprise, initiative, ambition. A pampered industry is not an aggressive, vigorous one. What is given first as a favor comes to be considered by the recipient as a right. A pampered business is like a pampered son. "From shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in three generations" is the inexorable result of pampering.

Ships should be built in America as cheaply, or nearly so, as anywhere in the world. No country is more favored in the way of mate-

rial. The cost of labor may be somewhat higher, but this has been over-emphasized. The heavier costs against us have been because we have not a reasonable system of financing shipbuilding and because we have ignored basic economies.

In England the financing of shipbuilding is a business in itself as it should be. There are various companies and various firms that specialize in it. There is one great concern, the British Investment Trust, that stands to shipbuilders as our title guarantee companies do to real estate builders. The men or company desirous of building ships borrow from the trust company after the plans for the vessel or vessels have been examined or approved. Against the mortgage bonds are issued.

Why not have such financing here? Surely American housebuilders would not be able to keep up with the demands for new structures if they had no easy method of financing. The establishment of real estate banks has systematized and stabilized real estate finance. The establishment of shipbuilding banks would systematize and stabilize American ship finance.

In England it is possible not only to insure ships but to insure profits on ships. An American merchant marine would require an American marine insurance somewhat after this fashion.

Europe is far ahead of America in shipbuilding because Europe has recognized the virtues of stabilization and standardization.

America is far ahead of Europe in automobile making because America in this industry has recognized the worth of stabilization and standardization.

We have 3,000,000 automobiles in America to-day. We would not have 500,000 if it were not for standardization. The automobile is a vehicle of fine construction, some of its parts being brought down to the one-thousandth of an inch. The cargo vessel is little more than a floating warehouse.

In time of rising costs of labor and material we have the spectacle of the largest manufacturer of automobiles cutting the price of his product nearly 20 per cent., while shipbuilders increase the price of their goods 100 or 200 per cent.

To standardize American shipbuilding it is necessary first to ascertain the size and type of the vessel suitable for the broadest possible use—a vessel that can reach the ports of South America and the Orient, that is economical in service, not too expensive to manufacture and which at the same time will meet the highest insurance standards.

Having established such a standard vessel, it must be developed over and over again. Any plant in which the same part is made in large quantities can introduce machinery and eliminate hand labor. Regularity in shapes will bring lower cost of material and cheaper storage. Sales effort will be simplified and repairs for the ships greatly cheapened.

Henry Ford has carried this principle so far that the labor time in a Ford car is insignificant. To Ford, a wage scale averaging between five and six dollars per day is of little concern, because standardization has reduced the total labor cost at that rate to less than thirty-five dollars. The same principle of one model will eliminate

the one handicap to American shipbuilding—high labor costs.

No industry is more stabilized and standardized than that of the motor.

No industry is less stabilized and standardized than that of shipbuilding.

Because the welfare of America depends so much on the development of an American merchant marine; because without American ships there will be no broadening of America's foreign trade; because without a larger foreign trade every American industry, from that of the humblest farm to that of the greatest manufactory, will be affected, it is necessary that the shipbuilding business be made sound.

We must have a bank to finance ships.

J. P. Morgan, Frank A. Vanderlip, Jacob H. Schiff, Edward T. Stotesbury, George M. Reynolds and William H. Crocker could establish one on the British model within a month if they so desired. It should serve a great and patriotic purpose and would pay.

Will they do it?

We must have marine insurance companies of our own if we are to have a merchant marine. They should be operated honestly, not with the chicanery which the British companies have practiced since the war began.

The same gentlemen could create such companies and profit through them.

Will they do it?

We must have standardization. No one is better qualified to introduce this than Charles M. Schwab, who owns more shipyards than any other American. If he needs in-

struction, which is not likely, an appeal will be made to Henry Ford, Howard E. Coffin, William S. Durant and others to give to him the benefit of their vast experience.

Will Mr. Schwab give an example to his fellow shipbuilders? It will pay more to the Bethlehem company in the long run than he appreciates.

This matter of American ships is of immense importance. It concerns every man, woman and child in the republic. It warrants the best thought and the best effort of which we are capable.

Morgan, Vanderlip, Schiff and men of that character can do no better service for the country than in this field to-day.—*Aug. 28, 1916.*

MANY SHIPS, LITTLE CARGO

New York harbor has seventeen ships open for charter at rates which a month ago would not have been considered. The cargo is slow to arrive, and marine men are beginning to wonder whether the blush is off the rose of sea traffic.

The threat of a railroad strike and the partial embargo ordered by some of the great land lines may have halted freight somewhat, but not to the degree shown by the congregation of empty ships.

The fact is that Great Britain has caught up with her needs in many lines of production, and is making smaller and smaller drafts on this country for goods.

Crop movements, particularly the exports of cotton, wheat and perhaps a little corn, may keep ocean freights up for a few months, but we have seen the best of the war boom, and we had better accept this fact and fit ourselves to meet that condition.—*Sept. 16, 1916.*

OUR SHIPPING ON THE PACIFIC

The eastern part of the United States does not realize in what desperate plight our trans-Pacific trade has been the last nine months for lack of American ships to carry it. A partial remedy is just being found.

The seamen's act, put upon the country at the joint instigation of a Democratic Congress and Senator La Follette, of that great salt water state Wisconsin—the seamen's act forced our Pacific Mail Steamship Company to go out of business at the beginning of this year. The Pacific Mail had built up our Far Eastern trade. Through forty years it had kept the American flag flying on the Pacific. The seamen's act forced this company to employ white labor on their ships, while the competing Japanese could employ yellow. The result was not to send Californian labor to sea—it does not want to go to sea, even if the Pacific Mail could afford to pay the shore wages of such labor. The result of the seamen's act was to drive the Pacific Mail off the sea. It sold its ships and name.

The largest of the Pacific Mail ships were sold to Japan; others were bought by the Atlantic Transport Company and run from here to Europe. Only one of the smaller ships, the *China*, was operated once in three months across the Pacific by a Chinese-American company. American trade depended for accommodation on Japanese or British boats, and these refused accommodation until their own nationals were cared for. They carried nothing for the large number of Americans on the British blacklist nor

for German firms in China who, cut off from Germany, were eager to become the outposts of American trade.

Warehouses in China and in our Pacific coast cities became stuffed with traffic for or from America, traffic which could get no transportation, either because British and Japanese ships refused to carry it or because they were already full of business of their own. Finally, the desperate merchants prevailed upon the American International Corporation and W. R. Grace & Co., joint owners of the Pacific Mail's trade name, to restore a sort of trans-Pacific service with four purchased Dutch vessels. The first of these boats has now sailed.

It is suicidal to trust to other merchant marines than our own. It is ridiculous to expect other nations to take care of us; they are occupied in pursuing their own interests

and defeating ours when ours come into conflict with them.

Indeed, it is the duty of every nation first to take care of itself; certainly to do that before prating about espousing the cause of humanity, joining leagues to enforce peace and assuming other jobs fit for none but those who are self-sufficient.

This shipping need has stared us in the face since the war broke out. The problem has been acute for two years. They were years of unexampled opportunity. The best the administration has been able to do was to appropriate \$50,000,000 for government merchant ships to provide unfair competition for private enterprise.

We need a new deal, or rather a new man at Washington, to play the magnificent cards we still hold. Too many of them have been thrown away already.—*Sept. 21, 1916.*

A Protective Tariff

THE DYESTUFFS FAMINE

To-day dyeing establishments in this country are running short-handed because we have no dyes from Germany, upon whom we have so long been dependent. In 1913, the last peaceful year, we bought from Germany \$21,617,000 of dyes and chemicals.

The talk of establishing an American dyestuff industry has so far come to nothing. The difficulty seems to be that the Germans, by patents, secret processes and the development of by-products, produce and sell dyes here so cheaply that our own manufacturers do not dare to start a dye industry now, unless the government will promise them a high protective tariff to keep out the Germans after the war. This the Democratic congress seems in no wise inclined to do.

Congress may be right. It may be that Germany's acquired advantages in the matter of producing dyes are such that it pays us to go on buying them from her and paying her with goods in the production of which our climate or our inventive genius give us an advantage, such as cotton and agricultural implements.

But this does not help the present emergency. Dyeing and printing works are shutting down. Paint, wallpaper and ink industries face disaster because of lack of colors. Except for a special dispensation by

the German and British governments allowing a small quantity of German dyes to come through for our federal authorities—except for this the colors of our postage stamps and of the very uniforms of our army and navy might have to be changed.

England is now maintaining against all goods from Germany to the United States what our administration characterizes as an illegal and indefensible blockade. Germany can ship dyes on the high seas to Sweden, for British warships dare not enter the Baltic. Sweden can export her lumber and iron ore to Germany in return.

England is "willing" to give permission for an occasional shipment of dyes to America to come through the blockade, which we have never recognized. The reason is simple. Experience has taught her that she can get for herself, re-exported from America, part of the German dyes she lets come through to us. However, England is not "willing" that we should ship through this same illegal blockade cotton for peaceful German industries or milk for starving German children to pay for the dyes.

Germany maintains an embargo on the export of dyes until we assert our rights to ship to her. She is following a policy of keeping from us what we want until we send her what she wants. She is plainly unwilling to send us dyes "by leave of

England" and will send them only as part of a free interchange of goods now unlawfully obstructed by the abuse of sea power.

The dyestuffs famine will be solved as a part of the larger problem of the rights of neutral trade on the high seas, to which Washington will now turn.—*March 11, 1916.*

DUMPING

Everybody knows what dumping means. It means selling goods in a foreign market cheaper than they are sold in the home market. It means selling abroad at or near the cost of production, while selling for a good profit at home.

Our own corporations have expanded our foreign trade by dumping. Congressmen have returned from abroad to complain of finding that sewing machines, or watches, or steel rails, made in America, were sold cheaper in Europe or South America than at home. They often say that the home consumer should buy American goods as cheaply as the foreign consumer, and that if the sewing machine maker can afford to sell machines cheap in Brazil he can afford to sell them as cheap here.

Not necessarily. A railroad carries much low grade traffic, like brick and lumber, at a ton-mile rate so low that if this rate were applied to all traffic carried, the road would be bankrupt. But the brick could not be had for transportation if a higher rate were charged. If the brick did not move, that would not allow high class goods to be transported any cheaper. The brick rate nets the railroad enough to pay for

the extra cost of moving it and also earns a small amount to apply to payment of fixed charges on the railroad investment, charges which run on no matter how much traffic is carried. By earning a part of the fixed charges, the brick business decreases the amount that must be earned on high class traffic.

The railroads call this "charging what the traffic will bear." When a corporation sells abroad at less than the home price, we call it "dumping." The principle is exactly the same. If an American corporation sells cheaply abroad, it is because that cheap price is all that the foreign traffic "will bear." If the foreign business were refused because the manufacturer could not get the American price for it, the American consumers would not benefit, any more than the shippers of peaches would benefit if the railroads refused to carry brick because they could not charge for carrying it the carload rate on peaches.

In countries with developed export trade, this policy of charging on export goods what the traffic will bear is one of the axioms of business. It gives the export trade an element of flexibility which, especially in periods of slack markets at home or in periods of severe competition abroad, enables the manufacturer to keep his plant in full operation.

Dumping creates no serious problems for the country which does the dumping; the land which need worry is the one that is dumped upon. A tariff, designed to protect home manufacturers against normal prices of foreign producers may wholly fail when these foreign producers dump their goods. Logically, anti-dumping legislation is the cor-

ollary of a protective tariff. Our manufacturers have forced Canada to add to her protective tariff a proviso that whenever an American cuts his home price in his Canadian sales, the Canadian duty is increased by the amount of that cut.

Now it may become necessary to add the anti-dumping feature to our tariff, to protect our markets from being flooded after the war. But let us in any case do this with our eyes open, realizing the large extent to which we ourselves dump and hence the extent to which we lay ourselves open to tariff retaliations. And let us realize that dumping on foreign markets is not a pernicious and wicked activity of our manufacturers, but a legitimate weapon to extend export trade and of advantage rather than harm to our industry.—*July 1, 1916.*

DUMPING OR MONOPOLY PRICE?

Certain circles have been in a state of agitation about the resumption of German dye exports to this country. It was claimed that these German dyes would be thrown upon the American market at a mere fraction of the cost of production, and that the incipient American dye industry would become at one blow a dead industry.

Now see what has happened: The *Deutschland* comes over with 500 tons of dyes bought by the Eastern Forwarding Company. The Eastern Forwarding Company refuses to dump these goods. They are wickedly taking advantage of the high prices which dyes command in America, due to our refusal to enforce our right to trade with Germany through a paper blockade

The Eastern Forwarding Company is temporarily a monopolist, and is doing what any other monopolist will do—charging all that the traffic will bear.

Hereby the Eastern Forwarding Company runs into the accusation of extortion.

How high or how low shall they sell dyes? How can they please? It all depends upon whom you ask. If you ask the American dye manufacturer he will say that those dyes cannot be sold too high to suit him. The dye user will tell you that German dyes cannot be sold here too low to meet his tastes.

At this moment the danger of dumping is not imminent.—*July 19, 1916.*

DEPENDENCE ON GERMAN DYES

Those who clamor for a high protective tariff to create an American dye industry and shield us from the competition of German dyes may be right. But they must not wholly forget that if we are to sell Germany goods we must buy from them in return. Otherwise they cannot pay us.

We export \$16,000,000 of lard to Germany and buy about \$8,000,000 of dyes from them. If we refuse to buy their \$8,000,000 of dyes, we shall have to stop selling \$8,000,000 of goods to them, perhaps lard. Let us assume that it will be lard. Five thousand farmer boys in Iowa who used to produce corn to feed the hogs that supplied this German lard lose their market. But there is employment for them. Five thousand hands are wanted at Bayonne to make dyes which we will no longer import from Germany. In the same way five thousand hands in Germany stop

producing dyes and turn to producing corn. Both countries are losers by the process. American users pay more than they used to pay for dyes whose production at home is forced. German consumers pay more than before for their lard. In neither country are more men employed than before.

This is the sort of thing that could result from the proposed high tariff on dyes. This is the sort of insane result which the entente powers are aiming at in their announced economic war on Germany after the war.

America will develop industrially and will get reasonable protection to aid her. But there are certain goods so much more cheaply produced elsewhere—for reason of soil, rare inventions, high industrial organization—that we do well to leave their production, for the time at least, in other hands. In turn, we will produce for export an excess, over home requirements, of those goods for which our production cost is low.—*July 20, 1916.*

THE DEMOCRATIC TARIFF COMMISSION

By the time the Democratic caucus finally takes its fangs out of the tariff commission bill which President Wilson so suddenly decided to advocate, it will be stamped all over with the imprint "Good for campaign purposes only."

As the bill stands to-day, it is a repudiated measure. Into every line is written the traditional opposition of the Democratic party to any effort to protect American industries through the tariff.

It is simply not in the blood of

the Democratic party to take any other attitude. An Eskimo could live at the equator quite as comfortably as the Democratic party could thrive in the atmosphere of an unbuilding protective tariff. It was created as a free trade party, has lived as a free trade party and can never sincerely be other than a free trade party.

Every Democratic senator or congressman who has spoken on the subject has been more frank about his real convictions than has Mr. Wilson. They have all revealed, in one way or another, their abhorrence of the measure which the President, for electioneering purposes, is forcing them to enact. They do not believe in it, and they are making a record which plainly shows a determination not to allow it to be permanent. They regard it solely as a "war" measure, and do not intend that it shall outlast the war. The latest amendment adopted by the Senate caucus prohibits the commission from leasing offices for longer than two years; at the same time, the salaries of the commission are reduced from \$10,000 to \$7,500. The temporary character of the commission is thus emphasized. The country is put on notice that two years is to be the life of the commission—just long enough for the war to end and the flood of European products to begin swamping home products in the American market. We will then return to the conditions we faced in this country as war began in 1914.

Every manufacturing center in Europe will be joyous over the way in which the Democratic party proposes to "protect" American industries if it is permitted to remain in power at Washington.—*Aug. 18, 1916.*

THE DYESTUFFS TARIFF

The pending revenue bill includes a protective tariff against imported dyestuffs, to apply as soon as the war is over and to free us from the importation of German dyes.

Possibly the dyestuffs industry is one that will flourish in this country with a small amount of protection. More likely we shall have to increase the present duties. Experience will teach us. But we have been driven to enact the tariff not by any calm consideration of industrial policy, but by the administration's desertion of American dye users.

Great distress came upon very large interests because the government refused to do more than assert, in academic language, that Great Britain had no right to stop our supplies of German dye products. The fair words did the dye users no good. So they ask for the alternative solution; the creation of a dye industry within our own borders.

But this is a solution to which all nations are being driven. Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland will not dare in the future to rely on us for any necessity of life, for this war has seen the destruction not only of the right of neutral nations to maintain with belligerents their non-contraband trade by sea, but neutrals have even been estopped

from trading with each other. Ask every neutral European nation and the answer comes that the situation is due to us and us alone. No small European neutral dared assert its rights while we showed ourselves willing to forfeit ours.

The foreign trade experts of the administration could do the country a service. They might explain just where our foreign trade is to expand. In their explanation they must keep before themselves the fact that the allies have pledged themselves to preferential trade arrangements with each other. They must keep in mind the fact that the central powers and neutral Europe have learned by bitter experience that we are willing to allow a belligerent sea power to suspend our trade as it chooses.

This is the true significance of our abandonment of the principles of international law. International law on the sea was supposed to safeguard against belligerent violation those very trade relations which we passively see broken. Without those safeguards the very basis of international trade, the basis of our oversea markets, is withdrawn.

At present no one can help buying from us, however much or little we are allowed to deliver. After the war it will be different. The nations will seek sources of supply on which they can depend.—*Sept. 9, 1916.*

American Preparedness

COMPULSORY SERVICE

I know how many men I want. I know their names and the numbers on their doors, and if they don't come I will fetch them. Give me the men and munitions I want and I guarantee we shall have the war in the hollow of our hands.

"Kitchener."

"If they don't come I will fetch them!" Slowly, reluctantly, the necessities of war are crowding the English people away from the ideal of individualism. That there shall be no compulsory service is one of the sacred traditions of the liberty-loving English, as it is a tradition of our own country, so strong that no political leader, barring one, of our statesmen has dared announce himself in favor of a campaign for universal, compulsory military service. Yet if there is any lesson in this war it is that a nation cannot mobilize its efforts unless supported by every available citizen. Any voluntary system brings out the self-sacrifice of the noblest and best and leaves the laggards and the selfish ones to pursue their course and to shirk their share of the burden of national defense.

This war has brought destruction, death, misery; it has loosened the control that has been established by years of scientific and sanitary efforts over ravaging diseases. But it has also brought about great good. Standing shoulder to shoulder in the trenches of France the capitalist and the common laborer

have found new bonds of kinship. In the awe of death that waits for them all alike they are learning anew the lesson of human brotherhood. Society has discovered that it can be strong only as its members.—Oct. 6, 1915.

STAND BY THE PRESIDENT

Better than anyone else in America President Wilson knows our country's need of military preparedness. Beyond a doubt he has learned many things which he does not dare disclose about the present situation. There must have come to him in the many confidential conferences at the White House since the war began information that no other one man can possibly possess. More closely than any other President since Lincoln, Mr. Wilson has been brought into intimate contact with the subject of war, its causes and its consequences. Never in our history has the question of national defense been so acute. No other President has had occasion to study so intimately and inquire so deeply into this subject. We know that he is bringing to bear in the formation of his policy all that he has learned from the lessons of Europe's war and all that our own naval and military experts have been able to give him for his guidance. So when the President says that what we need most is a great navy, the people of America

must accept and back up the programme for more and bigger battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

The President is clearly right in his belief that this is our first and greatest need. It is impossible to imagine the United States engaged in an aggressive war. We need preparedness only for defense, and any attack upon us must be from overseas. Our friendly neighbor, Canada, on the north, will never attack us; our somewhat boisterous neighbor, Mexico, on the south, could not attack us effectively even if its people could unite on a programme of war against the United States.

We do not believe, however, that naval preparedness alone will give this country a sufficient guarantee of permanent peace, nor is it enough to provide for the nucleus of a volunteer army. The entire nation—men, machinery, railroads, agriculture, every productive activity—must be organized into a workable machine available for effective use against a foreign foe.

We believe that President Wilson will eventually recognize this truth if he does not see it now. In the meantime it is the duty of every patriotic American to sink his partisan prejudices and personal desires and stand behind the President for the prompt carrying out of the new naval programme.—Oct. 29, 1915.

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

There is much to cheer the heart and stimulate national confidence in the President's address before the Manhattan Club last night.

With the President's reiterated declaration for pacific purpose and amicable relations every patriotic citizen must agree heartily. "Charity to all, malice toward none," is the tenor of his observations on this important point in our national life. Such a policy underlies the very foundations of the republic, and the President does well to recall the fact to the attention of the people in this moment of world-wide stress.

Mr. Wilson's plea for a greater army, as a means of defending the splendid things for ourselves and for all mankind for which the republic stands, will find an echo in every intelligence—so far as the principle, at least, of preparedness is concerned. Many may dissent—as *The Evening Mail* dissents—from the theory that the full national resources can be mobilized in time of peace for availability in time of war by the method of voluntary service. There is a growing feeling in this country that this can be accomplished only by the introduction of some form of compulsory service.

The President's pledge for a more powerful and more modern navy as our first line of defense will meet with undivided support among all our citizens who have ears to hear the voice of history and eyes to see the trend of events. Congress, if it be as sensitive to public feeling as it should be, can have no choice but to heed Mr. Wilson's well-reasoned advice on this phase of our national activities.

With the President's warning of divided loyalties among some of our citizens of foreign origin, every citizen who realizes the magnitude of his heritage must agree in principle and in practice. This is no

land, nor is it a time, for divided loyalties, for harkings back to issues which involve the danger of racial discord within the republic, or of qualified loyalty to its vital interests. At all times, and especially in the present world-wide clash of interests, the duty of every American citizen is to devote all the powers of his mind and his heart to the good of his own country.

The President's casual mention of the need of mobilizing our resources indicates that his views of preparedness as the problem of the nation do not rise to the requirements of the occasion. We are at the parting of the ways. Our theory of individualism has led to the conception of a national government with inadequate powers. The doctrine of states' rights must go. The organization of armies, as in England, on the basis of voluntary contract, has proved ineffective in this war. The culmination of the democratic idea of the "nation in arms," born in the storm and stress of the French revolution, is now the universal order of the day.

Preparedness cannot be purchased by the payment of a few dollars additional per capita taxes, to be expended in the purchase of equipment and the hiring of men. We must have the courage to say to every young American, as he ripens into manhood:

"You **MUST** give your country a period of service, and when the need arises you **MUST GIVE LIFE ITSELF.**"

A vast organization, comprising the highest business talent, must be created. The aid of the corporations must be enlisted, but on such a basis as not to tempt them to wish for war.

All this involves a conception of the state little in harmony with the traditions of the Democratic party, which grew out of individualism and theories of liberty and states' rights in direct conflict with the realization of a powerful central government.

The DUTY of the citizen must be emphasized at the expense of his privilege. He must be taught to travel a new road. Thenceforth, by service and devotion to his nation, he must act as a unit in a socialized group. Out of the traditions and power of a nation thus glorified by the devotion of its citizens, each citizen will draw a fuller and richer life for himself.

Can the Democratic party achieve this vast transition from its individualistic past? The undertaking is one that would flow much more naturally from the traditions of the Republican party, which holds within its ranks to a much greater extent the organizing genius of business men.

The President has undertaken a staggering task of leadership within his party, a task in which he deserves the support of every patriotic American.—Nov. 5, 1915.

WAR AND CHRISTIANITY

Mr. Bryan finds President Wilson's national defense programme "a challenge to the spirit of Christianity."

In all his speculations on the subject of war and peace Mr. Bryan is guided by the assumption that all war is un-Christian and all peace Christian.

It may be doubted whether all peace—even the kind of peace which Mr. Bryan has in mind—lies in an essentially Christian direction. What pacifists mean by peace is a thing about which there is no very great clearness. Mr. Bryan appears to mean by peace a vapid state of society from which all the feelings and impulses ordinarily associated with the idea of nationality have been eliminated. Peace of this kind would—whether or not Mr. Bryan realizes it—be apt to flower out into some form of materialism or sensualism, rather than anything resembling Christianity.

It would be a kind of peace which would offer to the spirit of Christianity a still more unmistakable challenge than President Wilson's plan for increasing our military force.

But assume that Mr. Bryan knows what he means by peace, and that the peace in question lies in a Christian direction. Will such peace be promoted by this country disarming? If all nations were to disarm and to begin simultaneously the practice of Christian ethics the policy of disarmament might be practicable.

But Mr. Bryan's proposal is that this country expose itself to the armed force of a world in which no such foundation of Christian morality really exists.

To follow counsels of this kind might lead to national humiliation and disaster, but hardly, as things now stand, to anything like Christianity. Mr. Bryan's programme would not promote the general interests of Christianity; and they would certainly not promote the interests of this country.—*Nov. 6, 1915.*

PREPAREDNESS—REAL AND OTHER

At the Chicago banquet of the National Security League on Wednesday night former President Taft gave his views on "Preparedness." He repudiated the Bryan pacifism as foolish and the Roosevelt idea as too radical. His own position seemed to be enshrouded in that twilight zone always sought by people of timidly good intentions and equally timid action. It was about as definitely located as the war stories we read so frequently nowadays under the date line "Somewhere in France." Of course, they leave matters nowhere in the reader's mind, which seems to be the predicament in which Mr. Taft's listeners in Chicago found themselves after he had spoken. He believed in preparedness, but preferred not to have too much of it.

In other words, if the Taft preparedness programme were to be adopted as a national policy, we would spend millions upon some kind of a national defense job, but not the kind of a job that would be a real defense. Why build a Namur or a Liege, certain to fall at the time when most vitally needed, rather than a Verdun, which defies big guns and bigger armies?

If we are going in for preparedness, let us do it with a thoroughness that will insure peace, rather than invite war. A state of real preparedness would make every nation hesitate to attack us. It would be realized that an attempt at invasion would be futile. No troops could be landed on our well-fortified coasts, with an adequate navy doing its duty, too.

For this country to do a poor job

of preparedness—to hesitate to make an effective defense because of its initial cost—would have the effect of inviting an opposing nation to our coast line at the first outbreak of war. Every war office in Europe would have the data of our coast defense weaknesses. Opposing navies and armies would be found battering away at places in which we had expended one dollar for an inadequate defense instead of two dollars for a real defense.

Evidently Mr. Taft is for the one-dollar defense idea. That differs from the Bryan idea only in the fact that it spends the dollar which Bryan would save. It provides no better defense than the Bryan policy of no defense at all.—*Nov. 12, 1915.*

WAR LESSONS FOR THE U. S.

A ban upon the emigration of young men of military age and upon luxury in living are two of the measures which British statesmanship is contemplating in the gradually developing scheme for the mobilization of the resources of the country.

Already two of the great transatlantic lines, the Cunard and the White Star, have announced their refusal to accept bookings of emigrants who might be of use at the front, and a mass meeting in Liverpool the other day passed a resolution calling upon the government to take action under the defense of the realm act to prevent the departure from the country of young men of military age without the special permission of the Home Office.

The passage of sumptuary laws designed to put a stop to "the thoughtless extravagance and unnec-

essary luxury still being indulged in by many persons to the annoyance of their neighbors," as a questioner in the House of Commons put it, is one of the possible conservation measures of the future, announced by Premier Asquith.

Thus Britain, under the necessities of a great struggle, is facing with apparent equanimity the prospect of a material abridgment of its cherished individual rights for the sake of the common good—a sacrifice which may confront this country at almost any moment in this significant period of universal readjustment.—*Nov. 23, 1915.*

"UNCONSCIOUS BLOOD"

"The navy is very old and very wise," says Rudyard Kipling. "Much of her wisdom is on record and available for reference; but more of it works in the unconscious blood of those who serve her."

The poet meant Great Britain's navy, of course, but he has told in these few words the whole secret of all great military bodies, whether they work on the sea or on the land. It is the secret, not only of England's navy, which has done in this war everything that was expected of it, but of Germany's army, which is another remarkable example of age and wisdom. All the war lore that has come into the mind of man since Napoleon's time has been working "in the unconscious blood" as well as in the conscious brain of the Prussian machine. England's navy and Germany's army have had the advantage of an unbroken line of spirit, system and officers. The morale, the methods and the traditions have come down through a

century and they are proving just what the founders of them wanted them to prove.

In this country some of the "unconscious blood" of Barry and Faragut still flows in the navy; at least it was still flowing strongly enough at Manila and Santiago. It may need an injection of salt and iron to bring it back to its old pulsation, but it is there.

Our army, unfortunately, has no such asset. But it can be made to acquire training and discipline, and these, with the right machinery, will go a long way.—*Nov. 23, 1915.*

A WORD OF ADVICE TO BRYAN, LA FOLLETTE AND KITCHIN

In the *Commoner* of November Congressman Bailey, of Pennsylvania, asserts the existence of a marvellous lobby, "of which the Army and Navy League, the National Security League, the National Rifle Association, the Aero Club of America and scores of similar organizations are the visible expression."

Wherefore Mr. Bryan says:

"Investigate the activities of the business group pecuniarily interested in increased appropriations for army and navy, which has become so active in pushing its selfish demands. Congress ought to at once appoint a committee to investigate. It is more than a lobby. It is a concerted attempt to misinform the whole nation with a view to the securing of enormous profits at the expense of the taxpayers. Publicity is the surest weapon with which to meet an evil of this kind. Let the people once know the real motive back of this movement for preparedness and it cannot succeed. Exposure will kill it. *Turn on the light* and let the country see the

fraudulent character of the pretended patriotism which is now being paraded before the country by men who claim a superior attachment to the nation, but are in fact nothing but leeches and parasites. *The investigation ought to commence at once.*"

We favor the investigation provided it is not conducted by irresponsibles and blatherakites. Where a man who makes the claims to public leadership that Bryan does brings such charges against reputable organizations of citizens as are named in Bailey's article, he ought to be compelled to make good. An investigation such as he proposes would be an exposure of his own incurable irresponsibility and a valuable discounting of such influence as has survived.—*Chicago Tribune.*

Mr. Kitchin to-day went over the situation with several prominent members of the House. He said:

I believe we might find some interesting facts about the backers of the Navy League and the National Security League. Let's find out whether they own stock in munition plants. Let's find out whether all this preparedness sentiment is real or is manufactured by men who expect to profit by it.

"I want to keep the people from being taxed for preparedness. If I cannot prevent it I will not oppose my party in providing the necessary revenues."

His idea is that before anything is done toward spending hundreds of millions of dollars for national defense there should be an investigation to show whether the needs are real or fancied, and principally whether the whole movement for preparedness is not inspired by gigantic interests which have dreams of reaping a golden harvest from the government.—*Washington Dispatch.*

Senator Robert M. La Follette to-day published a signed statement in his newspaper attacking the preparedness program, if it was to be carried out through private contracts. He cited figures tending to prove that huge profits were being made by the millionaires of the United States who were interested in munitions plants. The statement in part follows:

"At present these patriots are devoting their great talents to the making of public opinion for a big standing army and a big navy."—*Dispatch* from Madison, Wis.

Every editor knows that he is advocating a policy of preparedness from his knowledge of a certain body of facts. Every munition manufacturer knows that the movement for preparedness exists entirely without his initiative or assistance, and every public man who makes such assertions as those made by Mr. Bryan, Mr. La Follette and Mr. Kitchin loses, in a greater or less degree, the confidence and esteem of the editors and manufacturers.

The editors know that no effort has been made to urge them to carry on a campaign for preparedness. They know that these gentlemen make statements which they cannot know to be true. They know that these gentlemen cannot know them to be true, because there are no such facts.

The campaign for preparedness on the part of the newspapers represents the settled convictions of the editors based on indisputable facts.

It is impossible to respect public men who are willing to make accusations that are without foundation.—*Nov. 30, 1915.*

WILSON ON PREPAREDNESS

The President's appeal for preparedness in his notable address last evening will awaken a vigorous response in the hearts of the American people. By his plain-spoken, unequivocal stand for the mobilization of the nation's resources, human and material, for the defense of the country's honor and its independence, Mr. Wilson has performed a great service to America. By uniting the traditional Republican demand for an adequate army and navy, and by focusing within his own party the hitherto divided sen-

timent for the creation of a force to serve as the basis of a national defense, he has cleared the great issue of the day and has placed it squarely before the reason and the conscience of the people.

The urgency of the issue, in the President's view, is indicated by his words:

I cannot tell you what the international relations of this country will be to-morrow, and I use the word literally. And I would not dare keep silent and let the country suppose that to-morrow was as certain to be as bright as to-day.

The logic of history has placed upon the shoulders of the American people a heavier burden than any that has been borne by a nation before. America's undertaking that the one hundred million people of the United States shall guarantee the rest of the nations of the hemisphere, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, from impingement by the vast pressure of Europe or of Asia, is the greatest international engagement that ever has been entered into in history.

This undertaking, so vitally important to the liberties of the United States itself, cannot be carried out without sacrifices far greater than any that the President has yet contemplated in his public utterances. The guardianship of the two Americas against encroachment from whatsoever quarter necessitates a plan of preparedness based upon compulsory universal service. And, as the President wisely points out, a state of adequate preparedness involves not only the placing of the entire youth of the land at the government's disposal in the hour of need, but a continuing plan of training and organization against that inevitable hour of need.

Such a continuing policy, aimed at the creation of a smoothly working defensive organization, must include the manufacturing resources of the country. It must include within its comprehensive scope every factory, every establishment for the production of food supplies, every financial institution. When the country's defenders stand face to face with the enemy there must be no bickering over contracts in the rear; there must be no speculation at the cost of human lives; there must be no haggling over profits while our defenders are being mown by the invaders' fire; there must be no strikes to tie up the country's powers of production in any department of supply.

Capital must be prepared to recognize the government's first call upon its manufacturing resources. The nation should obtain a clear right to all the manufacturing facilities within its boundaries at a fixed rate of profit of six per cent. Labor must understand that America, in time of the coming crisis, will be entitled to the full services of its brain and its brawn.

In return for the prospective sacrifices to be made by labor, the government must see to it that mentally, morally and physically those who work with their hands shall be fully up to the requirements of service in the factory or on the field. Recent statistics of enlistment in the regular army show that of those who presented themselves in the recruiting offices only eleven per cent. met the requirements. That is an appalling indication of the wastage of human resources in this country.

The realization by the President of the importance of the educational phase of the problem is indicated by

the following passage in his address last evening:

We ought to have in this country a great system of industrial and vocational education, under the federal guidance, and with federal aid, in which a very large percentage of the youth of this country will be given training in the skillful use and application of the principles of science in maneuver and business.

And the day will come, as it must, when the nation in its own defense will undertake a much wider scope of educational activities, designed to insure to its service the highest type of men that physical training, economic well-being and intelligent influencing of individual lives can bring about.

The policy of building up a nation virile in body, strong in mind and invincible in spirit should be maintained unswervingly and continuously, regardless of changes of administration or of party control.

It is not aspiration toward preparedness, but a definite programme, definitely applied, that will solve the problem which America is facing. In this lack of a clean-cut programme the President and his advisers have fallen short of the urgent requirements of the hour.—
Jan. 28, 1916.

GOVERNMENT ARMOR PLANTS

No more fallacious theory could be held by men responsible for shaping national policies than the plan of the Senate naval committee to establish government armor-making plants. The government could not successfully operate such a plant, and should not if it could. Senator Tillman, in presenting the committee's report urging government own-

ership, declared that the armor plate manufacturers are in the habit of "holding up" the government as to prices, and that their "stand and deliver" policy is responsible for the determination to have the government make its own plate.

It is not necessary to challenge the correctness of Senator Tillman's assertion regarding the attitude of manufacturers in order to show the unwisdom of the course he advocates. It may be true, doubtless it is true, that the three large manufacturers of armor plate, who practically control the industry, have made the government pay substantial prices—perhaps exorbitant prices. The remedy which the senator prescribes, though, is really worse than the disease. It would surely result in a much higher cost for the plate turned out, and it would reverse the true policy which the government should pursue.

It is preposterous to say that the government must submit to the exactions of private manufacturers in such a matter, or that its only means of escape is a heavy investment in a plant of its own and heavy maintenance of operative charges permanently. Making armor plate is not a function of government; and submitting weakly to the exactions of armor plate manufacturers is by no means a necessity. Armor plate is essential to the defense of the nation, and, as such, its manufacture comes well within the government's right of control. In this matter, as in many other phases of "preparedness," the government's wise policy is to encourage private manufacturers in every possible way, but to control them as well. That is to say, the government should insist on establishing a cost-basis for turn-

ing out armor plate, allow a reasonable profit, and possibly allow a fixed sum per annum for the right, in emergencies, to work the plant to its fullest capacity according to the government's needs.

Such a policy would tie up private enterprise to the government on a profitable basis, but it would not tie up the government to a costly manufacturing project. The nation would control, as it has an undoubted right to control, as to quantity and price of output; but the work of developing new ideas and of bettering quality would be left where it properly belongs, and would be paid for on a basis fair to all.

Private enterprise, made keenly alive to its responsibility to the nation, and held to that responsibility by the power of the government, would spell efficiency and economy. It would keep politics entirely out of our "preparedness" plans, whatever they may be, and give the country a dependable source of supply for all its needs.—*Feb. 15, 1916.*

A GREAT AMERICAN PHILANTHROPIST

From London has come very important news for our War department. A high official, in a cable news dispatch, headed "America's Turn if Verdun Falls," states that:

The chief object of the attack on Verdun is to force an early peace in Europe so that the German government would have its army and navy free to attack the United States.

Then the official in question, "whose identity cannot even be hinted at," went on:

The aim of the War office in Berlin is to attack the United States without giving the administration at Washington time to raise a trained army to repel the invaders or bring the navy up to its full fighting strength.

The identity of our unconscious benefactor "cannot even be hinted at." How very, very secret. How modest is true virtue.

An American philanthropist was determined not to let the flower blush unseen and set out to discover this prophet, to give him a local habitation and a name, a name inscribed high on the roster of those who have loved and served the republic. He called together a board of chirographers, clairvoyants and pathologists. He suspected an official personage in Downing street. The source is even higher. The board is unanimously of the opinion that the warning was issued to us by the lord high janitor of the House of Parliament. Their reading of the signs makes them certain that his lordship delivered his opinion on a wet Saturday night.

To supplement this uncovering of the danger from one quarter, the philanthropist prepared to lay bare the peril from others. He cabled the corresponding Parliament officials in Paris, Rome and Petrograd. From Paris he learns that if the Turks take the Suez canal they will at once march on Memphis. Rome sent a cable muddled in transmission. It appears to be a warning that if the German fleet escapes from the Kiel canal it will be to shell Duluth. Petrograd reports that if the Austrians gain the least success in north Italy they will send an expedition against Compagnoli's fruit stand on Jerome avenue.—*March 27, 1916.*

WORK TO BE DONE

Frank A. Vanderlip says, "What we do in the next twenty-five months will determine the course of our history as a nation for the next twenty-five years." A glimpse at the nature and the urgency of the national problems which press for a solution will show that Mr. Vanderlip knows what he is talking about. Here are some of these problems:

The organization of an army and navy that shall be adequate for the defense of the country from invasion and shall win for it the place among the nations to which its size, population and wealth entitle it.

The knitting together of our railroad system into a network which shall be extensive enough and co-ordinated enough to serve all the purposes not only of commerce but of defense.

The thorough organization of our financial resources in such a way that the derangements arising out of the fluctuations of business and the strain of extraordinary war expenditures shall not dislocate our money system.

The construction and establishment of a great merchant marine which shall enable us to send the products of our enterprise and our industry to the markets of the world and bring to our own market the materials which we may need from abroad, without exposing our foreign commerce to the mercy of the capitalists or governments of other nations.

The development of our educational system to serve all the purposes of a well-rounded and many-sided mental, physical, vocational and industrial training; the elimination of such fallacies in the public

school management of our great cities as the school board of New York, with its forty-seven members, its forty-seven counsels and its forty-seven obstacles to unified action; the halting of the present erroneous course of theoretical instruction and the correlation of education with life. Only by this means shall we be able to produce a nation of trained workers.

The adjustment of the relations between business and government, so that the two great forces in the state shall become supplementary to each other instead of working at cross-purposes, at heavy cost to the nation in the needless expenditure of money and a vast duplication of effort.

These are some of the problems to be solved within the next two years if the life of the country is to be conserved in the crucial period through which we are bound to pass in the course of the next quarter of a century—the period of the world's reconstruction after the present struggle.

Where is the leadership, where are the spiritual forces that shall accomplish these indispensable measures of nation-building? — *March 31, 1916.*

LET US BE READY TO HIT HARD

Whether a democracy can prepare for or against war in its modern meaning is a fascinating question, and it actually promises to be solved by us before long. The American people is practical-minded, if not actually mechanical-minded, and it may actually be that it will listen to experts in this grave

matter instead of to politicians. Here lies our only hope.

It is utterly stupid to poke our heads into the sand of mere defensive preparedness talk. Much better grow queues. A nation must strike in order to defend. Mere warding off blows will not do. Sowing our coasts with a million mines, setting cannon to run up and down our shores on wheels and launching whole schools of submarines is only a secondary and negative side of the question. It is the striking arm that settles wars, the arm that can strike hardest and most frequently.

England has concentrated on her navy. Her people are maritime-minded. They are intelligently interested in all that pertains to the navy. They understand war in terms of dreadnoughts and sailors.

France concentrated on her army. Every man and boy was a soldier or a potential soldier. The people were interested in the army because they understood it and were a part of it. They knew war in terms of infantry and seventy-five millimeter guns.

England lost practically her whole veteran European army, except such officers and men as had been reserved to train recruits, by the end of the battle of the Marne. France has since helped whip a new army into shape and the English army in France is absolutely under French control. France, on the other hand, depends almost wholly on England for marine operations. Both countries specialized.

If our American intelligence regarding our army and navy is an index to our interest in them, that interest is microscopic. Since 1865 our minds have been running to the issues of peace, and the Spanish war,

for most of us, was a momentary newspaper thrill. We have had little reason to be interested in war, and so we know practically nothing about it. If we did we would either prepare harder or give up the game.

It takes twenty years to make an efficient officer for a general staff. The various branches of military service are requiring just as assiduous devotion to mastery of technique as demands surgery, or engineering, or synthetic chemistry—in fact, it actually includes these professions in its scope. It takes time to train officers, it takes time to train men. In other words, it takes time to make over a large part of the nervous system of our human machines before we can get a modern soldier.

We may learn to turn out submariners at the rate that Henry Ford turns out cars or Ingersoll ticks out watches, but the men to man them have to be found, tested and trained.

As a nation we have not specialized in either army or navy. Our Congress can at one and the same time be interested in a proposed abandonment of our vital naval base in the Pacific and in a measure to increase our fleet. Our people can listen approvingly to the rhetorical stupidities about that million men that can rush to the colors over night in case of danger. Only of late have there been symptoms of a realization that war is a profession, defensive war or offensive war, and that it is time to listen to experts and not to politicians.

Congress may waste the nation's time splitting hairs about sundry amateur bills, but the American people are thinking about preparing to build up an army and navy. They have not yet begun to think clearly,

or to ask themselves "for what?" Fifty-seven varieties of preparedness have been dished out for sampling, but the questions of the expert are gradually being faced.

Shall we prepare to deal with Mexico? Then let us forget industrial preparedness and all the rest and concentrate on cavalry, mule-back kitchens and aeroplanes.

Shall we prepare to defend ourselves against Japan? Then there is nothing doing in regard to giving up Manila bay. We will stock it with coal and food and munitions. We will build ships to transport troops and ships to safeguard their way. We will get ready to strike first if any striking has to be done.

Shall we get ready to keep England from our coasts? Then what shall we do about Halifax, Bermuda and Kingston?

Is it France that we fear? What have we to compare with her seventy-five centimeter rapid-firers, and with her magnificent discipline of men on foot?

Germany? But the whole lexicon of military efficiency is there for us to read as much of as we can, and we must meet her on her own grounds or go under.

Switzerland, is it? But we will not be ridiculous; the question is big and grave, although not very definite. Let us silence the eloquence of the politician and listen to the men who know, and if we must get ready to strike, let us prepare to hit hard.—*May 13, 1916.*

AMERICAN AIRMEN

A few evenings ago a reader wrote and commented upon the unneutrality of Americans who were serving in the air squadrons of the allies.

The complaint is perhaps a natural one, yet when analyzed it loses its force.

The country is under no obligation to prevent any citizen from voluntarily enlisting in the army of any belligerent. Our sole duty is to see that belligerent agents do not use our soil as recruiting ground. More Americans enlist in the entente forces because the entente holds the seas and bars the way to Americans of German descent who would like to serve with the central powers. Yet there are many Americans with the German and Austrian armies.

In no case will the number of our countrymen thus serving have any perceptible influence on the outcome of the war. The sole effect of their service will be to give them experience in the new art of modern war. When they return to us they will be invaluable assets in the work of preparing this country for military efficiency.

Above all else, this will be true of the war-tried American airmen. The flurry in Mexico has shown us the desperate need of this branch of the service.—*May 22, 1916.*

SOCIAL PREPAREDNESS

A nation which has no money in times of peace to do away with its slums, and yet finds money to-day to throw the unprepared slum product into the trenches, presents a picture that is not pleasing to many Americans.

The picture is driving these Americans, in fact, to a cry for social as well as military preparedness that is increasing in volume every day. Many times the advocates of social preparedness have

seemed at loggerheads with the advocates of military preparedness.

In our own town Misha Appelbaum has been hiring halls and in the name of the Humanitarian Cult has been demanding that the President's cabinet be reorganized to take in a Secretary of Welfare, who shall do most of the things in the name of government that are now done by private charity societies. The aim of Mr. Appelbaum and some 18,000 followers who have signed as members of his organization is to have the government make a direct drive at poverty and slum conditions.

From a rather unimportant and small up-town hall the movement has twice overflowed the seating accommodations of Carnegie Hall. The other day Mr. Appelbaum rushed out to Detroit to place his programme before Henry Ford. Mr. Ford immediately hired the largest armory in Detroit and invited Mr. Appelbaum back for this evening to tell his story to the people of Detroit at large.

This propaganda, strange to say, makes full admission of the need for military preparedness and makes the job of obtaining social preparedness one of assembling parts for a much more gigantic preparedness machine than one of armaments and arms alone can ever be.

It takes into account the value of contentment among the people, of happiness derived through decent recreation and peace in old age through a consciousness of freedom from economic dependence. In this work it appears that Mr. Ford will find a task entirely congenial to him, which will not be much unlike the task of assembling parts in his own factories.—*June 6, 1916.*

LOCATING THE GOVERNMENT ARMOR PLANT

There is much unseemly discussion as to the military safety of our present steel industry. Mr. Edmonds, editor of the *Manufacturers' Record* of Baltimore, the organ of southern industrial interests, wants large munitions works, especially armor plate works, established in the South, probably the Birmingham district. He says that plants with this location would be more safe from foreign attack than plants dependent upon supplies of Lake Superior ore. Charged with a sectional element in his patriotism, Mr. Edmonds has more recently included the "central west" as an admissible site for the new development.

It may possibly be that the ammunition factories at Bridgeport and New Haven are unduly open to sudden foreign attack, but what Mr. Edmonds assails is the position of the heavy steel industry, making pig-iron and rolling-mill products in Ohio and Pennsylvania. Their weakness, he says, consists in the fact that they get ore from northern Minnesota via the Great Lakes. In case of war with England Mr. Edmonds foresees that the Soo locks would be blown up and our eastern blast furnaces would be helpless. Reminded that we could still get ore from northern Minnesota to Pennsylvania by rail, he answers that the ore fields would be at once captured and held by an attack from the Canadian border.

The inference we are asked to draw is that we must no longer be dependent upon Lake Superior ore, but must develop only the Alabama product.

The steel industry is mainly lo-

cated at centers between Pittsburgh, where coke comes from, and Duluth, where ore comes from. It is so located for very good and sufficient economic reasons: Because those are the most advantageous locations for assembling coke, coal, limestone, labor, machinery, and for reaching the great consuming markets. In recent years there is also a growth of the heavy steel industry near the Atlantic seaboard, as at Bethlehem, Pa., because of a growing use of foreign ores and a growing importance of foreign markets. Finally, there is a healthy development in the South.

There is no military reason for a governmental policy attempting to dislocate the industry using Lake Superior ores, as might be done by throwing all government armament orders to the southern plants. If, in a war with Great Britain, we cannot hold our own Minnesota ore fields, we cannot hold anything. Surely the Canadians alone cannot wrest these fields from us. The capture would be by a British expedition, and it would have a 1,500-mile fight to get from Montreal to the Minnesota border. If a British expedition is strong enough to do this it will rather move south to cut off New York and New England, an infinitely heavier blow to the country.

If Mr. Edmonds wants to protect us from England his only protection is a navy superior to the British or an alliance with a naval power with which jointly we can hold the British fleet off. He will hardly recommend that. In the meantime, the \$11,000,000 government armor-plate plant need not for military reasons be so located as to use southern iron ore—that is, located in the South. In deciding upon this location the sec-

retary of the navy will not neglect the economic considerations which have placed the bulk of the country's steel industry elsewhere. In other words, the sectional plea, however gilded, will be disregarded.—*July 27, 1916.*

AGRICULTURAL PREPARED- NESS

Monday, in the United State Senate, Senator Page, of Vermont, introduced the vocational-educational bill, providing for government aid for land-grant colleges in the giving of specialized education in agriculture, home economics, commercial and industrial training. His most interesting material was his description of the vast strides in agricultural efficiency made by Germany in the last thirty years, compared with our own slight progress. Agricultural education is designed to correct the discrepancy.

The senator said:

We do not lack for an example as to what intelligent, intensive farming will accomplish. Germany commenced thirty years ago to put the German farms in a condition that will support the German population when it shall have been doubled.

We have the statistics showing the comparison between the increased crops of Germany and those of our own country. I know how uninteresting statistics are generally, so I shall burden you but a moment with reference to this thought. It is, however, so pertinent as showing how weak we are in comparison with that energetic, virile nation that I think the figures are well worth the study of every senator.

Germany has an area equal only to the three states of Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri. Yet Germany produces three-fifths as much oats, four-fifths as much barley, six times as many potatoes and nine times as

much rye as we produce in the whole United States. In the last thirty years German rye production per acre increased 87% while the United States increased 10%; German wheat increased 58%, ours only 14%; German barley 60%, the United States 10%; German oats 85%, our own 6%; German potatoes 80%, ours 7%.

It is a notable achievement for a nation whose soil resources are poor and which for the last thirty years has been thought to be specializing on industrial development. The view of this great growth in Germany's agricultural production, the increase for every important article being greater than the increase of population, may ease the anxiety of those who worry because Germany somehow does not follow the instructions of her enemies and starve. Intensive production of foodstuffs was Germany's answer to the progressive power of the superior British navy, with its threat of starvation in case of war.

The time has come for us to husband our resources as Germany has done. Toward greater efficiency in the use of the nation's soil something will be contributed by higher agricultural education, and by instruction in home economics, which will make farm life more attractive. Something has already been done by the agricultural credit law, which at last throws credit open to the farmers on terms commensurate with the excellence of their security, the producing land of the country.—*July 29, 1916.*

THE EMPIRE OF THE AIR

The achievements of the aviation arms of the warring nations in the

pending struggle are only the beginning of a vast new offensive and defensive power. As Claude Graham-White, the accomplished British aviator, points out in an article printed on this page:

Aircraft in this war, the destructive machines, have given no more idea of the size or of the power of the fighting machines of the future than would a rowboat of an American liner. In the wars of the future it will be the great fighting aeroplanes, the machines for destroying hostile craft or for laying waste land positions, which will be to the forefront.

And in an earnest appeal to his countrymen he says:

Disaster awaits a nation which ignores these warnings—which refuses to read the writing on the wall. Immediately this terrible conflict comes to an end, the moment that peace is declared, this country must set itself the task of creating and maintaining a great and efficient air service.

The aeroplane had its birth in American ingenuity and American enterprise. The failure that led to the death of Prof. Langley, of the Smithsonian Institution, from a broken heart, has developed into a fourth dimension in the science of war—the battle in the air.

America has the brains. America has the money. America has the will to avail itself fully of this arm.

The development of our aviation possibilities is being held up by an inefficient and blundering governmental organization.—*Sept. 20, 1916.*

ORGANIZED DEMOCRACY VS. UNORGANIZED DEMOCRACY

A few days ago, in addressing a trade union congress at Bristol, Lloyd George, in begging for the co-

operation of workers in machine shops, alluded to the fact that in certain instances where Belgian workmen were employed and were doing their best to increase the production of munitions of war they were begged by their British colleagues to slacken up—not to do so much work.

In an address a year ago last May, in Washington, before the national Foreign Trade Convention, James J. Hill, giving a comprehensive view of world conditions and trade, spoke of Germany's success in the spoils taken from the foreign trade of Great Britain. He said:

The power of the English trade unions became practically arbitrary in fixing wages, hours and general working conditions. Germany found that, with a more advantageous wage scale, she could go into the world's markets and compete at prices which England could not meet. Hence the enormous growth of German exports of the manufactured articles.

For, in the vast pool of the world's activity, where the material, the worker, the machine, the method, fly from one end of the earth to the other at call, only a purblind nation can dream of basing its future on anything less commanding than equality or superiority in the elements of production; including, of course, the wages of labor and the remuneration of capital.

This Great Britain has not yet fully realized. The United States does not appear to understand it at all. Widespread and long-continued industrial distress in England comes from attempting to hold markets against competitors while maintaining a wage scale that does not permit her to meet their prices, and does not offer to capital an inducement to go into new fields of development or even to remain where it has hitherto been occupied.

She meets this not by removing the shackles from her industries, but by fastening other shackles on her capitalists; fetters that must be added later to those that already gall the limbs of labor.

She has entered upon the most elaborate experiment ever seen to compensate

the worker for the work he has lost through insisting upon impossible economic terms, now that work is no longer to be had, by a vast eleemosynary system which makes the whole state pay for his unemployment, his sickness, his misfortune and his death.

Reduced to its simplest terms, this project is not "humanitarian," but unspeakably cruel; though that high-sounding word and its familiar fellow, "social justice," are common cloaks for legislative cowardice or incapacity that does not dare apply the real remedy to the obvious disease. It merely postpones the inevitable, and intensifies the catastrophe which can no more be averted than hunger can satisfy itself on air.

The weakness of the British system, however, is more strongly revealed by the conditions of war. It is often said that this is a war between autocracy and democracy. It is futile to quarrel about words or definitions.

If we brush aside preconceptions, we will find that this is a war between thoroughly well organized nations and loosely organized nations. The day of loosely organized democracies is finished. Competition in trade is determined by universal laws. Commercially the world is one vast organization. No one country controls the character or direction of trade, and no nation can afford artificial handicaps in production and merchandising.

In the world competition the best organized will prevail. The power of all the people exercised through the government they have organized is stronger than the power of any group of people, whether corporation or labor unions.

A people to succeed and to secure general prosperity must organize themselves as a whole, that organization being expressed in efficient government, that is, an actuality of government by all the people and for all

the people, and not a government so weak that organizations more powerful than government establish themselves in the body politic.

The weakness in social organization in Great Britain alluded to by Mr. Hill, that permitted the loss of trade and commerce, also hampers and handicaps Great Britain in her supreme struggle.

A nation will hereafter be able to prosper only if all the forces and all the resources of all the people are organized together efficiently—each willing to subordinate its selfish interest to the common good.

The United States faces similar problems. Lines of cleavage have become apparent that threaten to separate us on the basis of race or previous nationality. The use of the power of labor unions in politics has not been limited to shortening the day or improving conditions directly. Full crew laws have been placed upon the statute books, compelling inefficient operation of railway trains manned with crews more numerous than the actual needs.

Similarly, large business enterprises have pursued their own selfish ends. In their dealings with labor and with the public as consumers, they have placed their own selfish interests, their own corporate interests, above the welfare of the nation.

Such selfish impulses of classes and of individuals break out under the stress of a war and menace the unity and striking power of a nation. The present war is carried by all the forces of every nation involved.

Nations no longer can fight in the interest of a special class. The struggle is not between democracy and royalty, for the days when a king or a land-owner class, or any

particular section of a nation, could carry the people into an effective war are past, since the advent of universal and compulsory military service.

The struggle is really one between democracies, for in each country the people are back of their government. In England the organization of government is so loose that the powerful trades union organizations dominate production even to the nation's detriment.

In Germany the most effective leadership is in control. Corporations, labor unions, like individual German citizens, are subordinating themselves to the national purposes. Hence their strength.

Not only in war, but in the struggle for commercial mastery that must follow the war, success will depend upon effective national organization. We in the United States have important lessons to learn for our future.—*Sept. 25, 1916.*

Army

UNPREPAREDNESS

A paragraph in a news dispatch to our neighbor, the *World*, describing the fighting between the American troops and the Villa raiders at Columbus, N. M., reads as follows:

Failure of at least one of the machine guns used by the American troops greatly handicapped them, outnumbered as they were by the raiders.

This paragraph is fraught with a lesson of the highest importance to the American people in this portentous moment in history. Back of the failure of "at least one of the machine guns" is a state of affairs which requires a drastic and prompt remedy. This machine gun which failed had been manufactured by presumably patriotic Americans; inspected by presumably competent Americans; cared for under a rigid system of military discipline by presumably faithful Americans.

The equipment whose failure put our soldiers at a disadvantage at a critical juncture of unforeseen events broke down not under the stress of long usage but under the initial pressure of the first test.

Like our submarines which have failed to work or have gone down with all their officers and men, never to come to the surface again except as coffins, the machine gun at Columbus revealed a fatal defect of construction, or inspection, or organization.

Like the military aeroplanes which are either worthless or are deathtraps because of the lack of training in our air service, amid scandalous circumstances the machine gun at Columbus betrayed a deplorable lack of tensile strength in some link of the human chain upon which the country relied.

These are not disconnected or chance incidents. They are related events, symptomatic of an essential condition in our national organization. Machine guns must not fail to do their work when the occasion arises for their employment to maintain the dignity of the country and protect the lives of its citizens. Submarine boats must not break down in ordinary maneuvers in time of peace. Aeroplanes must not be a source of danger to their operators because of the lack of training in the aerial arm of the service.

Unless the conditions indicated by these events are remedied without delay, the country may have reason to regret bitterly the state of chronic inefficiency which has made them possible.—*March 11, 1916.*

PATRIOTIC NEW YORK ATHLETES

Events of the past few days have proved the patriotism of New York's athletes and the value of

their training to fit them for service in a national crisis. Their response to the country's call has been astonishing.

The mobilization of the National Guard for service at the Mexican border has put an end to athletic competition here for the period of that service, just as effectively as the great world conflict put an end to athletics in Europe, and for the same reason; because the athletes were among the first to offer themselves for the grim competition of war.

In the metropolitan district alone 1,500 athletes are already included among the mobilizing troops, and of these fifty-three are champions in their respective fields. The list includes a dozen *Evening Mail* Modified Marathon winners.

By a rather strange coincidence those in this army of athletes who, but for the European war, would have represented America at the Olympic games this summer, would have left New York for Berlin at almost the moment the mobilization order was issued here.—*June 22, 1916.*

PROVIDING FOR THE FAMILIES

The amendment to the army bill, providing for the appropriation of \$500,000 for the support of the families of the national guardsmen who have been called out for duty on the Mexican border, looks very much like a small drop in a very large bucket. Many times \$500,000 will be needed for the purpose if the government is to carry out an unquestionable duty even on the most modest scale.

Private generosity is doing a great deal to supplement the work which impends upon the government, of taking care of the dependents of citizen soldiers on active service. Many employers, individual and corporations, are pledging the continuance of full pay to employes who respond to their country's call and are still further encouraging enlistments by assuring their workers that their employment will be open to them on their return from the border.

Various women's organizations are also taking the initial steps in organized work for the relief of any distress that might occur among the dependents of guardsmen on active duty.

But all these provisions cover a very small part of the total number of men who are leaving their homes at the call of their country. It is primarily the duty of their country to provide for their dependents. The country should perform this duty on a reasonably generous scale.—*June 24, 1916.*

MARCHING MEN

There is something about the tramp of many feet in unison that stirs the blood. The sturdy sound suggests united purpose. It gives hint of potential force. There is even a suggestion of menace in it.

The streets of New York these days and nights are resounding with that tread of strong men, ever marching forward—to trains, to ships, to the unknown. Thousands of the best blood and the keenest brains of this great city—the pick and cream of its young manhood—are in that khaki-clad succession of detachments hastening forward at

the call of duty. There are leave-takings, laughter that hides tears, light words that mask deep feelings. It is a demonstration of national consciousness and individual loyalty to an ideal which the rising generation should treasure in its heart.

Where are these men going?

The Russian soldier has created words to the simple notes of the retreat. The call is singularly effective. It consists of a repetition of three descending notes in three different scales, ending in a low, long-sustained hoarse finale. It is the call that is played over the bier or at the graveside of a soldier. The words are a repetition of the single phrase: "Tui kooda?" ("Whither thou?")

That is the question, old as the consciousness of the human race, which obtrudes itself as one listens

to the tread of soldiers in the streets of New York. Where are these clean - limbed, clear - eyed, keen-brained young men going?

The answer to that question must be an inspiration to the growing generation of girls and boys. These soldiers are marching to the highest purpose which can inspire the heart. They are marching to sustain the honor of their country. They are marching to restore, if fate has so decreed, a menaced civilization. They are marching, finally, at the simple call of duty.

A man who is incapable of responding to the appeal of duty is not worthy of the high heritage of his citizenship. The marching thousands are made of the stern stuff which has won freedom, vindicated right, shattered the chains of tyranny throughout the world in all time.—*June 29, 1916.*

The Garrison Plan

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

The plan elaborated by Secretary Garrison and approved by the President for the creation of a new army of 400,000 men, in addition to the augmentation of the regular army by about 35,000 men, looks well—on paper, at least.

In some respects the project for the creation of the new force of 400,000 men bears a close resemblance to the plan so successfully operated in Switzerland, which summons its citizens to the colors for stated periods during a term of years, and thus carries out its purpose of creating the "nation in arms" without too serious a dislocation of the industrial system of the country.

Mr. Garrison's plan provides for the enlistment of 133,000 men in each of three successive years for a service of two months under the colors for the first, second and third years at the pay of the regular army, and a subsequent liability to service for the remainder of the six-year term.

There is one essential difference between the Garrison and the Swiss plan, however, and the success or failure of the proposed defensive organization will depend entirely upon the effect of that difference. In Switzerland the "continental army" is recruited by compulsory service—and the military obligation in the little Alpine republic is enforced as rigidly as it is

anywhere else on the European continent. Our continental army is to be manned by "contract," as Mr. Garrison puts it.

Will the United States be able to enroll the 133,000 citizens each year which will be necessary for the maintenance of the projected force, when under present conditions neither the regular army nor the national guard organizations of the various states are able to maintain their respective personnels without great difficulty?

Does it seem wise to enter upon the contract system when the last of the European nations to employ that system — Great Britain — is abandoning it?—*Oct. 18, 1915.*

1,500,000 MEN FOR DEFENSE

It is an imposing plan of defense that is disclosed in the advance digest of the report of the general staff at Washington. The publication of this document in its entirety at an early date is urged upon the President by Secretary Garrison as a valuable contribution by experts to the data available on the subject which is fast assuming a dominant place among the problems of the hour. The Washington dispatches summarize the recommendations of the general staff in its essential features as follows:

It is recommended that the regular army be increased to 250,000 men permanently with the colors, with reserves of 300,000 fully trained men. Behind this

line it is proposed to have a force of 1,000,000 men with at least a year's training, giving the country an army of about 1,500,000 men fully equipped and easily mobilized.

The results aimed at in this plan will meet with the hearty approval of every citizen whose range of vision extends further than the end of his nose. A regular army of a quarter of a million men, with a reserve of 300,000 men fully trained, as the nucleus of a national armament of a million and a half, sounds well as a preliminary step in the creation of an impregnable wall of national defense.

But how is a regular army of 250,000 men to be recruited by the existing machinery, when the army fails in keeping its present numerical strength up to the petty standard of 100,000? How is a reserve of 300,000 men to be built up when the total strength of that arm of the service, as mustered recently at a dinner by Congressman Gardner, numbered sixteen strong? And how is the supplementary force of nearly a million men to be brought into being?

By the present voluntary system of enlistment? Utterly impossible. The excellent project of national defense, fully warranted by the uncertainties and hidden menaces of the international situation, cannot begin to be put into effect without the establishment of the principle of obligatory service, imposed by the inexorable requirements of the most vital interests of the country.

Without that one vitalizing and enabling energy, all plans for the maintenance of American rights and liberties are bound to degenerate into mere paper defenses—and in this war more than in any other

that has preceded it, paper defenses have proved unavailing against the pressure of national ambitions or national resentments.—*Nov. 17, 1915.*

CONTINENTALS OR COMPULSION?

If the nation requires certain service and offers the most favorable opportunity for the citizens to furnish such service, and, notwithstanding that, it cannot secure such service, it must then resort to some method of compelling the service.—Secretary Garrison, in his annual report, outlining the administration's program for the creation of an army of 500,000 men.

Mr. Garrison's words might well have been written by Lord Derby at the beginning of that British recruiting expert's final attempt to create an army adequate to Britain's urgent need, on the principle of voluntary service. Lord Derby, when he undertook his staggering task more than two months ago, offered the alternative of "some form" of compulsory service in the event of the failure of the voluntary system to meet the requirements of the crisis. He was appointed to the post of Britain's chief recruiting officer for the express purpose of making unnecessary a recourse to that alternative, so repugnant to British traditions of individual liberty. And now, after a thorough trial of the method of raising armies by moral suasion, Lord Derby is quoted as admitting his failure and as forecasting the imminent day when universal service must be resorted to as an inevitable measure of extremity.

Mr. Garrison bases a forward-looking project upon a backward-looking method. He has the advan-

tage of the lesson which the great democracy across the Atlantic has learned through a period of unprecedented national stress. He has neglected to apply that lesson to the needs of our own democracy. The records of the War department and the rosters of practically every National Guard unit in the country could have demonstrated to him the futility of attempting to organize an army of 500,000 men, or one-fifth of that number, upon the outworn basis of voluntary service in time of peace.

Why court failure and lose valuable time by essaying a project of vital national necessity on lines which have been conclusively proved to be impracticable? Why not take advantage of the experience of Great Britain and of the world?—
Dec. 11, 1915.

THE DRIFTING CONTINENTAL PLAN

It is evident that the administration's continental army plan is rapidly getting into the befuddled state that seems to be the fate of all of Mr. Wilson's policies. The President changes his mind so frequently and on so many questions that Congress naturally has a hard time to keep in line with him. Yesterday he was for letting Mexico alone; today he is for helping out Carranza.

Secretary Garrison and Assistant Secretary Breckenridge have made a stand upon the principle of national control. Nothing is so essential to an army as unity of purpose, and unity of purpose and action must originate from unity of control. The whole organization must be dominated equally by the same ideas and the same policies. This cannot re-

sult from piecing together, no matter how skillfully, forty-eight separate state units. The secretaries' resignations dramatize a great issue.

Nothing seems to be settled in the President's mind. To-morrow's attitude is to-morrow's secret.

So with "preparedness"; so with a tariff commission board; so with practically every matter that involves the nation's interests in a large way. Sooner or later the Democrats in Congress wake up to learn from their President that "frankly, I have changed my mind," as he recently wrote majority leader Kitchin.

Formulating a definite legislative programme under such conditions is much like forecasting weather probabilities for to-morrow. It is not surprising, in the circumstances, that the Democratic majority in Congress has to look to Mr. Kitchin, of North Carolina, for leadership on one feature of the Democratic programme; to Mr. Rainey, of Illinois, on another, and on the greatest question of all to (heaven save the mark!) Mr. Mann, the Republican leader, who seems to be doing more for the President's "preparedness" policy just at present than any of the President's party followers.

Into a chaos of this sort the continental army plan has been thrust, and it is having a hard time fighting for its life. Many Democratic Congressmen might be persuaded to give up their states' rights theory if they felt sure the President would "stay pat" on the present proposal; but with his wobbling record as a warning they are not inclined to take the chance. He can change his views, but they cannot change the roll call.

The best step that can now be

taken, therefore, in preparation for national defense is not likely to be taken at this session of Congress. In time, Congress, of course, will have to recognize the wisdom and necessity of a national volunteer organization. There can be only one authority over a military force, and that must be supreme over all. We are not going to build our defense against foreign invasion on state lines, nor delude ourselves into a feeling of security because we have

a loosely organized "national guard" in the various states, officered, trained and controlled by state authority. Rather than have compromises with state militia, the national government would do better to wait until the real solution of the problem is apparent to every one, and an effective national army, responsible solely to the authority of Washington, can be recruited. That is just about what is going to happen.—*Feb.* 11, 1916.

Universal Service

THE NEED OF AMERICA IS UNIVERSAL SERVICE

The assertion that under Secretary Garrison's Continental Army plan the United States would have a reserve of 500,000 men within three years sounds well only to inexperienced ears. But those who know what difficulties lie in the way of recruiting under a voluntary system see anything but plain sailing ahead. Only the sight of the 500,000 actually under arms will make them believe that such a force can be raised under the suggested method of enlistment.

Experience with the militia has indicated the barriers that loom between the continental plan and its fulfillment. Extraordinary inducements are held out to young men to enlist in the national guard. The armories are splendid clubhouses. Many of them have swimming tanks, gymnasia and handsomely appointed company rooms. The state has spent millions on the comfort of its guardsmen.

For the man of ambition promotion from the ranks is rapid, and the work itself seldom interferes with his business duties. Encampments and field maneuvers are of short duration and no more tiring than the activities of the usual summer vacation.

A man may choose his regiment, selecting an organization of which his friends are members or one in

which he thinks the surroundings will be congenial. Thus some companies are filled with men from the same neighborhood, college or business house. Service of this kind is never irksome, and the methods of discipline are such that no man can possibly complain. In fact, the criticism that they are not strict enough is frequently heard.

Yet in spite of all this there is not an infantry regiment in New York City with a full quota of men. Officers have done everything in their power to stimulate recruiting without bringing their commands up to the full peace strength.

In view of this condition is it strange that many find difficulty in believing the federal government can persuade 183,000 young men to join the colors voluntarily every year for the next three years? To be sure, federal service might appeal to many who remain cold to all overtures from state organizations. Also, many college students might be willing to give two months of their summer vacation to field maneuvers. The student camps already held indicate that the idea of military service is agreeable to the majority of American college youths. But the camps of the past have been considered preparatory schools for volunteer officers, and the students have enjoyed the status of cadets. In the ranks of the Continental Army they would occupy, when with the colors,

the same position as the private of regulars.

The militiaman may easily obtain relief from his duties through a change of residence or through business necessity, but the Continental soldier would be bound by stricter enlistment laws. He would enter into a much more serious agreement when he enlisted than the militia recruit, who merely contracts for defensive service or the suppression of internal strife.

Like the militia plan, Mr. Garrison's voluntary Continental Army is a half measure. It would place upon the few who are willing the burden of protecting those who are indifferent. If the organization of our new forces is to mark any real advance toward national preparedness against war, it must be accomplished in a manner that will affect the whole nation. To every man must be brought the consciousness that his citizenship is a trust which he must prepare himself to defend. There must be a spiritual broadening that will inspire all of us, rich and poor alike, to serve in the capacity for which we are best fitted. The nation's call for men must not be the invitation of a friend; it must be the command of a kindly parent who has the right to expect a willing response.

This means universal service, not only for those who are willing, but for those who must be trained to see their duty. It means not only the raising of an army of possible combatants, but the mobilization of an industrial force to back up the men in the field with the full power of the national reserves.

The administration plan is weak because it merely makes a request of a few; it should call for the best

efforts of all who are fit to serve.—
Oct. 21, 1915.

HERRICK FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE

There are few men who combine knowledge of America and Europe as Myron T. Herrick does. He knew this country, particularly the middle West, before he went abroad as ambassador to France, there to be a real diplomat. He was ousted from that post to make a place for an Ohio Democrat, and he came home and was hailed as a statesman who had won the admiration of most of Europe as well as of all of the United States.

If further proof of Mr. Herrick's courage were necessary—fortunately it is not necessary—it would be furnished by the speech he made in Boston the other night, in which he said:

By the course of events in Europe our complacency is somewhat disturbed. Our faith in the security of our isolation is becoming less implicit. We perceive rather clearly that our national existence is to be maintained and our safety as a people to be secured only by our own efforts. My observations in Europe have brought home to me most forcibly the great advantage, really the necessity, of some such system of universal military service as prevails in France, Switzerland or other countries, adapted to our own conditions and citizenship and drawing impartially from all classes.

It takes a man of courage to come out flatly for universal military service, particularly when that man has been told, as Herrick has been told, that there is a good chance for him to become President. The public mind automatically couples universal military service with the words "compulsion" and "conscription."—*Dec. 13, 1915.*

IS PATRIOTISM OPTIONAL?

Can a conscientious man fight for his country when he thinks she is wrong? There is a time for differences of opinion. After the decision has been made then comes action. This demands unity, loyalty and patriotism. Private opinion may then be treason; for liberty, as opposed to anarchy, is only reached by united action.

How much liberty would there be if each cell in the body was free to obey or not obey the stimulus to act from the nerve centers? There would be only death for all. Patriotism is as necessary in a nation as is loyalty and obedience from the members of a football team. When a game is on the only thing for the players to do is to obey loyally, enthusiastically. Then is not the time for debate of differences in judgment.

It is not that the individual loses his individual rights; but in order that all individuals may develop and conserve their rights, there must be combination and unity. Anything else is anarchy, and under anarchy there are no rights. That is, if we individuals are to really conserve our rights, we must realize that the rights of all are greater than our individual rights, and therefore we must be willing to fight for the will of the whole.

It is so with a nation. National policy—particularly foreign policy—after it is settled, demands and should compel the devotion of every citizen. A man should no more question the right and wisdom of his country to ask for military service than he questions its right to ask for and take part of his property in the shape of taxes.

This kind of patriotism should be taught to every citizen, to every boy and girl. In order to carry this out, every boy and every girl should be taught those principles which they should know in order to serve their country effectively.

As long as war is possible, every citizen should be prepared for it. This means two things: (1) Fitness of each individual—boy and girl; and (2) special training of the soldier.

Military training does not produce good results before a boy is sixteen. Therefore, all children before the age of sixteen should be given the training which will put them in the best condition for health and the development of power and hardihood.

After sixteen, in addition, every boy should be trained as a soldier, for patriotism is not optional. Patriotism may demand fighting for one's country. Fighting for one's country involves a long preliminary training—and there is no better training for citizenship than is given in the school of the soldier.

Peace and order are to be secured by force. Police give freedom. Police lessen belligerency and render individual arms unnecessary. International police—which we are to have—will make national preparedness unnecessary, but unpreparedness before international police have been developed is like throwing away one's defenses in a frontier town when the lawless are armed, ready and willing to murder.

The world can win permanent peace and order only as they have been won in western frontier towns, by united, forceful action by the peaceful majority. Permanent peace and order are secured only by de-

veloping a powerful force which will enforce obedience to law. To disarm before that result has been accomplished is to invite anarchy.

All of us who wish peace and order must compel peace by force that will restrain the lawless. This method has been followed in our cities and states, through efficient court and police powers. Internationally the problem presents two aspects. The first is the suppression of piracy on the sea and brigandage on land, in the less highly organized regions of the earth, where effective government has not been developed. For the accomplishment of this object a small international force will suffice.

The second aspect presents greater difficulties. The existence of mighty armaments is an outcome of the struggle that underlies all life. Nations change their status and their power and economic development with the current of time. Some nations remain stationary or decrease in numbers. Others, by reason of a high birthrate and a low rate of infant mortality, strain at their boundaries and are forced to seek more elbow room.

The flags that cover the map of the world do not weave into a mosaic that is permanent and final. The development of humanity and its frontiers can never crystallize into right form. The apportionment of Europe that was decreed as a finality by the council of Jena a hundred years ago looks preposterous to us now. When the diplomats of Christendom undertook at succeeding international congresses—at Paris after the Crimean war, at Berlin after the Russo-Turkish war, at London after the first Balkan war, at Bucharest after

the second Balkan war—to fix new delimitations of peoples, their mandates were annulled unceremoniously by the ambitions or the vital impulses of nations. And all these changes, all these reversals of the ordinances of statesmen have been accomplished by the sword or by sea power.

Unless we are willing to abandon our great policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine and the open door in China, we of the United States must develop an effective force, both on sea and on land, in order to hold our present position in the world and to further develop our influence. Until an international force has been developed that will continuously adjust boundaries and spheres of influence according to the vital energies of the various nations, by substituting the ballot for the bullet, battalions and naval power, not words, are needed to establish our position. National failure would narrow the life and scope of each individual citizen; hence the duty and the right of the state to call upon every individual for military service to make the group strong.—*Dec. 18, 1915.*

ATHLETIC NATIONS

We consider ourselves the premier athletic nation of the world. We win international matches in tennis, rowing, running. We look with a feeling of superiority upon the misguided German or Frenchman who knows no polo or golf. The truth is that they infinitely surpass us in the most valuable form of athletics, the art of being a soldier.

Nearly every sound adult male is this type of athlete on the continent. It is the sort of athletics

to which they give up one, two or three solid years of their lives. It is a game whose playing means not selfish pleasure but readiness to serve and protect the country, the institutions, the women who are dear to us.

Can any one point to a class of athletics in this country comparable with military service in setting a man up physically and morally, in imbuing him with the sense of team play and solidarity with his fellows? Military service on the continent is a major cause of the efficiency of industrial work there, a major cause for the strong competition we have to meet. The shiftless, undisciplined English worker is now getting this same stern training; also the worker of Canada and Australia. Are we alone to lag behind?

But the advantage to the individual is a small part of the argument for military service for all. Nothing else will make the country secure. Or do some of our fellow-countrymen think we could pit our college football teams, our champions in tennis, golf and water polo, against the trained and disciplined army and navy athletes from overseas?—*May 6, 1916.*

A UNIVERSAL SERVICE PLANK

The Republican convention, apart from the work of nominating the man best fitted for the presidency, owes to the party and the country the paramount duty of making a strong and plain-spoken declaration on the vital subject of preparedness. Glittering generalities revolving about the word "Americanism" will not do. Neither will a flaccid reference to preparedness.

What the people want is a definite, clean-cut pledge for the one form of preparedness which will mean something. That is, universal and compulsory service as the basis of a national armament that will enable us to repel invasion without a preliminary display of inefficiency such as that which made the Spanish war, in its initial stage at least, a demonstration of incapacity.

Against such a specific declaration the pacifists within the party are making an energetic fight. Rather than commit the party to the only definite plan which would meet the requirements, the pacifists are showing an unmistakable desire to set forth a mild inclination toward preparedness in gentle words which would have no meaning. If they should succeed in their designs of emasculating the cause they would play successfully into the hands of the enemies whose eyes may be directed at any time in the future toward the vast wealth of this undefended republic.

What the rank and file of the Republican party want—and what the country demands—is a straight, unequivocal declaration for compulsory universal service. That, and that alone, will solve the problem of our liberties and our honor as a nation. That, and that alone, will assure the position of this country in the front rank among the nations to which its extent, its industrial development and the wide scope of its interests entitle it.—*June 6, 1916.*

MAKING THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Now and then one has the good fortune to meet a Canadian soldier

back from the front and learn how this war is solidifying the British Empire.

An Australian and a Canadian, on leave, start up the Strand for the Hotel Savoy. Before they are there, they gather in a Scotchman and an empire man from Jamaica. At the Savoy an imperial lunch takes place.

They are all getting to know and understand each other, a knowledge based on mutual service and sacrifice for a common cause. Together they have met night attacks, watched the aeroplanes fighting overhead, hunted trench rats, fought for the new-made craters of mine explosions, or played football far back of the lines. They meet in London and talk of a new sort of British Empire.

A tremendous impulse to national feeling is throbbing through every fighting nation in Europe. North and south German are closer together than ever before; this war is completing what the Franco-Prussian began. The peoples of Russia are being thrown together by millions on the east front.

All the imperial conferences of all the ages would not have done for the British Empire what this war is doing. All the talk of Americanism, and all exhortation thereto, multiplied by seven, will not do for us what a few years of practical Americanism will do, a few years of universal military service, of making all of us ready to defend the country that has done so much for us.—*June 23, 1916.*

A SOLDIER'S FAMILY

The present situation of our national guardsmen at the front emphasizes the injustice of this system

of meeting the demands of national defense. These national guardsmen enlisted in the militia for service in the borders of the United States. They were drafted into the federal forces for service abroad. They are held inactive on the Mexican border, forbidden to perform the task for which they understood they were sent there. In the meantime many of their dependents are destitute at home, denied the pay promised by the guardsmen's former employers, and refused aid from the federal government.

The guardsmen are feeling the rank injustice inherent in any volunteer system. It distributes unequally the burdens of war. Equality of sacrifice demands equality of service; that is, readiness by all to perform military service. Far from being an autocratic regulation, universal military service is true democracy. Our present volunteers—or conscripts—bear all the risk and inconvenience of service in the field. Their dependents bear all the home suffering due to restricted or disappearing family income. Both the non-volunteers and their families are quite free from any contribution but kind words.

The national government has refused to do anything for guardsmen's dependents. If the guardsmen had crossed the border and enlisted in the American battalion of the Canadian army, both he and his family would be incomparably better off. He would be paid \$1.10 per day by the Canadian government, while his family would receive a separation allowance of \$20 per month, \$53 per month in all. In addition, the Canadian patriotic fund would allow his family so much per month for each dependent

child. In the American battalion, enlisting for England, an American and his family are from four to five times better cared for than in the national guard, which now pays privates \$15 per month.

No soliders in the European war are forced to worry about their wives and children as our guardsmen are forced to worry. On Tuesday Senator Warren said at Washington:

The United States and Mexico are in accord on one subject, and that is in making no provision for the families of the soldiers who are in the field. Mr. President, that is a phase of accord that I do not want to see go on as between these two governments. I think we ought to follow the example of all the rest of the world on this subject.

The national guard system has broken down, both from a military and a democratic viewpoint. Its democratic failings can be patched up by having the public treasury free from sacrifice the dependents of those who serve us. That relieves the inequality of sacrifice by women and children. Inequality of sacrifice among men can be relieved only by universal preparedness of all men to serve. And in no other way can we attain that military efficiency whose lack in the national guard has been wonderfully demonstrated in this border campaign.

The administration has met the situation with its cutsumary indirection. It has allowed guardsmen at the border to be excused if they could prove their dependents were in need. Pride long compelled the soldiers to stick it out. Now hundreds of appeals daily are reaching the War Department from dependents at home. The men are simply being forced to come back, and we shall soon see great gaps in every

regiment on the border.—*July 28, 1916.*

ROBERT BACON

Robert Bacon, in his confession of faith as a candidate for the United States Senate, strikes a clear note regarding the greatest single issue that faces us. He says:

I place my faith in the wisdom of the fathers of this country as expressed in the act of Congress of May 8, 1792, which imposed obligatory military training and service upon the nation; and I believe that Congress should immediately re-enact the principle of that law, which reads as follows: "Every able-bodied male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is of the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years shall be enrolled in the militia."

This policy is not only right, just and necessary, but it is in accordance with the true spirit of democracy and of equality.

This is one of the first manly facings of the facts since we heard Roosevelt speaking out, loud and strong, on that historic tour in the Middle West.

Robert Bacon has spoken the words that are in the hearts of us all. He has immeasurably strengthened his claim upon the consideration of his fellow citizens.—*August 24, 1916.*

MILITARY SERVICE AND INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION

Far-sighted men who love truth more than they do ease are proclaiming universal military service as the salvation of this country. At every turn they see how obstacles that baffle us would melt away if we were a nation of trained and disciplined citizen soldiers.

Mexico is too much for the statesmanship at Washington. So are Great Britain and Germany. Haiti and San Domingo are the two largest nations with whom our State department feels itself able to deal on equal terms. While it is likely that this particular administration would have held to a timid and dishonorable foreign policy under any circumstances, still that tendency was strengthened by a feeling of the terrible military weakness of our country. Germany, Great Britain and Mexico would never have flouted us had we not been just as impotent as we talked.

Neither the railroad nor the New York traction strike situation would ever have arisen had we been a nation of trained citizen soldiers. Soldiers who have sacrificed a year of their lives to serve in common their country could not take up arms against each other in industrial disputes without any honest attempt to compose their difficulties and with no regard for the country or community they are supposed to serve.

If the men who are managers and those who are workers had served a democratic year in the ranks together, they would understand each other for all time. It would make forever impossible such chicanery as Mr. Shonts and Mr. Hedley exhibited in their attempt to destroy the effectiveness of the union which they nominally recognized. In the army ranks would be developed a spirit of co-operation, of mutual regard, of working to a common end, not separate ends. Controversies as to the shares of labor and capital, respectively, would take on more of the aspect of discussions between business partners. All men would learn an ideal of joint service to a

public, a country, that is greater than any of them, or any group. It would no longer be morally possible for four railroad brotherhoods to threaten the industrial and private life of the country with death and destruction.

The lesson of sacrifice is the lesson of individual life. The ability to sacrifice, to restrain self, is character, in the man, in the group, and in the nation. And, strange as it might seem, the course of sacrifice is the most profitable one. We get by giving. Unselfishness is the highest, noblest—and most profitable—form of selfishness.

Military service would transfuse men and managers, traction owners and traction workers, with the spirit of readiness to make in common the last great sacrifice, life itself, for something above and beyond their own petty aims, to protect their country. It would be the simplest matter for them to make the minor sacrifices of money and comfort necessary to give each other a square deal and together to work for the industrial welfare of the country they stand ready to preserve.—Sept. 16, 1916.

AN EXTRA SCHOOL YEAR

Without any doubt the most democratizing influence of our American life is the public school. A common fund of childhood experiences, of school-taught principles and ideals is what, more than all else, has bound us together.

So it was in the past. To-day we need something more than this. The ingredients of the melting pot are too bulky, too diverse to fuse into one homogeneous product in the brief years of compulsory education.

Moreover, the children of those classes who possess capital, and so an advantage in the race for industrial leadership—these children tend to avoid the public schools.

The youth of the country needs another year of compulsory schooling together, another year of common experiences and ideals. And the subject of this extra year will be one that requires a severe discipline, a stern subordination to a purpose above and beyond the individual's petty aims, which will bind American youths together in the bonds of united labor and sacrifice.

The subject of this new year of school will be the study of arms, the learning of the art of being soldiers in their country's cause.

Are we ready for this test of willingness to serve? In us lies the hope of democracy and so of the whole world. History looks down upon us in this crisis. Shall it write that another great republic, grown rich and fat and great, chose the primrose path of luxury, softness and ease? Shall it be written that America, too, could not lift its eyes above its money bags and its platitudes of universal peace, nor give one little year to prepare, to preserve what our fathers and a gracious Providence bequeathed to our care?—*Sept. 18, 1916.*

UNIVERSAL SERVICE

There is no such democratic institution as universal military service by the manhood of the nation. It levels rich and poor, all classes together, and then raises them to the heights of common labor and common sacrifice for their country. Its

worth to the country is shown in war, but shown still more in peace. It is the path to the nationalization of America.

Therefore, when a man like Robert Bacon, points to this path to nationalization, it matters not what are his views on the merits of a war in which we are not involved. His is the way to give us success in any war in which we may become involved, quite against our will. True Americans will find that is more important than a man's opinions on a foreign issue.

To-day around Robert Bacon are rallying the forward-looking men who see in universal service and sacrifice the solution of the problems that darken the future. Our enemy is less war than luxury and soft ease. We need the regeneration that a century of military service gave Germany and which is proving the blessing of this war to England. We can have this regeneration now voluntarily, or later have it forced upon us amid the sufferings that chance or fate brings to those who refuse to insure or prepare against a world-old calamity.

Our voters find it unpleasant to lift themselves out of their selfish ease to render service to their nation. All honor and support to the statesman who has the vision and courage to stand for the truth of unpleasant facts.—*Sept. 19, 1916.*

A DEFEAT THAT IS REALLY VICTORY

The only national issue involved in the Calder-Bacon rivalry for United States senator was the question of compulsory military service.

On all other questions the two candidates were of one opinion. On that issue, however, they stood at extremes. Mr. Bacon entered the contest with a most explicit and courageous avowal of his conviction that compulsory service was the only way to develop and democratize America. He believed it should be the policy of the Republican party. Mr. Calder promptly challenged the Bacon platform, declaring that not one Republican in ten believed in compulsory military service.

The vote at the primaries upholds Mr. Bacon's view. Republicans divided almost equally between the two candidates. Mr. Calder can no longer maintain that not one in ten Republicans approves compulsory service. Indeed, if he is frank about the matter, he will have to concede that his three years' canvass won out for him despite the weakness of his cause. His was a triumph of organization, not of principle.

The issue for which Mr. Bacon stood had a most remarkable and significant response from Republican voters, though he had only a brief two weeks in which to present it. The few thousand votes that deny him personally the full fruits of victory, while greatly to be regretted, are not the basis for analyzing and interpreting the result. The 140,000 votes that he received are the true test of the strength of his cause. They furnish the real guide to the minds of Republican voters, and substantiate in a most convincing way Mr. Bacon's claim that his platform accurately reflects the attitude of his party toward military service.

History is replete with defeats that are really victories. The Bacon defeat is of that kind.—*Sept. 21, 1916.*

UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE

China does not believe in universal military service. Maybe that's because there is no word in the Chinese language that means patriotism. China is getting a lesson in what lack of nationalism means. Japan is slowly but surely getting a strangle hold on the great unwieldy Chinese body and soon an island people of 55,000,000 will be masters over a mainland people of 400,000,000.

The Japanese have a word equivalent to patriotism. They have a love that is wonderful for the land of their nativity and a devotion almost fanatical to the spirit of nationalism.

China is crumbling. Japan is rising in power with tremendous strides.

Universal military service does not mean a militaristic nation. It means a nation trained, prepared and with the spirit of nationalism instilled into the heart of every citizen. It means better men physically. It means orderliness, cleanliness, system, a multitude of things that count for better manhood, better citizenship.

The world is not blood-mad, regardless of the spectacle Europe has presented for the last two years. Nations, like individuals, quarrel and learn respect for each other and a better control of their passions out of the blood they spill and the sufferings they endure owing to their clashes.

To-day Herbert Asquith, premier of Great Britain, and von Bethmann-Hollweg, chancellor of Germany, look with much more sober view upon the great questions that

brought on the appeal to arms. And how could it be otherwise, for they have made the great sacrifice.

It may warm the heart of the British premier if, when the name of his son is called, the response is like that made by all France for I a Tour d'Auvergne.

"Dead on the field of honor."

But it will not bring back his first born. Nor will anything bring back the two sons of the German chancellor who gave their lives in the cause of the Fatherland.

Eight princes of German royal

houses have been killed in battle. There scarcely is a family of the nobility of Germany or England which is not in mourning.

The tremendous tragedy must calm the brains and cool the blood of statesmen, rulers, people. It will be a better, a more tolerant and a less quarrelsome Europe.

But Europe will not have less of nationalism. It will not know less of patriotism. It will not become a group of Chinas.

And neither must America.—*Sept. 21, 1916.*

The Navy

\$100,000,000 EACH FOR BERMUDA AND JAMAICA

The events of the last year have clearly demonstrated that America cannot dispense with a background of force on which to rest its influence in the world. No matter how noble our motives, no matter how just our appeal, it may not be heeded, as Mexico has demonstrated, unless we are able and ready to back it up with military force. The navy must be our first line of defense.

The naval strength of the nations depends partly upon geography as islands and strategic fortifications on frontiers, and partly upon its equipment of battleships, submarines and aeroplanes. Bermuda lies less than two days' steaming radius from New York city. From it as a starting point any Atlantic seaboard city can be reached. Used as a submarine base it would tie up our whole commerce with Europe and South America. If used by a hostile power and made the base for Zeppelin raids New York city could be reached as London is reached to-day from Lübeck on the continent. Its strategic value, if in our possession and properly fortified, would make it weigh as heavily as twelve battleships and a fleet of submarines in our favor. Two hundred and fifty million dollars invested in naval equipment involving tremendous upkeep charges would not give us so much added strength as Bermuda in our hands properly fortified.

In the days of sailing vessels Bermuda was so far off that it did not count in our coast defense. Theoretical distances have remained the same. Engine-driven ships, submarines, aircraft have annihilated distance. During the last generation, so far as its military importance is concerned, Bermuda has been moved so that to-day it stands at the very doors of our continent.

Jamaica lies in the highway between New York and Panama. American shipping must increase after the war. Our ocean-borne commerce must go in American bottoms under the American flag, and it will need our protection. Every ship starting from an Atlantic seaport for our western states, for South America, for the Orient, will need protection in passing through the Panama canal. Jamaica is strategically the most important point to accomplish this end. If it should be seized by a hostile power or used against us with only a dozen submarines, it would prevent all access to the Panama canal. Twenty battleships cannot give us the same ability for the protection of Panama that the possession and fortification of Jamaica alone would furnish.

This is a time of readjustment. There are many grounds why we Americans feel that we have nothing to fear from England, and that the spiritual kinship of this country and England will make us safe for the future. Likewise, England can depend upon the permanent good in-

tentions of America. As a nation with 100,000,000 population, we need a larger influence in the world, and our political force should weigh more heavily. As strategic points for defense for the United States, these two islands will become incomparably more valuable than they are at present.

It is to the interest of both countries that some arrangement for the sale of the sovereignty of these two points shall be made. England can well use the \$200,000,000 that we can well afford to pay, and the whole Anglo-Saxon world would be richer if the exchange took place.

The desire to exert our just influence in the affairs of the world compels us to look to the strategy of geography to augment our defenses along those lines. This is the moment for our statesmanship to act, for it may help to solve difficult problems of international finance.—Sept. 23, 1915.

SHALL WE ACCEPT SECOND PLACE?

In the *New York Times Magazine* for December 5 Roland G. Usher presents the interesting inquiry, "Does the United States Need Defense Against England?" He points out that it is essential to the preservation of her hegemony for Great Britain to rule the seas, that as long as England is England she will continue supreme upon the seas, but that Great Britain is the only great nation that dare not use her sea power for aggression, that she would never attack us; on the contrary, she would defend us.

"If we needed defense at all we

have depended upon England for it," he says, and points out that on the seas we could not cope with Germany's navy. He also says this: "She has been fair, just, and even magnanimous, to us for more than sixty years."

Perhaps Mr. Usher thinks that when Confederate cruisers were built in British shipyards and fitted out by Britons to prey upon American commerce, for which voluntarily Great Britain afterward paid us an indemnity of \$15,500,000, that was "fair, just, and even magnanimous," but, as yet, American history does not so express it, nor have Americans, as yet, accustomed themselves so to consider it.

Mr. Usher takes the ground that "so long as this condition prevails, so long as England remains mistress of the seas, the United States has nothing to fear from her, and we need no preparedness against her." His advice, therefore, is thus expressed:

Let us, therefore, do what we can to hold up her hands and maintain her position, in the firm belief that we are thereby advancing our own interests as definitely as possible.

Early in 1862, when Lord Salisbury (afterward prime minister of Great Britain) was speaking on the floor of the House of Commons, he said this:

Every one who watches the current of history must know that the northern states of America never can be our true friends, for this simple reason: Not merely because the newspapers write at each other, or that there are prejudices on both sides, but because we are rivals—rivals politically, rivals commercially. We aspire to the same position. We both aspire to the government of the seas. We are both a manufacturing people, and in every port, as in every court, we are rivals to each other.

Our manufactures far exceed our capacity at home to consume them. We must seek out, and find, and hold, and develop foreign markets for their absorption. Only with our own ships, under the control of our own nation and people, shall we be able to do this as we need to do it. Manifestly we cannot depend upon foreign ships, least of all England's, for this great need. Our industries must have foreign vent, or we must curtail production, which would be calamitous. We must go on. Going on, we must compete with Great Britain as a commercial nation and as a maritime nation. In such a situation wisdom and foresight alike admonish us to depend wholly upon ourselves.—*Dec. 18, 1915.*

THE PERIL

Last night, at the dinner of the Sphinx Club at the Waldorf-Astoria, the Sphinx spoke and made prophecies. Col. Glenn, chief of staff of the eastern department of the army, stationed at Governor's Island, described our army as a "pathetic thing."

What is more important, he told the direction from which our unpreparedness invited assault. This is what he said:

Keep in mind that if we are involved in the Atlantic we shall be struck at the same time from the Pacific.

It is Japan who will strike us from the Pacific. Who is her ally that will at the same time be attacking us from the Atlantic? There is only one such power. Japan has only one ally with whom we could possibly be involved, England.

The speech of the eastern chief of staff recalls the haunting words

of the President. At Kansas City, on February 2, speaking of the war, he said:

If this flame begins to creep in on us it may, my fellow citizens, creep in upon both coasts, and there are thousands and thousands of miles of coast. The navy of the United States must now, as rapidly as possible, be brought to a state of efficiency and of numerical strength which will make it practically impregnable to the navies of the world.

Does this fear explain our acquiescence in the Japanese closure of the open door in China, our acquiescence in the British rifling of our mails on the high seas, in the suppression of our food shipment for the German civilian population, and in their incidental strangling of our commerce with European neutrals?

Is this the compelling emergency for which we must now feverishly prepare?

Then, in heaven's name, let it be stated in plain words and not in half-veiled references. It is the part of loyalty to make clear to the American people a national peril of this magnitude.—*March 15, 1916.*

FACTS VS. DREAMS

Rear-Admiral Fiske's just published letter of November 9, 1914, is a frank, matter-of-fact summary of conditions by a man of large experience and sound judgment. It is the earnest recommendation, made "respectfully but urgently," of an officer who felt deeply the delinquencies of our navy, and who in the early period of the war clearly foresaw the menacing and vexatious incidents bound to occur and to involve this government more or less directly.

The country will be amazed at the confession of Secretary of the Navy

Daniels that he did not know of the existence of this formal letter from his Aid for Operations until months afterward, and still more amazed, now that the letter has been made public, that he resisted until the last moment every effort to have its recommendations made known to Congress.

It will be difficult for Mr. Daniels to satisfy people that he is a competent head of the Navy department when the solemn warning of November 9, 1914, by Admiral Fiske is contrasted with President Wilson's easy assurance to Congress three weeks later that we "should be ashamed of any thought of hostility or of fearful preparation for trouble."

In the one case the man of experience and of real information interpreted conditions with clear, prophetic vision; in the other case the man of no experience, and blind and deaf to real information, interpreted conditions with all the unreality of a dreamer.—*April 25, 1916.*

AN UNBELIEVABLE STORY

The Navy department, from Secretary Daniels down, may well regard with suspicion the story published by a Valparaiso newspaper that an officer of the battleship *Tennessee*, at a public dinner in the Chilean city, poured ice cream on the head of the admiral of the Chilean navy.

There are many reasons why this extraordinary charge against the manners of an American naval officer should be treated with extreme reserve by his countrymen. One reason for doubting the veracity of the tale is the failure of Capt.

Beach, commander of the *Tennessee*, to report an escapade which, had it occurred, would have furnished the basis of an international "incident." Another reason for maintaining an attitude of reserve is the testimony of Samuel Untermyer, who was a member of the McAdoo party, which arrived at Valparaiso two or three days after the time of the story printed by the Valparaiso newspaper, that he heard nothing of so gross a violation of the proprieties.

But the best means for assuming that no such incident occurred is the well-established reputation of the officers' personnel of the United States navy for good behavior even under trying conditions. In view of these circumstances it will take a good deal more than the word of a Valparaiso newspaper to make the American people believe, not only that an American naval officer poured ice cream on the head of the admiral of the Chilean navy, but that he also threw his shoe at the statue of another hero of the Chilean navy.—*June 1, 1916.*

OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

The lessons of the battle of Skagerrak have not been lost on the Senate committee on naval affairs. That body, with an assumption of initiative which does it credit, has recommended the construction of a real navy within a period of three years. In this last detail the committee has exceeded the recommendations of the naval board, which contemplated a more modest building programme extended over a period of five years.

Admiral Dewey in a notable ar-

tielc thus summarizes the importance of battleships as demonstrated by the greatest naval battle in history:

The battle of Skagerrak seems to have justified the position which has long been taken by the experts of the general board of the American navy, a position which has met the approval of most American authorities and which has been crystallized into the programme which America has followed. The general board has recommended for fifteen years that the United States continue the policy of placing its chief reliance in big ships. Since the dreadnought came into being that body has maintained that that vessel should be made the backbone of the fleet.

In harmony with the expert opinion of America's premier naval commander, the Senate committee has completely reversed the original programme of the House committee, which provided for the construction of five battle cruisers and no battleships, and recommends the construction of ten battleships within the specified period of three years. At the same time it has not ignored the value of the battle cruiser with its higher speed and its greater power of mobility. Inasmuch as this type of ship has played a prominent part in the British naval programme for the past few years, the committee makes provision for the addition of six battle cruisers to our navy within the same period of three years.

Profiting again from the brilliant record made by the destroyers in the struggle off Jutland, the Senate committee recommends the construction of no less than fifty of this type of vessel; and in recognition of the great efficiency which has been developed by both German and British submarines in this war, the committee contemplates the ad-

dition of fifty-eight coast submarines to our navy.

This programme would indicate that the Senate committee is making a serious endeavor to strengthen our notoriously weak first line of defense.—*July 3, 1916.*

LA FOLLETTE'S FOREIGN POLICY

Strange and wonderful are the ways of the irreconcilable pacifists. The summit of their achievements was reached last week when Senator La Follette found himself placed in the position of advocating that we should use our enlarged navy to protect citizens of all nations but our own.

La Follette introduced an amendment to the navy appropriation bill. In its final ripe form it read:

Provided, that no battleship, battle cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo boat destroyer or submarine herein appropriated for shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class or nature, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership or corporation of the United States.

The amendment aimed to leave our citizens to go abroad to spread our foreign trade, absolutely at the mercy of such justice as they could get at the hands of the local governments of semi-civilized countries, whenever these countries should fall into a state of anarchy and the property of Americans be taken. Indeed, this notice that we should do nothing to protect our citizens would serve as an invitation to rob them.

Senator Lewis pointed out that such a policy involved the abandon-

ment of the Monroe doctrine. For, he explained, European governments did not share our strange theories as to the abandonment of our citizens. If we did not protect their citizens in their lawful rights in countries on this hemisphere, where the civil power had disintegrated into anarchy, then the European governments would send their own military power into those countries to bring them to their senses. Such action would be a violation of the Monroe doctrine.

That is, Senator Lewis reminded the Senate of the fact that no international rights are without their obligations. If we order European countries to keep out of South America and Mexico, we must engage ourselves to preserve some sort of order there.

La Follette had the answer. He said that nothing in his amendment prevented us from protecting the citizens of *foreign countries*.

When I bring to the senator's attention the fact that this amendment relates to no investment made by any foreign citizen, syndicate, corporation or copartnership he will see that the criticism that he is making cannot have application. It is limited only to a prohibition against using the vessels provided by the appropriation in this bill to collect the claims of our own citizens, so that the question of the Monroe doctrine can under no circumstances be raised by my amendment.

That is, we were to spend over \$500,000,000 for naval construction to protect the property rights of citizens of other nations, while expressly promising not to protect the property rights of our own citizens.

With the issue so clearly drawn, the Senate defeated La Follette's amendment 42 to 8. It was an interesting and instructive occurrence.

It is too bad that the practical working of more of the doctrines of the ultra-pacifist dreamers cannot be thus exposed.—*July 25, 1916.*

AMERICA NEEDS THE DANISH WEST INDIES

Foresight is better than hindsight. The purchase of Alaska in 1867 for the paltry sum of \$7,200,000 in gold was a piece of foresight for which America has ample reason to be grateful. The failure to purchase the Danish West Indies now will prove a costly cause for regretful hindsight ten years from now.

America needs the West Indies. The islands lie on the main route to and from South America. The lion's share of that trade belongs geographically and economically to the United States. For the purposes of a coaling and cable station, a sort of halfway house between New York and the mouth of the Panama canal, the island of St. Thomas is ideal. Denmark is willing to sell. The legitimate commercial and political interests of this country make the purchase of the Danish possession imperative at this time. We should seek, on every consideration, to prevent some strong foreign power, like Germany, from establishing itself in our back yard. To permit such a peaceful penetration, whether by Germany or some other power, would create problems which America might have ample cause to regret in the future.

Not only the Danish West Indies, but several of the British island possessions strung out along the sea route between the two Americas,

should be acquired by the United States in the fulfillment of its manifest destiny as the upbuilder of South America. And among these possessions Bermuda stands out as the base of great advantage or possible menace to American interests. Jamaica, within easy striking distance of the Panama canal, is another British island which, logically and as a matter of simplest measure of precaution, should be placed under the American flag by friendly purchase.

The great war has shown the transcendent strategic value of straits and of lands dominating waterways. By her control of the Suez canal Britain is able to maintain her unobstructed sea road to India against the assaults of her enemies. The little rock town of Aden is the key to the Red Sea. The frowning cliff of Gibraltar is the sentinel that guards the gate of the Mediterranean. By her fortunate possession of the sandspit of Heligoland, acquired through an unprecedented fluke of fortune, Germany is able to interpose a barrier of steel and fire between the mouth of the Kiel canal and the might of England's navy.

It would be suicidal for America, on the threshold of her great commercial expansion in South America, to suffer a Heligoland, or a Gibraltar, or an Aden to be erected by her rivals at the mouth of her Suez.

The purchase of the Danish West Indies would be of hardly greater advantage to the United States than

to the people of the islands themselves. One reason why Denmark is prepared to sell the islands is because, through the operations of tariffs and of the inexorable laws of supply and demand, the people who inhabit them are vainly struggling against economic ruin. Under the American flag the people of St. Thomas and of St. John, under the operation of the same laws, would wax prosperous.

What is true of economic conditions in the Danish West Indies is equally true of Bermuda and of Jamaica. Like the people of the Danish West Indies, the inhabitants of Bermuda and Jamaica would find in annexation to the United States a prompt and effective cure for their economic distress.

Altruistic as well as selfish reasons, then, press upon America the duty of availing herself of the present opportunity to extend her dominion of the Danish West Indies. And the purchase of these islands should be the first step in a fixed and continuing policy which shall gradually eliminate European nations from the command of our sea-ways.

Such a policy would constitute imperialism only in the same sense as the purchase of Alaska was an imperialistic step. Clearing away the opportunities for hostile naval stations on our road to South America would be an indispensable adjunct to our future naval development.—
July 25, 1916.

Industrial Preparedness in General

GUNS AND THE MEN BEHIND THEM

Every thoughtful American who can see the effect of recent events in the relations of nations recognizes that our programme of defense must be strong and determined. Our navy must be strengthened, our army developed, or there is disaster ahead. The events of the last fifteen months leave no room for doubt or hesitation. Force cannot be dispensed with in international relations.

No movement, no political issue is the equal of this in importance.

Already the administration does well in its attempt to meet the public demand, but in the suddenness with which the issue has arisen there lies grave danger.

We need a complete and far-reaching organization of all the energies of our people so as to make them valuable in time of war. Such an organization must comprise our whole able-bodied citizenry because wars are no longer fought with a thin fringe of men on the firing line. Back of every soldier on the battle front there are three men engaged on the railroads, in industries and on the farms, supporting by their industrial energy those who are actually fighting. A soldier requires not only physical hardiness, courage and discipline that enable him to co-operate en masse and make him responsive to

direction, but also special skill for the use of tools of modern warfare and its complicated machinery.

We must have the complete mobilization of every corporation and railroad. All these interests must work with precision and in absolute harmony if the full industrial energy of the nation is to come into play. War creates new tasks for agriculture, for science, for hospitals and medicine. Preparedness, in short, requires a new form of national organization permeating the whole body politic. Years of the most patient and most energetic effort and the ablest organizing minds that our people can produce will be needed to build this vast and complex human machine. Highly trained and specialized bodies of officers and experts must be developed who are versed, not only in the technical devices of warfare but also in the art of drilling and developing men. The military officer's function is broad and he must be, among many other things, a skillful teacher and sanitary expert. The task of bringing to a common focus the energies of the United States has never been attempted on the scale now demanded.

How are we meeting this situation? *The proposal to spend \$400,000,000 in battleships and machinery will not solve our problems.* This plan has been seized upon by political leaders with eagerness,

but it will not make us safe. Much more than a vast aggregation of battleships and solid reserve supplies of cannon are needed. These material things are but incidental; the real need is for a living organism that must be built of men, and it takes longer to create such an organization than to produce the tools with which it will work.

Large appropriations of money for ships and cannon are finding favor with political leaders because it is easier to convince a citizen to pay a few dollars of taxes than to get him to see his duty to his country by submitting personally to the discomfort and effort involved in military training. Then, too, there is a very definite commercial stimulus on the part of those who would manufacture the equipment required which tends to develop our energies in this direction.

The *Wall Street Journal* of October 15 paints a seductive picture of the vast profits to be realized in meeting this demand for preparedness. It says:

New Naval Programme to be a Help to Many Companies

Chief Beneficiaries Include Bethlehem Steel, Crucible Steel and Submarine Boat Corporation—Carnegie Plant of United States Steel and Midvale Company in Line for Big Armor Plate Contracts—Battleships.

There is more business ahead of American manufacturers of battleships, cruisers, submarines and naval equipment and ordnance than ever before in the history of the country, provided the tentative programme for naval defense, as now contemplated by the administration in Washington, is carried through. That programme calls for the expenditure of \$400,000,000 in the next few years, and for an estimated outlay of

close to \$250,000,000 in the next year. The latter an increase of \$100,000,000 over last year.

This country's prospective enormous defense fund is one of the chief factors leading to the recent industrial expansion which has been especially noted in the companies that directly profit in naval construction orders. This large volume of work which now seems assured because of the general belief that the United States should have an adequate defense, will supplement large foreign war orders for shells and ordnance generally which have been placed during the past year.

Nothing can be more dangerous, for our problem of preparedness cannot be solved by an appropriation of money to be spent upon iron, steel, copper or other material equipment. Speculation in war stocks with the wildly exaggerated reports of profits in the munition business may endanger the whole movement for adequate national defense and check the willingness of the American voter to face the grave international issues that confront him. *Nothing would kill such a programme in a political campaign more quickly than the conviction that it was being furthered largely in the interests of equipment companies.*

The United States needs a well co-ordinated industrial organization to produce the materials of war. No nation has ever made in a decade such great steps toward preparedness as has the United States during the past fifteen months. The grouping under one management of interest, the co-ordinating of industrial plants that can be turned to the production of war supplies of all sorts is to be advantage of the country. We need to have large capital and intelligent and alert management to pur-

sue consistently the problems involved.

Private and corporate initiative in this field are rendering national service of the first order, but recognition of this fact must not lead us to conclude that the production of equipment is the main issue. It is not. The military efficiency of Germany and France lies in organization that runs back in unbroken threads to the time of Napoleon. The names of battleships such as the *Moltke*, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Bouvet* are material evidences today of the spirit which generations ago went into the armies and navies of those countries. Let us recognize that our first and greatest problem is to create the spirit and the personnel—the organization. We need some equipment immediately, but that is only a minor part of the task confronting us.—*Oct. 19, 1915.*

MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

War is a contest of technical skill rather than a struggle between masses of men. The nation that possesses the highest mechanical equipment is the nation that is best equipped to achieve triumph on the battlefield in defense of its rights, and perhaps of its very existence. The superiority of the machine over the man in warfare was made evident as early in the history of the world as the wars of Cæsar in Gaul. In one of his accounts of his many victories, the great conqueror ascribes the turning of the fortunes of war to the superior temper of the Roman hasta, or short sword, as compared with the weapons of the enemy.

To-day more than ever has victory attended the machine rather than the battalion. The forty-two centimeter gun was the element that gave to Germany her astonishing preponderance over her enemies in the first phase of the present struggle. Thus it was the work of the inventor and the manufacturer, rather than that of the soldier, that won battles for the Germans in the first clash of forces.

Under any such conditions of warfare, America, by reason of her inventive genius, is bound to excel in the power to defend her liberties. But inventive genius without organization is not qualified to stand the supreme test in time of crisis. Experience has shown that in America private enterprises are far more efficient in doing their work than governmental agencies. The corporations, in far higher degree than the government, possess the human and material resources for the manufacture of mighty weapons of defense like the forty-two centimeter guns.

These corporations, and their wealth of equipment constantly improved by the keenest minds and the most alert enterprise available in the country, must be mobilized for use in war as an adjunct to the government. With this end in view, the government must enlist among its defensive resources the industrial giants of the land—its Rockefellers, its Fords and its Schwabs. It must give to the corporations the opportunity of making legitimate—not excessive, but legitimate—profits in time of peace, in order that it might avail itself of their vast and highly perfected machinery of invention and production in time of war.

On the other hand, the corporations must give the government the first opportunity of acquiring their inventions and their powers of production—in time of peace. In time of war their machinery, human and material, must automatically become an integral part of the resources of the government.

By this method of industrial mobilization will the country be best able to meet the requirements of modern warfare—a warfare between engineers, inventors and manufacturers, rather than between masses of men, no matter how patriotic or how highly efficient individually.—*Nov. 4, 1915.*

A NITRATE FAMINE

For nitrates, which are necessary for making explosives, we are wholly dependent upon Chile, 3,000 miles away over the sea. Our navy is inferior to Great Britain, probably now to Germany, in view of her vast additions during the war period. Either of these nations, if at war with us, could close the seas and destroy our production of explosives.

No step in preparedness is more necessary than to guard the nitrate supply. There are three ways to do it. First, we can build a navy superior to any in the world. Even if we appropriated an unlimited amount for new construction, this end could not be attained within ten years, unless other nations in the meantime stopped their construction, and of this there is no sign. We have not now a ship-building industry capable of the task. It must be created. And we cannot neglect the nitrate supply for ten years.

Second, the government might buy from Chile and store in this country nitrates to last for a long war, say five years. We say "might." Ships are not available in the world for such huge carryings. After the war the demand for ships to carry reconstruction material will be vast and ocean rates high. Chile nitrates will be costly beyond all precedent, sought for as fertilizers for the depleted European agriculture and by the arms factories of all the world, engaged in restocking national arsenals. But by bidding without limit for ships and nitrates we could conceivably in two years accumulate a stock that would safeguard us. But what of our security during these two years?

The third way is an immediate government-owned plant to extract nitrates from the air or a government subsidy for such a private industry. The government plant for many reasons is better. Provision for it is included in the pending bill of the House naval committee. It should be authorized and constructed with no delay.

When this war began, England cut Germany's supply of Chile nitrate. The expectation was that Germany would soon run out of explosives. In May, 1915, Sir John French told the Havas News Agency that the Germans were getting chary of shells "because the failing supply of nitrates necessary for high explosives is making itself felt in Germany."

Sir John was wrong. German shells in the next few months "sprayed" Przemyśl and tore Hill 60 on the west. To-day they are blasting the French out of Verdun. The reason is simple. In peace,

with British sea power in view, the Germans had developed in Norway the process of taking nitrogen from the air. When the war broke out, they transferred the process to five new German factories, which are now supplying all needs both of the military and of agriculture. There is no end of air, and so no limit to nitrates and explosives.

Until our sea power is invincible—that is, for the next ten years at least—our defense must look to the methods of that nation which was itself confronted by superior sea power. And so the Naval Consulting Board and the navy turn to the example of Germany in guarding its home supply of nitrates.—*March 20, 1916.*

THE POWER OF ORGANIZATION

In an earnest plea for preparedness, Thomas A. Edison makes the following discouraging statement:

The trouble with us is that we are not good organizers, and I don't know that we ever will be. Our government is composed of all kinds of representatives, and it is very difficult to make the majority agree upon anything.

The second sentence in this statement furnishes a complete answer to the first.

History offers no parallel to the wonderful organization which has been built up in less than a lifetime by that characteristically American enterprise, the Standard Oil Company. Extending its field of operations from a local to a national scope, the Standard Oil has reached out beyond the seas and overspread the world. In China, the American corporation has been for years one of the strongest factors in the

peaceful development of the country. In Roumania, in Russia, in the Near East and Asia Minor the Standard Oil can is one of the familiar objects of domestic economy. Unlike the Hudson Bay Company and the East India Company, which represent the nearest approach to the commercial activities of the American corporation, Standard Oil has not commanded the services of armies, nor has it carried fire and sword into the dark places. It has built up its vast business on a commercial basis by entrusting its affairs to experts and by the continuance of a definite policy directed at the accomplishment of definite ends.

The conduct of our national affairs offers a sharp contrast to this model of efficiency: As Mr. Edison points out, our government is composed of "all kinds of representatives." Very few, if any, of these are experts. Very few, if any, hold office long enough to make themselves thoroughly familiar with the duties which the nation—or rather the party in power—has entrusted to them. With the advent of every party to power comes a more or less complete change in policy and in personnel. That which has been builded in one administration is destroyed by its successor.

It is also true, as Mr. Edison points out, that "it is very difficult to make the majority agree on anything." The progress of the army bill through Congress plainly illustrates that truth. But it does not appear to be difficult to obtain unity of action in the Standard Oil directorate. That is because the Standard Oil directorate is a continuing body of experts—a group-mind, so to speak—which if

changed at all by the stockholders is only partly changed at any time. The great majority of that group of a score of men remain *always* in command of the activities of the corporation. And the result of this permanence of personnel is a permanence in policy and in achievements.

In our national life a widely different state of affairs is presented. The national board of directors—if the term may be used for the sake of convenience—is made up, not of a score of men but of a hundred score. Such a body is incapable of united or prompt action. Every member of Congress, to mention only a part of this unwieldy national directory, has to have his say, either for constructive purposes or for the benefit of the home constituency. In the multiplicity of counsels is discord, and error, and delay and incapacity for continuous action.

The American people have proved, in the course of their brilliant industrial and commercial development, that they possess the highest power of organization in the world. In their political life they have betrayed the lowest power of organization in the world.

Why this appalling difference?

Because America has not applied to its national life the lessons which it has so thoroughly learned in its business life.—*March 22, 1916.*

THE MISSING BALANCE WHEEL

For some days shippers, railroads and Interstate Commerce Commission have been sitting together in Washington trying to devise a way

out of the congestion of freight upon our railroads and especially at the seaports. The transportation machine has broken down under the load imposed upon it.

This is partly due to the insufficiency of railroad facilities. Double tracking, terminals, yards and equipment have hardly been increased since the panic of 1907, for since those days the roads have been through a financial famine. To-day they are in the midst of a feast, but the equipment and construction companies cannot extend the railroads fast enough to meet the situation that has been on the way to overwhelm them all through the last nine years.

So it is always with business in this country. It is a feast or a famine. A year ago a New York citizens' committee was planning how to meet the unemployment problem. To-day business men are figuring how they will meet foreign competition in international markets after the war with American industries carrying the unexampled wages forced by the frantic bids of prosperous business.

Nor is it a war-time phenomenon. The balance wheel in the industrial machine is lacking. In 1907 we had a feast and starved through years of reaction.

There is no privilege in modern social life that does not carry with it a corresponding duty. Do the leaders in American industrial life see that the privilege and power to direct industry, the power of concentrated finance, carries with it a responsibility?

The American industrial system is complex and far-reaching. Its development requires vision and foresight. It cannot be left to the

chances of a hand-to-mouth policy.
—*March 30, 1916.*

VERDUN AND VILLA

An American business man who has just returned from Europe after visiting his branch factories in Belgium, France and Germany, sums up the struggle for Verdun as follows:

It is not a battle; it is not a matter of brave charges undertaken by courageous men. It is an engineering feat. The greatest engineering feat that ever has been attempted in history is in progress. A mountain of forts is being assaulted. Shells filled with explosives, shrapnel shells, huge howitzer shells, are but details of the undertaking. The assault is not being made with men. It is a vast engineering enterprise carried on with machinery, just as a modern factory turns out its product, not by hand labor but by machinery. The quantities of ammunition have been calculated in units of 100,000 tons. The totals will reach a million tons. To transport this vast material railroads have been built and macadam roads laid in parallel courses over each strip of territory to be traversed, over each square mile of new land conquered. A whole nation has set itself to the completion of an engineering feat with the aid of modern science, modern machinery and vast forces of men organized by the aid of the telephone and telegraph into the most perfect working mechanism of men and machines that can be created.

What is true of the German operations is equally true of the French. Like the Germans, the French are carrying on a vast engineering campaign, with machinery, railroad construction and artillery of enormous range and power as the main implements of warfare, operated by many thousands of brave men.

We too have a war—though a “little war”—on our hands. Compared with the scale of fighting at Verdun our operations against Villa

are insignificant. The Germans report that 36,000 French prisoners have been taken at Verdun to date—a number almost equal to our entire mobile army. The losses on both sides run far beyond 100,000 men, or more men than America has under arms for all purposes.

But the equipment and material efficiency of both the German and the French armies at Verdun furnish an interesting basis for comparison with the equipment and material effectiveness of our own expedition “somewhere in Mexico.”

More than 300 aeroplanes are in use on either side at Verdun, and the observations of the aviators have played an important part in the defense as well as the offense. We had six aeroplanes at the border when the trouble broke out, and two of them have been wrecked, while the remaining four are not working satisfactorily enough for long flights, such as are necessary in the pursuit far into the interior of Mexico.

At Verdun the artillery on both sides has done all that was required of it, without a hitch or a breakdown. In Columbus, when Villa made his murderous raid, the losses to our soldiers were swelled by the fact that one of the machine guns failed to work. This weapon had been condemned as far back as the Cuban campaign—and was included in the equipment of a part of the American army which had been sent south on the assumption that its services might be needed at any time.

At Verdun the problem of food and supplies has been solved by the creation and maintenance of a commissariat on wheels such as the world never saw before. “Some-

where in Mexico" our soldiers are compelled to subsist on parched corn and to resort to the native hide sandals to replace worn-out shoes because their supplies cannot be transported in time to keep up with the moving columns.

At Verdun every shortage of any sort is quickly made good by the operation of a vast network of railway feeders. In Mexico the movement of our cavalry is badly hampered by the lack of remounts, which cannot be forwarded to the "front" in time because Carranza declines to give us the full use of the Mexican railways.

And while all these things are going on Washington is trying to decide, not how these serious defects in our war organization can be most quickly remedied, but whether Congress, the War department or the commanding officers are responsible for a situation disheartening in the extreme and ominous of future disaster when this country shall have a real, and not a "little," war on its hands.—*April 14, 1916.*

AMERICA

From England comes the statement on official authority that "Charlie" Chaplin is no less a patriot than the man in the trenches. Mr. Chaplin gets vast sums for doing ridiculous things that make people laugh, and as a loyal Britisher he is investing his immense earnings in British bonds, thereby helping to maintain sterling exchange.

No doubt Italy considers Enrico Caruso no less a patriot than Eng-

land deems Mr. Chaplin. Signior Caruso sings for Americans and gets and takes back to Italy enough money to pay for possibly a quarter or a half million bushels of wheat.

America needs some patriots. It needs patriots who will plan to put back into the soil that of which the earth was robbed when the quarter or half million bushels of wheat that represent Caruso's high notes were grown. It wants patriots who will restore the farm lands of America to a state of fertility that will mean forty bushels of wheat to the acre as were produced when the land was rich, instead of from thirteen to fifteen bushels to the acre as is the average now that the land has been made comparatively poor.

We cannot impoverish our greatest heritage, the soil, without disastrous consequence. We must put back into the land food, nourishment in place of what we take from it. When this is done the reward is great. But it takes time, money and intelligence.

America needs some patriots in its banks, its manufactories, its corporations—men who think and act for their nation in the spirit of Caruso and Chaplin. It needs men who think first of the nation and who are free from corporation strings or petty ambitions. It needs big men to think for and serve it, to organize and energize its work even to that of safeguarding the farm. Abuse of the soil is folly. The waste, the loss resultant from this one act of national omission is immense. It cries out for correction, yet it goes without correction.—*Sept. 13, 1916.*

Manufacturing Preparedness

OUR OWN ESSENS

"The Bethlehem plant could turn out for this country 50 per cent. more arms and ammunition than the Krupp works in Germany."—Charles M. Schwab.

"If we could reach Essen," has been the sigh of the allies, "it would end the war."

It is very likely that it would end the war. The smashing of the Krupp works would be a blow too smashing for Germany to withstand. But aside from one or two futile aeroplane raids that have been reported, Essen has not been reached. Fifty miles from the nearest frontiers—and these are the frontiers of neutral Holland and captured Belgium—Essen seems in no immediate danger.

But how about our American Essens? Have they been as carefully placed as Essen, with the possibility of an invasion of this country in mind? The Krupp works are not government owned, because in Germany the state does not take up work that can be done better by a corporation, but the government has kept as closely in touch with the manufacture of ammunition as if it owned the plants.

The great ammunition plants of the United States are not government owned. Most of them are owned by corporations which are more efficient than the government itself. But the munitions plants, old and new, appear to have been

placed for the immediate convenience and profit of the owners, and with little thought of the possible needs of the nation in the event of war.

There are so many opinions as to what an invader could accomplish in America that a discussion of the subject is more interesting than useful. Your student of strategy will tell you that an invader would first strike at the north shore of Long Island Sound, with a view to cutting off New England. We have three or four towns that are described as "American Essens," and, curiously enough, two of them are on the north shore of the sound.

With no desire of frightening the folks of Bridgeport and New Haven, we wonder what plans our army experts have made about them. The munitions plants in these cities are great resources to America. Since the war they have been almost doubled in size, not by putting up flimsy buildings, but by adding modern structures filled with modern equipment. These Connecticut manufacturers evidently believe that the stocking-up process of Europe after the war will keep their shops busy for years; nor is it likely that they left the arming of America out of their considerations.

If New England cannot be invaded, if Long Island Sound is impregnable, well and good. But if our defense experts are not certain

about it, what is the government doing to protect these huge plants? Obviously their machinery would have to be moved at the first sign of danger.

Another group of powder and munitions plants lies farther south, along the Delaware river, in the Wilmington region. Many of these have been slapped together for present war purposes only. To reach them an invader needs to cross New Jersey. How large or small that task would be we must leave to the war sharps. The point we wish to make is that most of our ammunition industry is near—perilously near, perhaps—the Atlantic seaboard. This has helped the manufacturers in making quick shipments and in getting labor. But it has not helped the defenses of the United States.

If the munitions plants were near the center of the country there would be little to worry about them. Chicago would be a point where workmen could be mobilized as easily as they are in New England. There are many places in the South, as Col. Roosevelt has suggested, where ammunition plants would be safe.

Another point. Suppose the European war ends without embroiling this country, what will be the fate of the munitions plants that have been built solely to meet the present large demand? We do not mean the flimsy, foul, disease-breeding boom towns along the Delaware river. They will be abandoned as soon as the present demand ceases, unless they meet the fate of Hopewell first. But there are huge plants, full of valuable machinery, like Bethlehem. There are plants in Connecticut which could not be

operated in their entirety if Europe found that she had no money with which to stock up anew. The locations of these plants may not suit the government, but they are full of modern machinery for the production of the very things that this country will need in a hurry if we get into a war. It would be wild waste to scrap these plants because their owners could sell nothing more to Europe.

If the men whose capital and leadership has built up the munitions industry had taken thought of America's interests as well as of their own and had put the plants at strategical points of national defense, they could with justice ask the government to co-operate with them in saving their capital values after the war. And, on the other hand, if the government had shown intelligence and initiative in advising with the munitions industry as to the locations selected, our defensive system could have been strengthened immensely at no cost to the public. If great values are to be created in this and other lines, the government and business men must not antagonize each other, but must work hand in hand.

America is learning for the first time how to make arms on a huge scale. England has had to learn the trade, and it took the pressure of war and the whip of Lloyd George to make her do it. Japan, making munitions for Russia, is making them not to favor Russia but to put herself—not her munition magnates—in condition for the future. If the United States does not learn her lesson and take advantage of it she is a nation of folly. She is being paid for going to school!—*Feb. 17, 1916.*

EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS— WAR

War, in the early stages of civilization, was a business about on a plane with railroad gangs. The mercenary captain of mercenaries was at the hire of him who needed temporary help, just as the padrone with his crew of laborers is ready to serve the corporation. There was no combination of military interests until the Crusades, and even then the various groups of warriors retained their separate feudal form.

It was not until the day of the French revolution that the French people came to realize that a whole nation must go to arms to meet a foe. It was not until the present war that Europe came to know that a nation needs not only the help of the men eligible for service in the field, but every asset that may be held by man, woman and child, rich and poor, corporation and individual, field and forest, factory and finance.

Europe is learning that war is such a big business that it must involve every other business. Britain's announcement that it intends to regulate shipping rates drives down the stocks of a big American ocean transportation company. The announcement in Canada of a new war tax programme—an impost of 25 per cent. on net profits above 7 per cent.—causes a break in the stocks of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Nations are saying to industry: "We are fighting a great war, one purpose of which is to protect you from the enemy. The war is costing us millions of lives, which we never will get back. It is costing us billions in money, part of which is coming back to you. We are not

going to let you stay at home and get hog fat on the proceeds of the nation's blood."

It is necessary for nations to say this, because industry is full of selfishness. There are some real patriots in business, but there are also gentlemen who watch the stock market more closely than they watch the death lists. These have to be dealt with in a way that will help the nation without actually harming industry itself. For object lessons in business men, good and bad, read the article from the "Annalist," printed elsewhere on this page. As capitalists are in France, so they are in every country. The government has to handle them so that the good shall not suffer for what is done by the bad.

Nations are not content with drafting the help of big business. The individual is being used to his fullest extent. The women of France and Germany have long since taken the places of the men in the fields. England has been obliged to follow suit, and the women who go out to plow and cultivate are to wear a sleeve badge of honor. Women have been used as munition makers for a year in most of the European countries. Now a Philadelphia factory announces that it will put a thousand women at the work of making fuses for shells. This, if the wages are good and the surroundings decent, is a good thing. While America can get the knowledge for nothing, it ought to learn all it can about a business that has been threatening to be our most important business.

If war should come, it will be curious to see how quickly this country will mobilize its industries. It will be interesting to see whether

finance will rally to the colors. Will Wall Street step up to the recruiting station, or will it hold back for profit? If the elder Morgan were alive as leader we should not hesitate for the answer.—*Feb. 18, 1916.*

WHAT WINS WARS

At great periods like the present crisis on the western front of the great war, Americans stop and ask themselves: What are the lessons of this conflict to us? What does it teach us of the new art of defense and attack, for us to use in any future war that may be forced upon us?

One lesson that the great war seems determined that we shall learn is the supreme value of preparation. For the attack on Verdun, artillery and explosives were massed in unexampled force. The rain of fire obliterated dense woods, tangled with barbed wire as with the growth of tropical vegetation. When the Germans charged, it was over a waste and no one was left to oppose them. Explosives launched from ten and twenty miles away—the range directed by hovering air craft—exterminated trenches, men and machine guns. Artillery saves half the lives that might be lost in the charge against modern defensive positions.

But the other half of lives cannot be saved. There are still winding trenches and concealed positions that cannot be found by the searching glasses in the captive balloons and roving aeroplanes of the Germans. These positions must be taken by men who face the leaden hurricane and give their lives to buy with cold steel what the shells could

not purchase. In the last analysis, it is the men who seal and deliver the message of victory or of surrender which the big guns write.

Away with this talk of economic pressure, of the mere weight of natural resources, in winning wars! Economic pressure is met by the passion for self-denial and the genius for invention which infuse a great people in its hour of need. The weight of natural resources, unmobilized, unco-ordinated, blindly trusted in, becomes a weight indeed, a weight of deadening slumber upon those who put their faith in words, in Fourth of July orations, in statistics.

No, America is learning that wars are won and countries are saved by masses of artillery, by trainloads of explosives, by a perfect co-ordination in the use of guns and infantry, by years of detailed schemes to meet every possible contingency in every possible war, by plans immediately to put peace industries on a war footing and mobilize the national resources.

Above all, we are learning that wars are won by patriotic men who impose upon themselves sacrifices of military service and who, when the call sounds, take arms into their trained hands and meet the enemy in the shock of battle.—*Mar. 4, 1916.*

OUR MUNITIONS WORKS

To-day's wars are wars of explosives. It is not Joffre who wins ground in the Champagne; it is the seventy-fives of Schneider. Joffre's men merely surge forward and occupy the wilderness made by the shells of the French munitions works. It is not Sir John French

who takes Hill 60. It is the workers in the three thousand British factories where, under Lloyd George, men and women make explosives and projectiles.

It is not the genius of the archduke and Von Mackensen who smother with shells the defenses of Przemyśl and Ivangorod. It is not the Bavarians and the Brandenburgers who drive the French from the forts of Verdun. They are blasted out by the "Busy Berthas" and the Austrian 30-centimeter mortars.

So with us in future wars. Our most important preparation is to safeguard our supplies for a war of artillery. For the first six months of war we should be dependent on supplies from existing munitions factories. Where are they located?

All of the large factories are on or near the seaboard, susceptible to rapid destruction by an enemy capable of landing on our shores. Winchester is in New Haven. The Union Metallic Cartridge Company is at Bridgeport. Colt is at Hartford. The United States Catridge Company is at Lowell. The Bethlehem Steel plant is in Pennsylvania, a short distance from tidewater. The Robin Hood Ammunition Company is at Swanton, Vt., just south of the Canadian line. The only ammunition factories in the safety zone west of the Alleghenies are Peters at Cincinnati and the Western Cartridge Company at St. Louis. Our powder mills are in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and especially Delaware.

Suppose a foe were to land at New Haven, send a column a few miles east to Bridgeport and then proceed up the Connecticut valley? Indeed, the enemy need not land.

If he held the seas, he could lie off the coast and demolish New Haven, Bridgeport and Wilmington and be immune from submarines because of his torpedo nets and his destroyers.

Our industry for munitions and explosives must be moved to points west of the mountain range. There is no call for any policy that will destroy the present companies. Let the government give its orders only to concerns located within the safety zone and, if necessary, subsidize the rapid erection of plants there. The present munitions and explosives people will be the first to transfer their capital and their activities to the place where money is to be made.

It is for the government to defray for industry the higher labor costs and the higher assembling and distributing costs which will arise when the most vital part of our defensive organism is placed beyond the range of sudden military or naval attack.—*Mar. 18, 1916.*

BETHLEHEM STEEL HEAD MAKES OFFER TO NATION

Presents Project to Furnish Armor Plate at Lower Price Than That Heretofore Paid

By EUGENE G. GRACE.

[The following statement by Eugene G. Grace, president of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, is reproduced because it presents the principle of co-operation between the government and private enterprise, which will best conserve the interests of both. Mr. Grace, as the head of one of the greatest producers of armor plate in the world, makes an offer to supply armor plate at a figure which, compared with the cost of the same material to foreign navies, indicates a sincere desire to place at the services of the country the producing

power of a great corporation for the needs of the nation. Mr. Grace's communication is addressed to the House committee on naval affairs, which is now considering the bill passed by the Senate providing for the establishment of a government armor plate plant.]

The Senate has passed the bill to construct a government armor plant at a cost of \$11,000,000. If the House should pass this bill, it will mean that as soon as the new plant is constructed, the twenty odd million dollars now invested in privately owned plants will have been rendered practically valueless, for existing plants have ample capacity to meet all the needs of the government.

The question, however, should not be determined merely with reference to the interests of private manufacturers; it should be decided with reference to the interests of the people as a whole, and especially with supreme regard for adequate national defense.

The Bethlehem Steel Company, altogether aside from its financial interests but recognizing its obligation as a citizen, in order that its position may be clearly understood now desires formally to submit the following proposition to the federal government:

We will manufacture one-third, or such additional quantity as may be awarded to us, of the armor-plate required for the contemplated five-year naval programme (estimated at approximately 120,000 tons, at a price of \$395 for side armor, as compared with the price of \$425 now obtaining. The proposed price is lower than has been paid by the government for more than ten years.

If the foregoing price is not satisfactory, we will agree to permit

any well-known firm of chartered public accounts to inventory our plant and make careful estimates of the cost of manufacture; with that data in hand we will meet with the secretary of the navy and agree to manufacture armor at a price which will be entirely satisfactory to him, as being quite as low as the price at which the government could possibly manufacture armor on its own account, after taking into account all proper charges.

Lower Price the Aim

Admiral Straus, chief of the naval bureau of ordnance, has stated that the only possible purpose of a government plant is to obtain a lower price. There certainly is some point where it would not pay the United States to build an armor plant of its own.

We make the foregoing proposition rather than have our plant put out of existence. We have invested over \$7,000,000 in that plant, as actually inventoried to-day. This figure does not take into account large sums—certainly \$2,500,000—expended for plant and equipment which have been abandoned because of becoming obsolete.

We are to-day selling armor to the United States government at a lower price than any other large naval power in the world is paying, even where the government has itself embarked in the business. Not only is that true, but the specifications in the United States are much more rigid and the wages paid are very much higher than those prevailing in any foreign country.

England buys its armor from five privately owned plants, and is now paying \$503 a ton. Germany has two privately owned plants, and is

paying \$450 a ton. The United States pays \$425 a ton, and we now offer to reduce that figure by \$30 a ton.

All the more important countries engaged in the present war employ the policy with reference to armor-plate manufacture which this country now threatens to abandon.

At Disposal of Country

The meaning of that policy is that it places continuously at the disposal of the government in this important detail of national defense the experience, the enterprise, the initiative and the resources of the steel manufacturing industry of the country.

Steel prices are continually going up, and they are to-day much higher than has been the case for many years. In spite of that, we offer to build armor at a lower price than the United States government has paid for twenty-nine years, and we agree to accept this lower price for the next five years.

We also call attention to the fact that though since the war began we have been able to get in Europe almost any price we chose to ask for ordnance, we have during that period made no addition whatever to the selling price to the United States government of any of the ordnance products which we manufacture.—*Mar. 24, 1916.*

HOSPITALS, GRAVES AND AMMUNITION

A keen American observer on the German front in France writes and tells us the reason why the Germans, with small losses in men, are slowly closing the steel jaws of the crown prince's nutcracker and slowly reducing Verdun.

The American observer rode toward the fighting lines from the German interior in the days when the fighting around Vaux and Douaumont was raging and reports were reaching us of whole German army corps being annihilated. The observer found nothing of the sort. As he approached the front he saw no hospital trains moving to the rear. The feature of the railroad traffic was the endless procession of ammunition trains rolling forward to the German lines.

When he reached the safe fringe of the fighting front he found the field hospitals only normally employed, but at the end of the standard-gauge railroads he saw mountains of shells piled high on platforms and on the ground besides.

The American pressed on toward the fighting trenches of the Germans, over miles of territory freshly taken from the French. It was not dotted with graves, as is the ground of many battlefields in this bloodiest of wars. The gain had been purchased at small cost of life. What he did see was the serpentine trails of narrow-gauge railways, their toy engines chugging forward over the rough terrain, carrying shells from the safe basis in the rear to the new positions which the guns were to occupy when the infantry made its next advance.

The neatly piled mounds of ammunition mark the location of the German batteries to-morrow. The same batteries are now back eating yesterday's shell heaps and blowing the French out of their trenches. When the trenches have been obliterated the range of the German curtain of fire will be shifted a little farther forward, and under its terrible protection the German infan-

try will advance and re-dig the blasted French defenses.

Not hospital trains for the rear, but endless trains of ammunition for the front, mountains of shells, busy winding narrow-gauge railways to the firing line, stores of projectiles for the hungry guns, and a curtain of fire.

Which does America, which does Congress want? Our men at Washington are choosing for us. They may vote now to have trains of ammunition ready to carry our shells to the front. Or some time later, located in some temporary capital west of the Alleghenies, they may have occasion to vote money for hospital trains to carry their fellow citizens to the rear.—*April 13, 1916.*

FORD FIREWORKS

In all the newspaper acreage that Henry Ford is sowing with anti-preparedness one fails to find the very note that might be expected of a man of great constructive ability. In the desire of a man of wealth and power to further a campaign in behalf of peace and industrial progress there lies an unparalleled opportunity for constructive education in the advancement of a positive and creative programme. Red-blooded Americans, especially young Americans, will listen to anybody who has a proposition that is highly colored with something to do. They have little patience, however, with anti-cults and merely negative plans.

The "armor plate people," whom Mr. Ford so trenchantly attacks, have at least a definite programme of tangible constructiveness. They say to us: "Let us build great ships and sail them. Let us build huge factories and turn out new and won-

derful machinery for the defense of our nation. Let us have a flock of splendid aeroplanes to fleck the sky and tell us where danger lies. Let us make submarines bigger and more powerful than any the world has ever seen. Let us create a magnificent transportation and supply system that will enable us to hit quick and hard if we need to hit at all. Let us do things bigly and thoroughly and proudly!"

There may be an undercurrent of selfishness in this line of talk. The patriotism of Hudson Maxim and Mr. Du Pont may be tinctured with a desire to see their business interests grow; but that is not to the point. The fact remains that the preparedness people, the armor plate people if you please, hold up a creative programme that is shot through with "something of the heroic." Even if it prove to be an obsolescent form of heroism to build great engines of destruction, the appeal to do will remain stronger than the warning to don't so long as there is a spark of the constructive urge within us and perhaps a dash of Nietzsche's "Will to Power." Under the standard of the minus sign, pacifism will make its appeal only to the timid and retiring; to people who wear small, shy buttons labeled "Anti-War," and whose nervous systems melt instead of bounding to the roll of a drum or the trample of horses' hoofs.

Suppose Henry Ford should get together some of the great captains of peace-time industry like himself and say: "Go to, now, let us not kick against the pricks; preparedness is a good and weighty word, let us use it instead of knocking it. There are hundreds of thousands of acres of state and national land in our

country that need reforestation. There are hundreds of thousands of husky school boys who are aching to go camping next summer. Let's get these young boys and several million young trees together in summer camps for a big piece of conservation work in the spirit of play. Let's bring in all the military training that is good for youngsters to have, under regular military officers, for additional recreation. Let the boys have sham battles and dig trenches. They love to play at fighting and they may as well do it under expert direction and in a spirit of good will. The training will do them good mentally and physically, but the principal motif will be the larger preparedness of creative and conservative work for our country, the planting of trees for the future wealth of the nation. Preparation for a possible defense of our flag will be incidental, but thorough and important. Thus we will bring about an unconscious education of all those manly qualities that we want American citizens to have, and we will lay the foundations for that technique which will serve us in case of need."

Suppose that the Ford educational propaganda could show big business—say, the paper and lumber business, for example—that some such patriotic experiment could be tried on a large scale, just as it has been already tried in miniature, not as an adventure in charity, but as a definite investment of capital. Suppose the industries of peace could be shown ways in which they could enlist in a great preparedness campaign that would be as profitable to them in time as the present campaign promises to be shortly for the purely military industries. Suppose that, instead of going counter to our

American instinct to create, to achieve wealth and power, and to pioneer in new fields, the pacifists should get in line with the best that lies in this instinct and work out a constructive programme for its wise direction. Would not something inspiring, and perhaps even glorious result?

Henry Ford has taken a high place among Americans of constructive and organizing genius. In turning part of his attention from the making of machines to the making of peace he has shown that quality of heart and mind which is the heritage of our best American manhood and womanhood, and which realizes itself in the conviction that there are even higher fields of service than the building of fine physical instruments for human use. Mr. Ford learned a bitter lesson on his visionary trip to Europe. Perhaps he will learn another lesson while he watches the spectacular play of his far-flung verbal pyrotechnics, which leave only the blackened shell of negative don't-ness after their sparkling and noise. Perhaps he will be the first great pacifist to harness the power of idealism supported by money and organizing genius in the cause of a real and fundamental preparedness for the future contingencies of peace, and possibly of war.

This larger preparedness is not to be measured in terms of nitrogen, copper and steel. It is a question of building sound bodies and steady, obedient nerves. The human stuff is waiting, ready, anxious to respond to the pacifist's call; but this must come in the form of practical plan, freighted heavily with something to do!

And yet the name of Ford, and the principles of pacifism with which

it is coupled, are being made a rallying cry in politics in the West and middle West. Michigan, despite the fact that Mr. Ford has declined to appear in the part of "favorite son," gave him a larger vote than it accorded to Senator William Alden Smith, for many years the political leader of the state and in full control of its electioneering machinery. In other western commonwealths he is acclaimed as the bearer of a new and stirring message to the people.

May it not be that internationalism is nearer than most of us think it is, that America is to be the pioneer in the movement and that Henry Ford is to be its standard-bearer?—*April 19, 1916.*

AMERICA'S GREATEST ECONOMIST

In the homely, forceful way he has of expressing things Henry Ford has likened the automobile market to a pyramid of layers and layers of people. Up at the top there is but one. At the bottom there are hundreds upon hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions. If there were only one car in the world he supposes one man would pay a million dollars for it. There are, however, 2,000,000 families in the United States who should have automobiles, and every time the price of a car is reduced the market is broadened by uncovering a new and wider layer to the pyramid.

It is as an economist, a master merchant, that Henry Ford most concerns America. He has furnished the most absolute proof of the soundness and the virtue of the principle of Low Cost and Big Volume.

Perhaps no other business than that of the automobile offered so good an opportunity for the demonstration. It is new. It had not been bound up in old ideas and old systems. It was saved from many perils through the good sense of its pioneers in agreeing to "co-operative competition" by standardizing the tread of the car, standardizing various parts of the car, eliminating strife and ruinous legal fighting over patents, and limiting rivalry to salesmanship, to efficiency, utility and value.

The output of the Ford plant is colossal. It is one of the industrial wonders of the world, all the more amazing in view of the short time in which the automobile has been a vehicle for man. Mr. Ford is to make 1,000,000 a year. More than on-half of all the cars in America to-day are Fords. There is a limit to everything. The point of saturation may have been reached or may be approaching in America. The manufacturers think not. Conservative observers think otherwise. There may be a halt temporarily and then a new era of development and expansion.

That, however, is beside the main issue. The great thing Ford and a few of the others have demonstrated is the responsiveness of this great American market of 100,000,000 or 110,000,000 of people to immense volume of an essential product when that product is brought down to reasonable price.

They have proved there is more profit in a great output at a moderate profit than in limited output at a higher rate of gain.

No nation offers such a market as does this one in America. No other industry has proven so wonderfully

and so convincingly the worth of manufacturing principles and methods that are and always have been at the command of all. Great volume of output makes possible the application of numerous manufacturing economies otherwise impossible, and these economies in turn make for lower selling price of the product. Greater volume of production means greater prosperity more employment, better living.

The example Mr. Ford has given to the manufacturing world must sink deep into the consciousness of men in other lines of industry. It must serve to eliminate much of the waste with which too many of our industries are cursed. It must promote standardization. There is not a larger business in America that cannot profit by what has been done in the automobile field. How burdened we are with wrong ideas few persons realize. How widely we could economize, and in economizing improve, few appreciate. The railroads could save countless millions by standardizing the box car. To-day there are 1,100 different styles of box car. And a box car costs approximately \$1,000. Fifty or seventy-five styles would serve immeasurably better, and the cost of manufacturing would be reduced immediately perhaps \$100 per car. There are 2,500,000 box cars on the railroads of the United States.

Standardization would reduce the cost of ship building. The fogies fight against it, ridicule the idea, scoff as they scoffed at Ford.

There hardly is an industry in our whole business fabric to which the lesson of Ford could not be brought home with profit to the producer and profit to the consumer.

Greater than as an apostle of so-

cial justice is Henry Ford, the industrial economist.—*May 5, 1916.*

THE SHIFTING OF MILITARY POWER

It is interesting to understand the industrial basis for the present setback which Italy is experiencing at the hands of Austria. The reason is not that the Italians are not as brave as the Austrians or as well-trained and well-officered. Numerically the Italians are far superior to their adversaries. And yet the battle goes on against them. The reason is the overwhelming superiority of the Austrian artillery, the Austrian shell supply. It is an instructive illustration of the fact that war has become largely a complicated metallurgical operation. The cause of Austrian superiority in metal lies in the relative resources of the two countries.

Italy has no steel industry, for she has no coal or ore fields upon which that industry could rise. In normal times she has bought her coal, and much of her raw iron and steel, from England and Germany. Now the war cuts off the German supply. England needs nearly all the steel she can make, both to supply her own needs and to make good the loss of France when the metal centers of that country were occupied by the Germans. Italy must be content with what can be spared after these main demands are met.

Nor is this a time when a steel industry can be built up in Italy. Germany will not supply the coal. England cannot spare it. The United States would supply it, but there are no ships to carry it across. Think of freight rates from Norfolk

to Genoa of \$35 per ton on coal! And there is no tonnage to carry it even at that rate. If by any means Italy could get the coal, where are the vessels to bring iron ore from Algiers and Spain?

Contrast with this the situation of Austria. Germany is the greatest steel producer in the world, after the United States. The Germans are helping the Austrians out. But Austria has mighty steel works of her own, the Skoda munitions plant ranking with Krupp, Schneider and Vickers. It is Skoda and Krupp that are driving the Italian armies down into the plains of Italy.

The world could not have a better demonstration of what wins wars, nor a better illustration of the fallacy of counting male populations and estimating the strength of fighting nations thereby. Italy's teeming millions will not avail against the machines and tons of steel against which human arms cannot stand. Russia's hordes do not bring victory to her; her industrial heart, Poland, is in the hands of the enemy. To-day the Russians are shifting men to the western front, where the allies have shells enough to protect them. It is vain for the Czar to send his simple moujiks against the German trenches in the east: Let him stamp a steel industry out of the earth if he can.

In the future handbooks of war, statistics of populations and even of standing armies will play a minor role. The compelling facts will be the statistics of steel production. The overpowering influence of artillery in war is creating a totally new basis for military supremacy, just as the submarine is shifting the basis of sea power.

We look amazed at the working

of a fate that plays into our hands. We have half the steel production of the earth. Organized, co-ordinated with a trained citizenry, it will make us invincible on land. We are separated by wide oceans from all nations powerful enough to attack us, oceans which our fleets of submarines can make the certain grave of any expedition that comes against us.

A kind Nature conspires with the course of development of military art to provide us with the means of certain and impregnable defense. If we do not even care to learn to use the weapons thrust upon us, we shall deserve the defeat and conquest that we shall some day suffer at the hands of a people for whom fate did less but who were willing to do more for themselves.—*May 25, 1916.*

AMERICAN EFFICIENCY

These days are furnishing us with instances of the marvelous America in which we live, of the great efficient industries which stand ready to serve us, and which, once properly co-ordinated with a national system of training our manhood and assembling material for them to use, will make us invincible and immune from attack. Since this Mexican border mobilization began, the Ford and Packard Motor companies have, in the quiet way that great things are done, shown us what such industries mean to us.

The Ford Motor Company was asked by the War Department how long it would take to make and have ready for shipment 1,000 trucks of a certain type. The Ford Company said that they would need a little notice; that if they were notified at

4 o'clock on the afternoon of one day the cars would be completed and ready for shipment at the close of the next day.

An official of the War Department called the Packard Company on the long-distance phone from Washington and ordered twenty-seven armored motor cars made and shipped to the Mexican border as rapidly as possible. The Packard people were asked to supply expert driver and mechanic with each car. The Packard Company went to work on the cars and engaged the men to operate them. A train of freight cars was put on the Packard siding, attached to it a Pullman and diner. In twenty-two hours after the telephone was hung up the twenty-seven armored motor cars were made and loaded, and the train was moving southwest from Detroit with the right of way to destination. In fifty-one hours more the motor cars were unloaded and ready for service "somewhere on the border."—*July 6, 1916.*

COAL

The enormous rise in sea freights has, it is true, raised the price of coal to almost prohibitive figures, and although wood is being used in increasing quantities as a substitute, the supplies so far have fallen short of the demand, and much additional expenditure has been incurred.—From a report on the Buenos Aires Great Southern Railway in the "Statist," of London.

Coal at the mine mouth costs from 60 cents to \$1 a ton in the United States. The cost of transportation to the seaboard is less than \$2 per ton. In Buenos Aires soft coal sells at from \$30 to \$40 a ton. American coal men cannot market their coal in the Argentine

or elsewhere because they cannot get ships.

This would be ludicrous if it were not such a sorrowful indictment of our national neglect, our disjointed, haphazard way of doing things, our failure to plan and to act logically and coherently.

Occasionally a man does a thing that should open our eyes to some of the opportunities that are about us. A man did this some years ago in this department of coal. The man was H. H. Rogers. He had made a great fortune in Standard Oil. He had vision and courage. He saw in the mountains of West Virginia a vast region underlaid with coal which was undeveloped because it was so difficult to reach. Difficulties appealed to Rogers. He had been wrestling with them all his life. He determined to master this one. He built a railroad from the sea up to and across the mountains. The building of a railroad through the Grand Canyon was easy in comparison with what the men engaged on the construction of Rogers's railroad had to contend with. There are some miles of line on that route that cost probably more than a similar amount of main line anywhere else in the world.

And all this, it must be understood, Rogers did to get volume of tonnage of the lowest class of freight, traffic on which the net profit would not be more than a mill per ton per mile.

Despite all his wealth, influence and power the building of that road almost ruined him. He poured out his money as if there were not end to it—never wastefully, but freely where he saw the expenditure of a million meant the lessening of a grade to a degree that would com-

pensate for the outlay. The road was to be his monument. It was to be the creation of one man, the greatest, best and most admirably equipped and economically managed freight line of the world.

He was caught in the panic of 1907 and it nearly broke his heart to find that bankers to whom it was customary for him to give orders now demanded the instant payment of loans he had negotiated; that he, who had been imperious, now had to be a suppliant; that the treasures he had piled up through a lifetime of wonderful success he had to sacrifice to save his one cherished project; that instead of being a superman financially he was brought down to the common level in time of terror.

He sacrificed much to save the railroad. To have lost that was something unthinkable to him.

He finished the building of the line, and then he died. He had given to the country an artery through which a great flood of the rich blood of commerce could flow. While he depended on the coal business of the Atlantic coast states for the bulk of his business, he had the vision to see that with the cheapest freight rate in the world from the mine to the sea a tremendous trade with the nations to the south of us might be developed; that instead of Great Britain selling millions of tons of coal in Latin America, the United States might have the trade and that such commerce would develop return cargo for this country that would ramify in ways beyond appreciation.

Rogers was an economist. Waste to him was something always to be fought. The pride he took in the Virginian Railroad, for that was the name he gave to his property, was

in the remarkable manner in which Nature's obstacles had been overcome to reduce grades to a minimum, to employ the power of gravity to the highest possible degree and to bring the line as near perfection as was humanly possible.

And of what avail was the effort of H. H. Rogers and other great Americans whose vision has been broad? Of what use is it to blaze a way to new and richer fields if those for whom you would work are indifferent and would rather idle in older pastures?

There is a coal concern at 1 Broadway that had an opportunity to sell millions of tons of coal to France, 500,000 tons a year for five years or ten years, or a million tons a year for five years if it could make delivery. It has been unable to find vessels for one-fifth of the amount required in the first year. It chartered Greek ships and British ships. After one of its British ships had delivered two cargoes in France, it was taken over by the British government, ostensibly for transport purposes, but really to break the charter.

This was one of the many embarrassments to which the coal people were subjected. It seemed as if, although Great Britain was unable to supply coal to France, Spain, Italy and the countries on the north coast of Africa, except in limited quantities, she did not intend any other country should enter the trade.

France, Italy, Spain, want coal. The prices they pay are fabulous, but America can do nothing, for America has not the ships. Some American coal men, inflamed by the prospect of profits, have gone so far as to plan to send coal across the ocean in barges, as coal is sent

along the shore in this country. Lately there has been a radical improvement in towing. By means of a spring hawser the slack of a rope is taken up automatically and held taut at all times, no matter how heavy the sea may be. There are sea students and shippers who believe freight will be carried across the ocean before long in trains of barges as freight is carried on land in trains of cars.

But of what good is all this today to the Virginian Railroad, or the Norfolk and Western, or the Chesapeake and Ohio, or the coal miners of West Virginia or Pennsylvania?

South America is burning wood because, although willing to pay \$30 to \$40 a ton for coal, she can get no coal.

France, Italy, Spain, in desperate need of coal, can get no coal except as England doles it out.

And America, the richest country in the world, a nation with nearly two-fifths of the wealth of all the nations and with the largest coal deposits on earth and the best railroads and the cheapest and best land transportation of any land, is helpless when it reaches salt water. Its financial statesmen are busy making commissions.

What a pity!—*August 26, 1916.*

Transportation Preparedness

"A FINE THING FOR KATY"

When our *pénétration pacifique* of Mexico was determined upon, speculation began in the stocks of southwestern railroads. A financial paragraph in a New York paper thus described the situation:

In case the government is forced to transport large masses of troops to the Mexican border, this business should prove very remunerative to the railroads. Wall street recalled yesterday the characteristic remark of a director of one of these properties, the M. K. and T., made at an early date when war with Mexico seemed imminent, that "it would be a fine thing for Katy."

Already the talk is of what the railroads will get out of the nation's emergency, not of the service they will render. The prospective character of service is being indicated by the reports of congestion and delay in handling troops and supplies for the tiny force which is sampling the large job of clearing those Augean stables south of the border line.

It is not that Katy is malicious. It is that she has never been taught that her business is less important than the national business. Ask the railroad officials whether they have a set of freight and passenger time tables for military trains, worked out in detail for emergency, whether their equipment and their lines near the border are built to serve army as well as civilian needs. No; the government's is like any other piece of emergency business for which no

particular preparation has been made.

Later, when we have a real enemy on our vulnerable Atlantic and Pacific borders, we shall pay the full penalty for this haphazard co-ordination of our military and industrial resources for the common defense. Then perhaps we shall learn that in war, as in everything else, whatever is worth doing is worth doing well.

Our performance in this children's battle in the south may be trying for the rest of us. But "it will be a fine thing for Katy."—*March 17, 1916.*

A FREE PORT IN NEW YORK

Barcelona has established a free port district and Spain has added another to the limited list of free ports. Three years ago the Merchants' Association of New York interested itself in the matter of a free port for New York. It may not be an inopportune time to revive the matter.

The model of all free ports is Hamburg. The port district of Hamburg—the water area and the land immediately adjacent—is surrounded by a paling of the German customs department. The free port is treated like foreign soil; goods pay no duty until they cross the customs line. A ship sails up the Elbe into the free port of Hamburg and discharges with no surveillance of the customs authorities.

Goods are stored in the free port

warehouses and re-exported—often after rehandling, rebranding or mixing—without the customs people knowing of the process. There are factories in the free port which manufacture mainly for export. They import their raw materials and export their products as free from surveillance or interference as if they were on a desert isle. The red tape of bonded warehouses, bonded factories and duty drawbacks greatly hinder such a development in this country.

Of course the need for this particular facility depends largely upon the extent to which New York is a transshipment point for goods whose origin and destination are elsewhere. Hamburg has a vast transshipment trade, by which she handles a large part of the commerce of the oversea world with Scandinavia and Baltic Russia. Copenhagen's free port during this war is reaping the harvest now being sowed. New York has a considerable transshipment business moving between Europe and the West Indies, Mexico, Central America and northern South America. New York will have a larger transshipment business when the former currents of European-Asiatic trade shift to the route via the Panama Canal after the war. New York will then become a great port of call and point of interchange.

A free port district in New York may well be taken into consideration as a measure of commercial preparedness looking to the end of the war.—*June 29, 1916.*

RAILROAD PREPAREDNESS

"30,000 pounds, 12 horses, 28 men."

This is the inscription on the standard German box car. That car is built for the services of peace, but it is ready for the uses of war. It will carry 30,000 pounds, 12 horses or 28 men. If you examine it carefully, you may find rings on the walls and ceiling. That is where the cots are hung.

When a German railroad is laid out, commercial and topographical considerations do not alone prevail. In America a railroad connects traffic centers by whatever roundabout route affords the easiest grades. It may evade some strategic point on a frontier or a coast. It would cost us a little more to accommodate the roads to military and coast defense demands, but the extra expense could be borne by the government, and some day perhaps save us a disaster.

On New Year's day every year the German chief of staff hands the Kaiser the military time tables of the empire. These are schedules suppressing the ordinary trains and providing for the mobilization of millions of men in a few days on Germany's borders. The military schedules do not interfere with the peaceful traffic of the railroads. Only, when the test comes these railroads are ready for national service.

When the mobilization call is sent out each operating official of the German railroads opens the sealed envelope containing the time tables for his division. He knows how many men, horses, guns, how much ammunition and equipment, are to be taken on at each entrainment station. Ordinary freight and passenger traffic is suspended.

That is why the general staff knows that to-morrow morning 40,-

000 troops and their equipment will roll into some apparently insignificant station on the Russian border, some station with abnormally large terminal yards for its commercial needs.

It was this sort of silent mobilization that had Germany's force of millions on her borders in a week. But the service of the railroads did not stop here. They not only dispose but shift forces. It is not the number of your men that counts. It is the number of men and the force of artillery you can bring into a given action. In the midst of the German drive for Paris in early September, 1914, when the Russians suddenly burst into East Prussia, two army corps were detached from the western front and almost overnight were put into Hindenburg's hands and hurled against the Russians in their first defeat at the Masurian lakes. Hindenburg told an American correspondent that he won his battles with railroads. To-day it is not German numbers that count, but German mobility. Mobility is due to the railroads.

The lesson of this railroad war is clear for us. We have two-fifths of the railroad mileage of the world, wholly inco-ordinated with our military needs. The mobilization on the Mexican border is showing us one phase of our unpreparedness, and it may teach us to meet the whole problem.—*July 3, 1916.*

THE CANADIAN PACIFIC

With ownership of the Canadian Pacific Railroad held in this country, and possibly in New York, it seems absurd that not one representative of this country is on the directorate.

With nearly one-third of the mileage of the Canadian Pacific in the United States, it seems unjust that every energy of the Canadian Pacific should be exerted for the benefit of everything Canadian at the expense or to the detriment of everything American.

What does ownership mean or mileage in this country signify if the property is not to be of worth to the United States as well as Canada?

To-day, to build up Canada at the expense of the United States, the Canadian Pacific does everything within its power to make the border a Chinese wall between the two countries.

The Canadian Pacific has been government aided, government controlled, and almost government directed. But it is not government owned. Its ownership now rests in new hands. It would be well for the Canadians to recognize this, and also the great and impelling fact that within the next ten years the problems of the Pacific may be pressing for solution; that these problems concern Canada as well as this country, and that a people speaking one tongue and having the same high ambitions can do more working for the economic strength and soundness of all the Americas than by proceeding along narrow and old lines of prejudice, jealousy and opposition.

The Canadians have much in common with the people of the United States. Canada's great railroad should be no more an agency for Canada than for the United States. The Canadian Pacific is too much American now to be wholly Canadian. It is time for some of our banker-statesmen to emphasize this fact.—*Sept. 11, 1916.*

Our Finances

NEW FEDERAL TAXES

Now that the international crisis is either cleared or evaded, we hear that Washington is to turn to the matter of raising additional revenue in the form of war taxes. When the subject was last under consideration by the Democratic leaders in the House, it was estimated that \$100,000,000 additional revenue could probably be raised by means of an increase in the income tax rate, especially on large incomes.

The largest loss in federal income is due to a drop in customs duties collected on imported goods. The greatest loss is because our imports from the central powers have been exterminated by what our government designates as an illegal blockade.

Of the \$700,000,000 which in normal times the United States collects in the form of taxes, nearly half, \$300,000,000, is in the form of customs duties. Germany alone furnishes normally $14\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of our imports subject to duty. Many of the German imports are high in value and carry high tariff rates. It is not unreasonable to assume that \$40,000,000 to \$45,000,000 of customs revenue normally is levied on imports from Germany.

It might not be amiss to remind Congress and the administration that there is a simple way to raise \$45,000,000 of revenue and at the same time raise the British "blockade."

The power lies in the hands of Washington to compel England to the same observance of international law which we are requiring of Germany. Moreover, by the same action the President would fulfill his ardent wish, expressed February 4 at St. Louis:

I want the record of the conduct of this administration to be a record of genuine neutrality and not of pretended neutrality.

Forty-five million dollars is a rather large annual contribution for a neutral government to be making toward the maintenance of a blockade which, it officially declares, is illegal, indefensible and a glaring violation of the rights of peaceful commercial nations upon the high seas of the world.—*March 13, 1916.*

PATRIOTISM IN FINANCE

A New York banker questions whether it is fair to criticise American bankers for floating the \$500,000,000 Anglo-French loan when they might, by refusing to lend the money, compel foreign holders of American securities to sell them back to us at our price. He points out that American bankers played a large part in influencing foreign investors to supply the money that built American railroads, and without the railroads, which make up one-half of the world's total, the development of America would have been impossible. He points out fur-

ther that, as agents of these foreign investors, the American bankers are under a moral obligation to protect them and not act to their embarrassment.

There is a fair measure of merit in his contention.

Unfortunately, the American banker has not given evidence at all times of a moral obligation to protect the foreign investor or the American investor. His long record of passive conduct while speculators or wreckers played ducks and drakes with great railroads is not to the credit of the American banker.

The banker has dominated the management of the railroads for many years. He dominates to-day. If his management always had been with a full sense of the moral obligation to the investor it is doubtful whether properties aggregating more than 40,000 miles of road would be in bankruptcy and the federal and state governments would have found it necessary to place such restrictions upon railroads as now are in force.

The banker is under a moral obligation to protect the foreign investor. He also is under a moral obligation to the nation. To protect it, to advance its interests, should be one of his highest aims.

It is because the banker has not shown the vision, the ability and the broad patriotism to utilize to the fullest the benefits to America that the wonderful situation created by the world crisis presented, that the editorial, "Wanted, a Financial Statesman," was printed.

This country has had bankers of magnificent courage, high ideals and inspiring patriotism. They were not content in time of national emergency to be mere middlemen.

What finer figure in all the history of American finance is there than Robert Morris? He devoted his great talent and his entire fortune to the cause of his country in the long years of the revolution. But for him, the cause of liberty might have failed. Somehow he managed in the darkest hours of the struggle for independence to find money and furnish supplies for the ragged army of Washington.

In the council room of the Bank of North America in Philadelphia the chair in which he sat and the table at which he worked are preserved as sacredly as are the historic treasures of Independence Hall across the way. It was in his honor, no doubt, that the government granted to that bank, the oldest in the western world, the privilege of retaining without change its name when it took a national charter. To-day it is the only national bank in the United States without "national" as part of its name.

And the sailor-banker Etienne Girard, whom we know better under his Anglicized name of Stephen Girard, was no less patriotic. He was the mainstay of the government in finance in the war of 1812.

In 1813, when the capitol at Washington had been burned and the torch applied to the President's mansion, the treasury, the arsenal and the barracks, and the government was in disorder, he did his greatest service to the republic. The finances of the government were in a sorry state. The army and navy were clamoring for supplies. Grave doubts were entertained as to whether the British would not overrun the land and force the President to sue for peace.

When the outlook was blackest,

the government had to try to float a loan of \$5,000,000. That does not seem much now, but it was large at that moment. The nation's credit was so poor that this loan, which was to bear 7 per cent. interest, was offered at 70. The government's agents did everything they could to get subscribers, but when the day for the closing arrived only \$20,000 had been pledged.

Failure meant financial collapse for the government.

What was to be done?

While others were asking the question, Girard came forward and subscribed for the whole \$4,980,000 that remained of the \$5,000,000.

The effect was electrical. Men who were predicting the downfall of the nation suddenly had a change of heart. A leader had arisen. If the greatest banker of America was willing to stake his entire fortune on the integrity of the United States, they were too. A few asked to be permitted to subscribe. Then others came in droves until there almost was a struggle for the privilege. He let them subscribe and they rejoiced. So did he. So did the anxious President. The government had been saved from bankruptcy and discredit.

How many persons know of that other banker, Enoch W. Clark, who financed the Mexican war? He gave his best efforts to his country.

It was one of the men trained in E. W. Clark's service, Jay Cooke, who was the great power, the brains, in financing the United States government in the perilous years of the Civil War.

All these men were Philadelphians.

The Quaker City no longer stands pre-eminent in American banking.

That proud distinction now is held by New York.

To-day America offers to a financial statesman an opportunity greater than ever before presented in her history.

The nation is the richest of the earth. The commercial and financial headship of the world should be its heritage.

One man—one leader—can point the way and chart the course, one man who will play the American game and play the game for America.—*March 16, 1916.*

WANTED: FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP

American bankers have been missing a chance to remove British financial domination from our money market by forcing Great Britain to hand back to us the vast hoard of American securities which she was always ready to throw on our markets. The possession of this power has given England the call on our gold resources. Upon gold resources depend credit, and upon credit financial power.

For many decades London has been the financial center of the world. International debts of all sorts were paid in sterling exchange, in bills on London. The interest on these bills, and the commissions paid the acceptance houses whose approval made the bills current in the London market—both were sources of large earnings to London. Moreover, the concentration of international financing in London tended to draw with it the concentration of international trade so financed. This financial situation was one of the pillars of British commercial supremacy.

The British money market was both the most stable and the cheapest in the world. It was the cheapest because of England's vast accumulation of wealth during centuries of internal peace and external dominion. It also was the most stable money market—in part because billions of American securities were held in British hands. If British interest rates went up, due to the pressure of credit demands upon the gold reserves of the country, England sold American securities in New York, and so replenished her gold supply. Our gold was thus constantly at London's call.

When the war broke out Great Britain began to order from us by the hundred million. In return for these purchases American bankers had the power to demand from England what payment they chose. To demand gold would have been to wreck the British financial structure; besides, we had as much gold as we needed.

The thing for our bankers to do was to demand that British-held American securities be collected by the British government and returned to us to pay for our shipments. This would have accomplished three objects: First, it would have obtained our "investment independence" from Britain. Second, it would have given us securities that are truly secure, whose payment is not dependent upon the financial solvency of a belligerent in a war which may wreck all those engaged in it.

Third, this course would have freed our money market from an ever-threatening call upon our gold, a condition bound to be more dangerous for us in proportion as we really become a center of international finance, with our need for

credit-power continually conflicting with that of England.

Instead, we took \$500,000,000 of unsecured Anglo-French bonds. They give us no call on the British money market, for they are listed only in New York and payable only there. As this \$500,000,000 is being spent, the British government is being forced to "mobilize" American securities—it could have been forced to do this at the beginning.

But most of these American securities are merely "loaned" to the British government by the investors. They do not desire to part with the surest securities in the world in these days, which threaten international bankruptcy. Now the talk is that the collected American stocks and bonds will not be sold in New York, but that England will supply herself with further funds by a new American loan, for which the collected securities will merely be deposited as collateral.

America expects every banker to do his duty. We have a right to buy back our own securities at the prices which this occasion will normally dictate. When our own securities are back, we want the British-held South American rail and industrial securities, whose possession will bind South American trade to us by the strong chains of investment. In exercising a choice for America, our bankers are to choose those securities which give us not weakness and uncertainty, but strength, independence and power. This is the obligation that lies on those to whom is intrusted the handling and direction of our funds.

Americans scorn the imputation that their bankers get 2 per cent. commission on a British loan floated and $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent. on American

securities returned and sold in New York, and hence are led by their interest to prefer a British loan. We are going to trust American bankers to play the American game. We are going to trust them to play the game for America.—*April 4, 1916.*

WHAT A HARRIMAN MIGHT DO

Since the Stock Exchange reopened in December, 1914, a stream of foreign-owned American securities has poured into the United States to be marketed. According to the report of the Lorce committee, the amount of railroad stocks and bonds remaining in foreign hands on July 1, 1915, was slightly in excess of \$2,200,000,000 par value and \$1,700,000,000 market value. Between December, 1914, and July, 1915, the railroad securities liquidated by foreigners averaged about \$124,000,000 per month. If this average has been maintained for the last thirteen months the amount remaining abroad is about \$600,000,000.

Outside of United States Steel, the foreign holdings of American industrials are negligible. The books of the Steel Corporation show 625,254 shares of the common held in Europe on June 30, 1916, against 1,285,636 on March 31, 1914—a reduction of more than one-half.

There is one property for which the foreigners have had a pronounced preference for many years. That is Canadian Pacific.

The ownership of Canadian Pacific has been distributed widely. England had a lot of it. So did Germany. So did Holland and Switzerland.

The foreigners had perhaps 60 per cent. of all the shares outstanding. Canadian holdings were moderate—perhaps 15 per cent.

In normal times there have been three general markets for Canadian Pacific—Montreal, London and New York. Before the war about 25 per cent. of Canadian Pacific stock was owned in the United States.

What good is this ownership going to do America? Isn't there a man of vision, imagination and ambition in Wall street able to see and use for the people of this country and of Canada the tremendous possibilities that attend control of this property?

In size the Canadian Pacific is the colossus of all transportation systems of the world. It is the one transcontinental line of the western hemisphere. Its mileage is almost 50 per cent. greater than that of any other railroad on earth. Its employes run into the hundreds of thousands. It owns millions of acres of "choice" land. Its string of hotels which dot Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific rank with the best man knows. It has fleets of fine steamships on the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is exempt from taxation. Its earnings are enormous. It pays 10 per cent. dividends. It could pay more.

The Canadian Pacific is considered and operated with the idea that it is a Canadian railroad pure and simple. How many persons appreciate that its mileage in the United States is more than twice as great as the whole Erie system?

Between the United States and Canada there is a wall of petty prejudice that does good to neither country. The world would be better if there were no trade restric-

tions, tariffs, customs houses and such barriers to freedom of commerce and the good-will of people.

Within the last eighteen months Canadian Pacific shares sold as low as 138 and as high as 194. In 1912 it sold at 283. Of common stock there is outstanding \$260,000,000.

What would a Harriman see in this magnificent property? He would see it, not Canadian alone, but Canadian and American. He would link it up with New York, with Pittsburgh, with Boston. He would open new avenues of commerce for it to the coal fields, the steel centers and to the warm water ports. He would bring the United States and Canada into closer relationship. He would break down the absurd distrust and the narrow jealousies that keep two people akin in blood, in speech and in purpose, aloof and out of common sympathy.

A Harriman would make the Canadian Pacific the most potential transportation vehicle in the world. He would make it do a business not of \$12,000 a mile as at present (the Pennsylvania does \$43,000), but \$16,000 or \$18,000.

Every important banking and brokerage house in Wall street has lots of Canadian Pacific. Blocks of it have been bought by thousands of investors, north, east, south and west.

But of what good is American ownership so long as the holdings are scattered and no one appreciates what could be done by bringing them under one control?

Wall street needs some one who can see beyond the range of commissions and underwritings. It needs financial statesmanship. It needs brains, courage and constructive ability. It needs men like Har-

riman, men who can see nationally and who feel nationally.

For such a man or men there are opportunities such as never were presented before.—*Aug. 3, 1916.*

SECURED GOVERNMENT BONDS

We are to be confronted with an interesting experiment in finance. The British and French governments have jointly issued an unsecured \$500,000,000 loan in this country. Behind that loan is merely the promise to pay of these two governments.

It is impossible to float another unsecured loan of this type. No bankers in the country would attempt it; the \$500,000,000 Anglo-French bonds have continually sold below the price at which the underwriters took them.

Future credit of the allied governments must be based on the deposit of securities here. The French government has arranged a loan of \$100,000,000, secured by bonds of neutral countries deposited with New York bankers. The British government is to float a far larger loan in this market, secured by the deposit of great blocks of British-owned American securities, which are no longer being sold.

The question is: What will be the course of the unsecured British bonds when the secured bonds are on the market? Many predicted that out of care for the fate of the Anglo-French fives the British government would never consent to a bond issue in a form carrying that government's admission that it needed security beyond its own word in order to borrow money. The step of

the secured loan is to be taken. Financial circles will watch for the effect upon the unsecured.—Aug. 11, 1916.

TO MR. VANDERLIP PERSONALLY

For what you have done to promote American trade, Mr. Vanderlip, you deserve every meed of praise. As president of the National City Bank you have shown ardor, courage and patriotic ambition rare in the confraternity of bankers.

That was a fine conception of yours to win for your country the commerce and the good-will of Latin America. Many men have dreamed of this. It was for you to act.

We know broadly of what you have done; how you have sent scores and scores of men to Brazil, the Argentine, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and elsewhere to study the needs of the countries; to report as to the resources agricultural, financial and industrial of each section. We know you have established branches of your powerful bank in Buenos Aires and elsewhere; that you publish and distribute gratuitously a magazine, *The Americas*, which has done more, perhaps, to spread accurate and valuable information about Latin America than any other periodical this country has had; that you have in your bank a school in which you train young men for work in the Latin-American field—in short, that you have given to this work your energy, your high intelligence and your fervid spirit.

The commerce of Latin America should be ours. Geographically and logically it belongs to us, just as geographically and logically the com-

merce of Africa belongs to Europe. The Monroe doctrine makes us the guardian, the protector of the republics to the south of us so long as this nation endures.

The commerce of Latin America is a glorious prize to win and hold. If you could bring it to us you would do more of material benefit to the present and future generations than perhaps even you appreciate.

But, Mr. Vanderlip, how is this possible under present conditions? You have centered your efforts in the Argentine. You know, of course, that practically every Argentine railroad is in the hands of the British. You know, no doubt, that most of the banks, traction companies, land companies, dock companies, are controlled by the British. You know, assuredly, that despite the war, Great Britain is doing almost as much business in the Argentine as before the war; that the products of the Argentine are carried away in British ships and the goods the Argentine imports are borne to that country in British bottoms.

You are too good a student, Mr. Vanderlip, to believe you can win the commerce of a country unless you command the arteries of trade—ships, railroads, banks. No doubt you expected to get the ships when your bank bought so heavily into International Mercantile Marine. But the British safeguard themselves well. Their ships are their arms by which they reach out to the most distant lands.

No doubt it was a shock to you, as it was to most Americans, to discover that although the I. M. M. is an American corporation and American-owned, the British still control its affairs to a decided degree and

have it tied in a knot which hampers its Americanism.

You remember that famous joker in the agreement which J. P. Morgan entered into when he bought the British companies and put them in the combination. Here it is:

No British ship in the association nor any ship which may hereafter be built or otherwise acquired for any British company included in the association shall be transferred to a foreign registry (without the written consent of the president of the board of trade, which shall not be unreasonably withheld) nor be nor remain upon a foreign registry. Nothing shall be otherwise done whereby any such ship would lose its British registry or its right to the British flag.

Most of the ships of the I. M. M. are under the British flag. They must remain under that flag and all ships built to replace them must fly the Union Jack.

Until we get ships—American ships—we cannot hope to get Latin America's commerce. Nor can we expect that commerce with ships alone. Europe has become established in South America by furnishing the money to build its railroads, its hydro-electric plants, its traction lines, its wharves; to develop its mines, its plantations and its varied industries. The money thus invested has brought profit direct and indirect. We cannot with reason expect to supplant the Europeans unless we stand to South America practically in the same relation Europe has stood.

Great Britain is in constant need of money. So is France, Germany, Austria, Italy. Has any effort been made to acquire Europe's holdings in South America in return for the loans we have made to the warring nations?

We have poured out a world of

wealth to Europe since the war began. It aggregates nearly a thousand million dollars. Half of that sum invested in ships and in Latin American railroads, banking establishments and industries would root us solidly in Latin American trade.

If we can afford to lend money to the warring nations we assuredly can afford to buy from them securities that will mean immeasurably more profit to Americans than the 5 or more per cent. interest on the war bonds.

Why not, instead of lending money to the warring nations, insist that they sell to us such interests as they have in Latin American properties?

Why not, instead of lending our money for two or five or twenty years, buy what will bring profit to the Americans of this generation and all future generations?

We must have wider markets if we are to progress. We cannot expect wider markets unless we open the channels to them.

Europe means to hold everything it has in its commercial control.

What we get we must go after.

There is no altruism in the attitude of nations toward trade mastery.

Your bank has no foreign alliances. You are not hampered by British or German or French or Austrian influence. Your bank is American.

Your power would be tremendous if well employed.

Your well meant and praiseworthy effort in the Argentine will result in nothing substantial, nothing enduring for the American people; it will not mean more labor for American workmen, cargoes for

American ships, freight for American railroads, prosperity for America's many millions unless you realize the basic principle upon which commerce is controlled and unless you act accordingly.

It is possible for you to lead the way to a commercial welding of the Americas.

Will you do it?

Will you play the American game for America?—*Aug. 17, 1916.*

Americanism

VOICES FROM THE PAST

George Washington on the European war in 1795:

Contemplating the internal situation as well as the external relations of the United States, we discover equal cause for contentment and satisfaction. While many of the nations of Europe * * * have been involved in a contest unusually bloody, exhausting and calamitous * * * in which many of the arts most useful to society have been exposed to discouragement and decay; in which scarcity of subsistence has embittered other sufferings; while even the anticipations of a return to the blessings of peace and repose are alloyed by the sense of heavy and accumulating burdens, which press upon all departments of industry and threaten to clog the future springs of government, our favored country, happy in a striking contrast, has enjoyed general tranquility—a tranquility the more satisfactory because maintained at the expense of no duty. Faithful to ourselves, we have violated no obligation to others.—*President Washington in his address to Congress, December 8, 1795.*

The United States of North America * * * separated by the ocean * * * seemed, in the present extended contest, the only friend and guardian of the human race, despising equally * * * intrigues, menaces and aggressions, firmly maintaining the inde-

pendency of their nation. It was a pleasing and consolatory spectacle to the world, to contemplate America * * * standing up for the defense of property, and asserting the rights of men and of nations.—*A writer unnamed, in his Comments on the History of Europe for the Year 1798; published in The Annual Register, London, 1800.*

Thomas Jefferson on the world war in 1801:

Kindly separated by nature, and a wide ocean, from the exterminating havoc of one-quarter of the globe, too high-minded to endure the degradations of the others; possessing a chosen country, with room enough for descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation; entertaining a due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisition of our own industry, to honor and confidence from our fellow citizens, resulting not from birth, but from our actions, and their sense of them; enlightened by a benign religion, professed indeed and practiced in various forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, truth, temperance, gratitude and the love of man; acknowledging and adoring an over-ruling Providence, which by all its dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness of man here, and his greater happiness hereafter; with all these blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and prosperous people? Still

one thing more, fellow citizens, a wise and frugal government, which, restraining men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government; and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities.—*President Jefferson's Message to Congress, March 9, 1801.*

President Madison on the European war and tragedies in 1815:

Whilst other portions of mankind are laboring under the distresses of war, or struggling with adversity in other forms, the United States are in the tranquil enjoyment of prosperous and honorable peace. In reviewing the scenes through which it has been attained, we can rejoice in the proofs given that our political institutions, founded in human rights, and framed for their preservation, are equal to the severest trials of war, as well as adapted to the ordinary periods of repose. As fruits of this experience, and of the reputation acquired by the American arms, on the land and on the water, the nation finds itself possessed of a growing respect abroad, and of a just confidence in itself, which are among the best pledges for its peace career. * * *—*Sept. 15, 1915.*

It remains for the guardians of the public welfare to persevere in that justice and good-will towards other nations which invite a return of these sentiments toward the United States, to cherish institutions which guarantee their safety, and their liberties, civil and religious, and to combine with a liberal system of foreign commerce an

improvement of the natural advantages, and a protection and extension of the independent resources of our highly favored and happy country.

In all measures having such objects my faithful co-operation will be afforded.—*President Madison's Message to Congress, Dec. 5, 1815.*

THE RECALL OF DUMBA

A sense of profound relief and approval welcomes President Wilson's request for the recall of Ambassador Dumba. The American government and the vast majority of the American people think in terms of America and refuse to permit the rivalries and hostilities of the European powers to be fought out on American soil.

George Washington's farewell address, advising the people of this country not to become involved in European conflicts, and President Monroe's declaration of policy known as the Monroe doctrine are principles identical in purpose with the Wilson doctrine that immigrants who enter upon industrial employment in America cannot have a divided allegiance as between the United States and their native land.

The United States and Austria-Hungary have enjoyed peculiarly friendly relations. The President's desire to maintain these friendly relations expresses the general feeling of the people of the United States.—*Sept. 10, 1915.*

THE LARGER LOYALTY

As the request of the President, the Austrian government has recalled its representative, Dr. Dumba.

He will leave the United States on October 5. From a superficial viewpoint this controversy arose in the indiscretion of one man, but in fact it has turned on basic principles. The outcome represents a victory for the diplomacy of President Wilson and will have a far-reaching influence.

The President had a vision of an enlarged and nobler citizenship. To him American and American ideals are tangible, living things, potent and binding to-day and in the future, as they were in the past, upon all. The foreigner, no matter from what land he has come to America, must accept the conditions of life and abide by the decisions made by the government of the United States. When he naturalizes and receives the vote he must accept also the obligation of an undivided loyalty that is binding upon him, even when he happens to number among an outvoted minority. We recognize it as quite legitimate for him to work to bring his views to acceptance by the majority, providing that he is actuated, in casting his ballot and exerting his influence, by the desire to promote the welfare of the United States.

The President has had throughout the war a vision of a higher and more devoted citizenship; he has held steadfastly to his course to enforce recognition of this. Due to the President's effort the United States will ask more in the future of the newcomer to our midst. Full loyalty on his part will lead us to give his traditions and his outlook upon life more sympathetic consideration.

"Our country!" in the words of Stephen Decatur, "our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but

our country, right or wrong."—*Sept. 29, 1915.*

PLOTS AND PATRIOTISM

During the past four months there has been a succession of fires, explosions and mishaps in industries connected with the manufacture of munitions and other supplies for the allies. Ships at sea and on the great lakes have taken afire from mysterious causes or encountered other trouble. The burning of Hopewell, rendering ten thousand people homeless and paralyzing the employes of a powder plant, is the latest incident in this chain of circumstances.

Before forming an opinion, it is necessary to eliminate the fact that with suspicion in the air it is possible to attribute several accidental occurrences to deliberate purposes. In some cases assumptions have been made that afterward were demonstrated to be incorrect. Again, the powder industry as well as any other industry working under pressure becomes extraordinarily hazardous. Taking all these fatalities in full consideration; however, there remains a chain of events too strong in the opinion of any unbiased observer to be due to accident. To make war upon American munition plants or American industries is an insult to the neutrality and the laws of the United States. The offense becomes doubly grave if perpetrated by American citizens, involving, as it does, disloyalty to our laws and institutions. American neutrality must and will be maintained. America must be able to keep in full force its laws and its protection to all upon American soil. When these are threatened the very foundations of our government are menaced.

Looking ahead to some future date when our country may be needing factories and plants for its own purpose, a grave danger looms up. With our population imperfectly bound by a common national feeling, how could we protect our industrial establishments against outside meddling and destruction in time of war? The strongest protection in any of the warring countries is the solid unity of the people behind their governments. No artificial barriers, no cordon of police can take the place of an overwhelming feeling of patriotism that holds all to a common purpose.

What are the present and future measures; who are the statesmen and leaders of the next decade; what are the policies of a new nationalism that can create for us the white heat of patriotism that will fuse all the elements in this melting pot of nations into a solid whole?—*Dec. 11, 1915.*

"CIVIS ROMANUS SUM"

A settlement of shepherds, tending their flocks on seven hills on the Apennine peninsula, reached out from their bleak home for the scepter of world dominion. For more than two thousand years civilization has grown and expanded upon the foundations which they laid for it. The centers of colonization which they established have remained for all that period the centers of power—political or spiritual—until our own day. The seven hills have become Rome, the Immortal. *Castra Dorii*—the camp of Dorius—has become *Dorchester*, in England. *Colonia*, in Germany, has become *Cologne*. *Dacia* still sur-

vives; *Londinium* is London. Wherever Roman military might found standing ground in its powerful penetration of the barbarian world, great cities and lasting civilizations have grown up. Roman law, like the Roman arch, has lasted to this day and is the basis of the jurisprudence of the world.

The first sign of the decadence of Rome was its failure to enforce respect for Romans. When the ancient She-Wolf of the Capitoline could no longer defend her scattered whelps, her citizenship became a word without meaning—as all words are when they are not backed by deeds.

Long after Roman civic and military power had disintegrated, however, its very tradition was so mighty that Rome and the outlying stations of Roman administration became the center of the most effective and lasting ecclesiastical system that the world has ever seen.

By the beginning of the Christian era the dignity and the importance of Roman citizenship had become so overshadowing that the mere declaration by St. Paul, in the castle at Jerusalem, that he was a Roman citizen, though a Jew by race, was sufficient to cause the centurion to unloose his bonds without delay, and Scripture tells us that "The chief captain also was afraid after he knew that he (St. Paul) was a Roman, and because he had bound him."

It was Lord Beaconsfield, the great British empire builder, a Jew like St. Paul, who said in the House of Commons: "I want the day to come when an Englishman in any part of the world can call out as St. Paul did, 'I am an English

citizen,' and find that his words compel respect, as did St. Paul's call more than nineteen hundred years ago, 'Civis Romanus sum.'"

And England, following in the footsteps of Rome, has made her citizenship respected wherever an Englishman has chosen to establish the home which has ever been his castle. For protective power, for the capacity to enforce respect, the phrase, "I am a British subject," has strangely come to recall that much more ancient phrase which was a Roman's shield and buckler against the menace of all the powers and principalities of the then known world.

All this dignity, all this weight of authority, all this sense of personal worth, was founded upon force. Behind the sonority of the proud announcement of Roman citizenship was the muffled tramp of legions, ever audible to the consciousness of an aggressor; beneath the toga of the Roman citizen was the breastplate; behind the word was the short, quick thrust of the hasta and the pilum. Rome's arm was long, and it never failed to reach any point on the known surface of the earth where the slightest impingement was threatened upon the dignity of the empire in the person of any of its citizens.

Only by that method did Rome succeed in elevating to a universal significance its declaration of citizenship. Underneath the national personality lay the skeleton structure of force, giving shape and expression to the national ideal—an ideal which has lasted for twenty centuries and has within it the inspiring vigor which will make it last as long as time itself endures.
—Dec. 15, 1915.

IN 1776 AS NOW

No study of history could be more profitable for any patriotic American than a comparison between the problems of Washington's time and the problems which now face the nation. Washington's farewell address was delivered at the close of an epoch in history—an epoch marked by a successful attempt of a group of thirteen impoverished colonies to break the shackles which a rich and powerful nation overseas was seeking to rivet upon them. The struggle, by the qualities of heroism which it developed and because of the triumph for democracy in which it culminated, furnished a new ideal to the world—an epic which was destined to influence the souls of unborn generations. The name of Washington has become not the name of an individual but a watchword of freedom wherever men think and aspire. Wherever men have revolted against tyranny, wherever they have unfurled the flag of liberty, there the name of Washington has been breathed ardently as the synonym and motto of the cause of human rights. Washington belongs, not to America, but to the world.

And back of the splendid achievement which ultimately gave a new nation and a new ideal to civilization there is burned into the annals of America a record of failure, of heart-breaking disappointment, of defeats suffered where victories should have been won—because the American people failed, in the first, the second and even the third instance, to learn the lesson of preparedness. The references by the Father of His Country to the difficulties which encompassed him are

replete with reflections, sometimes tinged with bitterness, which show how and to what extent the colonies suffered in the struggle with Britain because of their tardiness in grasping the essential truth that the time to prepare for defense is not when the enemy's foot is upon our soil but long before he has marched across our borders.

In Washington's epoch, as in our day, there were men in the legislative halls of the nation who relied upon some divine frenzy of patriotism, upon some happy conjunction of events, to win the liberties of the people and to prevent the triumph of the enemy. In Washington's epoch, as in our own day, there were hectic idealists who denounced as enemies of democracy the men whose vision and knowledge pointed out the inevitable conclusion that the time to prepare for war is in time of peace.

In our own day, as in Washington's time, the cause of liberty upon this continent is menaced by external foes. These foes have learned the lessons of events. They have perfected, or are perfecting, vast resources of offense and defense. America, expanding by leaps and bounds since Washington's day, has become the richest, the most productive—and the least defended nation on earth.

In Washington's administration America was sufficient unto itself. Its commercial interests, confined to the production of a small output of raw products, impinged upon the interests of no other power. To-day American interests—the very wages of our workers—are so bound up at innumerable points of contact and pressure with the interests and the wages of other peoples that the firing of a gun across the Danube

has become a local event here, an event affecting every American wage-earner, every American capitalist, every woman and child dependent upon an American.

And under these vastly changed conditions the advocates of haphazard methods are still urging dependence upon a divine frenzy, upon some happy conjunction of events, to safeguard the independence and the honor of the country which Washington bequeathed to posterity as one of the great moral achievements of all time.

The lesson which Washington sought to teach has not penetrated the consciousness, has not touched the hearts, of a large number of his countrymen.—*Feb. 22, 1916.*

INJUSTICE TO MR. PUTNAM

Last night at a meeting in Carnegie Hall, engineered by the "American rights committee," in the interest of bringing America into the war on the side of the allies, George Haven Putnam was explaining that the British government was the most beneficent on earth. He was interrupted by what the morning papers call a Teuton asking "What about the Boer republics and Egypt?" The interruption was unfortunate and rude. But, once it occurred, the police should not have hustled the interrupter from the hall. They should have allowed Mr. Putnam to answer, as no doubt he would have done. His answer would have done a service to the British cause in America.

The interrupter may even have been a perfectly good American, asking an honest question. Our own American experience in 1776,

1812 and 1861-5 did not overcome us with the conviction of England's supreme beneficence. Many detractors of England say that we have proof in recent years that she has not changed, proof in Egypt, Transvaal, and in the more recent partition of Persia between Russia and England.

Hence, it was a shattered opportunity for those presenting the British side in the war when the police ejected the disturber and so prevented Mr. Putnam from answering his question. It is to be hoped that this answer will be given at the next public meeting of the "American rights committee."—*Mar. 14, 1916.*

MINDING ONE'S OWN BUSINESS

We are getting just a little weary of foreigners telling us how to manage both our external and our internal affairs. Andrew Bonar Law, British colonial secretary, occupies a full page in a Sunday paper warning us of the menace of a German invasion and reminding us that a German victory in Europe would mean an attack on the United States. It is, therefore, to our supreme interest to have Britain now defeat Germany.

After all, it is our own worry, and possibly we are doing our own thinking. We recall very vividly the British rage at Col. Roosevelt for telling them how to manage Egypt. It rushes to the mind that England must need all the constructive thinking that A. Bonar Law can turn out. His country is paying him \$25,000 per year, presumably to look out for its interests. He neglects his duty when he devotes his working hours to the elab-

oration of a foreign policy for the United States. Why in 1916 should we accept a direction of our destiny from the source which we repudiated in 1776? And why at this crisis of history should we turn for advice to the country which is most egregiously mismanaging its own foreign affairs?—*March 30, 1916.*

UPHOLD THE LAW

American history has proved that partisanship ceases at the water's edge. It should also prove that dissension ends at the statute book. The law is the basis of civilization and of the state. Until it is changed it must be respected by all citizens, no matter what their views on extraneous issues. Any other path would lead into the wilderness of anarchy—and the wilderness of anarchy borders upon the abyss of destruction.

If a group of citizens, or aliens living under our laws, have seen fit to defy those laws and endanger public safety by acts of violence against property destined for foreign ports, they should be dealt with rigidly under the laws which they have outraged. That this property took the form of munitions of war supplied to powers with which these citizens are not in sympathy, does not alter the case in the least.

We must have public order, and the hand that strikes at public order strikes at the dignity and the sovereignty of the republic.—*April 15, 1916.*

AN INCITEMENT TO WAR

A group of American citizens, including such distinguished men

as William Roscoe Thayer, Morton Prince, Bliss Perry and Josiah Royce, are issuing simultaneously to-day in America, England and France a remarkable manifesto which deserves the careful scrutiny of every American. It is entitled an "Address to the People of the Allied Nations." It pledges to the entente powers the "sympathies and hopes" of "an overwhelming majority of the American people." It is, in effect, an appeal to the American people to take up arms for the cause of the entente nations and an assurance to the entente that the American people would follow that course if they only had their way.

The authors of this manifesto show a remarkable freedom from doubt as to the complete soundness of their conviction that Great Britain and her allies are 100 per cent. right in their aims and their methods, and the central powers and their allies 100 per cent. wrong in their purposes and the manner in which they are carrying on the war. There is no twilight region in the minds of these leaders in science, education, art, letters and the law. There is no room for compromise in their reasoning, no possibility of a scintilla of justice in the attitude of Germany, no limit to their "horror and detestation of the methods employed by the Teuton confederates."

"The conscience of the American people," say the authors of this astonishing document, "cries out and protests against outrages upon civilization" committed by the enemies of the entente powers, and "against their methods of warfare that break the international laws of nations and the moral laws of humanity."

Germany must be brought to in-

ternational justice, announce the manifestants. Only such an event, in their opinion, could save the "tottering pillars of international law." They say no word of restoring England's respect for that law. They neglect to state that since August 20, 1914, there has been in effect a British blockade against our exports to Germany and a semi-blockade against the neutral countries of Europe, in flat violation of the law of nations. They give no intimation that this illegal blockade was an attempt by Britain to starve the German nation, an attempt which has been thwarted only by the prompt action of the German government in confiscating breadstuffs, and, through their gradual distribution, conserving the lives of its people.

The manifestants fail to mention that the submarine warfare against merchant vessels did not start until February 18, 1915, and was admittedly a measure of retaliation against the British starvation plan. They do not set forth that in February, 1915, we asked England to give up her starvation plan, and asked Germany to stop using her undersea craft against merchantmen. Germany agreed, England refused.

The authors of this manifesto by some chance neglect to state that Germany has, at our instance, modified her sweeping intention to torpedo all British carriers of foodstuffs. Now she exempts unarmed passenger liners. She stands ready to exempt merchant steamers as soon as England will disarm them. At the same time no success has crowned our efforts to remove the British blockade. The British answer to our note asking her to join

Germany in a return to law was a new order in council of March 11, 1915, which blockaded our imports from Germany and our exports of cotton, just as her previous measurer had blockaded all our exports except cotton.

The manifesto fails to explain that the difficulty in our present negotiations with Germany is entirely due to the failure of England to go a single step toward settling what America recognized as a joint issue. A few days ago the German chancellor renewed his promise that Germany would stop her submarine war if England stopped her blockade. Two days later Lord Cecil said England would not renounce her starvation campaign no matter what Germany did. In securing immunity of unarmed British passenger liners—the only British vessels on which Americans have any business to be, in these days—we have reached the limit of one-sided concessions.

Those who represent England as 100 per cent. right also overlook the fact that, in the words of our government, we have been assuming an attitude of neutrality to Germany ever since March 30, 1915. On that date we wrote England denying the legality of her blockade. We went on:

But even though a blockade should exist and the doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory be rigidly enforced, innocent shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition or confiscation.

And no claim on the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with these clear rights of the United States and its citizens as neutrals could be admitted. *To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality to-*

ward the present enemies of Great Britain which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this government in the present circumstances.

If the self-appointed spokesmen of America will study our diplomatic correspondence they will learn the true source of the embarrassment in which Washington finds itself. For over a year our country has been put in a position of unneutrality toward Germany by the operation of an unlawful blockade. Until we take some successful steps toward removing that blockade and regaining our neutrality, we cannot consistently force the total abolition of a submarine campaign which the blockade induced in Germany as a reprisal.

Let no one light-heartedly assume that a diplomatic break will not mean war. A break will take out of the hands of the German and American governments the control which each now has over its press. The jingoes in both countries will run wild. As there will be no channels of diplomacy, intercourse or explanation left between the two countries the wildest lies will spread unrestrained and unrestrainable. Finally, one country or the other will yield to the clamor of the mob and war will be upon us.

And such a tragic consummation of events is the desire of these passionate manifestants, who would impose upon Germany all the restraints of law and confer upon England complete immunity from any law.—*April 17, 1916.*

AMERICA FIRST

The relations between the United States and Germany are nearer the breaking point than ever before.

The President has taken a stand from which there is apparently no possible recession. Germany must yield to America or diplomatic relations between the two nations must cease—with possibly even graver consequences.

There is only one course open to American citizens if this crisis comes. It is no time to continue discussion of the merits of the controversy. Every American must place his country's interests above all other considerations and loyally give to the nation his unwavering patriotic support.

Let us formulate the things that represent America's highest purpose in definite terms so that we may have before us clearly the ends for which our power and our moral influence will be exerted. A clear and definite statement of the objects which we seek in tangible terms that can be embodied in the peace negotiations is needed. Then let us all unite for them so that America may stand as a potent influence for the right. This is the only course. May our country emerge from the heat of this crisis as a nation integrated and unified from ocean to ocean so that it shall stand one in heart and one in purpose.—*April 19, 1916.*

BUILDING THE IDEAL NATION

Nicholas Murray Butler, in his address before a distinguished body of editors at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press, drew a vivid picture of the problems and the opportunities before this country. And chief of these problems,

because basic, is the upbuilding of a nation. In the opinion of this eminent student of history and of men and events, America is still struggling with the initial task of its existence. It is not yet a nation. After tracing the discords and the difficulties that hampered the colonists in their early struggle, Dr. Butler said:

The result was that there grew up here, not a nation, but the material out of which a nation could be made. There is a sense, a deep and striking sense, in which the same remains absolutely true to-day. There is not yet a nation, but the rich and fine materials out of which a true nation can be made by the architects with vision to plan and by the builder with skill adequate to execute.

No country in the history of the world ever had the opportunity for building up an ideal nation that this country still has. The hundred million people who inhabit America represent the best blood of Europe, its best traditions, its highest achievements. This blood, these traditions and these achievements constitute a heritage which no other country ever had in the annals of civilization.

We have the respect for law, the uncompromising devotion to duty, the rugged energy which characterizes the English stock at its best.

We have the power of organization, the habit of foresight, the idealization of country as the object of the endeavor and the loyalty of every citizen which has been so marked a feature of German character.

We have the artistic instincts, the lightness of spirit, the keen power of analysis, the dash and the thrift which are a heritage of the Latin since the dawn of history.

We have the sturdy honesty of

the Scandinavian, the optimistic enterprise of the Irish and the plodding industry of the Slav.

And we have the deep religious sense, the idealism, the constructive force and the inflexible purpose of the Jew.

All these strains of blood and of genius, which at one time or another have been the dominant forces of civilization, are ours in the aggregate. Why are we not a nation?

The most serious mistake which the architects in this unparalleled task of nation-building have made is suggested by the assumption that the salvation of this country lies in the maintenance of the ideals which were brought from Europe by the vanguard of this great army of population. To this phase of the problem of nation-building Dr. Butler, after pointing to the influx of various race-stocks that has marked the growth of America, referred as follows:

With this heterogeneous immigration there came, in no inconsiderable measure, the echo of the old world animosities and feuds and hates. These did not manifest themselves in any direct sense as anti-American, but they did manifest themselves with sufficient strength to deprive America of a unity of attitude, of feeling and of policy in dealing with international relations which every day grew in importance and in significance.

What are the causes of these manifestations of disunity? Chiefly an unsympathetic attitude on the part of the earlier comers into the great American commonwealth toward the ideals, the aspirations and the habits of mind of the later comers. Rome, in the highest period of her imperial power, raised up the ideals of her subject races, as represented by their gods, in her shrine. The Eternal City became

the temple of all the peoples over whom she ruled.

America should recognize in similar fashion the best that is in all the civilizations from which she has drawn her vast host of recruits. Every race that enters into the composition of the country should be made to feel that the best and the noblest of its traditions and its feelings has been made a part of our moral and political fabric. Then every race within our boundaries would feel that it has an equal standing in what President Wilson has called a "universalized nation."

Switzerland is made up of three races. On a smaller scale the difficulties that might have been expected to retard and complicate the problem of achieving national unity in the sturdy Helvetian republic may be taken as a good example of those that America has encountered. But in Switzerland such difficulties do not exist. No race has attempted to enunciate to the two others: "You will think and feel as I do, or I shall put you down as a hyphenate, a traitor and a foe to the country."

The result is that Switzerland, despite its heterogeneous racial make-up, is an absolutely united country, as has been demonstrated in inspiring fashion by the unanimity with which its people have rallied to its defense in the present crisis.

When our architects and our builders follow the example of Switzerland the forces of disunion which are hampering the development of America will vanish. We will have a united nation—not an Anglo-Saxon nation, or a German nation, a French nation or a Slavic nation, but an AMERICAN NA-

TION. And it is not yet too late to achieve that splendid triumph of nation-building.—*April 27, 1916.*

THE SENSE OF HUMOR

And now Lord Sydenham, member of the British government, tells us what we should think on the world issues confronting America. We have heard from A. Bonar Law, British minister for the colonies, that our safety depends on the success of the allies. Perhaps Mr. Law sent us gratuitous information because we were a British colony a hundred and fifty years ago, and Mr. Law is not well versed in more recent history. Recently "a high British official" gave out the disconcerting news that Germany was pushing the attack on Verdun in order to force an early peace and have its army free to attack the United States. Sunday Lord Sydenham threw a third bomb into our bucolic sense of security. His lordship says that the fate of the Monroe doctrine hangs on a victory for the allies.

How very, very kind of them all, to take time away from the pressing problems of their own countries and tell us what is best for ours. But these English statesmen run the risk of convincing us that the upper classes in England have no sense of humor. Think of these men posing as disinterested advisers to the United States! They must be posing as disinterested, for if their advice is in the interest of England, it is an insult.

There are other Englishmen devoid of a sense of the ridiculous position they put themselves in, when they solemnly advise us the course we should steer. Some of them are

professional peace advocates. For example, G. Lowes Dickinson. Mr. Dickinson, under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation, gave a lecture at New York University on the subject of the "League to Enforce Peace." Among other things, he dissuaded the United States from building a large navy. He said that the difference between England and Germany arose when Germany began her navy programme. Up to that moment, nobody had hated Germany. Therefore, he said, the United States should not herself enter the navy-building business and risk a similar estrangement with England.

It is all so naive. Mr. Dickinson is a British subject who cannot be blind to the terrific value to Britain of its navy in this war. Speaking as the representative of the American World Peace Foundation, he tells Americans that they ought not to covet sea power, lest it bring them, like the Germans, into conflict with the owners of the seas.

Fortunately, the President feels differently. In St. Louis on February 4 he said:

There is no navy in the world which has to cover so great an area, an area of defense, as the American navy. It ought, in my judgment, to be incomparably the greatest navy in the world.

If we have a navy such as the President wants, no foe can land on this hemisphere. President Wilson proposes to take care of Lord Sydenham's anxiety about the Monroe doctrine.

Think of the rich field of constructive statesmanship open to all these Englishmen in their own land. The energy devoted to our welfare might solve the Irish problem, keep India quiet, eliminate the subma-

rine menace, settle all labor troubles and save the British empire. Moreover, since 1776 we have done our own thinking and managed our own affairs. We might be allowed to continue this course a little longer.

But the humorous contributions to the ghastly literature of the period are not confined to English minds. The World's Court, Inc., of which the principles have been enunciated by ex-President Taft, is distinctly humorous in one of its aspects. The humor lies in the assumption that the world's frontiers as they now stand have been irrevocably fixed by divine decree, as it were, and that the duty of international justice is to maintain the existing arrangement.

If that be the function of international justice, what is to become of the races which are the victims of oppression, owing to the presence of foreign masters by might of conquest? Would Mr. Taft venture the dictum that what is right? Surely no more preposterous principle than that was ever advanced by the most immoral and hidebound statesman of Europe in his most cynical mood. —May 4, 1916.

PRO-AMERICA

The other night in a New York restaurant there was enacted a strange American scene symbolical of our country to-day.

The orchestra played "Tipperary." Instantly from nearly half the guests came hand-clapping, which grew into wild applause and cheers. It was the sort of reception that "Tipperary" might have received in London.

The demonstration was no sooner started than it was answered by a

counter-demonstration. There were hisses and cat-calls and groans. It was the sort of reception that "Tipperary" might expect in Berlin.

The mingled uproar was so loud that the music could not be heard.

Not long after, the unhappy orchestra played "Die Wacht am Rhine." The "Tipperary" scene was repeated. Those who cheered now hissed and those who hissed now cheered. Men glared at each other.

The question asked itself: Is this America and are these Americans, generating mutual distrust and dissension in behalf of the participants in a foreign war? What are Tipperary and the Rhine to us?

Nobody thought of playing the "Star Spangled Banner" or of asking for it. Men's minds were intent, not upon what united them, but upon what separated them.

The incident was a type and symbol of America to-day. We have been so busy taking sides with alien belligerents that we have no time or energy to look after ourselves and our common welfare.

We are so busy being pro-ally or pro-German that we are not heeding the call to unite as pro-Americans only for the protection of our own interests.

The hour is late, but not too late, to change. We are following the paths that lead to participation in this war and to civil strife at home.

Who cares to come back with us to America?—May 18, 1916.

A DIVIDED NATION

One of the foremost men of the republic asked the question the other day, "Is America a nation?" Then

he proceeded to answer by proving it was not.

Let us face the facts. The greatness of the British nation dates from Cromwell. He welded and unified the diverse and discordant elements of the British Isles into one body. Before his time Scotch and Welsh, north and south and east and west English were slit into factions, each with its own jealous and selfish interests. Not until they were amalgamated, knit with a national spirit to a common purpose, did Britain grow into a world power. The literature, wealth, progress of Britain began with Cromwell's work.

While Germany was a federation of twenty-five states, each with its own set of laws, its own distinct coinage, its separate army, its own courts, its own schools and its own dialect, it was the battleground of Europe. Through the genius of Bismarck Germany was unified. Of all his acts nothing, perhaps, was more effective than the codification of the laws. With the German states consolidated the German nation was born and a new spirit animated the people. Then followed the most remarkable and rapid development in history. From a land poor and a people poverty-stricken Germany became one of the richest of the earth. From a group of states whose influence upon the world was negligible united Germany became a world power. Science, literature, industry and agriculture developed amazingly. With the end of petty conflict came new forms of organization and productiveness. The spirit of nationalization gave to Germany an ideal for which every German citizen was willing to strive and, if necessary, to die.

America to-day is the richest country on the face of the globe. It has one-third of the wealth of the world. It is a giant in size, an empire within itself. In material resources it has treasures of illimitable possibilities. But with all its richness, greatness and inherent strength it is made weak, cumbrous, unwieldy and inefficient by its folly.

The present is one of the most critical periods in its life. We are prone to think the conflict across the sea will cripple the nations of Europe. We are deceiving ourselves. Within the last two years Europe has advanced more than in the preceding generation. War has forced upon the nations an organization, a system, an assembling of national energy beyond anything ever known. This is a potential power of tremendous force. What it may mean if given direction against America commercially is of vital concern to Americans.

To-day our conflict of laws brings the law into contempt. In the forty-eight states are radical divergences on such fundamental issues as marriage, education and responsibility of parent to child. A man divorced in one state may remain married in another. What is bigamy in one state is not in another. The moral and educational conditions of life have a most intense relationship with the economic welfare of the people. The more moral the people, other things being equal, the more effective they are as economic agents. The sounder they are in moral character as a whole, the greater their strength in the production of national wealth.

Bad as is the conflict in laws regarding moral questions, it is worse in relation to business. The people

of one state which regulates child labor, hours of toil and protection of women workers must compete with states where child labor is unrestricted and where hours of toil are unregulated. Laws regarding deeds, contracts, mortgages, etc., differ in almost every state. The American business concern which would operate on a national scale must have a legal department to advise it of its rights and privileges in the various states. Heavy as is the direct burden and much as it hinders expansion of trade, the effect it has in destroying respect for the law is more serious, and industry and enterprise are in thralls.

The spirit of nationalism is absent in Congress. A representative or senator has more interest in appropriations for the "improvement" of creeks and the spending of huge sums on federal buildings in his district than on the passage of laws for the benefit of the republic at large. All questions from national defense to the tariff and the pension roll are viewed in their local aspect. Of statesmanship that means broad patriotism there is little. Of politics that mean plunder there is much.

What the absence of nationalism means in waste, inefficiency and neglect is incalculable. It affects every branch of industry, every home and every person. Not until the forty-eight states now loosely joined and each jealous of its state rights are as one in national spirit, national organization and national form will the United States be truly the United States. And not till then will America be really strong or safe or know the impulse that makes a people really great.

Building a nation is the task before us. This week the Republican

and Progressive parties decide upon the leader who is to undertake the great work.—*June 5, 1916.*

THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA AND THE PRESIDENCY

By S. S. McCLURE

ROOSEVELT BEATEN, SAY PRO-GERMANS.

Metz, Viereck and Others Are Quoted as Saying That Propagandists Killed His Chances.

Special to the New York Times.

Chicago, Ill., Wednesday, June 7.—The *Chicago Herald* this morning prints the following dispatch from New York stating that the *New York Evening Mail* will print it this afternoon:

"We have beaten Roosevelt, and we will beat any other candidate who takes Roosevelt's position on foreign affairs."

A prominent officer of the German-American Society, known throughout the country, declared that "this would be a lesson to American politicians who believed they could ignore the German vote."

"If the Republicans will nominate Hughes or some one like him, and if the candidate will come out squarely on the issue that we have just as much right to quarrel with England as with Germany, he will get the German-American vote, and he will be elected."

"Suppose the Republican candidate should decline to place the Lusitania and England's interference with neutral trade on the same level?" he was asked.

"Then he will not get the German-American vote," was the reply. "The point that I am making is that we German-Americans have proved that we have to be reckoned with in American politics. We are going to stand together and see fair play."

(Extract from *New York Times*,
June 7, 1916.)

George Sylvester Viereck, editor of the pro-German weekly, "Fatherland," talked of the situation at great length.

"I am glad of it," he said, meaning the report that Col. Roosevelt had been

defeated for the nomination by the German-American propaganda.

"The German-Americans set out to beat Roosevelt for the nomination and I don't see how any one can blame them. But please understand we are not against Roosevelt because he is not pro-German, but because he is not pro-American."

As an old editorial hand I've been accustomed to sense public opinion; to judge "atmospheres," states of mind, etc. After spending several months in many warring and neutral countries of Europe, I found out that the impression one forms of Germany and the German people from the pro-German propaganda and conspiracies in America is a totally false impression. It would be impossible to estimate the harm that Germany has suffered in the esteem of the American people from the so-called German propaganda. It gives a totally wrong conception of what the people are like. The greatest enemy Germany has had in forming American public opinion is the men who have engaged so actively now to defeat Mr. Roosevelt.

I was in Germany during the days in which the German government was considering the reply to the Sussex note. It was one of the most serious periods in Germany since the beginning of the war. During these days the men especially burdened with the responsibility of government and with answering the Sussex note first learned vividly the significance of the pro-German activities in America and how much harm had been done to Germany in American public opinion.

But the harm done to Germany by the propaganda of the past will be slight compared to the harm done by such statements as head this column. I have known Germany and the Germans many years. I have

known France and the French, and I have known England and the English. I can truly say that my heart is with all these peoples. I try to see things as they will appear years hence. I know, for instance, that the German Chancellor and the Kaiser wished to avoid this war. I know that England worked wisely, and to the utmost to avoid the war. At this moment Von Bethmann-Hollweg is defending himself and his government for delaying for days the declaration of war against Russia—delaying it at a time when all Germany feared the impending Russian armies. He is also defending his submarine policy as against the Von Tirpitz policy. The character of the man is shown in these two matters.

No attacks on Germany can harm Germany a fraction as much as the new development of the German propaganda in regard to the presidency. No other man in the United States has Mr. Roosevelt's competence in dealing with the pressing problems of economic and industrial development and organization. No other man more keenly senses the human side of man's daily labor and needs.

But it is in the larger relations of the civilized world where Mr. Roosevelt's greatest usefulness lies.

Sometime during the next presidency the Great Peace will be made. The character and permanence of that peace will be greatly influenced by the part played by the United States. In dealing with the world questions—the greatest questions since the dawn of history, the United States will serve humanity well, or ill, in accordance with the character and ability of its chief magistrate.

I believe that Mr. Roosevelt has

the vision, right mindedness, knowledge and power to enable the United States to render a service to humanity commensurate with the need of the time and the greatness of our country. I speak as one who loves equally the warring and suffering peoples of Europe.—*June 7, 1916.*

NO HALF-MEASURES

Some far-seeing men realize the deplorable international situation in which our country finds itself to-day. Our national spirit has been weakened. Our failure to insist upon American rights has broken down all respect for our government in its diplomatic intercourse. One concrete example of the larger problems that loom ahead is the increasing menace of the Mexican situation. To some who see clearly—Col. Roosevelt among them—this situation appears so dangerous that it calls for the subordination of all internal differences in favor of a union of all nationally-minded forces to take the government out of the hands of the Democrats. They have proved themselves incompetent to operate the machinery of government.

If the crisis is such as to actually imperil our national position there must be no half-way measures. All forward-looking Americans must lend their full strength to the common effort. They must do more than merely give Hughes a chance. It is the duty of every one of us who senses the danger to throw his full strength into the effort to bring about the defeat of the Democrats at the polls next November. For all who join in this struggle for a stronger American nationalism there

must be fairness and a real truce to all former animosities. There is a duty upon many outside of Republican ranks to join in supporting Mr. Hughes whole-heartedly, but there is also an obligation upon those within the Republican party to appreciate and respect, by fair play, the spirit in which these new supporters come to help them to victory.

On this basis only can there be whole-hearted union and a sweeping victory in November.—*June 14, 1916.*

GOD'S COUNTRY

The greatness, the beauty, the many and varied resources of each state in the Union find a striking illustration in the local patriotism, sometimes the provincialism, of its citizens.

Go back to your home in Minnesota and they all congratulate you on being "in God's country" again. You are reminded that it has 10,000 lakes and the most beautiful climate in the world, that it is the greatest spring wheat state in America, that its educational institutions are unapproached, and that there is nowhere such an equitable distribution of wealth, such general prosperity, so much happiness. St. Paul and Minneapolis, it seems, produce every article of which the human mind has yet formed a conception, and they are in imminent danger of becoming the manufacturing center of the United States.

The prodigal son from New York is welcomed with that heartiness due to one escaped from that babel of noise, flats, subways, elevated railroads and robber restaurants. They cannot be convinced that this is the

outer shell of New York. Why, they have been there, they have been through it. New York is a good place for visiting, but as for living there!

Nor is this peculiar to Minnesota. The same attitude prevails in California and Virginia; and in New York itself, with respect to other parts of the country.

Though we think it queer that people should want to live in other states, we do not think they are queer themselves. They are all Americans like us, and we know it. That is what distinguishes nationalism from internationalism. Foreigners live in strange countries and they are strange themselves. They are not like us. Travel, unrestricted trade, intermarriage, the news service, have served to break down the barriers between individuals in the same country. The same forces were at work to break down the barriers between individuals in different countries when this war broke on us.

This is the saddest and most desperate aspect of the war. Its loss of life, its destruction of property, its heritage of debt are nothing when compared with the heritage of hate and the new trade barriers which will for a long time suppress the factors that have made for international civilization, mutual understanding and peace.

Those citizens of neutral countries who allow themselves to be obsessed by the hate and revenge that fill the hearts of belligerents in no way aid in the solution of the conflict. They are merely piling up obstacles in the way of those who, when the war is over, will have to set about repairing the worst of the damage it has done.
—July 10, 1916.

AMERICA'S EMPIRE OF BEAUTY

America is slowly awakening to the value of a tremendous asset. It is an asset of surpassing beauty as well as of unlimited financial possibilities. For many years Switzerland, with its mountains, lakes and valleys, has served as the playground of the old world. Between the Atlantic and the Pacific we have twenty Switzerland. Part of this heritage of beauty lies within sight of the skyscrapers of New York. The Palisades can be reached in half an hour from the ferry house at West 130th street. The most remote of America's Switzerland—Mount Rainier, in the State of Washington—is a week's journey from the Atlantic coast.

Only a small fraction of the American people have any inkling of the wide variety, the surpassing grandeur and the inspiring power of the masterpieces which Nature has strewn about this continent in the mighty upheavals of its birth pangs. They surpass anything that Europe has to show. A German professor who was visiting New York just before the war spoke to his host with enthusiasm of the beauty of the Rhine-banks. "Have you seen the Palisades?" asked his host. "I have not," answered the German professor. After the visitor had been taken up the river in a yacht by his host, he said in an awed voice: "I shall never speak again of the Rhine—in America."

America and the world have agreed upon Niagara as the father of waterfalls. It is a well-deserved distinction. With the possible exception of Victoria falls, on the Nyanza, Niagara is the most spec-

tacular demonstration of falling waters in the world. But we have in America other waterfalls that dwarf the Niagara. The Great Falls of the Yellowstone, a part of the National Park system, is twice as high as Niagara. The Yosemite Upper Fall, in the Yosemite National Park, tumbles roaring down a cliff nine times as high as Niagara. And the settings which Time and Nature have provided for these gigantic cataracts are of surpassing beauty that strikes the spectator dumb.

The world has heard much of the glories of Lake Constance, of Lake Geneva, in Switzerland; of Killarney, of the lochs of Scotland, of Como, in Italy. It has yet to hear of the incomparable Mirror lake, in the Yosemite National Park, framing in its blue bosom the towering summit of Mount Watkins. It has yet to hear of Crater lake, the waters of mystery nestling amid the wild grandeur of mountain tops in Crater lake, National Park. It has yet to hear of the sapphire snow-fed waters of Glacier National Park. America itself has only begun to hear of these beautiful lakes. When it has heard it will spread its message through the world.

Is it mountain climbing that the traveler seeks? There is the king of American mountains, Mount Whitney, the mighty climax of the Sierras, whose isolated summit rises 14,500 feet above the sea. It is in the realm of perpetual snow. Glaciers have drifted for ages down its rugged slopes. Then there is Mount Rainier, rearing its silver crest 14,408 feet above tidewater at Puget sound—a land of snow-bound silence. There is Stevens glacier, a mountain of ice a thousand feet deep; the stately battlements of the

Rocky Mountains and the serried cliff formations of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, a sort of Pali-sades on a vastly grander scale, of which John Muir wrote: "A gigantic statement for even Nature to make in one mighty stone word. Wildness so Godful, cosmic, primeval, bestows a new sense of earth's beauty and size."

A European poet has said that Nature in America lacks one attribute: human tradition that every forest, every mountain and every valley of Europe is a memorial of struggle, of suffering, of achievement—and that America is lacking in these memories.

Then what of our lost cities of the Mesa Verde—those cities of stone built into the sides of dizzy cliffs, which Dr. J. Walter Fewkes has helped to discover? What of the Sun Temple? What of the inscriptions that tell of struggles, of ambitions, of joys or of disappointments of unknown antiquity?

What is the life story of this vanquished race—a race that has left in these ruins some of the most ancient human remains known to science? Who was the enemy who drove them into oblivion? Here is rich material for the archaeologist. Here is romance that has yet to be written. Here is appeal to the imagination as powerful as any that is to be found in the storied places of Europe.

And, speaking of antiquity, in the Sequoia National Park are the oldest trees in the world. Some of these giant trees, scientists agree, were flourishing when the Star of Bethlehem guided the wise men of the East to the lowly manger of history.

Such are some of the beautiful

and impressive things to which every American is heir, and which the Government of the United States is safeguarding for the people in perpetuity and making available to the many by the construction of roads, camps and hotels.

Beginning with this issue, our cartoonist, Mr. Brinkerhoff, will give from time to time an artist's impressions of this splendid heritage of the American people—a heritage without a parallel in the world.—*Aug. 21, 1916.*

WANTED: A SPIRIT OF NATIONALISM

England has been made great by the unity of her statesmen, her bankers, her manufacturers and her people in a national purpose. Without large agricultural or mineral resources, she would have filled a minor role in the world's development and in world affairs had not necessity and ambition led her to reach out beyond the seas for trade. Throughout the centuries she has appreciated that commerce was the blood of life to her; that without it her industries would shrivel. To broaden her lines she has gone to the ends of the earth. Every market opened for British goods meant more work for British labor, more investment for British capital, more bills of exchange for British bankers, more cargo for British ships, more power and prosperity for the British.

Great Britain did this despite manifold handicaps. It brought from all quarters of the globe the raw material out of which British manufacturers fashioned articles to be sold not only in nearby markets

but to the people from whom the raw material was purchased. It bought cotton in America, transported it thousands of miles across the seas, translated it into calico in Lancashire mills and sold the goods the world over, even to the people who grew the cotton. It bought wool in Australia and transported it half way 'round the globe, wove the wool into cloth and sent the finished goods half way 'round the globe to clothe the Australians. It bought iron ore from Sweden, France, Canada, the United States; tin from the Strait Settlements and Peru; copper from America, Turkey and other distant lands; rubber from Brazil and the Congo, carried them in British bottoms across the seas, made them into articles of worth and utility and sold the bulk of the manufactures outside the British isles.

In all this the British banker has stood behind the British manufacturer and the British ship owner, and the British government has stood back of all three. There has been system, organization in it all and a definite policy which has been adhered to unswervingly.

America is a Colossus. To-day this country commands one-third of the wealth of the world. No other nation has such agricultural and mineral resources and no nation worthy of the name, barring Russia, has 100,000,000 population. No other nation has greater natural advantages for industrial expansion, more of the stores of raw material within her borders to draw upon, or more of opportunity to aid in the progress of the world. But the Colossus is chained. The Colossus looks out on the western ocean and sees few but British ships; on the

Pacific and sees few but British and Japanese vessels. To the north the Colossus sees Canada bound to Britain by ties of blood and loyalty and trade. To the south the Colossus sees Mexico, Central America, South America, most of the republics of which are financed by Europe and trade ordinarily with Europe by need or by preference.

America will have ships on the seven seas when America knows the spirit of nationalism, and not before. Until that spirit is strong in its government, in its bankers and in its people it cannot assume its rightful position in world commerce. Unless the spirit is awakened, the end of the war will see American goods going out in British, German, French, Italian, Austrian, Dutch, Norwegian, Greek and Spanish ships as before, and the markets now open to us gradually will close.

If America is to be confined to America, as is inevitable unless this country has its channels to the markets of the world, its industries must be limited sooner or later to America's needs. It cannot have trade channels unless it creates them. They can be established and maintained only through national effort, by unity of action by government, by bankers and by the public.

Heretofore America has been sufficient unto itself. It has been concerned wholly with its internal development. It has had a plethora of natural wealth. No nation has been more favored in this respect. The lavishness of its resources has, in itself, led to overconfidence, indifference, carelessness of the future. But no longer. The population has increased prodigiously. Industries have expanded as never be-

fore. Nations, like men, must progress or they retrograde. We must widen our markets permanently or we will suffer. We can widen our markets and hold them through national effort and in no other way. Not until the manufacturer knows that every vessel that bears the Stars and Stripes on the seas is an asset for him; until the banker realizes that by aiding the farmer to increase his crops, the railroads to transport freight more economically and the manufacturer to turn out more goods he is adding to his own business by creating more of trade and more of commerce, and until the statesman sees in everything that helps American marketing something that demands his patriotic support will American commerce find channels of its own through which it will flow freely and permanently. We cannot open foreign markets and hold them unless we act as a nation.

The sooner the national spirit is awakened the better.

If it is not stirred by the opportunity of to-day—the most dazzling opportunity ever presented to a nation—it may be born late, as it has in other lands and to other peoples through struggle, privation and bitter need.—*Aug. 23, 1916.*

THE AMERICAN RIGHTS LEAGUE

We all remember the American Rights League, a spontaneous protest against the *Lusitania* horror. No American could feel alien to the league in its original purpose.

To-day it has ventured on a new field. It is distributing circulars which urge us all to "write or bet-

ter telegraph" our senators, congressmen, the State department, to have our government protest against the execution of Capt. Fryatt.

Since when did he become an American and his execution an infringement on "American rights"?

Once more the facts of the Fryatt case: He commanded the British passenger steamer *Brussels*. A German war vessel, a submarine, rose and ordered him to stop. The war vessel was obeying our orders that it stop and search, and not simply destroy. Fryatt turned his vessel to ram the warship, which barely escaped. For this exploit Fryatt bore an engraved watch given him by the Admiralty. On a later trip Fryatt, his vessel and watch, were captured by a German destroyer and taken to Zeebrugge. Fryatt was tried by a German court and condemned to death as a sniper.

Fryatt's attack on the warship deprived his vessel of immunity. The *Brussels* became a warship, subject to torpedo destruction by a second German submarine—they generally hunt in pairs. That would have sunk innocent passengers. Instead, Capt. Fryatt, alone responsible, was alone punished. Germany does not deny the right of passenger vessels to resist warships. She merely asserts the equal right that warships shall punish such passenger vessels—not to the limit of international law, but far below that limit.

The execution of Capt. Fryatt will help deter captains of British passenger steamers from endangering the lives intrusted to them, just as the summary execution of snipers deters the hotheads of a captured town from bringing heavy punishment on innocent civilians.

Upon examination the old Ameri-

can Rights League seems now diverted to the work of protecting the "rights" of another nation.—*Aug. 23, 1916.*

THE UPPER CLASS

There is one thing, and one thing alone, that will save the leisure classes of this country, and that is to abandon leisure and get to work like the rest of us. The workingmen have it in their power—and they are learning their power—to overturn the whole social system.

It is a good system. It has resulted in vast accumulations of machinery and railroads, which increase the general prosperity. The laboring man is better off than he would be under any other system.

That is not the point. He would rather be less well off and not support in idleness and wasteful display a whole race of parasites.

There are two so-called economic justifications of the capitalistic class. First, through the dividends it receives, it acts as agent to withhold part of the product of labor and reinvest it in more machinery and railroads. Labor in this generation is forced to contribute to the creation of more machinery to serve the next generation. It is in this that our progress has consisted.

Second, the capitalistic class has given to it the money to develop strong, healthy children, to give them travel, education, counsel and wide experience, that they may be fitted for the tasks of leadership in the society which, in their youth, supports them without labor.

This upper class is simply the trustee of the wealth entrusted to its hands, to be employed in new investment or in training for serv-

ice. But when these trust funds are diverted by the trustees to sybaritic luxury and display and when favored youth is trained not to service or leadership, but is rendered incapable of anything but lives of still greater display and luxury—then what words can we find to describe the baseness of the breach of trust?

Let the upper class search their hearts, examine their lives, count their achievements and judge whether they are rendering account of the talents entrusted to them. So surely as they are not, they will be stripped of the leadership they inherited from more robust fathers, and cast out to the fate they deserve.—*Sept. 20, 1916.*

Political Issues; Autumn, 1916

FORMER PRESIDENT REFUSES TO ALLOW USE OF HIS NAME IN PRIMARIES OF ANY STATE

**Tells Henry L. Stoddard in Interview at Trinidad That
Only Thought is to Arouse Americans to Unpleasant
Facts and Great Responsibility—Nothing to be
Gained from Present Administration, Which Offers
Choice of Different Degrees of Hypocrisy.**

By HENRY L. STODDARD.

Special Cable to The Evening Mail.

PORT-OF-SPAIN, TRINIDAD, B. W. I., MARCH 9.—I found Col. Roosevelt here this afternoon. He has keenly enjoyed with Mrs. Roosevelt the last days of his tour of the West Indies and appreciates with characteristic enthusiasm every point of interest on this historic island. An average of five hundred words of cable tells the daily news of the whole world to the people here, and as most of that now deals with the war zone, the amount of news information from the United States is not especially enlightening. Such as it is, however, it is greater than Col. Roosevelt has had any time since he left Sagamore Hill.

It was my privilege, therefore, to give the Colonel the first news he has received of what has occurred in the political world in the United States the past month, and in particular to place before him the situation that has developed in the Presidential field.

COL. ROOSEVELT STATES HIS POSITION.

As a result of the movement in Massachusetts to elect Roosevelt delegates in that state I submitted to Col. Roosevelt the various statements published by the contestants and requested him to make an authoritative statement in reference thereto, so that the country would thoroughly understand his position. Col. Roosevelt took the papers I submitted and after carefully studying them wrote and signed the following statement:

"I am deeply sensible of the honor conferred on me and of the goodwill shown me by the gentlemen who have announced themselves as delegates to be elected in my interest in the Massachusetts Presidential primary. Nevertheless I must request, and I now do request and insist, that my name be not brought into the Massachusetts primaries, and I emphatically decline to be a candidate in the primaries of that or of any other state. Months ago I formally notified the authorities of Nebraska, Minnesota and Michigan to this effect.

"I do not wish the nomination.

"I am not in the least interested in the political fortunes either of myself or any other man.

INTERESTED ONLY IN AWAKENING AMERICA.

"I am interested in awakening my fellow countrymen to the need of facing unpleasant facts. I am interested in triumph of the great principles for which with all my heart and soul I have striven and shall continue to strive.

"I will not enter into any fight for the nomination and I will not permit any factional fight to be made in my behalf. Indeed, I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic—unless it feels not only devotion to ideals but the purpose measurably to realize those ideals in action.

"This is one of those rare times which come only at long intervals in a nation's history, where the action taken determines the basis of the life of the generations that follow. Such times were those from 1776 to 1789, in the days of Washington, and from 1858 to 1865, in the days of Lincoln.

GREAT RESPONSIBILITY IS BEFORE THE PEOPLE.

"It is for us of to-day to grapple with the tremendous national and international problems of our own hour in the spirit and with the ability shown by those who upheld the hands of Washington and Lincoln. Whether we do or do not accomplish this feat will largely depend on the action taken at the Republican and Progressive national conventions next June.

"Nothing is to be hoped from the present administration, and the struggles between the President and his party leaders in Congress are to-day merely struggles as to whether the nation shall see its govern-

mental representatives adopt an attitude of a little more or a little less hypocrisy and follow a policy of slightly greater or slightly less baseness. All that they offer us is a choice between degrees of hypocrisy and degrees of infamy.

"But disgust with the unmanly failure of the present administration, I believe, does not, and I know ought not, to mean that the American people will vote in a spirit of mere protest. They ought not to, and I believe they will not, be content merely to change the present administration for one equally timid, equally vacillating, equally lacking in vision, in moral integrity and in high resolve. They should desire, and I believe they do desire, public servants and public policies signifying more than adroit cleverness in escaping action behind clouds of fine words, in refusal to face real internal needs, and in complete absorption of every faculty in devising constantly shifting hand-to-mouth and day-to-day measures for escape from our international duty by the abandonment of our national honor—measures due to sheer dread of various foreign powers, tempered by a sometimes harmonizing and sometimes conflicting dread of various classes of voters, especially hyphenated voters at home.

CRISIS TOO GRAVE TO MAGNIFY COUNTRY'S NEED.

"We must clarify and define our policies, we must show that our belief in our governmental ideals is so real that we wish to make them count in the world at large and to make the necessary sacrifice in order that they shall count. Surely we, of this great republic, have a contribution to make to the cause of humanity, and we cannot make it unless we first show that we can secure prosperity and fair dealing among our own men and women. I believe that in a crisis so grave it is impossible too greatly to magnify the needs of the country or too strongly to dwell on the necessity of minimizing and subordinating the desires of individuals.

"The delegates who go to Chicago will have it in their power to determine the character of the administration which is to do or leave undone the mighty tasks of the next four years. That administration can do an incalculable amount to make or mar our country's future. The men chosen to decide such a question ought not to be politicians of the average type and parochial outlook; still less should they be politicians controlled by sinister influence from within or without. **They should be the very best men that can be found in our country, whose one great mission should be to desire in unequivocal terms for a programme of clean-cut, straight-out, national Americanism, in deeds not less than in words, and in internal and international matters alike, and to choose as their candidate a man who will not merely stand for such a programme before election, but will resolutely and in good faith put it through if elected.**

CHICAGO DELEGATES SHOULD BE PATRIOTS.

"These men should be men of rugged independence, who possess the broadest sympathy with and understanding of the needs and desires of their fellows; their loyalty should be neither to class nor to sections, but to the whole of the United States and the people that dwell therein. They should be controlled by no man and no interest, and their own minds should be open.

"June is a long way off. Many things may occur between now and then. It is utterly impossible to say now with any degree of certainty who should be nominated at Chicago. The crying, the vital need now is that the men who next June assemble at Chicago from the forty-eight States and mingle the view of the entire country shall act with the same and lofty devotion to the interest of our nation as a whole which was shown by the original Continental Congress. They should approach their task unhampered by any pledge except to bring to its accomplishment every ounce of courage, intelligence and integrity they possess.

"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

March 9, 1916.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

By S. S. McCLURE

There is talk that the German-American vote prefers Hughes, because he has said nothing against Germany. For this reason he is, the report goes, to be preferred to Wilson, who is accused of unneutrality in the war, and preferred to Roosevelt, who has said unkind things of certain moves of the German military abroad and of professional German trouble makers in our own country.

There is no German-American vote. Before a German can vote in this country of ours and his, he becomes a naturalized citizen, fore-swears allegiance to any land but America, and takes the oath to cleave to this country. There is a vote of Americans who used to be Germans or British or Irish, just as there is a large vote of men who used to be children. But if they

had not ceased being children they could not vote at all.

What is this Americanism which Americans who used to be Germans are called to support? It is a ruthless insistence that foreign nations respect our rights and our sovereignty. What a spectacle we are before the world to-day! We sent our first note to England on December 26, 1914. We are still corresponding. We sent our first note to Germany on February 4, 1915. Whether or not we are through corresponding, no one knows. It is a spectacle that no American, no matter what his land of birth, can endure for the land of his citizenship. The same spectacle is presented in Mexico and in our dealings with Japan—impotence, dishonor, contempt abroad and lack of self-respect at home.

What in these past two years do we regret, deplore and—in our hearts—know that we are respon-

sible for? Consider only Belgium, the *Lusitania*, the British exercise of sovereignty over our commerce, the British seizure of international mails. Every one of these shameful conditions sprang from our criminal weakness and inaction.

Washington saw that France and Germany were glaring at each other across Belgium. A strong man would have told both that a move across Belgium would mean war with the United States. It was no time to weigh conventions and split hairs; it was a time to speak and warn. A strong man at Washington would have spoken. A weak man was there and he kept silent. Voila la Belgique!

When Britain issued her first order in council, on August 20, 1914, a strong man in the White House would have said: "England, you stop this violation of international law, and stop it now."

Why, we feed England! But a weak man was in the White House. He kept silent until December 26, 1914, and spoke in dulcet tones that have not risen above a whisper since.

The German submarine warfare, instituted on February 18, 1915, was said to be a retaliation against the starvation campaign of the British orders in council. If that is true, the submarines would never have been unleashed, for the orders in council would long since have been abrogated. If these orders were not the real occasion of the submarine warfare, that warfare would still have never started. A strong man in the White House would have said: "The first American passenger drowned in a submarined liner means war." And no American would have been drowned.

But our actions in Mexico and the course of our negotiations with England gave Germany every reason to believe we meant nothing by the little we said in our note of February protesting the proposed submarine warfare. It was a year before we sent Germany the note we should have sent in February, 1915. Our correspondence with Britain still drags its slow length along. Every one has half a contempt for us, and we are by no means sure how much we respect ourselves.

Who is the strong man in America? Who can rescue us from the pit into which we have fallen? There is only one name on American lips—Roosevelt. We recall him in the Spanish-American war, in the work of starting the Panama Canal, in the answer which the fleet gave to the Japanese peril, in his handling of the Venezuela dispute with Germany, in his holding an open door in China. Somehow Americans feel that if Roosevelt had been in the White House the whole European war would have been on a higher plane, international law would still have a meaning, and we should have a place of honor among the nations of the earth.

A period of stern preparedness, military, industrial and spiritual, awaits this nation. Americans, no matter what their ancient, broken ties, seek a man to lead them away from the fleshpots of Egypt, out of this wilderness of words which we call a national administration.—*May 26, 1916.*

CHARLES E. HUGHES

At last there is prospect that the Republican and Progressive parties can unite upon a common candidate

who will represent them both and represent the American people if elected.

In these days of political self-seeking, of tumult and shouting, there is something refreshing in the vision of a man so devoted to his high calling of justice, so aloof from the political game, that he not only refuses to participate in it and refuses to authorize any one to participate in his behalf, but even refuses to say one word to supply a platform on which he could be judged.

If the people wanted Charles E. Hughes, they had to take him as a man, not as a platform. They wanted him enough to take him on these terms. His deeds had been such that no words were needed to judge him by. It is a good omen for the state of American political sense that in our country the office still knows how to seek the man.

Those whose memories go back a few years know that it was just so in 1906, when Hughes was made governor. He refused to raise a finger to get the Republican nomination, nor did he authorize any one to raise a finger in his behalf. The bosses did not want him; he could make them no promises. It was the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, who made the bosses take Hughes. Robert Fuller says:

It required some plain language from President Roosevelt and some diplomatic work on the part of those who represented him to get them to consent to the nomination of Mr. Hughes.

During the convention Hughes wired to Senator Page, in reply to an inquiry:

I shall accept the nomination without pledge other than to do my duty accord-

ing to my conscience. If elected, it will be my ambition to give the state a sane, efficient and honorable administration.

When he accepted the nomination he sounded the keynote of his service as governor:

No interest, however, prominent, will receive any consideration except that to which, upon the merits of the case, it may be entitled, when viewed in the light of the supreme interest of the people.

He accepted no corporation contribution to his campaign fund. The people wanted him, and he was elected governor by a large majority, the only Republican elected on the state ticket. It was because of his achievements. As counsel for two legislative committees he had won the fight for 80-cent gas and had cleansed the Augean stables of the insurance scandals. And so the bosses had to swallow him.

In his inaugural speech he could truthfully say:

I assume the office of governor without other ambition than to serve the people of the state. I have not coveted the power, nor do I permit myself to shrink from its possibilities.

When Mr. Barnes found himself and his party in possession of this new kind of governor, they made overtures to him to effect a "reconciliation." He wrote Mr. Barnes the terms on which he would reconcile:

New York, Dec. 3, 1906.

My Dear Mr. Barnes—I have been unable to answer your letter before this.

I agree with you that we should strive to heal differences, to unify sentiment, and to have the co-operation of the Republican press. Important as is efficient organization, the great need of the Republican party is to secure a larger measure of public confidence, and to this end the best efforts of the organization should be directed. It is not enough that there should be harmony, but rather there should be harmonious action in an

endeavor to interpret and to meet public sentiment in a just manner. * * * We must not simply be receptive and hospitable, but aggressive and convincing in leadership. * * * This is the only way in which, in my judgment, the Republican party can put itself, as you say "in fighting trim."

Yours truly,

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

The same words can appropriately be addressed to the Republican party to-day. This record of Hughes is the reason why the movement for his nomination did not originate in the Republican machine. He is not and cannot be a machine man.

It took him four years of office to convince the machine of this state that he ruled, not they. But, at the end of those four years, the machine and the people of the state knew that a new, strange sort of leader had been among them: one who talked little of the glorious principles of democracy, but who daily demonstrated them; one who did not declaim against the bosses, but quietly suppressed them. Compared with the politicians, he was like a great, silent hydraulic press compared with the chattering of a one horse power donkey engine. He was the hydraulic press; the power was the volume of universal public approval which he concentrated upon himself.

Against the bosses and the state legislature which controlled he passed the law inaugurating the Public Service commissions, and he obliterated race track gambling. He wiped out corrupt public officials serving the state and set a new standard for official appointments. He originated the direct primary bill in this state. The machine defeated him in that, but he put the idea on the map. In the next elec-

tions it was in both party platforms, and now is law. In 1910, after two terms as governor, he accepted an appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States. He was a "presidential possibility," but then, as now, did not seek, but rather shunned, political life.

Somehow the record and the qualities it discloses appeal to Americans. Here is a man who, like Roosevelt, knows how to go past interests and legislatures who represent them direct to the people themselves. He has such a habit of doing all things well, such a habit of selfless devotion to those he serves, that we rest secure that he will meet the larger needs of the nation just as he has met the large needs of the state. In this vital matter of national preparedness to defend our own, to assure for ourselves justice, honor, peace, the upholding of our rights and those of humanity, we trust Mr. Hughes. We trust him to recognize the new demands of a time when the world seems reverted to

—June 12, 1916.

The good old simple plan

That they shall take who have the power
And they shall keep who can.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

No one needs to write a valedictory for Theodore Roosevelt. He is not gone, but is with us in a deeper, more personal sense than ever. Col. Roosevelt cannot be out of politics, no matter what he may say, for politics means the art of interpreting the hopes and aspirations of men and leading them to the realization of these hopes and aspirations.

Roosevelt made the platform, the

issues, on which the Republican party will stand, united and victorious. Roosevelt reasserted Americanism in a country rent with civil discord and blind partisanship in a European war. Roosevelt developed the issue of preparedness, military, industrial, social and spiritual—developed it in so irresistible a manner that even the national Democratic administration had to adopt it as its own. Roosevelt laid bare, and kept bare, the crime of our conduct in Mexico. From the beginning of his political career the name Roosevelt has meant social justice, or, as he puts it, the square deal.

All this is now the Republican creed, and because Roosevelt has made it the creed of Americans it will prevail. Some one said:

Let me write the songs of the people; I care not who makes their laws.

So this master man, who has laid down the principles of American policy, can afford to watch another carry them out.

Great is achievement. But greater is the willingness to subordinate self to a cause that is larger than self. He withdrew because he had already won. Those who say that Roosevelt withdrew because he was beaten do not know the American people. He is still the first man in the hearts of his countrymen. It is by no means certain that he could not win the election to-day.

But no one can for fifteen years combat corrupt business interests, machine politics, pacifism and materialism without accumulating personal hostilities that must now be obliterated in a united fight against a repetition of this present administration. If a man's principles are to prevail, he can afford to withdraw his individuality.

Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice. (If you seek his monument, look about you.)—*June 12, 1916.*

RALLYING TO HUGHES

The Hughes candidacy is steadily uniting all the substantial elements opposed to the Wilson administration. It is gripping the confidence of the people; it has instilled in them the hope that their national government will shortly be restored to its rightful place of dignity and influence in the parliaments of the world. The country is rallying to a leadership that means peace without momentary menace of war, that means national policies concentered in deeds rather than mirrored in words, that expresses and inspires by its clear vision and virile patriotism the real aspirations of the people, and their firm determination to achieve them "with malice toward none, with charity for all."

It is not surprising to find these evidences of confidence in Mr. Hughes. The American people have an unerring instinct for the real, the true, among their men and women. They are quick to search out genuineness and to honor it above all else. It is the essential quality which they demand of their leaders in times like these. It is in such times, too, that every man's record stands out with North Star brightness as the true index to his character and purposes. It is on the record, and on it alone, that his countrymen base their estimate of him, and give or withhold their confidence. This was notably demonstrated in the nomination and election of Grover Cleveland in 1884; it was even more strikingly proven in Chicago two weeks ago, when the

Republican national convention, turning finally from the turmoil of political rivalries, tendered Mr. Hughes a unanimous nomination.

Our political history has no precedent for such a tribute of confidence in any man. Mr. Hughes was drafted for a duty he did not desire, but which he would not shirk. With prompt decision he undertook aggressively his new public services. It was characteristic of him that his campaign began the moment of his acceptance; that the country knew from him with the quickness of a rifle shot that he stood for a "patriotism that is single and complete," "for an Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose."

A man of action, of settled purpose, was instantly revealed to the people. Mr. Hughes stood at no cross-roads. He had no moments of timid indecision. He knew what he desired to do and to say. He knew the road he proposed to travel. He could see its end as well as its beginning. It had no twists and turns. It led toward no wilderness and into no mires. It cut straight, across the clear, open field of collected thought, wise decision and timely action. Mr. Hughes stated his convictions in words that made good the guarantee of his record, and that justified the action of the convention in taking him as its candidate "on faith."

In that light, Mr. Hughes now stands before the country. His candidacy is not the result of fractional rivalry, political bargaining or his own personal ambitions. It is simply and wholly a call to him to take up anew and in a broader field the splendid work he did as "counsel for the people" in the executive chamber at Albany. In those four years he established a standard of govern-

ment in this state that is universally accepted as the highest type of efficient and earnest public service. It had courage, independence and single-purposed loyalty to the public interest as its guide and inspiration. It ranked ability above partisanship, service to the people above service to any man or interest. If elected, as we are confident he will be, Mr. Hughes as President will follow the same course he pursued as governor. He will serve his party best by serving his country best. That is why he should be chosen.—*June 26, 1916.*

MR. HUGHES

If ever a man should feel the inspiration and uplift of a national call, it is Charles Evans Hughes. His nomination was something unique for a national convention which met, as national conventions do, to trade votes and balance favorite sons. The great current of our need swept away their little plans and imposed upon them a man who cares nothing for votes, favorite sons, political creeds and political issues.

The people were lost in a wilderness of national policy and, inept as our conventions are in the art of registering what the people want, the people forced this imperfect instrument to do their will. They chose a man without political adherents, with no authorized representative at Chicago, a man who would not even indicate he would accept the nomination if it was offered him. No American was ever before nominated for President with so little encouragement on his part. The office of President had to go about seeking the man.

There are two reasons why Mr. Hughes took this course. The minor reason was his respect for the high dignity of his position as Supreme Court justice. Yet he could at any moment have resigned his office, gone into the fight and been certain of nomination. He knew that. His major reason for silence was to keep himself free from the pledges that are bound up with office seeking. He will take the President's chair free of obligation to any men or group of men or interests, responsible only to his conscience and the people he serves. It is a proud position and, under the circumstances Mr. Hughes has made, incomparably the most powerful position in the world.

How did the people dare to select a man who had not pronounced himself upon the issues of the day? It is because they have had over three years of the most glorious and high sounding pronouncements from an administration that never gets beyond pronouncing. The American people want less diction and more action. So they have turned to a man whom they have learned to expect to do things.

When Mr. Hughes was through acting as special counsel for a legislative committee in New York state, the public in this city had 80-cent gas. When he was through acting as special counsel for another legislative committee, the state and the country knew the full extent of the abuses which insurance companies had perpetrated with the people's money, and laws drafted by Mr. Hughes were passed which made a repetition of those abuses impossible.

When the people of this state wanted Mr. Hughes for governor

they had to draft him for the service just as he has been drafted for a higher office to-day. Against the bosses controlling the legislature, Gov. Hughes abolished race track gambling and passed the Public Service Commission Bill. He has a habit of going direct to the people with his issues and theirs. All honest men of all parties supported him, for he was the governor of New York, not just a Republican governor.

So in November honest men of all parties will make Mr. Hughes President and he will be not merely a Republican President. The issues to-day transcend party lines. They are:

1. Shall we have union or civil strife at home? Shall we present a united or a broken front to other countries? This is the issue of Americanism.

2. Shall we have a form of military, industrial and spiritual preparedness which will make us strong to defend the right? This is the issue of preparedness.

3. Shall we unswervingly uphold the rights of neutral nations and humanity in this war and keep it upon the high plane which international law prescribes? This is the issue of international law.

4. Shall we face the facts in Mexico or not? Shall we do the disinterested service we did in Cuba and free our border and the people of Mexico of the curse of bandit governments? This is the Mexican issue.

Americanism, preparedness, international law, Mexico—these are our immediate problems. Our experience, our hearts and our minds tell us that Hughes will help us solve them. In the solving of them we shall develop that national strength and that national unity which, under Hughes's leadership, will enable us to play our part at the peace conference and to effect those measures of social justice and industrial efficiency which will press for set-

tlement after the war.—June 27, 1916.

HUGHES THE TRUE PROGRESSIVE LEADER

By HENRY L. STODDARD

If there is any Progressive who does not see a triumph for progressivism in the Hughes candidacy he must be one whose conception of the Progressive party is that it is solely a machine for making Col. Roosevelt a perpetual candidate for the presidency, regardless of everything—the colonel's own wishes included.

No governor of this state, no governor of any eastern state, has a record that squares so absolutely to Progressive principles as does the Hughes record, from his fight for a Public Service Commission to his fierce struggle for direct primaries. Between those two most conspicuous examples of his progressivism are a score of lesser matters of legislation and a list of appointees to public office that has not been equaled for capacity or integrity by any successor.

Had Roosevelt died before the Chicago convention met, or had his name been absolutely out of consideration, the first name to occur to Progressives as a fitting successor to him would have been that of Mr. Hughes. The Hughes record would have compelled that recognition. Has any one ever heard any reactionary Republican claim Hughes as the candidate of his choice? Has any one heard any wild shouts of joy from one William Barnes, Jr., over the result at Chicago?

The fact is that reactionary Republicans met at Chicago two weeks ago the defeat which they averted

four years ago by using the machinery of the party organization to thwart the will of the party primaries. Mr. Hughes was not the personal choice of the old-type Republican leaders. He was not the candidate they wanted; he was the candidate they had to have. They were as much in control of the recent convention as they were of the 1912 gathering, but they had better control of their senses. They knew they could not repeat their old tactics. They realized that this time they had to recognize the party will, and take chances with a candidate not of their class. They did not dare turn down the Roosevelt demand without giving the country a Progressive in record and purpose.

Hence they picked as their nominee the only man who had a chance to get the Progressive party indorsement, and whose record they knew would compel such indorsement, provided Colonel Roosevelt did not run on the Progressive ticket. With all their bitter antagonism to Roosevelt, they knew down deep in their hearts that he was too much a patriot in this crisis to stand in the way of union against Wilson.

They knew he had twice forced the nomination of Hughes for governor; they knew—some of them knew—that Hughes would have been Roosevelt's choice as his successor in the White House in 1908, instead of Taft, but for matters that need not now be recalled; and they knew that if Hughes had been off the bench last winter and campaigning for the nomination he would have had Roosevelt's support.

In brief, they knew that Hughes's record in public office was the kind

that Roosevelt could whole-heartedly indorse. Hughes's enforced silence on the big issue of the day was the one bar to accepting him. That bar removed, the colonel promptly responded.

The only reason that any Progressive can now give for opposing Hughes is the illogical one that he prefers the election of the man against whom the whole Roosevelt-Progressive fight has been waged. Mr. Hughes stands squarely on the platform adopted by the Progressive convention. That document is anti-Wilson from top to bottom. Every line of it vibrates with intense opposition to the Wilson administration. It was adopted with enthusiastic unanimity by the Progressive convention. If the delegates meant what they said in it, how can they now take any step calculated to keep Wilson four years more in the White House?—*June 29, 1916*

THE FLIGHT OF WILSON'S DIPLOMACY

No one can examine the situation of our State department, in its European diplomacy, without a certain feeling of regret and sadness.

Somehow it seems to mean less to be an American than it did under Jefferson, Seward, Olney, John Hay.

There are said to be three types of powers in the family of nations. One type includes those nations whose sovereign rights are a mere fiction, nations which are regarded or disregarded as pleases the large and small real powers of the world. In this first type of nations we may reckon China, Persia and Colombia.

The second type includes those lesser powers whose sovereign rights are recognized and regarded by all

their fellows except by the very greatest in times of their great stress. Then the mighty powers, for the allotment of their selfish ends, trample upon the rights of those lesser powers without scruple. To the second type belong Belgium, Holland and Greece.

There is a third type of powers so majestic, so compelling of awe and respect, that their sovereign rights are respected by great and small in any and all circumstances. These are powers of the first rank; indeed, this immunity from insult is the badge of such rank. Among these first-class powers we reckon Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Austria, France, Japan.

Those who love America and yet face the facts of the last two years find it hard competently to classify their country among the nations of the world. We have had open insults from three nations: Mexico, Germany, England. In none of the cases have we exacted reparation or attained an honorable and lasting settlement.

At Tampico our flag was insulted. We sent an expeditionary force to Vera Cruz to exact apology for the insult. No apology came. Very well. We retaliated by withdrawing our expedition. Under pretext of shunning contact with the morals of Huerta, the strong man of Mexico, we made common cause with that detestable murderer and adulterer, Villa. Then Carranza catches our fancy. We turn to him. Villa is offended and raids our border to pillage and murder. We are enraged. We send Pershing to Mexico to get Villa dead or alive. Our presence annoys Carranza. He waylays a cavalry troop, kills part of the men and marches the others through the

Mexican populace into Chihuahua jail. He is very annoyed. Very well. We withdraw Pershing and agree with Carranza to name six arbitrators who will determine which of us was the offender. However we may class ourselves, there is no doubt that the Mexicans reckon us of the type with China and Persia and Colombia, the type which even little nations may affront at pleasure. Who can blame the Mexicans?

Germany—on May 7, 1915, the *Lusitania* was sunk, an inevitable result of the submarine decree pronounced to us on the preceding February 4. It was nearly a year before we had from Germany the pledge that we could have had by saying on May 8, 1915, the same strong words we finally said. Nor does any intelligent person imagine that the German settlement is a permanent one. Germany's surrender was unconditional, but her note made the permanence of her order leashing the submarine depend upon our willingness to make England also return to the limits of law. Nor can any thinking man call Germany unreasonable in her attitude. The German crisis is merely postponed. It is not removed.

England—We protest against her unexampled expansion of the contraband list. She answers by putting even raw cotton on that list. We demonstrate in an eloquent note that Great Britain has no right to hold up our shipments to Germany via neutral countries. She answers by an order in council announcing that she will seize all German trade in whichever direction moving and by whatever route. Very well. The State department retaliates by appointing two foreign trade advisers to transmit from the British ambas-

sador to American exporters how they may ship to neutral countries without incurring Great Britain's suspicion that the goods are destined for Germany. We protest against violating private letters taken out of mail sacks found on steamers stopped on the high seas. Great Britain says she must open the letters to look for rubber in them, rubber being sent to Germany. Very well, we say, but please stop destroying the letters after you have opened them and card-indexed their business contents. We protest against a vague trading-with-the-enemy act. England accommodates us by making it specific, and names eighty American firms or citizens who are to be outcasts in the international world; no one is to dare to deal with them.

How does England classify us? With China? Or are we in a new classification all our own?

It is not merely a matter of personal or national pride, of our wishing as individuals and as a nation to hold our heads high. The issue goes far deeper than that. We are betraying not only ourselves and our traditions, but we are also betraying the future of the whole world. International law emerges from each war as strong as the strongest neutral has been willing or able to enforce it during the war. In great conflicts of the past century Great Britain has been a neutral. She faithfully performed the task of upholding the law of nations. Upon us in this war that duty fell. In our hearts we all know, and history will tell, how we have performed it.

We have made new international law. In future wars there will always be a dominant sea power. That sea power may now indis-

criminally stop what commerce it chooses upon the high seas regardless of all previous laws of contraband or blockade. That sea power may rifle and dump into the sea international mails all over the world. That power may issue orders in council that take away the livelihood of neutral citizens who have simply done what their government told them was lawful to do. That sea power may, in all likelihood, torpedo and sink unarmed merchant vessels with their passengers and crews. For the last word in the submarine controversy has not been spoken, and we shall not permanently be able to grant to Great Britain alone the right to "develop" international law.

Because of the future danger of international commerce in war time, and because there will always be the possibility of wars, nations in peace will not dare become dependent upon an oversea source of supply for any necessity of life. Viewed in this aspect, the "development" of international law in which we have participated will prove a blow to our export trade which all political speeches, all marshaling of statistics will not mitigate. International confidence and trust, the basis of trade, is being undermined.

These are the plain recorded facts of two years of Democratic diplomacy. It will not be easy for Democratic orators in the coming campaign so to adorn these facts as to get large comfort out of the administration's achievements in the field of diplomacy.—*July 24, 1916.*

THE SOUTHERN MILITIA

The *Chicago Tribune* has recently published a remarkable compilation

of the numbers of militia of each state in the Union, and the place at which that militia is stationed. The remarkable thing about the tabulation is that, outside of the border states themselves, the only southern state to have any troops on the Rio Grande is Virginia. Virginia has 2,000 troops on the border and 2,000 in mobilization camps at home. The entire militia of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Arkansas is in mobilization camps at home. The border forces are from northern and western states. For example, New York has 16,000 troops on the border and 6,000 troops mobilized at home. Illinois has 11,000 troops on the border and 2,000 at home.

It is of course not true that political influence is being used to spare the southern troops from service while their brothers in the North, at very great inconvenience to themselves and great distress to their families, have gone to the front. The men in the South are acclimated to the very heat which is now so distressing to the northern boys down there. There must be some very serious reason for the failure of the entire South to do its share, some such reason as lack of training, lack of equipment or impossibility of recruiting the regiments up to the minimum required by the War department before it will send them to the border.

If the National Guard is to be the force upon which we are to rely in time of emergency, we ought to be able to count on it in every state of the Union, and we ought to know where the weak points are and why they are weak.—*July 27, 1916.*

MR. HUGHES ACCEPTS

Those who heard Mr. Hughes accept the Republican nomination attended more than a political meeting. They participated in a national event.

They heard a brilliant speech. It was not the speech of a politician, unless a politician be one who understands wise policies for the nation. In its unerring logic, its unsparing exposure of the bankrupt Wilson administration, it was the speech of a great thinker. In its close touch with the warm, pulsating desires of us Americans it betrayed the man of the people. In its wide grasp of the staggering problems of war and peace it disclosed the man of affairs.

In Hughes's reply we miss some of the tropical undergrowth of Wilsonian rhetoric, but we are thereby betrayed into no pitfalls. The ground is firm beneath our feet. The words of Hughes lack those fairy Wilsonian pictures, and they lack the Wilsonian mirages which these last four years have undermined our faith in words.

Hughes promises us a clean sweep in the administration of our affairs at home and abroad. He promises us peace, honor, military and industrial preparedness, efficiency in government, a firm policy in Mexico, discharge of our obligations in the Philippines; a rounded neutral programme upon which to unite our composite nation in pure Americanism. No one of these desirable things do we possess now.

Will he perform as he promises? We judge him by his record as our governor. His word was his deed. The Democrats by word or solemn pledge in their party platform

promised us internal harmony, honor abroad, industrial and military preparedness, efficiency in government, a programme to unite us in Americanism. No one of these promises has been redeemed. Shall we turn to him who in the past has performed what he has promised or to him who has constantly promised what he never performed?

Terrible is Hughes's picture of the record for which the Democratic party must answer. They must answer for the withdrawal of our ambassadors from Latin-American countries, like Santo Domingo, to make way for "deserving Democrats." They must answer for Bryan and Daniels in the cabinet, for the withdrawal of Herrick from France and Henry Wilson from Mexico, for the strange adventures of John Lind as our representative with Huerta and William Bayard Hale at the court of Villa.

The Democratic party must answer for the fiascos at Tampico and Vera Cruz and—because their policy could not avoid war—for the tragedies at Columbus and Carrizal. They will answer for the nameless scores of American men and women insulted, robbed and outraged.

The Democrats will answer at the polls for the vacillation and weakness of our policy toward Germany, a policy that cost us the lives on the Lusitania, Arabic and Ancona before the President would heed the nation's mandate and speak.

The Democrats will answer for the vacuity of our correspondence with England, a correspondence so fatuous that to-day we are committed to acquiescence in the abolition of freedom of the mails, acquiescence in a blockade which we have diplomatically described as "in-

effective, illegal and indefensible," acquiescence in an orgy of British censorship of our telegrams, letters, freight shipments—nay, our individual commercial lives—all for the purpose of enforcing that blockade.

The Democrats will answer for the inanities of their preparedness policy. They will explain the President's academic assurances of our safety in December, 1914; his wild call to arms a year later, his gathering of Garrison's volunteer army and his subservient abandonment of the plan and Garrison too. They must answer for the menace in the painful revelations of our national guard, upon which they chose to depend.

But the Hughes address was not a mere clearing of the wreck of Democratic administration. He designs the building that is to take its place. Last week Vance McCormick, chairman of the Democratic national committee, issued this challenge:

Let them who are out and who want to get in tell what they would have done if they had been in the President's place.

Mr. McCormick has his wish. If he will read Mr. Hughes' speech he will learn what Hughes would have done at each juncture of Wilson's breakdown. Further, he will read what Hughes proposes to do in the future. He will protect our citizens and property on land and sea, at home and abroad. He will have us perform our function as guardians of international law. He will use the protective tariff policy to further industry, attain economic independence and shield American workmen from the over-competition of an enervated Europe after the war. He will have a merchant marine by government aid, not by government

competition. This is only to encourage Mr. McCormick to read the address. It is full of meat.—*Aug. 2, 1916.*

THE DEMOCRATIC ANSWER TO MR. HUGHES'S ACCEPTANCE SPEECH

On Saturday Senator Lewis of Illinois undertook to answer Mr. Hughes's scathing arraignment of the Democratic administration in its Mexican policy. On August 3 Senator Lewis conferred with the President and announced that on the following day he would answer the charges in Mr. Hughes's speech. The Lewis answer in the Senate was to be the answer of the administration, as was indicated by the dispatches from Washington; for example, this to the *New York World*, dated August 3:

Senator Lewis had a long talk with the President to-day, and it is expected that his remarks will be regarded as voicing the sentiments of the White House. He will address himself particularly to the Mexican situation.

There was a solemnity in the form and matter of Senator Lewis's oration which mirrored the high responsibility he felt. In the *Congressional Record* his words bear the caption: "Reply to Mr. Hughes's Acceptance Address." All in all, what Senator Lewis said must be taken very seriously indeed. It deserves the widest circulation. Washington papers indicated that the speech would be sent over the country by the Democratic campaign committee. If the Democratic campaign committee by any chance omits this patriotic duty the Republican campaign committee should perform it.

Mr. Hughes charged the government with deserting Americans with property interests in Mexico and denied that the Democrats could meet the charge by villifying the persons they had refused to protect. Read Senator Lewis's eulogy of Americans who went down to help develop Mexico:

The mining buccaneers of the mountains, the land pirates of the plains, pillagers of the peons, oppressors of liberty, despoilers of homes, murderers of justice, come all of you; at last there is found for you a house in which ye are worshiped as gods and at whose altars the innocents are to be sacrificed for you to make an election holiday. It is your father's house—the Republican party, and there you shall burn incense to the worship of despots and despoilers, the new high priests of modern republicanism, headed now by the newly appointed chief of this political hierarchy—nominee of a Republican convention for President of the United States—Charles Evans Hughes.

The "mining buccaneers" are the American copper companies who opened mines in Mexico and took the wretched peons away from land slavery, paid them the wages of free men, established towns with schools to educate their children, and paid taxes to the Mexican government—when there was one and when there was not. Among the "land pirates of the plains" are American oil companies that took tens of thousands of Mexican laborers, paid them nearly as many dollars as they had earned in cents before, made Mexican merchants prosperous by the trade of the enriched workmen, created modern towns in the wilderness. Ask the Mexicans who have had opportunity to work for these American malefactors. These Mexicans will tell you that the American "oppressors of liberty" brought them the only freedom they ever

knew—the freedom to work and prosper. They would tell that the only freedom taken away from them was the freedom to starve.

Senator Lewis then turns to the question of Huerta vs. Villa. He justifies the repudiation of Huerta on moral grounds. He then proceeds to denounce the Republican Senators for being unwilling to support the President in his championing of Villa. Had Congress only unitedly stood with the President for Villa, all would have been well.

Every encouragement (to Villa) that could be given without the violation of our duty was afforded. The object of the United States was to keep the hands of power off of Mexico; let it work out its own destiny through the agencies of its own creation, as was the process of the government of republics. Villa was not acquiesced in by all of Mexico. He was opposed in his own land. Frustrated by those whose assumption of control he sought to dispute, and which he claimed had for its object the robbing of the poor, for whom he spoke, the ruling classes of Mexico and certain business interests all combined against him—under what righteous claim I know not. But this I do know, that had the leaders of the Republican party in Congress given to the Democratic President support in this foreign policy and announced that as the President had recognized Villa as a test and trial to bring forth through him order, and had they demanded united obedience in America to this effort of the President as one from the highest authority and from the only authority that was vested with privilege of deciding the question, there would have been a different result from what ensued. Mexico would have seen that all the United States was behind the President.

In so far as the Republican Senators prevented a closer alliance with the infamous Villa, it is a record of which they may well be proud, and upon which their party may safely stand, in November.

The peroration of Senator Lewis's speech was a true climax:

Sir, there, too, stands Mexico. As she has been, so shall she remain, the stepdaughter of our republic. Though prostrate by oppression, stripped by her despoilers, and profaned by her ravishers, she shall still be the charge and the care of her protecting mother. We take her by the hand, we bring her to her feet, bid her take new hope to the days when through our aid, through the encouragement of civilization, by the agency of humanity and through the sanctity of religion, she shall inherit freedom as her state, liberty as her justice, and to her children transmit the blessing of a free country, living under a constitution guaranteeing the freedom of press, the freedom of man, the freedom of worship. Upon these she will build anew to the splendor of her future, and be welcomed in the family of nations as a republic purified through sacrifice and through the aid and friendship of the United States to be at peace with her children and sovereign of her nation.

Mexico, prostrate, despoiled, stripped, profaned and ravished, may well wish that her "protecting mother" would be off and her place taken by some good Samaritan who would help her defend herself against the alternating sets of bandits who prostrate, despoil, strip, profane and ravish her.

Senator Lewis has presented a strange case for his Democratic clients. His case is to arraign the American property owners who have been developing Mexican resources and dared asked protection from bandits in a country whose government, broken down by our opposition to Huerta, could give no protection. His case is to extol the Democratic liaison with Villa and glorify the pacific patience of a "protecting mother" before whose eyes her beloved stepdaughter, Mex-

ico, was repeatedly outraged.—August 9, 1916.

THE PRESIDENT'S CATASTROPHE

The President now has the country in a mess from which he offers extrication by passage of a law forcing the railroads to accept precisely what they have refused: the President's own individual settlement of the railroad dispute.

Let every one keep the facts clear in mind. When the President called the brotherhoods and the railroad managers to Washington the brotherhoods were asking to have their normal working day reduced from ten to eight hours, with no reduction in pay. They were asking for one and one-half times their regular hourly pay when they work over eight hours. The railroads refused these demands and in return demanded that the men no longer—as at present—get a full day's pay, no matter how few hours they may be in service.

The railroads came to Washington offering to submit all demands to arbitration, or even to withdraw their demands and submit to the decision of an arbitration board regarding the men's demands alone.

The men came to Washington announcing that they would accept no arbitration of the main issue: their desire for ten hours' pay for eight hours' work. Their frankly avowed reason was that they had not fared satisfactorily, to themselves, in past arbitrations.

The President says that it was then impossible for him to get arbitration. He never tried. With no hesitation or investigation, follow-

ing no counsel but his own, he asked the men to accept ten hours' pay for eight hours' work and arbitrate the question of 150 per cent. pay for all work over eight hours. Of course, they accepted; he offered them 95 per cent. of their demands. The great weight of his office was thrown in one side of the scale. That was his injustice to the railroads.

He told the railroads, if they would yield to this 95 per cent. of the men's demands, that he would use his influence to get them a raise in freight rates; that is, he offered to pay with at least \$50,000,000 of our money for the daily two hours of work which the men refuse to perform for present pay. That was the President's injustice to us, the public. We were given no chance to be heard.

The railroads refused the offer. They feared the ramifications of the eight-hour day; they clung to the principle of arbitration, the granting of labor's demands because of investigation, not because of the mere threat of force. They feared that shippers would not submit to a \$50,000,000 rate increase.

Fortified by the President's alliance, by his announcement that it was useless to try for arbitration, the 640 brotherhood chairmen hurried home, with strike orders in their pockets, dated September 4.

Mr. Wilson goes to Congress. He appears as an advocate of the brotherhoods. He forecasts a successful strike:

The freight service throughout the United States must stand still until their (the men's) places are filled; if, indeed, it should prove possible to fill them at all.

He says that the railroad managers had rejected his counsel.

In the face of what I cannot but regard as a practical certainty that *they will be ultimately obliged to accept the eight-hour day by the concerted action of organized labor* backed by the favorable judgment of society.

In other words, he says to the men, "Go ahead, we are all with you." It is a bold assurance for the President to give.

So the President asks Congress for legislation. He protests that the principle of arbitration of industrial disputes is dear to him; he will yield to no one in championing it. But he does not ask a law forbidding this strike until an investigation occurs. The law is to so suspend future strikes. This law is to grant what the men refuse to submit to the orderly process which the President loves. The law is to establish the eight-hour day, with ten-hour pay, for trainmen. It is to provide two more extra interstate commerce commissioners. It is to recommend an increase in railroad freight rates to meet the extra cost to the railroads. That comes out of us.

If Congress passes that law there will be no strike. The men will have what they demand. The railroads must take the dose and send us the bill. If Congress passes that law it will be to help extricate the country from an abyss into which it was plunged by a President who refused to lift one finger on behalf of the arbitration principle that he so beautifully commends, a President who sided, and still sides, with those who substitute for that principle the law of brute force.—
Aug. 30, 1916.

LONG LIVE FORCE!

Now that Congress is being entreated to enforce by legislation the President's private settlement of the railroad dispute, it is important to carry in mind the outstanding facts of the case.

When the matter first reached the President there were three parties to the controversy: men, railroads, public. There was a specific solution that would best serve the interest of each party.

The selfish interest of the men would be best served by granting their demands: the main demand of ten hours' pay for eight hours' work and the incidental demand of time and one-half pay for overtime hours.

The selfish interest of the railroads would be best served by flatly rejecting the men's demands. The main demand meant a 25 per cent. wage increase on the railroads; the incidental demand, also granted, would increase railroad wages 30 per cent. instead of 25 per cent.

The men number 400,000. Railroad stockholders are said to number 600,000. But the third party before the President, THE PUBLIC, numbers 99,000,000.

If all men are equal before the law and the President, this public deserved ninety-nine times the consideration given to railroads and men together.

See what consideration the public got!

Public interest demanded an investigation, a full presentation of the facts before the men's demands were either granted or refused, for the public had to pay the bill in higher freight rates if these demands were granted.

The President was free to represent any one of these interests. Common justice would have urged him to champion the public, for its demands were neither for nor against the men; it merely asked an orderly investigation as to why it should pay the \$50,000,000 bill. It never disputed the possible justice of the bill. It merely objected to having the bill collected at the point of the gun.

The President championed the men and tried to force the roads to grant outright the men's demands of an eight-hour day, ten hours' pay, with arbitration of the incidental demand regarding overtime. The railroads got no consideration. The public got none. Mr. Wilson implied that the public or "society" favored an eight-hour day for the men and was willing to pay for it.

Now he knows better. Now he says he is the staunchest possible advocate of arbitration—in theory—but it was impossible to have it in this case.

Impossible? Why? Impossible, he says, because the men said they would not accept it. But in the same sense the eight-hour day was "impossible," for the railroads refused to accept it without a hearing. Yet the President set out to attain the eight-hour day by aligning himself with the men. Why not set out to obtain arbitration, investigation of the case, before a strike could be declared?

That would have been taking the public's side. The men would not have dared to refuse to bring their case to court if the President had yielded to the nation's voice and demanded that they do so.

The President's partisanship has in effect told the men to go ahead

and strike rather than submit to arbitration their demand for an eight-hour day, ten hours' pay. Congress is asked to legislate upon the public the cost of this innovation in order to save a perfectly needless situation created by the President himself.

We are to pay \$50,000,000 so that Mr. Wilson may have the glory of settling a strike which he himself declared, and so that he may have \$50,000,00 to hand over to the four voting brotherhoods. Isn't that a rather large campaign fund to levy on us 99,000,000?

Worse than that is the principle of the thing. The men are taught that brute force, threats, are the ways to attain their ends. Idly the President talks of enacting legislation to make future strikes less likely by forcing railroad employees to submit their cause to investigation before stopping work.

The brotherhoods indignantly denounce any such clause in the proposed law. Of course. They have found a better way to get what they want. Other labor will not be slow to learn. The principle is: get your rights, not by negotiation and arbitration, but by threatening the country with starvation or industrial paralysis. Then proceed to a panic-stricken President seeking reelection. He will fix it up for you; if not by personal mediation, then by mandatory legislation.—*Sept. 1, 1916.*

MR. WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY

We have before us Mr. Wilson's acceptance speech. It is the record and the platform upon which he

and his party will go through the country. Mr. Wilson's words are so fair, so musical, that they invite the senses to slumber. But the country is not ready for slumber. It was never more intent in keeping awake. So to-day we look beyond the music of the words to their meaning, check professions with performance.

Particularly emphasis is laid in the acceptance speech upon the Democratic record in foreign policy, in its dealings with Mexico and Europe. In the dealings with European powers the President's policy has been, he says:

That property rights can be vindicated by claims for damages and no modern nation can refuse to arbitrate such claims; but the fundamental rights of humanity cannot be. The loss of life is irreparable.

In the first place, Mr. Wilson has not lived up to this principle. Germany destroyed American lives for a year with total impunity. Read the record: *Lusitania, Falaba, Gulfight, Arabic, Ancona, Sussex*. That loss of life was more than irreparable; it was preventable. When the submarine campaign was announced in February, 1915, it was clear to all, including even the administration, what would happen. The administration wrote a "strict accountability" note to Germany. It then politely suggested that Germany renounce the proposed submarine warfare and that England cease her attempt to starve Germany by illegally stopping our exports of foodstuffs; for it was against this stoppage that the German submarine warfare was a retaliation.

Nothing could have been more weakly silly and sentimental and

academic than to "suggest" that these two nations, fighting like mad dogs, should each release what it though was a death grip on its enemy. The point was that these illegal acts both interfered with our plain and undisputed rights. Neither belligerent would, for the sake merely of a melodious diplomatic note, cease pursuing his own ends simply because such pursuit violated our rights. Germany and England had to be shown that they would suffer if they did not regard us.

Any strong man in the White House would not have suggested *but enforced* that joint observation of our rights. He would have enforced it by the very means that were then in our hands, and which we have finally been driven to use a threat of war with Germany, a threat of a retaliatory embargo on exports to England.

But before Mr. Wilson indicated action to Germany a year had passed and nearly two hundred Americans were drowned on the high seas. After a year and a half Congress seems to have forced from the unwilling executive consideration of the use of an embargo against Great Britain. In the meantime markets in neutral countries have been permanently lost to us. Former buyers of our merchandise in Europe have been driven to find other sources of supply or to devise substitutes for our products. Germany's future foreign trade with us will never reach the old mark by tens of millions of dollars. Germany has developed substitutes for what she used to buy—peaceful goods like wheat, lard, lumber, agricultural implements, which she had a perfect right—un-

der international law—to buy from us. She and all other countries oversea will, when the war is over, be forced to make themselves independent of us. No customers dare depend on a merchant who, when an emergency arises, refuses, at the dictation of a rival customer, to supply him.

All this shows that Wilson's dictum is not true. There are property losses which are "irreparable." It is because they are irreparable that an indignant business world and an indignant Congress are forcing into the President's hands the weapons of embargo and the refusal of clearance to British ships that discriminate against "black-listed" American citizens.

Mr. Wilson continues in his speech:

Neither can direct violations of a nation's sovereignty await vindication in suits for damages. The nation that violates those essential rights must be expected to be checked and called to account by direct challenge and resistance.

Mr. Wilson tries to say that such action will be defending the nation's sovereign rights. Sovereign rights of whom, for what? Why, sovereign rights of American citizens to maintain and develop their trade at home and abroad, free from dictation by any foreign power.

Any tardy defense of the nation's sovereign rights will seem ludicrous from an administration which has maintained two novel foreign trade advisers attached to its State department. The function of these has been to sit in Washington and act as a clearing house between American exporters and the British embassy there. The foreign trade advisers present to the British embassy the request of American ex-

porters for permission to carry on their normal trade with neutral countries of the world. The foreign trade advisers, who still exist, then hand back to American exporters the ruling of this foreign agency.

National sovereignty!—Sept. 4, 1916.

MR. WILSON AND MEXICO

The major part of Mr. Wilson's acceptance speech was devoted—and properly—to the defense of his Mexican policy. It is perhaps wrong to speak of the administration's Mexican policy, for the word policy implies the recognition of some end to be accomplished and the definite shaping of our course toward that end. In this sense we have had no policy.

The President still refuses to face the plain facts of the case: That Mexico's one need is law and order; that it will take a strong man, not the schoolmaster Carranza, to establish law and order; and that to-day matters are so bad that not even a strong man can accomplish the task without our active aid.

Mexico is harried by alternate sets of bandits who steal the fruits of human toil in agriculture and industry. Mr. Wilson sees in the whole process the struggle of a noble race toward liberty,

for it is their emancipation they are seeking—blindly, it may be, but with profound and passionate purpose and with unquestionable right, apply what true American principle you will.

All that the vast majority of the ignorant population of Mexico are seeking is the chance to support themselves, to earn a living. They have no inner compulsion that drives

them to seek liberty, representative government, cabinets and election. Few of them can read or write; still fewer can think the deep thoughts that President Wilson attributes to them. Experience is rapidly teaching them that the way to acquire a living is to join a marauding band, not raise corn or coffee for the marauders to steal.

Mexico needs, first, order. Second, it needs capital. To develop its oil fields, its copper and gold mines, capital in the form of machinery must come in from abroad, primarily from the United States. Mexicans will be profitably employed as men, foremen and managers. Most of the earnings of enterprise are paid to labor. Most of the advantages of these developments would stay in Mexico. Mexicans would have capital and use it both to establish new enterprises and to buy back from Americans control of their companies.

Eventually Mexico should be able to pay back the debt it owes us, just as we are now completing the process of paying back our indebtedness to England. But without the help of British capital our country would be twenty years behind its present development. The only hope for an impoverished country like Mexico is to attract capital from abroad. It is magnificent business for Mexico when it need send to the United States only 8 to 10 cents on every dollar that American capital earns, while 90 or 92 cents stays in Mexico.

It is not the United States, but Mexico itself, that needs to have investments in Mexico protected. It is the Mexican people who suffer otherwise. Hear Mr. Wilson:

I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men and pitiful women and children than in any property rights whatever.

So is everybody. But the oppression of pitiful men, women and children is not a political one; it is an economic oppression that consists in the abolition of property rights in Mexico—the property rights of Mexicans to enjoy the little they have produced, and the abolition of the rights of American enterprise that wants to employ the Mexicans and give them more.

Men do not think of liberty until they are clad, housed, fed and educated. Such is the soil where liberty grows; it does not grow in a land plowed with the hoofs of cavalry, sown with bullets, watered with fraternal blood and harvested by death.

To talk of the fortunes of Mexican men, women and children as being at odds with property rights is to play with words, to deceive and mislead those whom a President of the United States should guide and instruct. Contrast Cuba and Mexico, and the contrast measures the gulf that lies between this administration's opportunity and its performance. In Cuba, men, women and children, all who will, work; the whole land grows rich before our eyes. Liberty, law and order reign, property rights flourish. In Mexico, we see a nation infinitely richer in its possibilities than Cuba, but a land where men, women and children, property rights, liberty, law and order are all cast into one great furnace of pillage, bloodshed and crime.

Mr. Wilson made one profound observation:

Mistakes I have no doubt made in this perplexing business.

No doubt.

The country will weigh in the balance what the Republican party under Mr. McKinley's leadership did for Cuba, with what the Democratic party under Mr. Wilson's leadership has done for Mexico, and render its judgment on the result.—*Sept. 5, 1916.*

THE DIFFERENCE

"Show me the way that is right," said Mr. Hughes to his Nashville audience, "and I will take it, but I won't take any way that I do not know anything about."

Level-headed words. They forecast the end of the "watchful waiting" era in our government at Washington. After March 4 next we are going to look before we leap; we are going to know what we are doing before we try to do it; we are going to proceed on established facts, not on theories.

"Show me the way that is right and I will take it!"—has any one heard such an utterance from Washington the past four years?

What a relief to the country it will be to have as President next year a man who is willing to be shown the way, who will not write notes until he is sure of his ground, or decide great wage disputes until he has heard both sides!—*Sept. 7, 1916.*

THE POLICY OF NOT SETTLING ANYTHING

I.

Nothing is so striking in the record of the present administration

as the ineffective manner in which it meets crises. When a crisis arises, the administration, in the most perfect form, announces the high principles that apply. It then proceeds to abandon those principles and substitute some expedient which does not settle the issue permanently, but only postpones and makes more difficult the settlement of the issue when it must be met and can be no longer evaded. Examples crowd to the mind, both in foreign and domestic affairs.

The German issue. When Germany announced her submarine campaign in February, 1915, the administration saw the inevitable slaughter of American citizens and wrote Germany the "strict accountability" note. That was a polite statement of the principle, though the German government noted that since the war opened we had held no one to strict accountability for violating our rights. It assumed we were still fooling. We were. The State department then adopted a miserable expedient of note writing, while for a year the German outrages went on. But the principle could not be downed. The issue had to be met. It was met in February, 1916, by an attitude that showed we meant business, which would have settled the question a year earlier.

Great Britain. In August, 1914, Great Britain issued its first order in council, unlawfully abolishing our trade with Germany and hampering our trade with European neutrals. We began our academic protests in October, 1914, and they continue to date. Feeling her way carefully along, Great Britain has extended her measures until American meat packers and oil pro-

ducers have submitted their entire foreign trade to the dictation of England, which now operates a blacklist that forbids American citizens even to trade with each other, and which opens our business letters to Holland and Scandinavia, and destroys them after tabulating their contents for the benefit of British trade. But the principle would not down. It had to be met. Now, two years after the issue arose, Congress is forcing into the President's hands the weapons of embargo and refusal of clearance for vessels that observe the British blacklist. But the situation is infinitely harder to meet now. Great Britain feels she has acquired—through our inactive acquiescence—a sort of vested right to dominate the internal and external affairs of every neutral country in the world.

The time to meet issues is when they arise. The time to stop wrongdoing is when it begins.

The great achievement of Theodore Roosevelt is that he performed the herculean task of unscrambling the mess of abuses in American corporate life which his timid predecessors had allowed to grow up. The achievement of Woodrow Wilson is that he has, by his timid, sidelong policies, created a vast tangle of vested rights to do wrong. He has torn down the structure of international law designed to protect the rights of neutrals in wartime, a structure which grew up through the centuries and which it will take long, long years to reconstruct.—*Sept. 8, 1916.*

II.

Mr. Wilson met our great issues with Germany and England not di-

rectly, but by evasion. The principles at stake, however, pressed for settlement. After a year of mere expediency in policy, the German issue was at last met. After two years of mere expediency in policy, the British issue is now to be met. And in the Mexican affair, the same fatal fault inheres in the present administration.

In the case of Mexico, the principle at stake was the protection of American lives and property from Mexican outrages, both here and in Mexico. After Theodore Roosevelt's speech in Portland, every mind recalls freshly the miserable vacillations in our Mexican policy, a ceaseless attempt to evade the issue. We recall the insult to the flag at Tampico; the hare-brained expedition to Vera Cruz, which accomplished nothing; the desertion of American citizens at Tampico to the protection of German and British cruisers; the administration's feud against the "unspeakable" Huerta; its championing of the unspeakable Villa; the massacre at Columbus; the futile *penetration pacifique* of Mexico with its climax at Carrizal. We should think with amusement—if it were not so tragic—of the present conferences at New London between representatives of the United States and of one of the warring factions at Mexico, a faction with whom we have been at war; and whose soldiers join merrily in the diversion of raiding American towns and ambushing American cavalry troops.

But the real issue will not let itself be obscured. Neither the wretched Mexican people nor the Americans who have staked lives and property down there can be saved except by a strong govern-

ment. To-day a strong government without our active support is unthinkable. Mr. Wilson deposed a strong man, Huerta, who came to the throne by revolution, the established path to power in such countries. Mr. Wilson has refused to help the Mexicans get a substitute for what he took away from them. In the meantime he justifies his plain neglect of duty by describing the feuds of bandit chiefs who harry Mexico as a passionate striving of the Mexican people for freedom. What they passionately long for is law and order, which Mr. Wilson has done much to take away from them, and which he refuses to help restore to them.

Nothing is ever settled by this administration. For nearly four years President Wilson has muddled through the Mexican situation, and no one of the plain duties confronting us has been performed. Mexico suffers a reign of terror. We have the whole national guard on the border and the whole army in Mexico to discourage bandits to whom experience has taught the value of American soil as a happy hunting ground. Neither Americans nor Mexicans can resume their peaceful lives in Mexico. America's protection of its citizens is a joke in all the world. As for the aid we are rendering our "sister republic," other Latin-American countries will want little such aid. —Sept. 9, 1916.

III.

The fatal flaw in the record of this administration is that it never meets squarely any great issue when it arises. The policy is to temporize with wrongdoing until wrongdoers

think they have a vested right to do wrong. To stop them then requires ten times the effort which would have controlled them at the beginning.

So with Germany. After allowing her for a year to pursue an acknowledged course of wrongdoing, it required a practical declaration of war to recover our rights. So with England. After two years of our tolerance of her illegal blockades, mail seizures, blacklists, she is as much outraged at our prospective retaliation as she would be at an attack on some acknowledged property right. Four years of shiftless handling of the Mexican situation find us in complete confusion of purpose, conferring with an impotent bandit chief as to the right of our soldiers to patrol his territory and the right of his soldiers to go marauding in ours.

It is just so with a great domestic issue that presented itself last month and has been met by the same evasion, which does not settle but merely postpones. The railroad brotherhoods and their employers had a difference. The men wanted a wage increase, to be borne by the public. The railroads did not want to grant the wage increase out of fear they could not raise their rates and pass it on to the public, for the wage increase would cost \$50,000,000. Every consideration of justice to the public, every regard for industrial peace in the future, required that the matter should be investigated before the burden was laid on us. The President had in his own hands the power to direct the course of events. Men and managers appeared before him. He could have thrown his influence toward granting the men's demands, toward refusing them or toward

holding up the matter for investigation as the basis of action.

The country will not soon forget what the President did. He yielded to the brotherhoods' threat of force and then, because the railroads would not accept the solution of surrender that he proposed, he went to Congress, infused it with his own terror and rushed through a bill forcing the wage increase on the railroads and so—in the end—on the public. Congress in effect passed a revenue bill levying a tax of \$50,000,000 on shippers of the country, to be paid into the brotherhoods' treasury.

The men's demands may be right. But this hold-up method of enforcing them is utterly and unspeakably wrong. Arbitration, or at least investigation before the use of force, is the solution of the strife between capital and labor. If we are not to have orderly co-operation between these parties, the alternative is industrial, then civil, war. The weight which Mr. Wilson thus cast into the wrong scale is the greatest of all the injuries he has done his country. Some day the principle of law and order must be championed and upheld over the law of force. The present surrender of the President to the law of force makes infinitely more difficult the final triumph of the right.—*Sept. 11, 1916.*

THE BARGAIN

A straw shows how the wind blows. The railroad brotherhoods have set up a large-sized weather-vane.

When the President forced Congress to surrender \$50,000,000 of the country's money to the four

railroad brotherhoods, he suggested that, for the future, the legislators should provide for arbitration to supplant force. The brotherhoods would have none of this. The matter was dropped by Washington.

The President now thinks that the next session of Congress should take up the problem and legislate compulsory investigation if not compulsory arbitration. The brotherhoods are ready for the fray.

They have sent their members each a copy of the hearings on the eight-hour bill, the congressional debates upon it and the recorded vote of representatives and senators. Also the following exhortation:

We believe the time has arrived when labor should know who is friendly to its interests and who is not. *Important legislation will take place in the next session of Congress.* It is important to you that men be elected who are friendly to you.

A Democratic Congress performed its share of a bargain. The brotherhoods are now to perform their share. In the meantime the country will ponder the wisdom of re-electing congressmen who, for the sake of 400,000 pledged votes, deserted the nation and surrendered the principle of orderly judicial process to the principle of force.—*Sept. 19, 1916.*

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